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## Syndicate 3: Haiti

### Background to the Conflict in Haiti

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### HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

#### THE EARLY YEARS

The island which today is divided into Haiti and the Dominican Republic was once inhabited by Taino and Arawak Indians who referred to their land as Ayiti — “Mountainous land.” Christopher Columbus arrived on the island in 1492 and named it “La Isla Española,” later shortened to Hispaniola. The Indian population was soon decimated to the point of near extinction through hard labour and European diseases. By the beginning of the sixteenth century the first slaves from Africa began to arrive on Hispaniola. Spanish control of the colony lasted till 1697, when the Treaty of Ryswick divided the island into French-controlled St. Domingue (now Haiti) and Spanish-controlled Santo Domingo (now the Dominican Republic).

#### INDEPENDENCE

Influenced by the revolutionary ideas from France and America the slaves defeated the French troops and declared independence on 1 January 1804. Being the first independent black state Haiti faced enormous opposition from the international community. The colonial states, often relying heavily upon the inexpensive labour from their own slaves, feared the Haiti precedent. By isolating the new state they hoped that these ideas would not spread any

further. Haiti became an international pariah. During the revolutionary years Haiti's plantation system had been nearly destroyed and the economy had collapsed.

### THE U.S. OCCUPATION

In 1915 U.S. marines invaded Haiti, for reasons that have never been clearly established. The 19-year U.S. occupation had considerable impact on the Haitian state and its population: the infrastructure was improved, a modern army was created and the government was centralised and thereby made more efficient. The occupation however reinforced the class divisions in that the Americans granted the mulattos political power over the blacks.

### DUVALIERISM

Historically a balance of power had been maintained between the army and the trading mulatto elite. Following the U.S. departure in 1934 the fairly professionalised army slowly began to deteriorate, affected by the political turmoil. Its weakening, coupled with growing popular tension, eventually led to an election, widely considered to be rigged, which paved the way for Francois, "Papa Doc", Duvalier's rise to power. When he took office 1957 a new political power emerged: the Duvalierists. In 1964 Francois Duvalier declared himself president for life.

Jean-Claude, "Baby Doc," Duvalier succeeded his father after the latter's death in his office in 1971. Only 19 years old, Jean-Claude continued his father's rule although not quite as efficiently nor as violently. "Papa Doc's" rise to power in 1957 had been largely a response to the rule of the mulatto elite and the U.S.-trained armed forces. During Duvalierism the political power of the mulattos waned, and was instead vested in the black leadership, while the mulattos devoted themselves to commerce in all its forms.

Growing popular opposition and international pressure were two major factors contributing to the overthrow of Jean-Claude Duvalier in 1986. Although the Duvalier era was over, the heritage of oppression and violence would prove more enduring.

### POLITICAL TURMOIL 1986-1991

During the period following Jean-Claude Duvalier's involuntary exile in the south of France the Haitian people experienced five different regimes in as many years. Under the Aristide Government several reforms were initiated. Senior military officers were retired, the position of section chiefs, appointed by the military to control the population in their respective districts, was abolished and numerous judges and prosecutors had to resign.

Opposition to the new Government grew from the military and the business elite. In keeping with the country's long and bloody tradition Aristide was overthrown in a coup

d'état on 30 September 1991 and forced into exile. Lieutenant-General Raoul Cédras became the new, unconstitutional, leader.

## INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT

### FROM NEGOTIATIONS TO ENFORCEMENT

In January 1993 Aristide wrote identically to the Secretaries-General of the United Nations and the OAS. He requested, *inter alia*, the following measures; 1) deployment of a joint United Nations and OAS international mission to monitor respect for human rights and 2) establishment of a dialogue between the Haitian parties under the supervision of the Special Envoy to find a solution to the political crisis: reformation of Haitian institutions, including the judicial system, professionalisation of the armed forces and separation of the police from the armed forces.

On 20 April 1993 the General Assembly unanimously adopted Resolution 47/20B. This authorised UN participation, jointly with the OAS, in the International Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH). Despite international efforts the situation in Haiti did not improve. The OAS embargo was not sufficiently effective since it was not universal: it bound only OAS member states. On 16 June 1993, as the situation in Haiti deteriorated, the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII, unanimously adopted resolution 841 establishing an oil and arms embargo and freezing all funds located in other states and controlled by the *de facto* authorities, to be effective from 23 June 1993 if there were no changes in the situation. According to the President of the Security Council these sanctions were warranted by the unique and exceptional situation in Haiti and should not be regarded as a precedent.

