

Campaign Monitoring and Measures of Success

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Mike Neighbour is Head of the Operational Analysis Branch, NATO Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) HQ in Rheindahlen Germany. He is responsible for providing timely scientific and analytical advice to the Commander and the Chief of Staff across the range of ARRC activities. This advice usually manifests itself in a high intensity warfighting scenario although in 1998/9 it was applied to Peace Support Operations in Kosovo with the deployment of HQ ARRC commanding the Land Forces in KFOR 1. Previously he worked within the UK Defence Establishment Research Agency (DERA) in various fields. As a resource Manager in Higher Level Studies (HLS) he was responsible for planning training courses. He was Head of Maritime Balance of Investment within the Sea/Air Division of DOAC looking at the maritime force structure for 2010. As Head of the Surveillance Section his duties included a study of the Military Utility of Space based Surveillance and Target Acquisition systems. He studied the contribution of HF Skywave radar to Air Defence systems and stand-off and line of sight air launched anti-armour weapons.

INTRODUCTION

The Operational Analysis Branch (OAB) is an integral part of the HQ of the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) which is directly subordinate to NATO's Supreme Commander Europe (SACEUR). The HQ is a multi national organisation whose mission statement is:

“HQ ARRC is to be prepared to deploy on SACEUR's order, to an area of operation designated by SACEUR, and to undertake combined, joint military operations across the operational spectrum either as a Corps HQ with up to 4 divisions and corps troops under OPCOM/ OPCON, or as a Land Component Command HQ, in order to support SACEUR's crisis management options.”

The HQ has a staff of 462, which is increased to approximately 1000 when deployed on an operation. The HQ is equipped and staffed to be able to deploy in seven to 15 days.

OAB although headed by a civilian and consisting of two military officers and two analysts and support staff who deploy along with the HQ on all exercises and operations. The mission of the branch is:

“To give timely independent analytical and scientific advice to COMARRC and COSARRC to aid their decision-making over the spectrum of ARRC activities.”

The general tasks of the Operational Analysis Branch are:

1. Support to HQ Planning. Covering: Contingency planning, concept development and Force mix issues.
2. Model/Technique Development. Ensure that OAB has relevant tools and information to support tasks.
3. Technology Demonstrators. Military Staff planning tool development.
4. General Science and Technology. Liaison between ARRC and scientific community to ensure HQ ARRC has access to latest developments.

HQ ARRC HISTORY

HQ ARRC has had a short history having been activated in 1992 a year after a working group was set up to consider its formation. The HQ has been deployed twice first on Operation Firm Endeavour in Bosnia and lately on Operation Joint Guardian to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and Kosovo

Operation Firm Endeavour saw the HQ deploy to Bosnia and Herzegovina to act as the Land Component HQ for the Dayton peace accord Implementation Force (IFOR) from December 1995 to November 1996. The mission given to the Commander of HQ ARRC (COMARRC) was:

“On order, COMARRC is to assume command of the AO of B-H and complete the military task of the peace agreement as defined by the NATO Atlantic Council. He is to control and secure the withdrawal of the UN forces not transferred to the IFOR. He is to be prepared to execute the emergency withdrawal of the UNCRO forces.”

Operation Joint Guardian was in two parts. The first to FYROM started in February/March 1999 the mission from SACUR to COMARRC was:

“Ensure force protection by means of an integrated defensive posture against attacks on HATO forces and forces formerly part of UNPREDEP deployed in FYROM.

Within means and capabilities, support UNHCR and FYROM authorities humanitarian assistance to refugees.

Be prepared to establish KFOR to implement and, when necessary, enforce compliance with the military provisions of an Interim Agreement.”

The HQ deployed into Kosovo on the 12 June 1999 and returned to home base on 20 October 1999. The revised mission to cover operations in Kosovo as at 20 July 1999 was:

“KFOR, in accordance with UNSCR 1244, is to:

- a. Monitor, verify and, when necessary enforce compliance with the conditions of the Military Technical Agreement (MTA), and the UCK Undertaking.
- b. Establish and maintain a secure environment, including public safety and order.
- c. Provide assistance to the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), including core civil functions until transferred in order to facilitate peace and stability in Kosovo.”

CAMPAIGN MONITORING

During both missions OAB became involved in what has been termed Campaign Monitoring, the intention being to track and give numerate indicators to the progress of the mission.

Looking at the mission statements and commanders intent for the two missions completed by HQ ARRC three common elements, which are amenable come out they, are:

- The need to track the **compliance** of the various factions with agreements they have signed.
- The need to establish the degree to which **stability** (Security is often used as an alternative) has been achieved.
- The need to establish what constitutes **peace** (normality is perhaps a better descriptor as peace is subjective where as normality refers to the normal state for the region) in the region and to what extent that applies in the area of operations.

