

Operational Analysis in Support of HQ ISAF, Kabul, Afghanistan, 2002

D. J. Evans

Senior Analyst, Operational Analysis Team,
OA, Ops/Cts, HQ Land Command,
Erskine Barracks, Wilton,
Salisbury, Wiltshire, England, United Kingdom.
e-mail: cdawltn@dstl.gov.uk

Dave Evans is a Senior Analyst in the small Operational Analysis team that resides at HQ Land Command. Currently this team is exclusively manned by analysts supplied from the UK Defence Science and Technology Laboratories (Dstl) and Dave is also the project manager for this manpower support from Dstl. At the time of this work the team consisted of only five permanent analyst; the Head of branch, two Senior and two Junior analysts. The OA team's primary customers are the headquarters of the UK's deployable land forces; effectively HQ 1 (UK) Armoured Division and HQ 3 (UK) Division, although the team also supports deployed Brigade-level HQ and provides OA for HQ Land as the mounting HQ for UK land forces. Dave was primarily the point of contact for support to 1 (UK) Armd Div and supported them in their exercise programme in the two years preceding this work, culminating in deploying in support of the Land Component HQ in the high profile Anglo-Omani exercise held in Oman of the Autumn of 2001. He has an honours degree in Physics with Astrophysics from the University of Manchester.

ABSTRACT

In the wake of coalition operations against Taliban and Al'Qaida forces in Afghanistan in late 2001, a light military force called the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was formed to operate within Kabul in support of the Interim Administration (IA). ISAF was initially led by a two star HQ based on 3 (UK) Division. 3 (UK) Division makes integral use of operational analysis (OA) and their analytical team was involved from the onset of planning for the operation. Subsequently, a team of two analysts deployed to Kabul with HQ ISAF on the 18 February 2002 and was present until the change of command (to Turkey) on the 20 June 2002. The country had been at war for over twenty years, and recently living under an arguably repressive Taliban regime; as a result, much of the infrastructure of the country was in ruins and "eyes of the world" were upon the international mission. The OA team was primarily tasked to seek quantified Measures of Success for the mission, which involved tracking indicators of the security situation. They also aided target audience analysis for the Information Operations campaign and became involved in a number of additional, *ad hoc* tasks. Whilst the team was often operating with a paucity of data, leading to limited analytical scope, the output of these tasks was highly valued. The successful deployment of UK analysts in support of HQ ISAF provides recent experience of analysis in support to a front line command and comprehension of the realities of attempting to provide measurement of stabilisation under such conditions.

BACKGROUND

Following the attacks in the US on September 11 and the subsequent operations against Taliban & Al'Qaida forces in Afghanistan the UK realised that ground forces would be required in order to achieve stabilisation. The UK further realised that it might need to play a significant role in this task and in November started planning for the deployment of a light force of about brigade size, commanded by a 2-star HQ based on 3 (UK) Division (Figure 1). Over the preceding years, 3 (UK) Div had learned to make extensive use of OA support provided from HQ Land Command and the OA team was immediately involved in the operational planning.




Figure 1: Timeline for the operation.

At the Bonn talks (27 November to 5 December) Afghan leaders agreed that an Interim Administration (IA) would be formed pending a Loya Jirga. They also recognised that the IA would require military support to achieve the necessary conditions of peace and stability in and around Kabul, although there was much disagreement over the size and composition of that force. In the event, this light military force was called the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF); the UK agreed to lead it and provide the bulk of the forces for an initial period of three months (which stretched to six months). ISAF was to be independent of the forces engaged in rooting out remaining terrorist forces although it was to be linked with the same US command (CENTCOM), primarily to ensure deconfliction.

