

U.S. Management of Complex Contingencies, Potential Global Partners, and Challenges to Achieving Unity of Effort

Martin Lidy

Institute for Defense Analyses
Alexandria, Virginia, U.S.A.
e-mail: mlidy@ida.org

Mr. Lidy retired from the U.S. Army after 20 years of service and continues to work on defense related projects as a civilian. He joined the Institute for Defense Analyses in October 1986 and serves as a Project Leader for tasks supporting the Unified Combatant Commands, the Joint Staff, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Recent projects include building an analytical framework for examining smaller-scale contingency issues for the Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation; improving force deployment capabilities and logistics support for the combatant commands for the Joint Staff; reviews of the U.S. European Command's activities during Operations Desert Shield/Storm and Joint Endeavor/Joint Guard; and developing concepts, materials, and providing support for joint and combined movement and humanitarian relief exercises conducted by the European Command (Agile Lion), Atlantic Command/Allied Command Atlantic (Cooperative Safeguard), and Southern Command (Blue Advance). Mr. Lidy also deployed to Bosnia in November 1995 as a member of the team that assessed the Federation forces and recommended to the Secretary of Defense actions to equip and train them. His military service with troops included assignments as a fixed and rotary wing aviator, staff officer, and commander of aviation units within infantry divisions and non-divisional aircraft maintenance and supply units in Europe and Vietnam, and he has more than 1,250 combat flight hours. He is a graduate of the United States Military Academy and received an MS in Operations Research from the Georgia Institute of Technology.

ABSTRACT

This paper summarizes the results of ongoing research conducted in response to tasking from the Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation, Office of the Secretary of Defense. The research is intended to assist the sponsor with establishing an analytical framework that will provide better estimates of U.S. military force requirements and the specific force structure needed to carry out future smaller-scale contingencies (SSCs) while retaining the capability to fight and win the nation's wars. The paper is organized to address four important topics that form the basis for coalition interoperability: (1) the operational environment, (2) the U.S. Government's assignment of responsibilities to interagency participants (civilian and military) in complex contingencies, (3) the potential global partners (civilian and military) that might participate in these operations, and (4) the challenges to military forces in achieving unity of effort within *ad hoc* coalitions.

INTRODUCTION

The principal mission of U.S. military forces is to fight the nation's wars and to bring them to a successful termination. The forces have been structured, equipped, and trained to accomplish these tasks with or without allied military assistance. The military has a dominant role in Major Theater Wars (MTWs), and the hierarchical structure of the forces has been organized and staffed to conduct armed conflict in an environment where the role of civilian agencies is minimal until the war has been won.

Throughout our nation's history, however, the same forces have often been tasked to conduct Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) during Smaller-Scale Contingencies (SSCs). These operations involve responses and resource expenditures that fall between peacetime engagement activities and MTWs. Typically, they involve the civilian agencies of the U.S. Government (USG) as well as a number of other organizations. During SSCs the roles are reversed because civilian agencies play the dominant role and military capabilities are limited in focus and are used to augment or complement the capabilities of civilian agencies.

Since the end of the Cold War, the international environment has changed and military forces have increasingly been employed to assist in the resolution of SSCs. The current National Security Strategy¹ recognizes this requirement and points out that these operations will likely pose the most frequent challenge for U.S. forces and cumulatively require significant commitments over time.

A major factor in the changed environment is the way nations interact. The term often used to describe this new operating environment is "complex." The most prominent aspects of this environment include challenges to the sovereignty of the state, the transnational character of many problems, and the increasing importance and role of information. The new operating environment is not only defined by the complexity of the issues to be resolved, but also by the requirement for all institutions engaged in their resolution—both state and non-state actors—to act and interact cooperatively in support of peace and security, but often with different national interests. These aspects of complexity—typically including the need for immediate conflict resolution and humanitarian assistance as well as longer term development of institutions and economic capacity—have had a far reaching impact on how governmental and non-governmental actors respond during these contingencies.

Although the new environment can include conflict among warring factions within a state, the challenges typically occur below the threshold of armed conflict between nations, and they are handled as SSCs rather than as MTWs. The SSC operations generally require multi-dimensional outside intervention within the affected state by both civilian and military resources to achieve successful resolution. In these contingencies, the military forces conduct MOOTW under direction of civilian authorities, and must coordinate their efforts and collaborate with the large number of other organizations to achieve unity of effort.

¹ A National Security Strategy for a New Century, the White House, December 1999.