In this paper these are the three elements which I will consider in more depth in order to monitor a campaign as has been seen all three relate to role undertaken by the HQ in both its deployments.

COMPLIANCE

In order to have a peace support operation there will be some form of agreement between the factions in dispute. This can be of the nature of agreements prior to the forces being deployed into the Balkans, or indeed the Peace support force may have been in conflict itself prior to assuming a peace support role.

In either case there will be an agreement to cease hostilities, in Bosnia there was the Dayton agreement, with its Military annex and in Kosovo there were two documents the Military Undertaking signed by the Yugoslavian Army and the Undertaking signed with the UCK. These agreements will form the basis of any compliance reporting, they are the standard by which we must measure willingness of the factions involved to stand by their agreement. The compliance report must be; accurate, based upon fact, having an audit trail back to an agreed document and timely.

Considering agreements in general which are associated with Peace Support Missions they can consist of four elements:

- Separation, this will be an agreement to confine forces to specific areas for the purpose of removing the potential for conflict. An example of this would be Cyprus.
- Behavioural, this will be an agreement to refrain from certain activities, both military and civil. For instance the requirement to cease hostilities is a pre-requisite but also may include an agreement not to undertake the activities of a civil administration, police and emergency services.
- Transformation, the requirement to change the nature of an organisation for instance from a gorilla army to a regular army, or a civil defence force.
- Disbandment, the requirement to totally disband such that the organisation ceases to exist.

Each of these four elements will have measurable components for instance Dayton called for:

“The parties must complete withdrawal of forces behind a zone of separation of approximately 4km within an agreed period. Special provision relates to Sarajevo and Gorazde.

As a confidence-building measure, the parties agree to withdraw heavy weapons and forces to cantonment/barracks areas within an agreed period and to demobilise forces which cannot be accommodated in those areas.”

In both the above paragraphs there are measurable elements. The first paragraph is about separation. The situation in what appears to a clear case of separation can be confusing. The crossing of a boundary by military formation will be a clear violation. However, the crossing of the boundary by a member of the armed forces not in uniform could be an honest mistake or not it is only by keeping track of all incidence we can see if there is an increase or not. It is interesting to note that in Bosnia most Compliance violations were due to:

- Localised problems.
- Former Warring Factions incompetence.
- Genuine inability to comply.

The situation in Kosovo was very different there was not one set of agreements covering both parties but individual agreements signed with the two main parties. The Agreements both with the UCK and with the VJ were negotiated by General Jackson the Commander of KFOR and not the more normal approach of being in the political arena. The agreements had elements of separation, the phased withdrawal of the VJ, behaviour and disbandment (it could be argued that the UCK was transformed into the Kosovo Protection Corps). This is illustrated by the following extract from the UCK undertaking:

“The UCK agrees to comply with all of the obligations of this Undertaking and to ensure that with immediate effect all UCK forces in Kosovo and in neighbouring countries will observe the provisions of this Undertaking, *will refrain from all hostile or provocative acts, hostile intent and freeze military movement in either direction across international borders or the boundary between Kosovo and other parts of the FRY, or any other actions inconsistent with the spirit of UNSCR 1244. The UCK in Kosovo agree to commit themselves publicly to demilitarise in accordance with paragraphs 22 and 23, refrain from activities which jeopardise the safety of international governmental and non-governmental personnel including KFOR, and to facilitate the deployment and operation of KFOR.*”

The section in **bold is separation**, that *in italics behavioural* and that underlined disbandment.

The different elements into which agreements can be divided will draw upon different data sources for compliance monitoring along the following lines:

- Separation: Surveillance reported through the intelligence G2 or Operations (G3) side of the HQ.
- Behavioural: Monitoring of public life through Media analysis, and surveys.
- Disbandment: Intelligence gathering as well monitoring of public life through Media analysis, and surveys.
- Transformation: As for disbandment.

While the above categories helps in identifying the range of possible data required for analysis of compliance in order to monitor compliance a more detailed approach is required. A detailed analysis of any agreement signed to bring about an end to hostilities reveals a large number of conditions the signatures agree to. By going through any agreement and identifying all points which have been agreed a large number of agreed points are invariably produced. The number of agreed points is such that it is impractical to keep tabs on all the points, thus the list has to be grouped into categories in order to make it manageable. An analysis of KFOR and Dayton agreements has identified that all points can be placed into the following twelve categories:

1. Cessation of Hostilities.
2. Location of forces.
3. Time Lines.
4. Cooperation with Military.
5. Cooperation with civil presence.
6. De-Militarisation.