DEPLOYMENT AND REACHBACK

As a consequence of the above events, in mid-December 3 (UK) Div was warned off to form the 2-star ISAF HQ and to prepare for deployment to Kabul in short order. Initially it was intended that two analysts be deployed on one of the early flights into Bagram airbase. However, severe constraints on air transport and life support and the requirement to build up military capability as quickly as possible delayed the OA deployment until ISAF was established and sufficient staff could be supported in theatre. Thus, it was not until mid-

February that an OA cell was formed in HQ ISAF with one analyst deployed on February 18 followed by a second on March 6. These two analysts were relieved in mid-April by a second pair, one of whom remained until the hand-over of ISAF command to Turkey on June 20. The analysts involved were:

OA Team One	Senior Analyst	Mr. Paul Scott
	Junior Analyst	Miss. Sara Dean
OA Team Two	Senior Analyst	Mr. Dave Evans
	Junior Analyst	Mr. Henry Marshall

It should be noted that while a small team of only two analysts was in-theatre at any one time the communications back to the UK were, for once, very good. We had secure email through the UK JOCS system, telephone connection through the UK MOD back to the office, and Internet connections (albeit the latter relatively slow and undependable). This allowed us to remain in contact with the office on a daily basis, as well as pass detailed information and requests back and forth using both secure and Internet email. As a consequence, the concept of “reachback” was successful, wherein the team were able to task the HQ Land Base Team to perform work on their behalf (Figure 2). Through this link the team also had access to the wider OA community and the world at large. Information from the Internet was gathered and collated, expert advice was sought from the UK military and databases, and models were developed by experienced programmers before being sent out to theatre.




Figure 2: Operational analysis organisation.

LIVING CONDITIONS

A key aspect of our approach to providing deployed OA support is that analysts impose no greater life support burden on the HQ than a staff officer (even were it possible). Living conditions in the ISAF camp in Kabul were a bit grim, at least for civilian analysts used the comfort of a warm office environment (Figures 3 and 4). Initially there was no glass in the windows and the weather was cold and wet (going down to -12 degrees C at night). The officers were accommodated within a dilapidated building, whilst the other ranks were

sharing tents. Human remains had been cleared from the rooms, although the blood remained on the walls. However these conditions did improve steadily throughout and by late spring the situation could be described as akin to a “holiday camp,” although the threat of hostile action remained throughout. Working conditions were also somewhat Spartan, but better than those we were used to operating under on field exercises.




Figure 3: Living conditions.



Figure 4: Early ISAF Camp.

SUMMARY OF WORK

Figure 6 outlines the significant tasks that were undertaken during the OA to HQ ISAF, including those that involved significant “reachback.” They were generally not “rocket science” but, given the quick response times required, the tasks were frequently intellectually

challenging and often required working long hours to complete (Figure 6). The available data was often sketchy at best. Bespoke tools and techniques were developed from little or nothing, and the results were habitually simple models, using a “quick and dirty” approach to most of our problems given the underlying constraints. Much of the work involved relatively simple collation and presentation of data rather than extensive analysis. Many of these tasks were IT based and may not be viewed as “true-OA.” In addition to these tasks, our familiarity with the major Microsoft applications enabled us to provide the HQ with a trouble-shooting service for minor IT problems. The key thing is that our output was valued, both by senior staff and at the working level.



Figure 5: Working Conditions.

There is neither the time nor the need to go into the detail of each of these tasks here, but I would like to give some further expansion of four chosen areas, namely:

- Strategic Lift
- Measures of Success.
- Support to Information Operations.
- Loya Jirga Delegates Arrival Modelling.

STRATEGIC LIFT

From the outset it was apparent that the deployment of ISAF forces would be severely constrained (Figure 7). Airfields were damaged and contaminated by mines and unexploded ordnance. Approach routes were under threat, constraining routes and flying to night time. Aircraft could not be refuelled in theatre. The list of problems went on and on. Thus in addition to the normal constraints imposed by aircraft availability (here compounded by the requirement for night flying) aircraft loads were severely limited, airfield capacity to handle

flights was limited and the capacity to store material once off-loaded presented difficulties. Thus there was a delicate balance to be struck between the desire to get combat power in rapidly and the need for EOD, transport and airfield repair capability. In addition there was a political imperative to get a visible presence on the streets of Kabul as soon as possible.

