

A Case Study Example of the Assessment and Evaluation of Peace Operations in Sierra Leone ¹

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Hugh Richardson became the focus for the provision of scientific advice to Operation GRANBY in Sept 1991. He led the UK scientific support team out in the Gulf during the conflict providing operational analysis (OA), scientific and technical advice direct to the UK Land Forces, for which he was awarded the OBE. He then became the focus for the Army lessons learnt analysis activity and then developed and implemented a new concept to enable the provision of scientific support for future field commanders. With the advent of UK operations in Bosnia Hugh became the scientific adviser for this operation whilst continuing to develop support to senior commanders. With the creation of the PJHQ at Northwood in April 1996, he was appointed the first scientific adviser and has led a small cell responsible for the coordination and conduct of scientific OA studies in support of planning and the conduct of UK joint operations worldwide. Over the last five years Hugh has provided OA and scientific support to about 40 operations conducted by the PJHQ (UK), ranging from evacuation operations in Albania and West Africa to humanitarian operations in Mozambique and to warfighting in the Middle East, Balkans and Sierra Leone. His activities have included the wargaming, simulation and numerical analysis of defence plans for IFOR in Bosnia, UK plans for operations in Kosovo, the comparison of UK planning options for the Balkans, Sierra Leone and air operations in the Middle East. In July 2001, Hugh joined Dstl-Analysis at Farnborough as a Principal Consultant where he has responsibility for operational and historical data exploitation in MoD studies.

John Lockwood was commissioned into the Staffords Regiment in 1976. He was promoted Major in 1988 and has received the MBE for military services. In early 1999 he was appointed to the PJHQ at Northwood as a member of J3 Ops (Land) supporting operations in Kosovo. Later he became the desk officer responsible for UK military staff and support to UN operations in Sierra Leone, Cyprus and Georgia. He has recently been appointed to an exchange post with a United States Regiment.

ABSTRACT

Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) J5 (OA) are responsible for providing Operational Analysis (OA) and scientific support to the Permanent Joint Headquarters. The J3 UN desk monitors, deploys, sustains and recovers the United Kingdom contribution to UN operations.

Using the specific worked example of UN operations in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), this paper will demonstrate how an assessment and evaluation of the mission can be made to support the

wider decision-making process within a headquarters environment. Initially, both the mission objectives at the strategic, operational and tactical levels are identified and linked and the analytical process adopted to measure them are outlined. Some conclusions are drawn and then building from the case study example, the paper concludes with general comments emphasising the added value that properly defined and measurable objectives can uniquely provide to the management of crises.

BACKGROUND

The Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) was set up in 1996 as a means of rationalising the headquarters effort in supporting UK military involvement around the world. To that end in the last five years PJHQ has been involved in over 40 operations worldwide.

The primary role of the PJHQ is:

“To be responsible, when directed by Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) for the planning and execution of UK-led joint, potentially joint, combined and multinational operations, and for exercising operational command of UK forces assigned to combined and multinational operations led by others, in order to achieve MODUK’s military strategic objectives.”

Once the political decision has been made to involve the UK in a theatre, the PJHQ is allocated the forces under operational command, and then carries out planning, deployment, sustainment, and recovery of the force. The span of operations over the last five years has been extreme with at one end, support of the large UK contribution to the various Balkan and East Timor operations, and at the other the support of the six UN operations in which we have peace keepers and monitors.

The authors have used a lot of the experience gathered from the operations over the last few years in the preparation of this paper. They hope you will find it interesting and thought provoking, particularly as the UN finds itself under increasing pressure to find a successful outcome to the seemingly intractable problems of Sierra Leone and other areas where conflict resolution is the desired end state.

SCOPE

This paper describes the background to the UN operation in Sierra Leone, and how it has developed and matured (Figure 1). The paper will take account of the successive UN Security Council Resolutions (SCRs) and mandate extensions from which the mission draws its authority. The paper will then go on to look at the identification of the military tasks that fall out from these documents. A number of appropriate metrics before looking at and demonstrating the application of TACO, a Tool to Assess Campaign Objectives, which has been developed by analysts within the PJHQ will then be considered. Some conclusions will then be drawn from the materials presented in the paper. Due to security sensitivities and the on-going nature of the operation, the examples demonstrated with the tool can only be illustrative.