7. Notification of Status.
8. Minefields, etc.
9. Repatriation.
10. Response to enforcement.
11. Adherence to procedures.
12. Declaration and Communications.

A manageable compliance report can then be produced using these categories, the KFOR example below shows how this can be done.

COMPLIANCE EXAMPLE: IFOR

The analysis in support of a separation is illustrated in Figure 1, which indicates the number of violation of the zone of separation (ZOS) in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The trend analysis presented in Figure 1 helps to identify long term trends from which variations can be tested statically to see if any trend is significant.




Figure 1: Violations of the zone of separation in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

COMPLIANCE EXAMPLE: KFOR

In order to measure compliance in Kosovo UNSCR 1244, the Military Technical Agreement signed by KFOR and VJ and the Undertaking signed by KFOR and the UCK were examined. A detailed analysis of the UCK Undertaking yielded 147 specific items for each item an implied compliance and a KFOR task was identified. Two such tasks are shown below.

| Ser Ref | Compliance Requirement | Implied Compliance | KFOR Task |
|-----------|---|---|------------------------------------|
| 93. UCK/4 | The UCK in Kosovo agree to commit themselves publicly to demilitarise in accordance with paragraphs 22 and 23 | Sound-bites which undermine the Undertaking are non-compliant | Monitor UCK media/press statements |
| 94. UCK/4 | The UCK in Kosovo agree to commit themselves publicly to facilitate the deployment and operation of KFOR | Sound-bites which undermine the Undertaking are non-compliant | Monitor UCK media/press statements |

The 147 tasks to monitor and report would have been unwieldy and consequently they were grouped into 10 categories which are listed below, each is but into the appropriate box for the different element of an agreement. In this table, the number in brackets indicates the number of tasks

| Separation | Behavioural | Disbandment | Transformation |
|---|--|--|----------------|
| Location of Forces (11) Minefields etc (8) | Cessation of Hostilities (13) Adherence to procedures (17) Co-operation with KFOR (25) Co-operation with civil presence (9) | De-Militarisation (8) Decarations & Communications of MTA/Understandin g (9) Response to enforcement (18) Timelines(29) | |

Figure 2 shows a specific example of an incident report. This report was then put in an incidents data base. Data from media analysis report as well as traditional military reporting chain were entered in the database. Using the incidence database a weekly compliance report was drawn up

The weekly compliance report consisted of an annex containing all the compliance incidence sorted into the 11 categories. For each compliance category a summary report was produced as shown in Figure 2 top left hand side. A summary report for all categories was produced an example is illustrated in the center of Figure 2. For each of the 11 categories a single comment was recorded i.e. compliant. Next to this is a colored box, red green or yellow to indicate non-compliant, compliant or mixed situation, the 3rd box then indicates the trend, arrow up for a deteriorating situation down for an improving situation and level for no

change. The example in Figure 2 is in the category of declarations and communications and we can see the positive comment made by Thaci has come through to contribute to a green in the final assessment on Declarations and Communications.




Figure 2: Kosovo Compliance example.

Figure 3 shows a compilation of the weekly executive summary indicators for compliance, showing the improving trend during the disbandment period of the UCK (the Kosovo liberation army). This diagram was part of the final report on compliance produced after the disbandment of the UCK.




Figure 3: Summary of Kosovo Liberation Army disbandment monitoring.

STABILITY

In order for life to return to normal one of the first tasks is for the military (and or Police) to establish a stable environment. The key indicators of stability are noted below.

Serious Crime: While crime is pervasive through out society a very high level is an indication of the break down of acceptable standards in society. Tracking crime rates indicate the return to normal, but at the high end also indicate the level to which stable environment has been created. Tracking crime rates is a standard task in all countries and rates per 100,000 are the standard. Relevant subcategories for a Peace Support Mission are:

- *Murder.* An example from KFOR is shown in Figures 4, 5 and 6.
- *Looting.* A KFOR example is shown in Figure 4.
- *Arson.* A KFOR example is shown in Figure 4.
- *Crimes against the person.*




Figure 4: Kosovo reported incidence of Murder, Arson and Looting.

War Crimes: When the ARRC deployed to both Bosnia and Kosovo there was no effective Government or police force, both function where temporarily being undertaken by the military. On the initial entry of Military Forces into both areas they are likely to be charged with helping document war crimes and preserve war crime sites, hence the following sub-categories:

- *Recording.* Figure 7 is an example from KFOR.
- *Guarding.*




Figure 5: Kosovo murder rate.




Figure 6: Kosovo murder rate for Serbs and Albanians.