	Pre-Deployment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Historical Analysis Review • Troops to Task • Strategic Lift • Sustainability
Deployed Teams (Feb-Jun)	TEAM 1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Measures of Success • Support to Information Operations • Simple Spreadsheet Tools • Assist in Threat Analysis • Statistical Advice and Explanation • Data Collection and Canvassing
	TEAM 2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Measures of Success • Support to Information Operations • Loya Jirga Delegates Arrival Model • Database Development • More Spreadsheet Tools • General IT Support

Figure 6: Summary of work.




Figure 7: Strategic Lift.

Compounding all these tradeoffs was the need to use the same air transport to deploy and sustain the forces in-theatre. Thus, as forces deployed the capacity to *deliver* forces was progressively reduced by the need to *sustain* those already there. It is hardly surprising then that the desired order of arrival was the subject of much study and debate.

To support this debate two Excel™-based models were constructed by the OA team over the course of about a week. The first examined the build-up in theatre of forces, stocks, engineering and transport assets at both the airhead and the HQ location (Figure 8). It further examined the feedback between engineering capacity and the storage and handling capacities, together with the requirement for transport to move stocks out of the airhead. This model was demonstrated and helped bring home to the planners the trade-offs involved, but it was not used with operationally valid data.




Figure 8: EOD and Lift Model.

The second, simpler, model proved of far more utility (Figure 9). It examined the deployment time taking account of the draw-down in available lift capacity due to the need to sustain the forces in theatre. The key to its utility was its linkage to the detailed FET (Forces and Equipment Table) together with the ability to rapidly change aircraft and airfield capacities, aircraft availability, sustainability requirements and most importantly the desired order of arrival.

Typical output of this model is shown in Figure 10, the three sets representing the time at which each force element arrives, the number of aircraft flights available and the number of flights required for re-supply. The key to the utility of this model is that for revised assumptions the arrival times of key elements could be provided in 1- 5 minutes depending on the complexity of the revisions. Results were provided immediately prior to the GOC's departure, whilst his party was in the air and after his arrival.

MEASURES OF SUCCESS

A methodology for the Measurement of Success of the mission had been proposed before the arrival of OA in theatre and about four weeks of data had been collected. The methodology

was based around these key success criteria developed from the overall campaign plan. However, data collection relied on patrol reports as the primary source and the three battle groups (UK, German, and French) were reporting at different levels of detail (Figure 11).




Figure 9: The Sustainability Lift Model.




Figure 10: Sustainability Lift Model – Example Results.

The OA analyst realised that the data requirements for such an ambitious plan would not be achievable and assisted in the further development and refinement of the approach, helping to identify additional key data sources and new methods of data gathering (Figures 12 and 13). He also persuaded the HQ to request a second analyst in order to cope with the

volume of work. A surprisingly large range of data was collected, collated and analysed. This was presented in terms of trends by time, area, etc. Some examples are given here. It is fair to say that the ISAF mission was primarily concerned with security, as indicated by its name. Thus it is unsurprising that we found the majority of the Measures of Success that were eventually demanded by the GOC concerned this issue, and other measures became unimportant.




Figure 11: Schematic Overview of the Campaign Plan.




Figure 12: ISAF Patrolling by District.

Patrolling	- Numbers - Duration	- Patrol Reports
Policing	- Number of patrols	- HQ KMNB
Crime	- Numbers - Types - Rest of World	- RMP - IA Police - Reachback
Military	- Sightings - Vehicle Movements - Barracks in use - EOD data	- HQ KMNB
Medical	- DNBI- Types	- HQ ISAF - Clinic data
CIMIC	- Projects Completed	- HQ KMNB
Use of KIA	- Flights	- Airfield Staff
Commerce	- Vehicle Movements	- HQ KMNB

Figure 13: Data Types and Sources.

Here we can see that reported crimes dropped dramatically (Figure 14). Note that real crime levels may be somewhat different and that some of the subsequent increase may be attributed to the improved situation leading to a greater proportion of crimes being reported.




Figure 14: Crime by Time.