Figure 1: A Case Study — The Assessment and Evaluation of UN Peace Operations in Sierra Leone.

BACKGROUND TO UNAMSIL

The conflict in Sierra Leone dates from March 1991 when the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) launched a war from the east of the country near the border with Liberia to overthrow the government (Figures 2 and 3). With the support of the Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Sierra Leone's army tried at first to defend the government but, the following year, the army itself overthrew the government.

Despite the change of power, the RUF continued its attacks. In February 1995, the United Nations Secretary-General appointed a special Envoy, Mr. Berhanu Dinka (Ethiopia). He worked in collaboration with the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and ECOWAS to try to negotiate a settlement to the conflict and return the country to civilian rule.

Parliamentary and presidential elections were held in February 1996, and the army relinquished power to the winner, Alhaji Dr. Ahmed Tejan Kabbah. The RUF, however, did not participate in the elections and would not recognise the results. The conflict continued.




Figure 2: Background Map to UNAMSIL.

Special Envoy Dinka assisted in negotiating a peace agreement, in November 1996, between the Government of Sierra Leone (GOSL) and RUF known as the Abidjan Accord. The agreement was derailed by another military coup d'état in May 1997. This time the army joined forces with the RUF and formed a ruling junta. President Kabbah and his government went into exile in neighbouring Guinea.



Figure 3: Conflict destruction.

The Security Council authorised ECOWAS to ensure the implementation of the accord using ECOMOG troops. On 23 October, the ECOWAS Committee of Five on Sierra Leone and a delegation representing the chairman of the junta held talks at Conakry and signed a peace plan. Among other things this called for a cease-fire to be monitored by ECOMOG and — if approved by the UN Security Council — assisted by UN military observers (Figure 4).

Although the junta publicly committed itself to implementing the agreement, it subsequently criticised key provisions and raised a number of issues, with the result that the agreement was never implemented.

In February 1998, ECOMOG, responding to an attack by rebel/army junta forces, launched a military attack that led to the collapse of the junta and its expulsion from Freetown (Figures 5 and 6). President Kabbah was returned to office (Figure 7).

On June 1998, the Security Council established the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) for an initial period of six months. The mission monitored and advised efforts to disarm combatants and restructure the nation's security forces. Unarmed UNOMSIL teams, under the protection of ECOMOG, documented reports of on-going atrocities and human rights abuses committed against civilians.

Fighting continued with the rebel alliance gaining control of more than half the country. In December 1998 the alliance began an offensive to retake Freetown and in January overran most of the city. Later the same month, ECOMOG troops retook the capital and again installed the civilian government, although thousands of rebels were still reportedly hiding out in the surrounding countryside.



Figure 4: United Nations helicopter.



Figure 5: Fighting Continues.



Figure 6: Rebels in country.



Figure 7: President Kabbah.

In the aftermath of the rebel attack, special Representative Okelo, in consultation with West African states, initiated a series of diplomatic efforts aimed at opening up dialogue with the rebels. Negotiations between the Government and the rebels began in May 1999 and on 7 July all parties to the conflict signed an agreement in Lome.

This was to end hostilities and form a government of national unity. The parties to the conflict also requested an expanded role for UNOMSIL. On 20 August the UN Security Council authorised an increase in the number of military observers to 210.

THE MISSION AND IDENTIFICATION OF TASKS

This was the beginning of the succession of United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) from which the evolving UN Operations in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) force was to take direction. It is from these documents that it is possible to draw out the UNAMSIL mission and tasks to work from in the study reported in this paper.

UN OPERATIONS IN SIERRA LEONE (UNAMSIL)

22 Oct 99 — UNSCR 1270
Establishment of UNAMSIL

07 Feb 00 — UNSCR 1289
Expansion of UNAMSIL

04 Aug 00 — UNSCR 1313
Strengthening of the UNAMSIL mandate

31 Mar 01 — UNSCR 1346
Strengthening of the UNAMSIL mandate

The paper will now consider how UNAMSIL has evolved over the last two years, drawing out the salient points and tasks from the successive UNSCRs.