The group of organizations providing resources to support contingency operations will likely include a number of other non-Department of Defense (DoD) agencies of the USG. In most cases it will also include elements from the United Nations (UN) Secretariat and its operating agencies. Inter-Governmental Organizations (IGOs), International Organizations (IOs), Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), and other nations are also potential coalition partners that can and often do provide resources needed to resolve these contingencies. These operations place a premium on the ability of the U.S. military to work closely and effectively with other USG agencies, the diverse set of coalition participants, and the available institutions and factions within the host nation.

To provide a more comprehensive understanding of which U.S. military resources are likely to be employed in SSC operations and the potential substitutability of the non-DoD resources, the Institute for Defense Analyses has been tasked by the Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation, Office of the Secretary of Defense, to respond to following questions:

- *Question 1:* What are the strengths, weaknesses, and unique capabilities of the U.S. military that affect U.S. involvement in SSC operations, particularly those in which non-DoD organizations may be involved?
- *Question 2:* What types of non-DoD organizations are the U.S. military likely to be collaborating with in the range of potential future SSC operations, and what is the typical nature of the involvement?
- *Question 3:* What changes to the current force structure and/or doctrine would better enable U.S. military forces to contribute to SSC operations, and collaborate more effectively with non-DoD organizations?
- *Question 4:* What factors affect backfilling a U.S. military withdrawal from a posture of engagement in SSCs, and what resources and capabilities could be shifted to non-DoD organizations?
- *Question 5:* How much and what type of residual military support would the U.S. likely need to provide to remaining organizations following a U.S. withdrawal?

This paper summarizes ongoing research² that responds to the first three questions.

This paper is divided into four sections. The first section briefly describes the post-Cold War operational environment. The second section addresses the USG organizing framework employed for complex contingencies. The third section provides a summary description of the potential global partners. The final section identifies areas where further research and

² See: (1) IDA Document D-2166 "The United States' Military Role in Smaller Scale Contingencies," August 1999; (2) IDA Document D-2277 "Exercise Rainbow Serpent After Action Report," January 1999; and (3) IDA Document D-2349 "Global Partners Potentially Available for Smaller-Scale Contingencies" (currently in draft), produced by the Institute for Defense Analyses and available from the Defense Technical Information Center, Ft. Belvoir, Virginia.

modest investment will be needed to enable U.S. military forces to be more effective and efficient when conducting SSC operations with their potential global partners.

THE POST-COLD WAR OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

Today's security environment is no longer shaped by concerns over global war between superpowers, but instead is based on the potential for less likely MTWs or more frequent and wide ranging SSCs.³ Because the operational environment in which SSCs are conducted is somewhat different than the one to which military forces became accustomed during the Cold War, it is important to highlight these differences.

The global security environment is still dominated by the system of sovereign nation states. In the past, the operating environment was relatively stable on the surface because it was dominated by the two superpowers and their allies. Turbulence and periodic crises generally occurred in countries where the superpowers competed for influence. Below that threshold, however, many nations were faced with internal political and economic challenges caused by local political crises, civil or regional wars, and man-made or natural disasters. These less visible situations were frequently handled by neutral members of the international community or by surrogates of the superpowers.

In today's environment, the direct competition between superpowers has essentially disappeared, and these regional or local situations termed complex contingencies—situations involving both conflict and humanitarian components—have become more visible to the entire international community. These contingencies typically occur in weakened or failed states⁴ and cause chaotic situations that require intervention in the affected state by the international community. In the past, the code of international conduct, first established by the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, applied. This code recognized the sovereignty of the nation state within its borders and states usually did not interfere in the internal affairs of another state. If an intervention was carried out, it was usually accompanied by a declaration of war. Interventions today are not based on declarations of war, but rather on UN Security Council resolutions. They typically occur when the internal conflict threatens regional stability or when abuses of human rights become so widespread that fleeing refugees or internally displaced persons create large scale, man-made humanitarian disasters affecting an entire region.

Another difference is the increasing transnational scope of the problems faced by these nations. Economic and social development traditionally has been funded on a country-by-

³ Joint Pub 3-07 identifies the following types of MOOTW that could require the use of military resources: arms control, combating terrorism, support to counter-drug operations, enforcement of sanctions, maritime intercept operations, enforcing exclusion zones, ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight, humanitarian assistance, military support to civil authorities, nation assistance, support to counterinsurgency, noncombatant evacuation operations, peace operations (including peacekeeping, peace enforcement, preventative diplomacy, peace making, and peace building), protection of shipping, recovery operations, show of force, strikes and raids, and support to insurgency.

⁴ For definition of these terms, see UNHCR Paper: "Reintegration in the Transition from War to Peace," 19 September 1997.

country basis, but in today's environment many problems, such as countering drugs, terrorists, or international crime, require regional or international solutions.