In addition, comparisons were made with other parts of the world for certain key indicators. The data for the rest of the world was obtained via reachback to the Dstl Frontline Department who tapped many sources and conducted extensive searches of the internet. Figure 15 presents a comparison of reported murder rates in a number of cities. The outputs from these analyses and comparisons were extensively used by COMISAF in briefing his visitors and members of the Interim Administration.




Figure 15: Headline Murder Rate.

SUPPORT TO INFORMATION OPERATIONS (TARGET AUDIENCE ANALYSIS)

Information Operations wished to sample public opinion on a range of matters, for example to find out which of their products were reaching an audience. Initially members of the Info Ops team went with the UK BG patrols on to the street with a translator to ask people the questions. It was evident that they were keen for their views to be heard; however this method was time consuming and, due to the intimidating nature of armed soldiers in uniform, was probably not producing fair results.

Media products to convey ISAF's message to the people of Kabul:

- ISAF Newspaper
- ISAF Radio
- ISAF TV
- ISAF Loudspeakers
- ISAF Leaflets

They wished to measure Kabuli's attitudes and the penetration of these ISAF media products.

Figure 16: Information Operations.

OA proposed creating drop boxes within the various police districts, which would contain questionnaires. Initially there was much concern over security issues booby traps, snipers,

etc. (Let's face it London is meant to be fairly safe but try and find a rubbish bin in a railway station nowadays!) However, the potential improvement in efficiency was deemed to outweigh these risks (Figure 17).

<p><u>For:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• can use to distribute other material - leaflets and newspapers• questionnaires available to all• no pressure or time limits for completion• cheap & easy to make collections• facilitates comparison of police districts• potentially large samples
<p><u>Against:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• security and safety issues• multiple entries by individuals• collusion• problems with illiterate people• possible access problems (location vital)

Figure 17: Drop Boxes — For and Against.

A prototype box was designed and produced. It was decided to place the box in the perceived most dangerous district, on the grounds that if it survived there, it would survive anywhere (Figure 18). The placement was decided by liaising with the patrols on the ground and looking for where a large number of people would come across it. A location outside a pharmacy was chosen in police district 5.



Figure 18: Drop Box.

With the success of this box more were produced and sited throughout Kabul. Info Ops were faced with a rapidly increasing number of responses and OA produced a database to aid the analysis and storage of this data. OA also helped with the design of the questionnaires and the location of the drop boxes in order to maximise the coverage and utility of the surveys. The overall conclusions drawn from these surveys are shown in Figure 19.

- Presence of ISAF soldiers and ISAF media products well received by the majority of Kabulis.
- Most Kabulis believe the security situation has improved.
- There is a good understanding of the ISAF mission.
- Gaps in knowledge have been identified.
- TAA is enabling targeting of Info Ops products.

Figure 19: Summary of Conclusions, Information Operations.

LOYA JIRGA DELEGATES ARRIVAL MODEL

As the date for the Loya Jirga approached there was increasing concern that security arrangements to handle over 1500 delegates would disrupt events causing unacceptable queuing. Perhaps more importantly, there was grave concern that queues would form outside the Loya Jirga site, presenting a target for terrorist attack. The latter could not be allowed. General McColl, COMISAF, suggested that OA should look at the problem.

The analyst in-theatre sought advice via reachback on potential modelling approaches and, after a short discussion, SIMUL8 was selected because it seemed eminently suitable, they had prior experience in its use, and the problem was relatively simple (Figure 20). The model was written in an afternoon and evening and subsequently refined over the course of about a week. SIMUL8 also produces a visually attractive animated model that was deemed valuable for briefing purposes.