Faced with this threat General Cédras agreed to a dialogue.

The terror and oppression of the people led to a massive flow of refugees towards the shores of the United States. This was probably a principal reason for the increased U.S. involvement in the conflict. The much-criticised U.S. policy towards refugees from Haiti, gradually began to shift during 1994, largely in response to national protests.

Although the *de facto* authorities continued to challenge the Governor's Island Accord, the MICIVIH began their gradual build-up in the country as of January 1994. However, the situation grew worse and on 11 July the Mission was expelled from Haiti by the *de facto* authorities. The Security Council found that the current situation continued to be a threat to international peace and security, and authorised member states to establish a multinational force "to use all necessary means to facilitate the departure from Haiti of the military leadership, consistent with the Governor's Island Accord; the prompt return of the legitimately elected President and the restoration of the legitimate authorities of the Government of Haiti, and to establish and maintain a secure and stable environment that will permit the implementation of the Governor's Island Accord.

The Security Council has many options in responding to a conflict situation. The ultimate measure is the use of forcible measures decided under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The authorisation of the use of force requires that the Security Council “shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression.” The decisions taken by the Security Council under Chapter VII are mandatory. The establishment of an embargo may thus prove very effective.

In adopting Resolution 841, the Security Council found that the situation on Haiti threatened international peace and security. Leaving aside the matter of external aggression it has never been clearly established what kinds of situation justify authorisation by the Security Council of the use of force. Three aspects of the situation in Haiti, considered by the Security Council in Resolutions 841 and 940, may arguably have constituted a threat to international peace and security. Historically, two of them — gross human rights violations and a massive flow of refugees - have been found to come within the scope of Chapter VII.

#### THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE

Headed by the United States, the multinational force soon exceeded 20 000 troops. It had been foreseen that the top leaders of the Haitian Army, the “Forces Armées d’Haiti” (Fad’H), would depart but not that the army would collapse in a matter of days, leaving the country without any security force. Even though the Haitian Constitution states that the police and the military should be separate forces, the Fad’H functioned as both.

President Aristide returned and resumed his functions on 15 October. With his return, the Security Council lifted the sanctions against Haiti. On 30 January 1995 the Council adopted resolution 975 by which it determined that a secure and stable environment existed in Haiti. The Council urged the Haitian Government to establish an effective national police force and to improve the functioning of its judicial system, with the assistance of the UNMIH and the international community.

#### DISARMAMENT

Control of the weapons circulating in Haiti is of utmost importance to sustain the prevailing security situation. The multinational force lacked any specific mandate to undertake disarmament measures under Resolution 940. The mandate’s wording “the use of all necessary means,” however, gave the force considerable latitude. It engaged in disarming the Fad’H, it initiated a gun buy-back programme, confiscated weapons found in vehicles checked during routine stops, disarmed attachés and confiscated weapons caches.

With the collapse of the Fad’H the multinational force soon gained control of its heavy weapons. But disarming the FRAPH proved more difficult. Based on the widely-held assumption that FRAPH members hid their weapons from the multinational force, Haitians fear that the weapons will re-emerge once the UN departs.

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## THE UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN HAITI

On 31 March 1995 the UN operation, UNMIH, was deployed. The MNF's mandate had been revised and extended with the adoption of Resolution 940 to "assist the democratic Government of Haiti in fulfilling its responsibilities in connection with: (a) sustaining the secure and stable environment established during the multinational phase and protecting international personnel and key installations; and (b) the professionalisation of the Haitian armed forces and the creation of a separate police force." The military component consisted of 6017 troops and the civilian police of a force of 791. Approximately two thirds of the military component and one third of the civilian had served with the multinational force.

The UN mission in Haiti has been prolonged several times since its original deployment. It was renamed the United Nations Support Mission (UNSMIH), with a mandate to "assist the Government of Haiti in the professionalisation of the police and in the maintenance of a secure and stable environment conducive to the success of the current efforts to establish and train an effective national police force." The UNSMIH was later transformed into the United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH), mandated to "assist the Government of Haiti by supporting and contributing to the professionalisation of the Haitian National Police." The current UN mission scheduled to depart on 30 November 1998, is named the United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH) and should "continue to assist the Haitian Government by supporting and contributing to the professionalisation of the Haitian national police." Thus the UN mission in Haiti has gradually shifted from a mainly military operation to one focused on the creation of a competent national police force.