The increasing role of the media and access to global information has also had an impact on the operational environment. Crises are seen simultaneously on television screens by both the public and the decision-makers who must take action. This instant visibility and media-determined focus increases the importance of public diplomacy, both to shape the perceptions at the outset of the crisis and to maintain support for actions during the crisis.

The complex contingency environment is also complicated by the plethora of players typically found in SSC operations. In the past, if the political situation became intractable and war was declared, the role of the military was dominant. In today's environment, the role of the military is generally one of support to civilian authorities. Political leaders retain control and apply military resources along with civilian resources to achieve their objectives. To carry out its assigned tasks, the military must coordinate and collaborate with a large number of civilian organizations from the U.S. Government and other donor nations, the UN and other IGOs, IOs, or NGOs, as well as with firms from the private sector hired to perform selected tasks. Each of these participants brings unique capabilities and resources to the operation, and all efforts must be coordinated to achieve unity of effort.

The authority, mandates, and responsibilities of the many partners also varies. Authority forms the legal basis for all organizations operating in the environment, and along with the mandate has an impact on what, how, where, and why an organization does something. Organizations are also responsible or accountable to some authority for the actions they take. Governments are responsible to their legislatures and public. The IGOs and IOs are responsible to their member states or donors, respectively. NGOs are responsible to their boards of directors and their donors, whether private, governmental agencies, or IGOs.

Because there is no central authority for a multinational contingency operation, but rather a collection of essentially sovereign authorities with differing objectives, it is more difficult to achieve unity of effort during planning or execution of these operations. Civilian agencies operate through a process of collaboration, cooperation, and consultation rather than the traditional military command and control process. Information and intelligence are two sides of the same coin because both support decision making. Both civilian and military organizations must share information in this environment if common understanding and unity of effort are to be achieved.

Security is another characteristic that is different. Many of today's contingencies require the application of military force to establish military security in the region. Military security may often be accomplished quickly by a superior military force that is capable of separating the factions and demobilizing their military capabilities. Public security and civil law and order, on the other hand, are more difficult to establish because the institutions upon which they are based—police, judiciary, and penal institutions—often must be rebuilt. Unless both components of security are in place, stability and progress towards nation building will be elusive and continued military presence will be required.

Capacity is another concept that must be understood in this environment. Few organizations or governments can devote the financial resources to maintain robust standby capabilities to respond to these situations; the capabilities they do have are usually already committed to ongoing contingencies. Some materials commonly required for emergency

situations are stockpiled, but most large civilian organizations rely on in-place procedures to expand their capabilities when necessary. This system works when the contingency grows slowly, but when the requirement is to respond to a rapid onset disaster such as a large earthquake or tropical storm or a man-made complex contingency, the capabilities of the standing military forces often become the only robust option immediately available to national leaders.

Underlying any contingency response is funding; without financial resources very little can be done. Funding is largely provided by donor nations through special assessments for UN Security Council resolutions, Official Development Assistance, or national emergency response procedures. Some UN agencies have authority to provide small amounts to affected nations to cover immediate emergency response activities, and IOs and NGOs have access to private donors. The more affluent donor nations play a major role in shaping this environment, but are influenced by different national interests and objectives.

The SSC environment is significantly different from that for which U.S. military forces have been trained, especially the senior leaders. The majority of training and doctrine has been aimed at warfighting on the modern battlefield, but initiatives are underway within the DoD to increase awareness of the SSC operating environment. Progress is slow, and with normal personnel rotations experience is rapidly lost. Most SSCs occur in remote locations under difficult conditions and the military is often one of the last organizations to arrive. When forces are committed, it is typically to a desperate situation with ill-defined objectives, and with little real understanding of the actual situation on the ground and the role of other participants. In such an environment, both the military and civilian participants must learn to work together. To do so, they must understand and gain confidence in each other before a contingency so that when *ad hoc* coalitions are formed in a crisis, they can work together and achieve unity of effort. Joint, combined, and interagency exercises provide the opportunity for such cooperative learning and information sharing.

U.S. GOVERNMENT ORGANIZING FRAMEWORK FOR COMPLEX CONTINGENCIES

The U.S. interagency is not a formal structure, but rather an established process for coordinating executive branch decisions that involve multiple agencies. Because most SSCs involve more than one agency, this process is usually invoked to bring together the appropriate agencies with the capabilities needed to resolve the specific contingency. When the nature of the problem is an enduring one, the organizational arrangements, responsibilities, and procedures of the interagency participants are formally documented in what are termed Presidential Decision Directives (PDDs) or a federal response plan. When the contingency is a unique event that has security implications, the National Security Council (NSC) and its organizational framework will be convened. Created in 1947 to respond to the national strategy of containment employed during the Cold War, the NSC has been faced with a growing number of unique SSCs. As currently configured, however, it is not well suited to execute today's strategy based on shaping through engagement and responding when necessary to the large number of contingencies it is called upon to address.