Initial interest from the staff was limited, despite the GOC's direction. However, once an initial model was running the attractive nature of the model quickly gained converts and the OA team were mentioned with glowing praise during the GOC's evening update. In the event, the model was used for briefing purposes: to Chairman Kharzai upon his visit to the HQ, and to the Loya Jirga commission responsible for directing the security arrangements. The model was taken no further because the security arrangements were changed so that queuing did not take place outside the Loya Jirga site. However, the piece of work demonstrated OA capability to the HQ staff and was a nice example of the "rocket science" that were would be able to produce.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

I believe that the work presented here gives a good example of the types of work conducted by OA deployed with UK HQs. The more academic reader will possibly be dismayed by the

lack of rigorous OR techniques employed, the paucity of valid data available, and the astounding leaps of faith that must be followed if one is to provide valuable contribution to the commander's mission. But that is what is sought; that is what we have learned to provide. ISAF was also very much an initial force; perhaps OA provided on later missions will have the capacity and the remit to provide more comprehensive analysis of certain aspects of the mission.




Figure 20: SIMUL8 Model.

In terms of the nature of deployed OA I would state the following lessons identified:

- Simple is good.
- Speed is paramount.
- Expect data to be relatively poor quality.
- The task is as much to provide presentation material as it is to provide analysis or decision support.
- The work is *ad hoc* as much as it is planned.
- The skills required are for IT as much as they are for OR.

I have started and ended with examples of good work which, although completed in rapid order, somewhat missed the boat because staff interest had moved on. This highlights the need for analysts to be an integral part of the HQ and planning staff so that rapid feedback on work can be obtained and the analysts can be aware of changes in priorities. Reachback on its own would be insufficient. It also highlights that if OA is to be truly effective in supporting the mission then perhaps it needs to be involved from the outset. The Measures of

Success need to be defined in the first draft of the plan, and the mechanisms for gathering the data to support this function need to be proactively sought by the military themselves. It was partially the case that a small force such as ISAF simple does not have the resources to collect the detailed data that OA demands. However, it was also true that, in some cases, the value and importance of such data was not properly conveyed to the soldier on the ground. But then, soldiers are trained to fight, not to collect data, and I suspect that many scorn such tasks.

The potential utility of OA is still not widely recognised at all levels throughout the UK forces. Frequently it is assumed to be restricted to wargaming, because that is where military staffs primarily encounter it. Thus, relying on reachback to provide a full service will not work because the staff will not recognise where we can help. Analysts integral to the HQ are essential to overcome this and they must be proactive. Prior to this particular operation OA was valued by 3 (UK) Div, in particular by the current GOC (General McColl). Nevertheless it was slipped down the deployment order, although it must be recognised that ISAF faced particularly stringent constraints on manpower, accommodation and transport. The fact that once we were there we were kept right up to the point at which the UK handed over command is strong evidence of the value placed on the team.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

In the production of this paper I freely admit to plagiarising the words of the Head of OA at HQ Land, John Sharpe, as indeed he directed me. Credit must go, of course, to the other analysts who deployed on the operation and produced some of this briefing material in the past, particularly Paul Scott who was the first one “on the ground.” Finally, my thanks to Henry Marshall who accompanied me to Kabul and who kept me vaguely sane during our time together in a tent.

SUPPLEMENTAL DATA

The document above constitutes the information that was presented at the Cornwallis VIII meeting, 14-17 April 2003. At the conclusion of the meeting there was a request in include more data in the final version that was published in the record of the proceedings. Rather than re-engineer the paper, it was felt that a supplemental section would be a preferential means of presenting that data. This supplemental data is neither comprehensive nor authoritative. The data is presented merely as a series of example charts, with those charts being indicative of the work that was taking place. Where practicable, a few sentences have been included to help the reader understand the context.






Figure S1: ISAF Boundaries Map.

A number of the other charts presented here (and in the main Cornwallis paper) discuss the Police Districts of Kabul. These are shown in the map above (Figure S1). During the period of ISAF, these districts did change slightly; districts were added as the boundary of ISAF expanded slightly, and at least one district was split into two and the areas renumbered. This did make for some minor difficulties in data consistency – some data could be realigned but some could not and this is reflected in the differing district numbers that will be seen on some charts. The map in Figure S2 shows a trace of the Information Operations campaign as at 14th February. The distribution of the InfoOps products can be seen.