A major challenge for the international community and the Government of Haiti is to maintain and increase the sense of security felt by the majority of the people today, which is unprecedented in the history of Haiti. The creation of a national police force and the reformation of the judicial system are crucial in this respect. To achieve the necessary confidence in the Haitian National Police an effective judiciary is of utmost importance. These aspects are fundamental to the success of peace-building efforts by the UN and others. The presence of international forces has significantly contributed to the current level of security and, the fragile democracy will probably need substantial international support to counter threats likely to increase when the MIPONUH is withdrawn.

### LEGAL FRAMEWORK

Two of the most important sets of rules governing UN forces are the Status-of-Forces-Agreement (SOFA) and the Rules-of-Engagement (ROE). These legal instruments are briefly overviewed below. In the Haiti operation the mandate gave considerable latitude for the use of force in self-defence and the ROEs therefore became particularly robust. The UNMIH troops were authorised to use force to defend international personnel and protect key installations designated by the Force Commander.

## HAITIAN SOCIETY

### ECONOMIC REALITIES AND CLASS DIVISIONS

Haiti is without comparison the poorest country in the western hemisphere and one of the poorest in the world. Subject to a kleptocratic rule for decades, where the elite minority has siphoned off an incredible amount of money and thereby created enormous personal wealth, the majority of the Haitian people still live in extreme poverty. The impact of the 1991 OAS trade embargo on the Haitian people was disastrous. It struck hard on the poor who were not able to store basic necessities before prices rocketed.

Wages are among the lowest in the world. Before the embargo, average annual income in Haiti was \$360. Two years later it was \$205. This should be compared to average Latin American incomes which were ten times higher. It is estimated that Haiti lost nearly one hundred thousand jobs through the embargo. By the autumn of 1994 eighty percent of the people were out of work.

In this environment the Non-Governmental-Organisations (NGOs) have played a fundamental role. Ever since "Papa Doc's" rule NGOs have been present in Haiti. CARE began their first humanitarian feeding programme in 1959. In a land where the state was viewed as a predator by its citizens and did nothing to improve the situation for the poor, the NGOs became an important actor. However, the aid provided to Haiti through various channels also had the effect of consolidating the relationship between the ruling elite and the vast majority rather than enhancing the position of the poor.

In the early 1990s about one thousand international and indigenous NGOs were active in Haiti. Due to this wide range of organisations supplying humanitarian assistance and socioeconomic development programmes and replacing services from the state, Haiti has been described as a "Republic of NGOs." NGOs have provided emergency relief, goods, services and other efforts aiming at bringing fundamental change in social, economic and political areas. Other examples of NGOs active in Haiti are OXFAM and various church and missionary groups.

It is estimated that international NGOs have provided rudimentary services for 15 per cent of the population during the past few decades. The embargo also hampered the work of the NGOs causing a severe reduction in their aid programmes, and it actually enriched the *de facto* authorities. Through smuggling and control of the import of humanitarian relief the rulers consolidated their economic power.

Despite the years of oppressive rule and poverty faced by the majority of Haitians the most outstanding aspect of the Haitian national character "is a profound and composite feeling of national identity, pride, and self-confidence."

The voodoo cult has played a major role in daily life in Haiti. Drawn from various religions in Africa and brought to Haiti during colonisation it also incorporated parts of Catholicism when it met European culture. Voodoo exists throughout the Caribbean but has a special significance in Haiti. Although many Haitians deplore voodoo they cannot ignore its

existence. Accordingly it is held that “voodoo has more enemies in public and more friends in private than anything else in Haiti.”

Haiti has two official languages; Creole and French. Creole dominates, being spoken by practically everybody. Fewer than twenty percent speak French, although most education is conducted in French. The Creole language became official in 1987 when the new constitution was adopted.

The above aspects have clearly contributed to the class division in Haiti. The wealthy and educated minority living in the cities and working in various professions stands in marked contrast to the poor and illiterate majority. Haitian society is not really influenced by ethnic divisions: what really divide Haitians is “economics, language, education, religion, and ideological awareness.”

The Haitian people face enormous challenges in their efforts to create a stable democracy. Perhaps the most significant obstacle is the lack of institutional experience among the Haitian people. Being effectively precluded from obtaining government employment during the years of oppression the majority lack basic skills in this area. Lacking resources and adequate premises Haiti has been unable to benefit fully from the major international assistance offered to the troubled state.

