

Measuring Terrorism and Insurgency in a 21st-Century Context

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Mr. Davis has been involved in varying capacities on many projects at Evidence Based Research, Inc. He has provided technical and research support for the Command and Control Research Program (CCRP) of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (OASD/C3I) in addition to helping edit several books for CCRP Publications. While at EBR he has been involved with planning and running several conferences focusing on Network Centric Warfare (NCW) and Agile Command and Control (C2). Mr. Davis has also participated in the development of the "Network Centric Warfare Conceptual Framework" sponsored by the Office of Force Transformation (OFT) and OASD/C3I. This involved technical and administrative management and coordination of a workshop attended by representatives from various international countries. Mr. Davis received a Bachelors degree from George Mason University in Economics. While at George Mason, he worked on a number of research projects focusing on Public Policy and Public Choice issues. In addition, he worked as an intern during the summers he was in school.

Ms. Keane joined Evidence Based Research in November of 2001. Ms. Keane specializes in research design and statistical analysis of data using both qualitative and quantitative methods. While at EBR, she has participated in several projects. Ms. Keane has worked to plan and facilitate several workshop conferences including the Network Centric Warfare/ Network Enabled Capabilities Workshop and the Future Joint C2 Workshop. Recently, Ms. Keane has supported OFT and CCRP of the ASD/3CI effort in the development of a conceptual framework for Network Centric Warfare. She is helping to develop metrics that support Transformation related experiments and studies. In addition, Ms. Keane has worked on recognizing and testing alternative approaches to C2 modeling and analysis. In this capacity, Ms. Keane utilized Bayesian networks to organize output data generated by Agent Based Models, to test propositions about complex metrics such as "control" and "collaboration" and to identify emergent behaviors. Ms. Keane is educated in research design and quantitative data analysis. Her undergraduate area of focus was the principles of statistical methods for data-reduction and hypothesis testing. She received her B.S. in Sociology with a concentration in law and society. Before earning her degree, Ms. Keane worked two years as a Statistical Clerk in which she performed statistical analyses to detect population patterns and trends. Since joining EBR, Ms. Keane has become a member of the Military Operations Research Society (MORS) and Women in International Security (WIIS).

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Ms. Leary has been instrumental in a number of competitive intelligence studies and comparative assessments on key technologies and product comparisons. She has experience working on projects dealing with information analysis, particularly in the realm of data collection. She worked on an events database for Sub-Saharan Africa, coding articles under 162 different indicators. In addition, Ms. Leary helped to edit several books for Command & Control Research Program (CCRP) Publications. While at EBR she has been involved with planning and running several conferences focusing on Decision Modeling and Command

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BACKGROUND

Many of the situations of interest to the Cornwallis Conference and its participants involve both terrorism and insurgency. Clearly this is true of Iraq, Colombia, the Philippines, and Afghanistan. The same argument can be made elsewhere – in Palestine, Sri Lanka, Haiti, and parts of Africa. Moreover, the two phenomena are often intertwined, with insurgents employing terrorism as a tactic and terrorists hoping that their attacks will spark a genuine insurgent movement, often (a) by demonstrating the inability of the authorities to provide security or governments or (b) by provoking overreactions by the regime or coalitions seeking to create stability and develop self-sustaining democracies with equitable economic systems. In occupation situations (such as Iraq today) the goal familiar from anti-colonial eras of convincing the external power (both its leadership and its population) that the price of staying involved is too high in lives and treasure is also relevant.

However, terrorism and insurgency are not the same thing. Failing to recognize the difference makes clear analysis and proper policy development very difficult. Steps taken to counter terrorism may well strengthen insurgent movements. The classic film, *The Battle for Algiers*, dramatizes the fact that French overreaction to terrorism within the city created the broad and deep backlash that ultimately forced them out of the colony.

Similarly, efforts to combat an insurgency may invite terrorism. Insurgencies that enjoy safe havens abroad or lack access to some areas of a country may find terrorism an appealing (or their only) method of attack. The Palestinians are a classic case. Unable to organize an insurgency within Israel itself, they have turned to terrorism to put pressure on the government there to grant their political demands for independence. In other cases, such as areas of Colombia, the insurgency is too weak to use any tool other than terrorism. Indeed, the use of terrorist tactics by an insurgency often signals that it is weak – it cannot compete with the established government for the right to govern, therefore it must focus on destroying the existing order in the hope of improving its opportunities within the society. This can be because the insurgency has just begun and is still trying to gain a foothold (as in Algiers) or because it has failed to generate a popular base, as in some of Colombia's provinces.

Hence, this paper seeks to (a) define these two concepts clearly, (b) examine how they should be measured over time, (c) provide limited, but suggestive, example applications, and (d) discuss how terrorism and insurgency can be usefully analyzed in the future.