On 22 October 1999, the Security Council authorised the establishment of UNAMSIL, a new and much larger mission with a maximum of 6,000 military personnel, including 260 military observers. At the same time the Council decided to terminate UNOMSIL. The key tasks under the mandate UNSCR 1270 were to:

- Assist GOSL and other parties in the implementation of the Lome peace accord.
- Assist GOSL in the implementation of Disarmament Demilitarisation and Reintegration (DDR).
- Establish presence at key locations throughout the territory of Sierra Leone including DDR centres.
- Ensure security and freedom of movement of UN personnel.

- Monitor adherence to the cease-fire in accordance with the cease-fire agreement of 18 May 99
- Encourage the parties to create confidence-building mechanisms and support their functioning.
- Facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance.
- Support the operation of UN civilian officials including the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), human rights and civilian affairs officers.
- Provide support as requested to the Sierra Leone elections.

On 7 February 2000, the Security Council, by its resolution 1289, decided to revise the mandate of UNAMSIL to include a number of additional tasks. It decided to expand the military component to a maximum of 11,100 military personnel, including the 260 military observers already deployed. This expansion was coming into effect when the RUF resumed hostilities in early May, leading to the Security Council subsequently increasing the strength of UNAMSIL, to 13,000 military personnel, by its resolution 1299 of 19 May 2000.

The key tasks were now laid down as:

- Provide security at key locations and Government buildings in particular Freetown, important intersections and major airports, including Lungi.
- Facilitate the free flow of people, goods and humanitarian assistance along specified thoroughfares.
- Provide security in and at all sites of the DDR programme.
- Co-ordinate with and assist the Sierra Leone law enforcement authorities in the discharge of their duties.
- Guard weapons ammunition and other military equipment collected from ex combatants and assist in their subsequent disposal and destruction.

It was perhaps notable at this stage that this was the only real direction given to the mission, with no detailed directive to support the tasks laid down in the UNSCR. The lack of capability within the UNAMSIL headquarters found the force struggling without the military fundamentals of an estimate, a risk assessment, operating procedures or proper command and control measures.

The lack of a coherent concept of operations was to prove almost catastrophic as UNAMSIL found itself close to collapse. This was one of the key areas of UN performance, which subsequently led to the publication of the Brahimi report in the autumn.

Once the fighting was over and the hostage issues were resolved the Security Council looked to strengthening the mandate. The tasks were now strengthened as follows on 4 Aug 00 under UNSCR 1313:

- Maintain the security of Lungi and Freetown peninsulas, and their major approach routes.
- Deter and, where necessary, decisively counter the threat of RUF attack by responding robustly to any hostile actions or threat of imminent and direct use of force.
- Deploy progressively in a coherent operational structure and in sufficient numbers and density at key strategic locations and main population centres. In co-ordination with GOSL assist through presence and within the framework of the mandate, the efforts of GOSL to extend state authority, restoration of law and order and further stabilise the situation progressively throughout the entire country, and within its capabilities and areas of deployment, to afford protection to civilians under threat of immediate physical violence.
- Patrol actively on strategic lines of communication, specifically main access routes to the capital in order to dominate ground, ensure freedom of movement and facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance.

Further enhancements were made to the mandate on 10 August 00 — UNAMSIL — Revised concept of operations. Further tasks were mandated:

- UNAMSIL is to create the appropriate conditions throughout the country so that the peace process can continue unhindered in order to lay the foundation for lasting peace and stability.
- The UN's desired end state is lasting peace and security in Sierra Leone. This includes control of the country's security and government institutions by the democratically elected Government of Sierra Leone (GOSL); governmental control of the country's resources; civilian reconstruction; full implementation of the DDR plan; and protection of human rights.

These tasks were phased:

1. Phase 1: Consolidation of the mission, protection of priority areas and enhancement of the credibility of the force.
 - a. Maintain the security of Lungi and Freetown peninsulas and Bo-Daru enclave.
 - b. Contain and deter the RUF.
 - c. Redeployment or reinforcement of exposed forces.
 - d. Enhance the intelligence and information campaign capabilities of the force.
 - e. Active patrolling to dominate ground, ensure freedom of movement between areas and west of line Kambia - Port Loko - Lunsar - Mile 91 - Bo - Kenema - Daru.
 - f. Assist the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) in re-grouping and re-organisation within capabilities.
 - g. Continue support of DDR and maintain the closest collaboration in designing plans for DDR expansion.