## POLITICAL SITUATION

Presidential elections took place at the end of December 1995. Under the Constitution of Haiti, which does not permit two consecutive terms, Aristide could not be immediately re-elected. Many of his supporters and allies demanded that he remain in office to compensate for the three years in exile. Although he hesitated to hand over power he eventually stepped down under US pressure. Despite a low voter turn-out - some 30 percent - OAS and U.S. observers found the election to be free and fair. The new President, René Préval, a former Aristide adviser gained 87.9 per cent of the vote and became the second democratically elected President in the history of Haiti. He took office on 7 February 1996.

Political turmoil following disputes over the electoral process (less than 10 percent turnout in local-government and national senate elections on 6 April 1997) have hardened the positions between the main political parties. As of 31 October Haiti had lacked a fully operational government for four months. The Lavalas movement has split into two factions, the Fanmi Lavalas (FL) founded by former President Aristide, which have a majority in the lower house, and the Organisation Politique Lavalas (OPL) which currently dominates the Government. The political opposition is divided. Three issues are identified as vital for breaking the deadlock: the elections, economic reforms and the appointment of a new Prime Minister.

## RESOURCE MATERIALS AND NOTES

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OAS Doc. MRE/RES. 2/91, 8 October 1991. The OAS had a few months earlier approved the OAS Santiago Commitment to Democracy and Development and the Renewal of the Inter-American System (the so-called "Santiago declaration"). According to the Declaration any threat to the democracy in the OAS member states prompted the OAS to meet instantly to counter the threat.

A/Res/46/7, 11 October 1991.

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See A/47/908/, 24 March 1993.

S/Res/841 (1993). The freezing of assets belonging to the *de facto* authorities and its supporters did, however, not come into effect until May 1994 following the adoption of resolution 917 giving those subject to these provisions the time to take precautionary measures.

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Article 39 of the UN Charter.

See for example on Rhodesia S/Res/232, 1966, and on South Africa S/Res/418, 1977. Finding the situation in Haiti to be a threat to international peace and security on this ground, see W. Michael Reisman, "Haiti and the Validity of International Action", in the *American Journal of International Law* Vol. 89, 1995 pp. 82-84.

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## Syndicate 3: Haiti Syndicate Discussions

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The Syndicate consisted of the following members:

- *Briefer:* Captain Lief Ahlquist, Sweden.
- *Facilitator:* Jennifer Stewart, U.S.A.
- *Scribe:* Eugene Visco, U.S.A.
- *Participants:* Andrew Caldwell, United Kingdom; Arthur Durant, United Kingdom; Corey Lofdahl, Ph.D., U.S.A.; James Narel, U.S.A.; Edwin Pechous, U.S.A.; Kim Rawlings, United Kingdom.

This Syndicate was charged with using the recent Haitian troubles and the involvement of the UN and the US in the island nation as a device to generate ideas for a research agenda responding to needs of peace support operations. Experience and knowledge regarding the Haitian situation varied within the group, ranging from hands-on experience (e.g., Captain Ahlquist who spent considerable time with the UN elements in Haiti and is the editor and a major contributor to a case study on Haiti, Co-operation, Command and Control in UN Peace Support Operations, produced by the Swedish National Defence College in 1998), through more academic and vicarious experiences (e.g., Edwin Pechous's work with a computer model of national economic and social interactions in nations undergoing severe stress and turmoil) to essentially no knowledge other than information found in the public press.

### AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

To get the group exercise underway, Captain Ahlquist presented a historical perspective of the troubles and the interactions between the military and civil elements, drawn from his experience in Haiti. The following brief statements are derived from his presentation cited earlier. They are presented here to set the stage for the effort of the group in developing a framework for analysis leading to suggestions for a research agenda to answer questions on

the relations between military and civilian components involved in peace support operations. The terse history, covering only the more recent events, is intended to provide only the barest sketch of a nation in dire difficulties. To fully understand the nature of the Haitian situation one should know the history of the island and the nation. Captain Ahlquist's paper is recommended for those interested in a complete history of Haiti.