DEFINITIONS

Terrorism has at least as many definitions as there are organizations and researchers working on the topic. Schmid and Jongman¹ cite 109 different definitions based on a survey of academics. They conclude that the key elements in these definitions are (in order of the percentage of time they are included) violence or force, mentioned in 84% of the sources, political issues (51%), fear or emphasis on terrorizing (47%), psychological effects or anticipated reactions (42%), discrepancy between the targets and the intended audience or victims (38%), planned or organized actions (32%) and terrorism as a tactic or strategy (31%).

Perhaps more usefully, Paul Pillar, a former Deputy Chief of the CIA's Counter-terrorism Center, has argued² that there are four key elements of terrorism.

- It is premeditated – planned in advance, rather than an impulsive act of rage.
- It is political – not criminal, like the violence that groups such as the mafia use to get money, but designed to change the existing political order.
- It is aimed at civilians – not at military targets or combat-ready troops.
- It is carried out by subnational groups – not by the army of a country.

A decade and a half ago, Schmid and Jongman³ developed what they felt was a “consensus” academic definition. According to them,

Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individuals, groups, or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal, or political reasons, whereby – in contrast to assassination – the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat- and violence-based communication processes between terrorist (organization), (imperiled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target (audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought.

¹ Alex P. Schmid and Albert Jongman, *Political Terrorism* (New Brunswick, NJ: TransactionBooks, 1988), p. 6.

² Paul R. Pillar, *Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Brookings Institution Press: Washington, D.C., 2001), p. 13.

³ Alex P. Schmid and Albert Jongman, *Political Terrorism* (New Brunswick, NJ: TransactionBooks, 1988), p. 6.

This is creative in its breadth, depth, and complexity; but very difficult to apply systematically. However, it provides a very useful point of reference.

The U.S. Code of Federal Regulations defines terrorism as “the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any element thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.”⁴ This is highly consistent with the official US Department of Defense definition, which is “the calculated use of unlawful violence to inculcate fear, intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological.”⁵

The most influential official definition is that in the United States Criminal Code which is “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.” This is the same definition that is used by the U.S. Department of State. The term “non-combatant” has been officially understood to include, in addition to civilians, military personnel who, at the time of the incident, are unarmed or not on duty. Similarly, the U.S. Government considers attacks on military installations or on armed military personnel to be terrorism when a state of military hostilities does not exist at the site of the terrorist attacks. This definition has been employed since 1983 as the basis for statistical reporting and analyses.⁶

The official U.S. definition has been used in this paper as it has in previous work by the Evidence Based Research staff. Note that it does include assassinations as well as other types of terrorist attacks as long as they are carried out as part of a campaign. Hence, the assassination of senior clerics or others working with the United States and coalition forces in Iraq or Afghanistan would be seen as terrorist attacks. Similarly, attacks on U.S. or other coalition forces after the cessation of hostilities in Iraq (or in other words, during the occupation) are also included. Note also that the clandestine acts of government agents would also be included, provided that the other criteria are met. To take a simple case from history, the work of North Korean agents to attack senior members of the South Korean government and thereby undermine that regime should also be seen as terrorist attacks. Governments have often sought to avoid the possibility of “state terrorism” being included in these definitions and the relevant data sets. However, those types of acts are included within the definition used here.

The most important points to understand about terrorism are:

1. The point of terrorism is to terrorize!⁷ And
2. Terrorism is theater⁸

⁴ U.S. Government Printing Office, Code of Federal Regulations, (28 C.F.R. Section 0.85, revised July 2001)

⁵ United States Department of Defense, Office of Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, DC : United States Department of Defense, 12 April 2001 – As amended through 5 June 2003), p. 531.

⁶ Office of the Law Revision Counsel of the U.S. House of Representatives, United States Code, (22 U.S.C. 2656f); Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism* (Washington D.C.: DOS, 1983-2001)

⁷ Byford writes: “This is the original use of the word “terror” in a political context. It entered the language during the later stages of the French Revolution, when Edmund Burke called the Jacobins “terrorists” for their enthusiastic resort to the guillotine. The Jacobins agreed: they had decided to secure their hold on power by terrorizing the populace.” Grenville Byford, “The Wrong War.” *Foreign Affairs* (July/August 2002)

Since the goal of terrorism is largely psychological, fear must be created. Fear undermines people's confidence in the government. It also motivates them to cooperate with the terrorists or, at a minimum, to withhold their cooperation from the government. A variety of choices flow from these factors – the choice of targets (I or those I care about are at risk), the choice of means (there is no effective way to defend myself or those I care about), and the choice of targets (symbols I value are threatened, going about my daily routine places me at risk, etc.). Moreover, fear that they will lose control or be unable to protect the population is often the reason why those in power react strongly to terrorism, potentially losing sight of appropriate ends and means. Hence, the more horrific, the greater the fear generated, the more likely the terrorist campaign will be effective. The most effective and original modern terror campaign was the original Palestinian effort that sent the message to the world that their cause was so important that they were prepared to ignore the rules of modern society (diplomatic immunity, safety of innocent people) to gain publicity and make their demands heard. That model has been widely copied, despite the fact that it was only marginally successful.