Early in the development of the Measures of Success study it was proposed that the movement of trucks in and out of Kabul could be measured as an indicator of commercial growth and stability (Figure S3). To that end, loaded and unloaded (i.e. empty) trucks were counted on the main Jallalabad road that entered Kabul from the SE. By early March the tracking was discontinued, since it was felt that that the analysis indicated that truck movements were comparatively stable and that the Measure of Success had been “met.”

Similar to Figure S3, Figure S4 demonstrates the early work that sought to track commercial indicators for the Measures of Success study. The number of aircraft passing through the APOD was also tracked. However by the beginning of March it was felt that the data demonstrated stability and the collection was discontinued.

Figure S5 is supplementary to Figure 12 in the main Cornwallis paper. Figure S5 shows in more detail the total duration of the Kabul Multi National Brigade patrols in the city, on a weekly basis. The timings of the day were as follows: (1). *Day*: 0500 to 1900, (2) *Pre-Curfew*: 1900 to 2200, and (3) *Curfew*: 2200 to 0500.




Figure S2: InfoOps Campaign Trace.




Figure S3: InfoOps Campaign Trace. Commercial truck movement into and out of Kabul as a possible measure of commercial activity.




Figure S4: Aircraft Tracking as a measure of activity.




Figure S5: Duration of KMNB Patrols.

Figure S6 is a summary of the EOD tasks undertaken by ISAF during the period shown. Figure S7 was produced during the early days of the formation of the 1st Battalion of the Afghan National Guard (BANG), which ISAF took the responsibility to train. There was a concern that the Bn should be a representative cross-section of the ethnic diversity of the

country and city, and that a single ethnic group did not dominate the unit. The OA team assisted in displaying such information graphically. It should be noted that the constitution of 1 BANG was fluid and will have changed hereafter.




Figure S6: ISAF EOD.



Figure S7: Early work showing ethnic breakdown of 1st Battalion of the Afghan National Guard (BANG).

Figure S8 is an example of analysis that was performed on the intelligence reports being provided to ISAF. At one point, the OA team was asked to assist in extracting information from database of intelligence reports. This involved checking the consistency of the data, stripping spurious reports and facilitating presentation of the data in summary form. The data shown here only covers a snapshot of time and a limited source of reports; it should not be taken as representative of the city as a whole or of the ongoing situation.




Figure S8: Example of Analysis of INT Reports.

During the operation the OA team had the occasion to examine the CIMIC projects that were being undertaken by ISAF. Figure S9 is a snap-shot of those projects, showing the number and maturity of projects assigned to different areas. It should be noted that these were only the projects that were managed and funded under the auspices of the ISAF operation. Large numbers of other civil projects were underway concurrently from the international community and aid agencies.

During our analysis of CIMIC projects, the OA team also sought to ascertain the apportionment of CIMIC projects to the districts of Kabul. The thought was that there might be some bias that needed to be addressed; either to re-align the projects more “fairly,” or to investigate why such a bias existed (Figure S10). No extant analysis or conclusion of the matter is presented here, however the next two Figures (S11 and S12) highlight some complementary analysis that investigated the situation in these districts.

As part of the investigation of the CIMIC projects, the OA also attempted to ascertain information on the situation in the districts of Kabul. Figure S11 presents some rough analysis of the total area of the districts, the urban area therein, and the associated urban area that was assessed as “non-destroyed.” The data were gathered from the estimations of the ISAF CIMIC teams who deployed in Kabul. The data was sought in order to provide a back-drop to any analysis of the apportionment of CIMIC projects.




Figure S9: ISAF CIMIC Projects.




Figure S10: CIMIC Projects by Population.




Figure S11: Areas of Districts.

Figure S12 is the final figure of those that were part of an investigation of the situation in the districts of Kabul and the apportionment of CIMIC projects by ISAF. This figure was a calculation, based on figures estimated by the CIMIC teams operating in Kabul, of the population densities in the districts. In particular, we attempted to ascertain what the density might be like in respect of the usable urban area (i.e. that proportion of buildings and homes that had not been damaged in prior conflicts). In the event, a conclusive analysis of the impact of such factors was not completed.