- *1957 to 1986*: Duvaliers, father and son, rulers of Haiti.
- *1986*: Jean-Claude Duvalier (the son, who succeeded the elder on his death) involuntarily exiled.
- *1986-1991*: Five different regimes in Haiti.
- *1990*: Father Jean-Bertrand Aristide, charismatic priest and advocate of the poor, elected president, with 67% of the vote.
- *1991*: Military coup d'État forced Aristide into exile; Lieutenant General Raoul CÈdras became unconstitutional leader.
- *1991*: Organization of American States and the United Nations condemned overthrow of constitutionally elected government; OAS instituted trade embargo on Haiti.
- *January 1993*: Aristide requested UN and OAS take action to monitor Haiti to ensure respect for human rights and to help open dialogues among the Haitian parties. Haitian government-in-being agreed to the proposals.
- *April 1993*: General Assembly unanimously adopted Resolution 47/20B, authorizing UN participation with OAS in International Civilian Mission in Haiti, with the mission of verifying respect for human rights in Haiti. About 430 persons were deployed to Haiti. Situation did not improve. OAS embargo not effective because it was not universal, binding only OAS members.
- *June 1993*: UN Security Council, under Chapter VII of the Charter, unanimously adopted Resolution 841, establishing oil and arms embargo and freezing Haitian funds located in other states. Pressure forced General CÈdras to the conference table.
- *July 1993*: Agreement (Governor's Island Accord) calling for return of Aristide, nomination of prime minister by Aristide, amnesty for those involved in the coup, modernization of the armed forces, and creation of new police force with international assistance.
- *September 1993*: Security Council adopted Resolution 867, establishing United Nations Mission in Haiti for six months to train and guide the armed forces and the new police force. UNMIH consisted of 567 police monitors and about 700 military personnel, mostly construction troops and including 60 trainers.

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- *October 1993*: Advance personnel, arriving on USS Harlan County, were met by armed civilians of the Front RÈvolutionnaire pour l'Avancement et le Progrès en Haiti. Violent demonstrations at the dock; the ship was prevented from landing. Further violence ensued throughout Haiti. Most of the UNMIH and MICIVIH personnel left. Agreement of July 1993 collapsed. Sanctions were re-imposed. Massive flow of refugees towards US forced a change in US policy regarding the Haitian situation.
  - *January 1994*: MICIVIH began build-up in Haiti. Situation worsened.
  - *July 1994*: MICIVIH expelled. Security Council Resolution 940 resulted: Haitian situation declared to be a threat to international peace and security and authorized member states to establish a multinational force "to use all necessary means to facilitate the departure from Haiti of the military leadership, consistent with the Governor's Island Accord; the prompt return of the legitimately elected President and the restoration of the legitimate authorities of the government of Haiti, and to establish and maintain a secure and stable environment that will permit the implementation of the Governor's Island Accord."
  - *September 1994*: Last minute attempt to prevent bloodshed; US mission, with former President Carter, Senator Sam Nunn and General Colin Powell, reached agreement with military government. US troops entered Haiti 19 September unopposed. Multinational force soon exceeded 20,000 soldiers. Interim Public Security Force began organization and training by the military as a stop-gap measure until UNMIH could deploy and train new police force.
  - *October 1994*: Amnesty legislation passed by Haitian Parliament; Aristide returned; Security Council lifted sanctions.
  - *January 1995*: Security Council adopted Resolution 975, declaring a secure and stable environment existed in Haiti. Multinational force began disarming the Haitian Army (Forces ArmÈes d'Haiti) through gun buy-back and confiscation projects. Disarming FRAPH was more difficult. UNMIH mandate did not include disarmament functions as mandate was based on Chapter VI which allows for the use of force only for self-defense.
  - *March 1995*: Multinational force officially replaced by UNMIH. Under Resolution 940, UNMIH was to "assist the democratic Government of Haiti in fulfilling its responsibilities in connection with: (a) sustaining the secure and stable environment established during the multinational phase and protecting international personnel and key installations; and (b) the professionalism of the Haitian armed forces and the creation of a separate police force." Military component consisted of 6017 troops and the civilian police of 791 persons; about two-thirds of the military component and one-third of the civilian component had served with the multinational force. Several time extensions have been made to the UN mission in Haiti. It was renamed the United Nations Support Mission in Haiti with a mandate to: "assist the Government of Haiti in professionalization of the police and in the maintenance of a secure and stable environment conducive to the success of the current efforts to

establish and train an effective national police force." UNSMIH later transformed into the United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti to "assist the Government of Haiti by supporting and contributing to the professionalization of the Haitian National Police." Finally, the mission was named the United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti to "continue to assist the Haitian Government by supporting and contributing to the professionalization of the Haitian national police." Thus the UN mission has gradually shifted from a mainly military operation to one focused on the creation of a competent national police force.