2. Phase 2: Create the conditions for a regeneration and progression of the peace process. Increase the pressure on the RUF and establish the conditions for the expansion of UNAMSIL. Tasks may be identified as follows
 - a. Apply military pressure to the RUF in co-ordination with diplomatic and SLA activities.
 - b. Enhance logistic and mobility capabilities of the force.
 - c. Ensure freedom of movement between brigade areas and west of line Kambia - Port Loko - Lunsar - Mile 91- Bo - Kenema - Daru within capabilities.
 - d. Within capabilities establish a security framework to allow resumption of legal mining operations (most likely - Zimmi).
 - e. Initiate DDR within recently secured areas (Joru and Kenema).

3. Phase 3: Peace support operations. Complete the re-establishment of GOSL control and authority over the key areas of Makeni, Magburaka, Koidu and Tongo, to create secure conditions for nation-wide free and fair democratic elections. Tasks may be identified as follows:
 - a. Establish UN sectors in Makeni and Kono regions.
 - b. Ensure freedom of movement.
 - c. Be prepared to establish a security framework for the entire country (including North SL).
 - d. Within capabilities, maintain the security framework to allow resumption of legal mining operations (in Koidu and Tongo).
 - e. Assist other UN and NGO agencies in the establishment of humanitarian assistance.
 - f. Recommence DDR process for RUF and for remaining loyal factions.
 - g. Assist in the facilitation of free and fair democratic elections.

On 30 March 2001 UNSCR 1346 was passed and authorised a further increase to 17,500 military personnel, including the 260 military observers. The Council took this decision by its resolution 1346, and, by the same resolution, approved a revised concept of operations.

This requested the Secretary-General to inform the council at regular intervals on progress made by UNAMSIL in the implementation of key aspects of its concept of operations, and further requested him to provide an assessment in his next report on steps taken to improve the effectiveness of UNAMSIL.

TASK METRICS

Reference A: Metrics and Measures of Effectiveness in Crisis Response Operations, dated July 200, Andrew Richardson, John Catherall, Steve Lea and Andrew Caldwell.

The authors must pay tribute here to the work of NC3A Dr Paul Chouinard (unreferenced NC3A paper) and to the CDA report on Metrics and Measures of Effectiveness in Crisis Response Operations, dated July 2000 by Andrew Richardson, John Catherall, Steve Lea and

Andrew Caldwell. I have used their work to help me identify appropriate metrics associated with the tasks and activities identified above.

The following will illustrate with a few selected tasks how appropriate activities and metrics may be identified.

TASK — PROVIDE DDR SUPPORT TO GOSL

1. Activities

- a. Dismantle militia and paramilitary forces.
- b. Supervise demobilisation and demilitarisation.
- c. Assist in weapons collection or confiscation.
- d. Verify cantonments and disarmament.
- e. Verify weapons destruction.

2. Metrics

- a. Number of armed groups, which do not agree to disarm.
- b. Number of armed groups' inventories correctly identified.
- c. Percentage of overall weapons verified as decommissioned.
- d. Percentage of overall weapons in cantonments.
- e. Percentage of armed groups demobilised (removal of insignia and disbandment of infrastructure).

TASK — PROTECT AND SECURE LAND LOCS

1. Activities

- a. Guard convoys
- b. Guard critical route choke points
- c. Monitor LOC routes
- d. Provide protection escorts for refugees

2. Metrics

- a. Percentage of Traffic flow interrupted by hostile action
- b. Percentage Reduction in LOC capacity (resulting from enemy attack)
- c. Number of convoys requiring escorts/day
- d. Percentage Casualties caused, own and convoy
- e. Hours to restore LOC following interruption

TASK — PROVIDE CIVIL COMMUNITY RECONSTRUCTION SUPPORT TO GOSL

1. Activities

- a. Support development of a competent civil authority.
- b. Assist civil interim authority.
- c. Assist NGO activities.
- d. Assist teachers and educators.
- e. Assist in community projects.
- f. Construct civil infrastructure.
- g. Assist broadcast (TV and radio).
- h. Assist repair of religious structures.

