

## Working Group 1 Report: The Potential of Analysis to Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DD&R)

Richard P. Cousens, OBE

Systems Consultants Services Limited  
Henley-on-Thames, England, United Kingdom.  
e-mail: rcousens@scs-ltd.co.uk

*Richard Cousens is a principal consultant with Systems Consultants Services Limited (SCS), based in Henley-on-Thames, England. A former British Army Infantry Officer, he was Director of Defence Studies for the British Army, Director of the Strategic and Combat Studies Institute and headed the PSO instructional team at the Army Staff College in Camberley. He served for 3 years in the US as the UK Liaison Officer to US Army Training and Doctrine Command during which time he worked in tandem with a team from Brown University on a number of Peacekeeping projects.*

During the course of Cornwallis VIII, Working Group 1 was required to identify potential areas for analysis within the complex area of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DD&R). Working Group 1 consisted of the following members: Sandy Babcock, Leigh Caraher, Richard Cousens, Davis Evans, Arendezej Frank, Steve Lea, and Gene Visco. Few members of the group had a clear understanding of DD&R and thus the group derived considerable benefit from having a member of the faculty of the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre as an integral member of the group. He was able to establish a conceptual baseline for the brief study and to warn of any gross errors during the course of the workshop. His involvement had a direct bearing on the quality of output from the group.

Given, the wide disparity of knowledge regarding DD&R within the group, it was necessary to define the problem and to establish a conceptual/doctrinal foundation on which to build. DD&R was defined as follows:

- **Disarmament**: Collection, control, and disposal of small arms and light weapons, and development of responsible arms management programmes.
- **Demobilization**: Process by which the combatants (regular and/or irregular forces) either downsize or completely disband.
- **Reintegration**: Process whereby ex-combatants and families and other displaced persons assimilate into the socio-economic life of (civilian) communities.

It was assumed that DD&R is a process that applies to a post-conflict situation in which a strategic “road map” to peace has been agreed and that it is therefore a multi-functional and inter-agency activity that spans many disciplines and players. From a peacekeeping perspective it was agreed that DR&R is likely to take place under the auspices of Chapter VI

of the Charter of the United Nations even though any preceding conflict may have been addressed under Chapter VII.

Following this necessarily brief analysis of DD&R and, conscious of the limited time available, the group attempted to “brainstorm/mind-map” the essential conditions for success and then to distil those down into a “top six.” This was a profitable exercise as it involved all members of the group, regardless of their expertise or speciality, and exposed the complexity of the problem. It highlighted the scenario-specific nature of DD&R and the risks associated with a template approach. The analysts within the group began to concede that, if analysis did have an application to DD&R, it was probably in support of specific operations rather than a more generic approach. It should be noted that the member of the PPC faculty was intrigued and impressed by this approach and felt that it had considerable merit. After an effervescent debate the group identified the following six factors as being the most important conditions for success:

1. The need for a holistic approach to acknowledge the multi-disciplinary nature of the task.
2. An understanding of the significance of cultural issues particularly in relation to tribal rivalries, land and gun culture etc.
3. The Environment in its widest sense, including geography and politics.
4. Perception Management. The group acknowledged the importance of the psychological dimension within DD&R.
5. The Conflict itself. An understanding of its causes, motivations, and time-scale.
6. Logistics. An acknowledgement that DD&R is a logistics-dependent activity and that logistics may almost represent a centre of gravity in that if logistic support is undermined or is perceived to be inadequate, the mission will probably fail.

The working group also identified a number of other conditions for success that included political stability, the notion of “buy in” from the participants, trust, local participation, and the requirement for independent verification. Time, the need for forward planning, and Information, as opposed to Intelligence were also identified as being critical.

By this stage of the workshop, the group had all acknowledged the extraordinary complexity of DD&R and that success might be more dependent on thorough strategic analysis rather than any application of modelling. In fact, given the scenario-specific nature of DD&R, the analysts wrestled with a number of applications that might be useful and relevant. Everyone agreed that there would be scope for precise tactical modelling such as queuing models as DD&R is focused on the efficient, timely and fair treatment of people. The numbers involved are often large and thus the modelling of, for example, the through-put of assembly areas and RV’s would represent a profitable application of effort.

At the higher level, the group identified three main issues for analysis as follows:

1. Understanding and explanation of the situation. This is what the military would call a “Mission Analysis” — a process, following an endorsed formula, which subjects the problem to operational as well as tactical level analysis, identifies key factors and draws deductions which, in turn, serve to shape the plan. The group agreed that DD&R is such a demanding mission that such analysis should be carried out by multi-disciplinary teams rather than by individual agencies. The hallmarks of many past DD&R operations are planning in isolated “stovepipes,” a lack of coordination across lines of operation, mutual suspicion and even antagonism. Hence the need for a strategic analysis was identified as the most important issue.
2. Training, planning and exercising. Following the strategic analysis, the group agreed that training, planning and exercising represented the most profitable avenues for analysis. This led to a detailed discussion of “Mission Rehearsal” techniques. In fact the group concluded that “Mission Rehearsal” was the area in which analysis would have the most to offer in DD&R operations.
3. Investment Decisions. Given the complexities of DD&R in relation to socio-economic conditions, it was agreed that various investment decisions might be modelled in order to identify the correct course of action. However, it was felt that this was a very specialist discipline that was beyond the scope of this particular workshop.

It was the area of “Mission Rehearsal” that enthused the group the most; in fact all were agreed that this represented the most profitable avenue for further exploitation. A number of challenges were identified including how to define the relationships within such a complicated framework, how to validate predictions and what sources of data to use. Everyone also agreed that credibility with the customer was pivotal and that this indicated the need for analyst and planner to work in harmony.

DD&R is scenario-specific, multi-dimensional and, above all, all about people. It is not an exercise that lends itself easily to analysis due to its opaque and imprecise nature. However, within the short time available, this small workshop during Cornwallis VIII was able to prove that analysis does have a number of potential applications but that all of them are dependent on the analyst being embraced as part of the larger corporate endeavour. Indeed, it was agreed that analysis in isolation or analysis for the sake of analysis is potentially dangerous.

Few members of the group had personal experience of DD&R operations and therefore hugely appreciated the fundamental guidance of PPC staff. The Centre has described the challenge as follows:

*“A tragic by-product of civil wars and insurgencies has been the waste of human potential as men, women and even children who have been swept into armies and militias around the world. After the conflict, war and barracks life may be all that they have known. Many have become brutalised by the nature of the life they were forced to lead. Some are in chronic ill health; others have no relevant economic skills. As international and domestic initiatives bring these conflicts to some sort of closure, a critical problem is posed by these erstwhile warriors. Failure to provide a future for those*

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*accustomed to fighting fuels the renewal of violence. Disarmament and demobilisation tend to be elements most often related to cease fire and peace negotiation activities; with reintegration in the realm of post-conflict development. To be successful, the whole process must take into account the social, economic and political environment in which the former combatants must live together.”*

The group was left in no doubt that the place of analysis in DD&R, given the extraordinary complexity, described above is difficult to identify but all were agreed that it did have an important contribution and that the area might constitute an area for further study. From a Cornwallis perspective, the workshop proved to be productive, informative and, above all, fun. It provided a small and intimate forum in which all participants were able to interact without feeling inhibited and a mechanism through which to get to know each other. It was universally regarded as a success and something that should be repeated in future years.