### **A FRAMEWORK FOR CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS**

The Haiti Syndicate began its deliberations, following the introductory history by Captain Ahlquist, by considering a framework relating three classes of civilian-military relations (military-police, military-human rights groups, and military-diplomats) to three phases of peace operations (intervention, stability, and transition to recovery). Each of the three classes of civilian-military relations has two levels of interactions: command and street level. The set of parameters can be viewed as a three by three by two matrix, thus containing 18 cells, not all of which required entries. For example, the military-police class during the intervention phase will have two levels of interest, the command level and the street level. Similarly with the other relations and phases. The framework allowed the group to focus on specific opportunities and challenges of civilian-military relations and a series of examples were discussed and argued.

It became clear that not all cells in the matrix were equally important; it also seemed likely that some cells may be non-existent or of trivial interest. For example, the relation 'military-human rights groups' might be of significance only at the street level or at least the importance of that relation at the command level might be quite insignificant. The analytic framework suggested by the matrix highlighted the criticality of "understanding" between the groups in the relationship. Most likely, the importance of each group understanding the culture of the other group in the relationship is greater at the street level than at the command level—at least, that is a hypothesis for further assessment. It also appears likely that the importance of the relationships changes over the phases of the operation. Generally, the military are dominant or more in a leadership role in the earlier phases than in the subsequent ones. Thus, the matrix framework offers an opportunity for a logical and comprehensive approach to the analysis of civilian-military interactions in peace support operations. However, the matrix framework would require more deliberate effort than could be provided during the group's exercise.

### **THE CIVILIAN ACTORS**

The next step was to examine more closely who the specific "actors" (civilian and military) were in the Haitian operation and what tasks the actors performed within the phases of the peace support operation. The civilian actors included UN agencies such as UNHCR, the Secretariat, and the Security Council; international service organizations, particularly human

rights organizations; government organizations including embassies, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund; non-governmental organizations including police training groups, humanitarian assistance groups and human rights groups; Haitian actors including police, judiciary, politicians, political parties, the private sector, the press, the church, and medical services; and the international press.

### THE MILITARY ACTORS

The military side consisted of the multi-national force and, at the outset, the Haitian Army. Interactions among the civilian and military groups were discussed to identify tasks and actions carried out by the representative groups. To an extent, selected cells of the earlier described matrix were used to identify tasks. Interactions between the civil police (embryo force) and the military included joint planning and protection provided by the military at the outset of operations. It was observed that the tasks changed over the phases of the operation. At the beginning, the police and the military operated from separate headquarters. Subsequently, a joint headquarters was organized, representing improved cooperation between the two groups. To provide protection, elements of the two groups patrolled in the same vehicles and covered the same patrol areas. Later, as security improved, separate vehicles were used, demonstrating improved capability on the part of the civilian police elements. Supplies and materiel, for example fuel for patrol cars, were provided by the military force.

### INTELLIGENCE SERVICES

Intelligence services were provided by the military, until the police force could develop its own relationships with the community. Intelligence was another function necessitating cooperation and collaboration between the civilian (police) and the military, with a changing relation over time. At the outset, the military were the principal providers of intelligence, resulting from the responsibility for patrolling and security. Later, as police personnel took on increasing responsibility for patrolling and local security, there was a concomitant increase in ability to gather intelligence. [One might recall the philosophy of Detective Sipowicz from the television series *NYPD Blue*: if you know the people, the places, the things they do, and the times they do them, you know the important things about the neighborhood you are responsible for.]

### RELATIONS BETWEEN THE HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS AND MILITARY ENTITIES

The relations between the human rights organizations and the military yielded the following tasks: at the outset, military units protected convoys and stores (supplies) and provided transportation. In addition, military provided supplies as needed. In return, the human rights

organizations provided intelligence, resulting from greater access to the civilian community. Communications is another function that followed similar patterns of relations. A similar relation was explored between the diplomats and the military respecting the conduct of elections after the intervention stage leading to the stability phase. Similar relations were found with respect to the functions of security and intelligence between the diplomats and the military.

### WAYS, MEANS, AND ENDS

At this point it was suggested that the group might try to structure the analysis in terms of ways, means and ends. With that in mind, a beginning approach of considering the provision of resources (i.e., logistics) as ends, the maintenance of security as ways, and the gathering of information as means.