2. Metrics

- a. Number of requests for assistance received
- b. Percentage of requests for assistance satisfied
- c. Number of liaison officers accepted within civil authorities

The authors believe that they have demonstrated with these examples how it is possible to identify metrics associated with the activities and the tasks mandated in Sierra Leone. It has not been possible within the security constraints of the current operation to assign real values to these illustrative metrics. Also the authors do not minimise the difficulty of obtaining the appropriate data remotely from an UK or UN Headquarters. Past operations in Bosnia and Kosovo serve to emphasise the value of having staff on the ground dedicated to the collection and analysis of such data.

TACO (TOOL TO ASSESS CAMPAIGN OUTCOME)

The Tool to Assess Campaign Outcome (TACO) aims to provide the Commander with a high level summary of campaign progress using the tasks, activities, and metrics previously identified. It draws upon British military doctrine using a lines of operation and decisive points methodology to depict campaign progress towards a desired end state.

It is intended to:

- Aggregate and structure information on campaign progress.
- Act as a check on the Commander's perception.
- Prompt the more detailed consideration of particular issues.

It is not intended to:

- Replace the normal briefing and reporting process.

- Provide detailed low level tactical information.
- Dictate the apportionment of resources to tasks.

THEORETICAL STRUCTURE

TACO is based around a series of up to 15 Decisive Points (DPs). Associated with each DP are a number of “Top Level Tasks.” Similarly, a number of “Sub Tasks” are associated with each “Top Level Task.” In naming DPs, a good policy is to try and complete “This DP is reached when ...” — this helps to ensure DPs are points and decisive! A freer approach is generally appropriate when naming tasks.

The theory is that daily progress is recorded for each Sub Task by attributing a value of either “G” (Green), “A” (Amber) or “R” (Red). Attributing a Green value to a Sub Task indicates that (at the current time) it has been completed. Conversely, attributing a Red value to a Sub Task indicates that either it has not been started or that progress is very slow. Amber allows for intermediate cases.

It is assumed that once all the Sub Tasks associated with a Decisive Point are coloured Green then that particular Decisive Point has been reached.

WORKBOOK STRUCTURE

“Daily progress” is where the structure of DPs, Top Level Tasks, and Sub Tasks is created. Buttons are available that allow the user to insert any of these items, or to delete a particular item.

Comments relating to changes in Sub Task values may be placed in cells, which lie at the conjunction of the DP with the date on which the change occurs. Such comments are processed and appear in the ‘Events Box’ on the “Display” sheet.

“Display” contains a display, which summarises the number of Green, Amber, and Red tasks associated with each DP. Each DP is also associated with a particular phase of the campaign (e.g. Deterrence, Defence, etc.) and a particular Line of Operation. Key events associated with the day in question are also displayed.

“Datasheet” is mostly used for internal TACO calculations. However, it also holds the start date of the campaign and the number of days for which TACO holds data.

UNAMSIL CAMPAIGN PLAN

Figures 8, 9, and 10 illustrate how TACO may be used to represent the UNAMSIL campaign plan. Figure 8 identifies the seven high level tasks and the sub-tasks. Figure 9 is a screen shot showing how daily progress may be determined for each of the Sub Tasks. The previously

identified metrics would be used to determine the colour coding but have not been incorporated in this example due to security considerations. Figure 10 is another screen shot illustrating how campaign progress is portrayed across the four phases (Consolidation, Enable Regeneration, Peace Support and Handover) and the five lines of operation (Strategic, IO, Maritime, Air and Land).