ISAF Information Operations became involved in looking at the opinion of the people of Kabul. The OA team collaborated in this work and the matter is discussed in the main Cornwallis report (see Figures 16-19). More detail on the results of these questionnaires is presented in the next series of Figures.

1. Firstly, the summary results of the “CIMIC Questionnaire” (also known as the “What Do You Think?” questionnaire) are shown (Figure S13). This questionnaire consisted of five questions designed to judge the level of trust that the population had in the various Afghan and International organisations and to ascertain the priorities of people.
2. Secondly, a few of the questions are presented from the General Questionnaire (which was the first) and the PsyOps Questionnaire (which sought to ascertain whether ISAF’s message was reaching the population of Kabul).




Figure S12: Population Densities of Districts.




Figure S13: Information Operations Questionnaires.




Figure S14: CIMIC Questionnaire – Question 1 – Peoples’ Priorities.

THE CIMIC QUESTIONNAIRE

1. Question 1 of the CIMIC Questionnaire (Figure S14) was:

Look at the following five categories and consider how they affect the quality of life for you and your family. Please rank these items in order of importance to you and your family.

The respondents were given a matrix of boxes in order to rank the categories. Some of the respondents only ticked one box and that is shown on the graph.

2. Question 2 in the CIMIC Questionnaire (Figure S15) was:

What should be the priorities for the Government of Afghanistan? Please rank these categories in order of importance to the Government.

3. Question 3 in the CIMIC Questionnaire (Figure S16) was:

Do you think that these organisations have been effective in improving the situation in Afghanistan?

4. Question 4 on the CIMIC Questionnaire (Figure S17) was:

What services do you think these organisations should be providing in Afghanistan?

This question presented a large matrix of the organisations and the services that were also present in the other questions and gave the respondents the opportunity to tick any that they thought should apply.

5. The fifth and final question on the CIMIC Questionnaire (Figure S18) was:

What level of trust do you have in these organisations?

In many respects this was the underlying question of the questionnaire as a whole. The results were also presented in a quantitative manner for this question using the following scoring system: *High = +3, Medium = +1, Low = -1, Don't Know = 0*. However, the results should be self-evident from Figure S18.




Figure S15: CIMIC Questionnaire – Question 2 – Priorities for the Government.

THE GENERAL QUESTIONNAIRE

The General Questionnaire was the first such survey carried out in Kabul. It was primarily asking the people's opinion of ISAF and ISAF's activities in the city. The second question on the General Questionnaire sought to ascertain whether the people of Kabul understood the mission of ISAF. They were offered three choices as to what they thought was ISAF's mission. The fourth question asked them whether they understood the origin of the ISAF force.

Figure S19 shows answers to a question about the understanding of the ISAF mission. Figure S20 shows results of a question on the composition of ISAF. Figure S21 shows

answers to a question about ISAF visibility. Figure S22 shows answers to a question on ISAF information.




Figure S16: CIMIC Questionnaire – Question 3 – Organisations Perceived as Effective?




Figure S17: CIMIC Questionnaire – Question 4 – Organisations Should Provide.




Figure S18: CIMIC Questionnaire – Question 5 – Who Do You Trust?




Figure S19: General Questionnaire – Q2 – Understanding of ISAF's Mission.




Figure S20: General Questionnaire – Q4 – Composition of ISAF.




Figure S21: ISAF Visibility.




Figure S22: ISAF Information.




Figure S23: Opinion of ISAF Over a Six-Week Period.

The third question on the General Questionnaire asked respondents to note what activities they had seen in the city, whilst the seventh question asked them how they had received information about ISAF. The General Questionnaire also asked the respondents in Kabul to give their overall opinion – how happy were they – of both ISAF and the Interim Authority in Afghanistan. The results of this survey are shown in Figures S23 and S24 for a six week period.




Figure S24: Opinion of ISAF Over a Six-Week Period.