Repeatedly and almost continuously, group members emphasized the fact that organizational cultures (modes of operation, links with and concerns of donors, extent to which faiths [of whatever kind] guided the organization, and other defining dimensions) had to be recognized as overwhelmingly responsible for misunderstandings and barriers to cooperation and coordination. Improvement in the knowledge of organizational cultures may be a research topic in its own right.

Another observation surfaced. There is a difference in the way US military forces and other national military forces view 'command and control.' US forces see 'command' as an art and the sole responsibility of the commander; 'control' is a science and is the purview of the staff. Other forces from around the world see 'command' as a national responsibility and 'control' the responsibility of the international force itself. This is another matter which may contribute to some of the disfunctioning during peace support operations, which may be linked with organizational culture misunderstandings, which may need improved clarity for future operations, and which may require research and analysis (part of the research agenda).

### AGENCIES, FORCES, AND IDEAS AND ISSUES FOR RESOLUTION

An additional framework was introduced which focused on three components: agencies (meaning the civil elements involved in the operation); forces (meaning the military elements); and ideas and issues for resolution (looking at the relations between the two sets of elements). This framework was aimed at an immediate surfacing of research agenda topics. Questions derived from the framework were:

- What are typical, scenario-specific problems associated with agencies, forces and issues for resolution?
- What are the areas of focus, meaning topics such as movement, refugees, food supplies, police forces...?

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- How can the problems suggested by the two previous questions be scoped and structured for subsequent analysis?
  - What types of analyses may be required?
  - What research agenda derives therefrom?

### THE INITIAL INTERVENTION IN HAITI

Continuing in the vein of the immediate preceding framework, the group looked at the initial intervention in Haiti, the multi-national (but US dominant), pre-UN operation. The mandate was seen as defining the military ends as: security (provide protection to international personnel and installations); professionalization of the Haitian army (subsequently removed by the Haitian president); establishment of an effective Haitian civil police force; departure when the foregoing were satisfied. The definition of the civil ends were: humanitarian (provide relief to the Haitian populace); human rights (stop the killing, provide a legal structure, and provide for accountability by Haitian government institutions); and institutional (governmental) and economic (private sector) development (the transitional and last phase of the peace support operation). This framework lead the group back to the ways, means and ends structure, with the following examples of relationships, with no need to specify the actors (civil or military) responsible for the actions.

During the intervention and stability phases of the peace support operation, the following examples of relations among means, ways and ends hold. Means are 'patrols'; a way is 'monitoring'; and an end is 'security.' Another mean is an academy with a supporting infrastructure; ways are recruiting, training, and command and control support; an end is the new Haitian police force. A mean is the judiciary; ways are protection of judges and other court personnel; consultation, reform and repair; and new legislation; the end, improved human rights behavior in Haiti. A mean is the police force; ways are reduced crime, improved order, growing trust with the citizenry, protection of the new police force, adequate distribution of police throughout the community, and adequate resources; the end is also improved human rights behavior. Political reform is another mean; ways include election support and the creation and reform of political parties; the end is more contribution to improved human rights behavior. A final example: improved economy as a mean; reduction in crime and corruption as ways; and again improved human rights behavior as the end.

### TRANSITION AND LATER PHASES

During the transition and later phases, other examples are relevant. International resources and support are means; International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, with foreign investment and capital resources are ways; and the long term ends are improved economic development. Improved physical infrastructure and a formal economy are means; repair of essential services, a secure environment, improved education facilities and services, and meeting financial needs are ways; all leading, in the long term, to improved and stable economic development.

## KEY QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS

Observing the Haitian experience led the group to frame some key questions and problems. The group concluded that there was inadequate and poor estimations of the resources needed to continue improvements in Haiti after the stability phase and leading into the transition phase. It was not clear why the civil police behavior and public order degraded so rapidly after stability and military force withdrawal. The group also concluded that disengagement of military forces from a peace support operation should be a joint civil-military decision.

The potential research areas resulting from the group's deliberations and analysis are:

- Inadequate and poor estimation of resources, including time, to continue and initiate needed programs after military force withdrawal.
- Reasons for civil police and public order degradation after military force withdrawal.
- How to establish 'correct' opportunity for military withdrawal (a joint civil-military decision); what are appropriate indicators showing that stability has been achieved?
- Since lack of cooperation normally means delay in development, how can cooperation be improved and increased?
- Identification of key civil-military interactions and links, and the timing of their establishment and initiation.