Two PDDs⁵ have established the framework for how the USG will respond to complex contingencies. PDD-25 requires a determination and sets the criteria that must be met before an intervention is conducted. When the determination leads to an intervention, PDD-56 assigns agency responsibilities in eight sectors⁶ and requires the development and rehearsal of a Political-Military Implementation Plan (PMIP) before intervention. A generic PMIP identifies more than 100 tasks for civilian agencies or military forces.

Building on the PDD-56 sectors and tasks in the PMIP, further research has identified and compiled additional tasks from other guidance documents, doctrinal publications, and reports from recent contingency operations. Duplicate tasks were eliminated and the residual set was ordered and arranged in a hierarchy of tasks and subtasks to develop a more robust checklist of possible SSC tasks. Lead and supporting USG agencies were identified and, where appropriate, UN agencies with similar responsibilities were also identified for each task and subtask.

Two groups of tasks were identified: common sector tasks and mission specific tasks. Common sector tasks are those that must be done for every operation once the decision to intervene has been made. They include establishing the sector interagency cooperation structure, conducting a sector needs assessment (mission analysis), and developing the sector implementation and transition plans supported by appropriate intelligence collection and information management. The mission specific tasks represent the checklist to be used when developing the mandate for each unique contingency. A total of 158 SSC tasks and 363 subtasks were identified in this process.

Military tasks from the Universal Joint Task List and Service task lists were then mapped into the SSC task structure to determine where military capabilities would be required either in a lead or supporting role. More than 1,100 military tasks were identified in this process, with nearly 400 supporting activities other than strictly military tasks. This task arrangement establishes where the military and civilian agencies have lead and supporting responsibilities across all sectors.

POTENTIAL GLOBAL PARTNERS

Potential global partners, other than sovereign nations, have been divided into four categories: IGOs, IOs, NGOs, and commercial businesses. The characteristics of each are summarized in Table 1. All organizations are formed for a specific purpose, but IGOs are consultative bodies formed by national governments. They are governed by representatives of those governments. Many organizations use “international” in their title, but IOs are

⁵ See: (1) White Paper: The Clinton Administration’s Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations, White House, Washington, DC, 14 May 1994; and (2) White Paper: The Clinton Administration’s Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations: Presidential Decision Directive 56, White House, Washington, DC, May 1997.

⁶ The eight sectors include: (1) diplomacy, (2) military activities, (3) humanitarian assistance, (4) internal politics, (5) civil law and order and public security, (6) public diplomacy and education, (7) infrastructure and economic restoration, and (8) human rights and social development. The Department of State is the lead agency for all sectors except military activities where the Department of Defense is the lead agency. Other agencies also have lead roles for many tasks and subtasks in these sectors.

unique because they are formed under international law or custom, are governed by private citizens but are recognized as sovereign entities by nations, issue their own passports, hold observer status with the UN General Assembly, and are non-profit. NGOs are also non-profit and governed by private citizens, but do not have the other status held by IOs. Commercial businesses are governed by private citizens with a goal of making a profit. These characteristics give the partners different interests and motivations.

Characteristics	IGO	IO	NGO	Business
Formed for a specific purpose	X	X	X	X
Consultative body of National Governments	X			
Formed under International Humanitarian Law or Custom and Recognized as a sovereign entity		X		
Directed by representatives of National Governments	X			
Directed by private citizens		X	X	X
Funded by National Governments	X	X	X	X
Funded by private institutions or individuals		X	X	X
Not for profit entity	X	X	X	
For profit entity				X

Table 1: Key Characteristics of Potential Global Partners.

THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION AND SYSTEM

The UN, created in June 1945, is the largest and most complex IGO, currently encompassing 188 member nations. The UN Organization (UNO) is the arrangement established by the UN Charter. The UN System (UNS) includes the UNO but adds the programs, funds, and other bodies that have been created over the years by the member nations to carry out the work of the UN.

The six principal organs of the UNO include the General Assembly and the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the International Court of Justice, the Trusteeship Council, and the Secretariat. The Secretary General is an administrator who supports the deliberative processes of the principal organs. The Secretary General heads the UN Secretariat with its thirteen separate elements such as the Department of Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO) and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). Member nations fund the budget of the Secretariat proportionally through regular contributions based on the wealth of the particular member. The operations authorized by the Security Council impose mandatory contributions on members, over and above the normal budget.