Forces Protection: Of particular importance to military commanders is the acceptance of the peace keeping force. Not only are attacks against the force resulting in casualties of the force a measure of stability but also the number of attacks against the force. While it is hoped that there will be no attacks against or casualties in the peace keeping force, a lower level of stability is how the force is accepted. In order to monitor acceptance of patrols each patrol will need to record in their patrol report the reception of the locals (for instance, friendly and smiling, indifferent or verbally hostile).

- *Casualties.*
- *Attacks against the force.* Figure 8 gives an example from KFOR.
- *Acceptance of Patrols.*




Figure 7: Kosovo location of reports of mass graves.

Boarder/Boundary Control: Depending on the situation it is likely that the boarders of the area will have to be secured either my military peace keeping force or some other body. Incidence of border violation both military and civil (smuggling for instance).

Basic Need of Population: A key indicator of stability is the needs of the population in the following catergories:

- *Shelter.* What proportion of the local population has a roof over their head? Figure 9 is an example from KFOR derived from the Rapid Village Assessment.
- *Food* To what extent are the population being feed? Figure 11 gives an example from IFOR drawn from OAB normality survey.
- *Water.* Is drinking water available to the population and what is the standard of that water?




Figure 8: Kosovo reports of Mortar attacks, Grenade attacks and engagements of KFOR.




Figure 9: Kosovo housing damage levels.




Figure 10: Food availability index to Figures 11, 12, and 13.




Figure 11: Availability of key groceries in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Return of DPRE. In any conflict there are likely to have been displaced persons or refugees, the rate of return should be monitored.

NORMALITY

The ultimate objective of any peace support mission is to set the conditions for the area to return to normal. However normal is a subjective term and any recording of normality should be against the pre-conflict norms of the society or the surrounding area. While the military will not be the prime agency for rebuilding normality, they will be responsible for setting conditions for the return of normality. In this area a great deal of the data to measure

normality is in the non-military domain and will require co-operation with a variety of agencies. The following categories are examples of measures of normality

Public Service: The following categories of restoration of public service can be monitored. The availability of the following categories of public life give an indication of normality. In all categories the facilities should be available to all members of the community: OAB Rapid Village Assessment shows the feasibility of collecting this data.

- *Schools.*
- *Universities.*
- *Hospitals.*
- *Transport.*
- *Local Administration.*
- *Water.*
- *Power.*

Commercial: The commercial restoration of an area depends heavily on the security situation. In Bosnia this became a critical factor to track while in Kosovo the restoration was so rapid that tracking was not extensively undertaken.

- *Food availability/Price.* Figures 12, 13 and 14 show examples from KFOR using the Rapid Village Assessment, direct sampling was used in KFOR




Figure 12: Availability of food in Kosovo.




Figure 13: Variation in food prices in Kosovo.




Figure 14: Geographical variation of food availability.

- State of shops/factories.

- *Media.*
- *Agriculture.* Figure 15 shows a KFOR example.




Figure 15: Changes in Kosovo agriculture usage.

Cultural:

- *Religious.*
- *Cultural.*

Recreational:

- *Spectator.*
- *Participation.*

Legal:

- *Police.*
- *Judiciary.*
- *Prisons.*

Rebuilding: The rebuilding of Kosovo was of particular concern and the military through OAB conducted a joint survey the Rapid Village Assessment with the aid agencies lead by the UNHCR. This survey became the cornerstone of KFOR knowledge of Kosovo.

- *Housing.*
- *Road/Rail infrastructure.*

Freedom of Movement:

- *Road traffic.* Figure 16 show an example from IFOR, where freedom of movement was a particular issue.




Figure 16: Traffic movement in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

MEASURES OF SUCCESS

Measures associated with most of the above categories can be established and a number of these were measured by OAB in Bosnia and Kosovo shown in Figures 4 onwards.

In order to demonstrate progress of a mission a simple summary graphic is required. Figure 17 is a fictional example. In this example we have four areas hence four columns in the graphic, the colours indicate the level of normality.

For all on the measures of success a predicted rate of recoverable can be estimated at the start of the mission and subsequently the criteria can be compared with the estimate. Figure 18 indicates a predicted rate of recovery that might be expected.

This shows that we would expect compliance to be relatively short term improvements, stability changes in months and normality up to years. Following the discipline of these measures would enable the military and international community to have a clear indication of their achievements.

CONCLUSIONS

An auditable measurable methodology for measuring the progress of the mission is possible and parts have been demonstrated in the Bosnia and Kosovo mission. Different measures will be important at different times during the mission thus a flexible approach is required throughout the mission.