1		Force Security
1 A		Force Security
1 A	1	Maintain Security of Lungi Peninsula
1 A	2	Maintain Security of Freetown Peninsula
1 A	3	Maintain Security of Bo-Daru Enclave
1 A	4	Reinforce Exposed Forces
2		Restore Credibility of UNAMSIL Force
2 A		Enhance Capabilities
2 A	1	Provide Enhanced Intelligence Gathering Capability
2 A	2	Provide Enhanced Info Ops Capability
2 B		Demonstrate Capabilities
2 B	1	Decisively Counter Any Threat of RUF Attack
3		Freedom of Movement
3 A		UNAMSIL Activities
3 A	1	Secure Land LOCs
3 A	2	Active Patrolling
3 A	3	Maintain Appropriate Presence at Key Locations
3 A	4	Support Operation of UN Civilian Officials
3 A	5	Enforce Cease-Fire Agreement
3 A	6	Apply Pressure to RUF
3 B		GOSL Co-ordination
3 B	1	Co-ordinate Plans with GOSL Forces
3 B	2	Assist SLA in Regrouping and Reorganisation
3 C		NGO Co-ordination
3 C	1	Facilitate Delivery of Humanitarian Assistance
3 D		Population
3 D	1	Facilitate Free Flow of People and Goods
4		GOSL Control Over Key Areas
4 A		Expand Control
4 A	1	Restore Law and Order
4 A	2	Establish UN Sectors in Makeni and Kono Regions
4 A	3	Maintain Security Framework to Allow Legal Mining
5		Structural Renewal
5 A		Infrastructure
5 A	1	LOCs
5 A	2	Community Buildings
5 A	3	Services
5 B		Political Re-integration
5 B	1	Completion of DDR
6		Elections
6 A		Elections
6 A	1	Assist in the Facilitation of Free and Fair Elections
7		Recover the Force
7 A		Recover the Force
7 A	1	Withdraw

Figure 8: Example UNAMSIL Campaign Plan — Tasks and Sub-tasks.




Figure 9: Example Screen shot of Task Display and Daily Progress.




Figure 10: Example Campaign Plan Display and Progress.

FUTURE TACO DEVELOPMENT ISSUES

The complexity of a campaign plan may be an issue; on one exercise in which this tool was used had 100+ Sub Tasks. This may make the tool unworkable; simplicity is a virtue when explaining to a Joint Force Commander how his campaign is progressing.

1. The staffing of information collection, who does it, if subjective, is it the voice of the senior officer present. This is of course why we need objective metrics.
2. The Red Amber and Green traffic lights do need precise definitions.
3. Although the tool is implemented in MS Excel and in theory fairly simple to modify, it is a bit “clunky”.
4. The other issue in terms of the display; is which doctrinal structure should be used? UK Commanders feel quite at home with our adoption of UK doctrine: a campaign plan with lines of operation. The authors could have chosen to use “maritime,” “air,” and “land” but they could be functional e.g. coalition building. The display also uses decisive points broken into phases, achievement of a centre of gravity, leading to an operational end state, (hopefully tea and medals!).
5. The tool clearly needs further review and extension to include metrics so that objectivity and an audit trail may be achieved.

CONCLUSIONS

The authors believe these conclusions are self-explanatory.

1. The need for a clearly defined UN mission and end state. The acronym SMART is always useful in defining the mission and end state, Simple, Measurable, Achievable, Realistic, and Timely.
2. The need for a well defined hierarchical set of objectives:
 - At the Strategic — UN level.
 - At the Operational level — the Joint Force Commander in theatre on the ground.
 - At the Tactical level, the component commander — the UN Military observer.
3. These objectives ideally need to be hierarchical, broken down into tasks and activities with time scales for achievement.

4. Finally a range of metrics appropriate to these tasks and activities needs to be defined.

On 30 March 2001, a further increase was authorised to 17,500 military personnel, including the 260 military observers. The Council took this decision by its resolution 1346, and, by the same resolution, approved a revised concept of operations. It is of interest to note and the authors wish they could have said that it was a result of their work but this new resolution does include the requirement to demonstrate progress and provide assessments of improvements in effectiveness.

The authors hope that they have demonstrated that the TACO methodology can display progress toward a desired end state. It requires further development to include proper metrics as well as military judgement but it does provide a record and an audit trail of the progress toward an end state.

If analysts really got their act together, it might even be used in a forecasting mode to try and identify whether sufficient resources are being applied to achieve the tasks by the times required.

A cautionary word, “no plan survives first contact with the enemy.” It is important to recognise that additional OA work is required to ensure that the tasks and activities identified at the strategic, operational and tactical levels in the campaign plan are sufficient and will ensure that the desired end state is achieved. Far be it from the authors to suggest that in Kosovo, NATO achieved all its tasks, destroying the enemy’s centre of gravity but nobody told Milosevic that he was defeated. He didn’t have the same campaign plan that we had.

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1. The opinions, observations and conclusions expressed in this paper are solely those of the authors. They are based on unclassified source material in the public domain, and are not meant to reflect the official views of the United Kingdom Government or Armed Forces.
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