The programs, funds, and specialized agencies that are included in the UNS are not under the control of the Secretary General, but instead are governed by boards of directors formed from participating member nations. There are thirty-nine UN Programs such as the UN Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UN Development Program (UNDP), and the World Food Program (WFP). In addition, there are eighteen UN Specialized Agencies such as the World Health Organization (WHO), the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO). Two additional organizations are independent and autonomous, but operate under the aegis of the UNS: the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the World Tourism Organization (WTO).

All of these programs, funds, and specialized agencies—essentially autonomous IGOs—are funded by member nations through separate budgets.

Coordination among the member states and the UN agencies is achieved through a number of committees and other organs. Resource mobilization in such an environment for in-kind contributions, personnel services, and funding is a major effort. Interagency coordination is another difficult task that maintains the linkages between the Security Council, ECOSOC, and the functionally organized Executive Committees that report to the Secretary General. In addition to these coordination measures, which largely occur at UN Headquarters located in New York and Geneva, coordination must extend to the UN participating agencies in the field at the scene of the SSC. Usually, coordination at that level is achieved through a Resident Coordinator, Humanitarian Coordinator, or Special Representative of the Secretary General, depending on the nature of the contingency.

The Secretariat and the funds, programs, and other bodies of the UNS often become involved in SSCs. The DPKO has a role in forming peacekeeping missions and UN Civilian Police for these operations. It has established a Standby Arrangement System⁷ to facilitate rapid assembly of such a force. The OCHA has a role in coordinating the international response to rapid onset disasters and has developed the Military Civil Defense Assets (MCDA)⁸ system of “service modules” to facilitate the assembly and deployment of resources in these situations or during complex emergencies. The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), UNHCR, WFP, and WHO have response capabilities that are frequently employed during SSCs, and other agencies also contribute their functional expertise to these operations. For longer term economic and social development in a nation affected by an SSC, both the UNDP and the IRDB (the World Bank) play a major role along with the other UN agencies.

INTER-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION PARTICIPANTS

IGOs frequently play an important role in SSCs. They come in a variety of forms and often fulfill a number of functions. Three categories of IGOs are addressed: those with a global focus or that span multiple regions, those with a regional focus, and those financial institutions having either global or regional responsibilities.

The IGOs with a worldwide focus address issues that have a global reach such as migration, international criminal activity, or economic development. Others bring together member nations from more than a single region that share a common culture or language. Another group in this category focuses on arms control issues or the prohibition of certain types of weapons or materials used for weapons. Examples include the International Organization for Migration (IOM), Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OCED), the Commonwealth of Nations (CWN), and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).

⁷ See <http://www.un.org/depts/dpko>.

⁸ The MCDA Register can be located at: http://www.reliefweb.int/ocha_ol/programs/response/register.htm.

Many of the regional IGOs have security and economics as their main, but rarely sole, function. Often they are intended to enhance consultation, but some have increased their responsibilities for conflict prevention or peace support operations as recognized regional arrangements under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. Examples of regional IGOs include the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Western European Union (WEU), Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Caribbean Community (CARICOM), and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

Financial institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and Bank for International Settlements (BIS) have global responsibilities. They work with a number of regional banks to make available economic resources to enable nations to accomplish economic and social development. Examples of regional banks include the African Development Bank and the Caribbean Development Bank.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION PARTICIPANTS

In addition to the characteristics described earlier, IOs operate internationally on the basis of neutrality and impartiality and use a distinctive insignia representing the protection extended by international convention or custom. Three organizations currently meet these criteria: the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), and the Sovereign Military Hospitaler Order of Malta (SMOM).

The International Movement of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies includes not only the ICRC and the IFRC, but also the 170 national societies worldwide, including the American Red Cross. The role of the ICRC is to protect and assist the victims of armed conflict, while that of the IFRC is to coordinate the International Movement's response capabilities during natural and technological disasters and chronic and acute pathogen emergencies. The ICRC normally works independently of the national societies, whereas a strength of the IFRC is its ability to draw on the resources of those societies when performing disaster relief. The IFRC has developed procedures and standards for Emergency Response Units⁹ (ERUs), comparable to the MCDA service modules, to assist the national societies to provide "off-the-shelf" capabilities promptly in a disaster. The roles of the ICRC and IFRC are by definition separate, but during recent complex contingencies, the differences between their roles have often become blurred.

SMOM is the world's oldest humanitarian organization, founded in 1099 by the armies of the First Crusade. It uses the Maltese Cross as its insignia. It is an Order of the Catholic Church focused on charity and humanitarian assistance. To perform these tasks in the modern world, the Order has developed a number of capabilities in national chapters that have been employed during recent SSCs. The Emergency Corps of the Order of Malta (ECOM) also has emergency response units available to meet the needs of affected

⁹ Emergency Response Units, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 1211, Geneva 19, Switzerland, 5 January 1996.

populations. The Order is unique in that it can operate in either military or civilian modes and has supported both civilian and military casualties.

NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION PARTICIPANTS

NGOs are an institutional expression of civil society. They traditionally work on humanitarian and development problems, but over the past half century have expanded into other areas such as human rights protection and other advocacy issues, citizen diplomacy (referred to as track two or multi-track NGOs), or religious, academic, and scientific activities.

Current estimates¹⁰ suggest there are possibly as many as 32,000 NGOs formed in developed nations, (northern hemisphere or international NGOs) that work in less developed nations and as many as 80,000 NGOs in less developed nations (southern hemisphere, national, or local NGOs) to work on local problems. About 15 to 20 international NGOs have full service capabilities and operate in 70 or more countries with annual budgets of \$100 million or more.¹¹ Others have more limited capabilities but may play an important role during SSCs. Another important consideration is that NGOs are usually already operating in areas by the time military forces are deployed and can be useful sources of information on the local situation.

MAJOR PARTICIPATING DONOR NATIONS

Donor nations provide the resources that make the international community function. The 21 member nations that form the Development Assistance Committee of OECD are the principal contributors, but several other nations also provide assistance. The contributions for economic and social development, given either bilaterally or multilaterally as Official Development Assistance, are focused on specific programs and targeted to nations and regions that are in keeping with the donor's national objectives. Humanitarian assistance is also provided by donor nations and other responding organizations of the international community. When disasters occur, the assistance is provided on a non-political basis and without compensation to meet the needs of the affected population. While the total amount of official aid has declined recently, the reduction has been more than compensated for through increasing private investments. Private investments, however, require a stable and secure environment to make the risks acceptable to the investors.

A secure environment requires both military security from hostile forces and public security from criminal activities and human rights abuses. Nations must agree to take collective action when another nation is confronted by these problems, and donors have

¹⁰ World Disasters Report 1997, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, CH-1211 Geneva, Switzerland, 1997.

¹¹ Preventing Deadly Conflict Final Report, Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, Washington, DC, December 1997.

cooperated to develop a UN system to support peacekeeping operations. When peace enforcement is required, the military task is more complex and is usually conducted by a lead nation and other willing partners as an *ad hoc* coalition or by a regional alliance of nations with sufficient capabilities to ensure success.

Unfortunately, the public security component is a more difficult and longer term task that requires the building of responsive institutions and the rule of law. Donors and the international community have not had as much success with the public security sector as they have with the military sector, and this lack of civil capacity often requires the military forces to remain deployed even though the military security tasks have been completed. One factor contributing to this problem is the lack of integrated planning of military and public security activities. Another is the long time required to assemble an international civilian police force and to build necessary institutions. The successful employment of Multinational Specialized Units (MSUs) during complex contingencies since 1998 suggests that this concept of paramilitary forces may: (1) provide the bridge until civilian capabilities can be established, and (2) serve in an economy of force role to enable the military forces to redeploy when their tasks are completed.

RESOURCES FROM THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY

With the globalization of the world economy, the role of business in contingency operations has expanded. Because of their forward presence and in-country knowledge, they can be a useful source of information for intervening military forces, especially during planning. During execution, they might be able to provide or arrange locally for critical resources needed by the force. Five types of commercial operators are discussed.

The first group of businesses are contractors used by the DoD to support forward deployed military forces. Each military department has its own program: the Army's Logistic Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP), the Navy's Construction Capabilities Contract (CONCAP), and the Air Force's Contract Augmentation Program (AFCAP). These programs provide life support, construction capabilities, maintenance, transportation, and other functions such as medical and communications for the forces deployed to a contingency.

The second group of businesses have formed what is termed by some the "disaster industry." This is a loose conglomeration of companies and middle men, generally European-based, that supply the needs of victims and relief givers. These companies include small manufacturers, pharmaceutical firms, auto dealers, and suppliers of humanitarian materials.

The third group is businesses that work for other USG agencies, allied nations, or UN agencies. These firms usually provide training, consultant services, or management for large scale projects. Some of these firms also provide contingency and recovery planning services. In certain cases, commercial firms will be employed to recruit, train, equip, and deploy the USG contribution of civilian police to contingency operations.

Another group includes public/private partnerships. Commercial businesses, when it is in their interest, will partner with governments at the national or local level to accomplish

specific projects that benefit the recipient organization. These partnerships leverage capabilities available in advanced economies and frequently provide support to local health and education programs, civilian institution building, and introduction of new technology.

Many of the other SSC participants will also contract with firms to provide them with the supplies and services their organizations need to perform their tasks. When the local security situation is poor, these firms may be the only protection available to the population until military forces arrive. In some cases, specialized firms may engage directly in combat operations for a weakened government using mercenaries.

MILITARY COMMAND AND CONTROL AND COORDINATION AND COLLABORATION WITH CIVILIAN ORGANIZATIONS

Military and civilian organizations, although structured differently, must work together in various types of SSC operations. Both communities have recognized these differences and, to achieve unity of effort, have established or are developing organizational arrangements to facilitate coordination and collaboration between the two groups. Both communities need to understand how the other is organized and where interfaces can be established so that differences can become transparent during planning and operation.

When military forces are employed, whether for MTWs or SSCs, they are generally tailored and grouped into various types of task forces. These organizational arrangements include concepts for single Service, joint, joint interagency, and combined joint task forces, depending on which elements are involved in the operation. During operations, civil-military coordination is effected through the creation of various types of *ad hoc* centers such as a Civil-Military Operations Center, a Humanitarian Operations Center, or an On-Site Operations Coordination Center. Within the USG, a Multi-Agency Support Team concept is being developed to enable the various agencies, country teams, and forces to plan and conduct SSC operations more effectively. Contact groups formed by interested nations and UN interagency executive and steering committees are used to coordinate efforts at the strategic echelon. On the non-governmental side, several groups, coalitions, or associations have been formed to provide a coordinating mechanism among the large number of disparate organizations.

The use of information technology and the Internet has enabled many civilian organizations to compile and make available very useful information to assist with planning and responding to SSCs. A number of these civilian networks, data bases, and systems could provide military forces with useful information during planning and execution of SSC operations. Examples include the Relief Web,¹² the Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN), and the Global Disaster Information Network (GDIN).

The U.S. Agency for International Development also operates an on-line system called Volunteers in Technical Assistance Network (VITANet).¹³ The Pan American Health Organization has developed an automated Supply and Management (SUMA) system to track

¹² Relief web is at www.reliefweb.int/.

¹³ VITA can be contacted at vita@vita.org. Their home page is <http://www.vita.org/default.htm>.

relief supplies from origin to destination. This system is being adapted worldwide and should provide more accurate records of supplies delivered and effective accountability of donor-provided relief during emergency situations. In addition, there are environmental data bases as well as reporting systems related to meteorological conditions, maritime distress and safety, health, food shortage, and famine early warning.¹⁴

Many agencies, especially OCHA, have web-based data bases on-line that identify rescue teams and other responding organizations, stockpiles of relief items, and legislation to facilitate customs requirements during emergency situations. These capabilities have enhanced significantly the exchange of vital information within the civilian response community, and can be accessed by military planners to provide a better understanding of available resources.

CHALLENGES TO ACHIEVING UNITY OF EFFORT

The key challenge for U.S. military forces is to be ready for both the less likely larger scale MTWs and the more frequent SSCs that require military intervention. This research suggests that the forces are capable of conducting both types of operations, but SSCs are typically planned and conducted less effectively and efficiently than they might be. Improvements in the capacity of the U.S. military forces to conduct SSCs will require modest but focused investment in its existing forces, not the creation of separate forces for SSCs.

SECURITY FORCES

Both aspects of security—military and public security—are recognized in PDD-56 and must be coordinated during planning and execution to achieve unity of effort. Military intervention is often required to separate, disarm, and demobilize warring factions, but local civilian police are frequently part of the same problem. They too must be disarmed and demobilized at the same time as the warring factions, and then rebuilt into a competent force capable of maintaining civil law and order to provide the public with a secure environment so that stability and economic redevelopment can take place. Rebuilding the institutions of police, judiciary, and penal system is a long term civilian mission.

The unfortunate reality is that civilian police worldwide are fully employed every day and not held in reserve. No nation has civilian police forces available for immediate deployment to an SSC. The capacity of the UN DPKO civilian police program is limited by available national resources and makes it difficult to assemble a viable force quickly. When they deploy, they are usually assigned observer or mentoring roles with little capacity to conduct coordinated police operations. The U.S. Department of Justice operates the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) for developing police forces and the Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training (OPDAT) program to rebuild the judiciary. These two programs have been used during a number of contingencies,

¹⁴ See for example: <http://geoweb.fao.org/> and www.info.usaid.gov/fews/fews.html.

but require time to rebuild the legal institutions and foundations that are needed in the affected countries.

In August 1998, the first MSU was deployed to Bosnia by NATO. Assembled from paramilitary forces maintained by several allied nations, these police forces have military status; their mission is to fill the gap between the local police and the NATO Stabilization Force. The MSU, although less than 600 personnel, is a well-trained force capable of operating either as civilian police or as organized military units, and it has an information unit that collects and processes valuable human intelligence (HUMINT). The successful MSU operations should be examined to determine the potential of this type of organization to fill the early security gap during future SSCs. These units could be deployed with the initial military force to bridge the gap until civilian police can be assembled, and then serve in an economy of force role to enable the military forces to redeploy when their tasks have been completed.

SIZING AND TRAINING U.S. MILITARY HEADQUARTERS FOR SSCS

Military organizations have been designed and constructed to operate effectively and efficiently within a large hierarchy of units when conducting MTWs. To perform their missions, headquarters receive support from other organizations within the hierarchy. However, when a headquarters is designated to conduct an SSC, it is removed from this complex organizational arrangement, provided with various capabilities embedded within the larger hierarchy, and required to operate with a large, diverse group of civilian organizations to accomplish its mission. The units assigned to the controlling headquarters continue to perform the same tasks, but the staffs of the designated headquarters must expand—some say double in size—to operate unique resources assigned to the SSC force and coordinate with other participants in the operation.

Commanders and staff must learn to employ many assets (e.g., national intelligence means, psychological operations, civil affairs, contracting) that would have been controlled by others in the MTW force. Because each SSC is unique, it is difficult to establish simple rules for sizing SSC-designated headquarters. Moreover, the commanders and their staffs will require additional training to understand the roles and capabilities of the civilian participants in these contingencies so that unity of effort can be achieved. One option that might be considered is to establish a standing joint task force or joint interagency task force headquarters with appropriately trained staffs. This headquarters could complement, or in some situations supplement with necessary resources, the joint task force headquarters established by geographic combatant commands. Operational units such as Air Expeditionary Forces, Marine Expeditionary Units, or Army units could be assigned to the standing headquarters on an “on call” basis for six-month periods in a planned force rotation.

MILITARY LIAISON CAPABILITIES

Within the U.S. military, liaison is often an *ad hoc* duty assigned when the need arises, with little unique training or resource support provided. In traditional MTW operations, such

assignments serve typically to establish information connectivity between headquarters or adjacent units. In multinational coalitions, especially SSC operations, liaison activities require well-trained personnel who are able to bridge the differences between the civilian and military organizations and serve as the glue to hold the temporary coalitions together and to facilitate unity of effort. The liaison personnel become “ambassadors” of their commanders and must understand the broader issues and commander’s intent during response operations.

Liaison is also important during peacetime engagement where cultural understanding and trust needed during response operations is acquired. The size of existing military groups is linked to the volume of foreign military sales; fewer sales reduces the group size. The U.S. European Command’s military liaison teams provide an alternative model that might have application in other regions. Foreign area and civil affairs specialists, active and reserve, can form the nucleus for fielding such capability, but positions need to be identified and filled with trained personnel to carry out engagement activities and to serve as key liaison personnel during response operations.

HUMAN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND INFORMATION SHARING

The U.S. military has excellent technical capabilities for collecting and developing targeting information, but is less capable in the area of HUMINT. During SSC operations, it is frequently critical to assess intentions of various populations and to anticipate potential problems not only in the military sector, but also in the other sectors of civilian activities involved with complex contingencies. Other organizations such as the MSU or UN agencies, IGOs, IOs, NGOs, or commercial businesses may have access to this type of information. Before such information can be collected and exploited to fill the current void in U.S. capabilities, it will be necessary to develop procedures to exchange a wide range of information with these organizations so that unity of effort can be achieved.

USG INTERAGENCY COORDINATION MECHANISMS

The existing NSC structure was developed in 1947 and, although modified slightly by each administration, is still based on a strategy of containment and reaction to a major crisis. The new National Security Strategy is one of shaping through engagement and responding when necessary. While the existing structure is capable of responding to individual crises, it has no interagency mechanism to shape the environment through government-wide coordinated engagement activities. Coordinated multi-dimensional engagement activities can reduce tensions in affected states or regions, possibly reducing the need for, or the magnitude of, a future response. Options need to be developed for aligning the existing NSC structure with current National Security Strategy to enable the USG to achieve greater unity of effort during engagement and response.

CONCLUSIONS

The SSC environment is complicated because of its multinational and multi-discipline participants and the varying capabilities and interests they bring to the operation. A secure environment, one free from military hostilities but also one that follows the rule of law and ensures public security, is essential if redevelopment is to occur. The coordination and collaboration architectures needed to carry out the military and civilian tasks to remedy the conditions that caused the intervention will vary by sector and task, but must be established and maintained so that information can be exchanged among the participants.

A key center of gravity is donor nation control of funding, but application of resources is subject to different national interests. Achieving unity of effort in such an environment is challenging and military commanders and their staffs must be aware of these factors and act on them during these operations. Greater emphasis on working with the civilian community during exercises is necessary to build the understanding and trust that is needed during SSC operations.

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