Given that the point of terrorism is to terrorize, it is a small step to conclude that terrorism is theater. Terrorists must get the attention of those they want to influence. Hence, the more original, unexpected, or dramatic their attacks, the more impact they are expected to have. Terrorists are losing if their actions become uninteresting. They are largely in the business of “criminal media relations.” That is, they want the maximum publicity for their behavior. If they fall off the front page, their movement is becoming marginalized and is less likely to have its intended effects. In a sense, the idea of “more terrorism” is best understood as terrorism that gathers more attention.

Insurgency is fortunately somewhat less controversial at the definition level. The Central Intelligence Agency's definition, as published in the pamphlet *Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency*, states: “Insurgency is a protracted political-military activity directed toward completely or partially controlling the resources of a country through the use of irregular military forces and illegal political organizations.” It further elaborates that “the common denominator of most insurgent groups is their desire to control a particular area.” Bard O'Neill, one of the leading scholars on the subject, uses a very consistent formulation, “a struggle between a nonruling group and the ruling authorities in which the former consciously employs political resources (organizational skills, propaganda, and/or demonstrations) and instruments of violence to establish legitimacy, for some aspect of the political system it considers illegitimate.” NATO and the US Department of Defense all use a similar definition, “an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict.”⁹

The U.S. Army elaborates usefully. “Insurgency is not simply random political violence; it is directed and focused political violence. It requires leadership to provide vision, direction, guidance, coordination, and organizational coherence. Leaders of the insurgency must make their cause known to the people and the government to establish their

⁸ Brian Jenkins, *International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict* (Los Angeles: Crescent Publications, 1975), p.16.

⁹ Central Intelligence Agency, *Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency* (Washington D.C.: CIA, n.d.); Bard E. O'Neill, William R. Heaton, and Donald J. Alberts, eds., *Insurgency in the Modern World* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1980), p. 1; Department of Defense, *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 12 April 2001)

movement's credibility. They must replace the government's legitimacy with that of their own."¹⁰

In fact, past EBR research has shown that insurgency is a struggle between the existing government (or regime) and its opponents for the attributes of sovereignty. Those attributes are:

- First and foremost, legitimacy both in the eyes of the population and in the eyes of the international community.
- Second, the monopoly of coercive force within the boundaries of the country.
- Third, control of resources (financial, but also human capital).
- Fourth, strong institutions (in the sense that Huntington describes them) in order to deliver services to the population.¹¹

Over time a successful insurgency gains the balance in each of these key arenas. First, it becomes the authority that the population believes should be the government – it seeks to become legitimate. In many cases a broad based insurgency will also seek to be seen as the legitimate representative of the population in the eyes of the international community. This often begins with neighboring countries, whose governments are able to supply safe havens. It may also extend to overseas populations or other countries that can be sources of funds, training, arms, or other support. The Palestinians have worked hard at gaining international recognition and support for their cause. However, the key issue is legitimacy in the eyes of the population inside the country. With their support, anything is possible. Without it, an insurgency is vulnerable, both because it will be isolated and also because those loyal to the existing regime are likely to provide the authorities with significant information. The IRA found that it could operate effectively in those areas of Ireland where they were seen as legitimate, but had little effectiveness in the areas where they were not, and were often found very quickly when they attempted to operate in parts of the United Kingdom where they were seen as outsiders.

While battling for legitimacy, insurgents also seek to gain the monopoly of coercive force within the country's boundaries. This typically originates in remote areas and along borders where they can seek protection across the border in friendly states. Over time, of course, their goal is to increase the territory under their control. Ultimately they will want to challenge the government in its strongholds – often major cities or the capital itself. The Chinese model argued by Mao of moving from the countryside for a final battle in the cities is the classic example widely cited in theoretical writing.

Coupled with the effort for territorial control (reflecting the balance of coercive force) is the battle for control of resources. Control of valuable resources, whether those are the diamond mines in Africa, areas rich in oil, or the ability to tax the population are very

¹⁰ Department of the Army, *Stability Operations and Support Operations (Army Doctrine 3M-F-07)* (Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, February 2003)

¹¹ Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1968); Grace Scarborough, "An Expert System for Assessing Vulnerability to Instability." In *Preventive measures: Building risk assessment and crisis early warning systems*, edited by John L. Davies and Ted Robert Gurr. (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1998)

important. Paul Collier of the World Bank contends that an insurgent group cannot mount an insurgency without the economic resources to support their actions.¹² Very often some of the original resources come from outside the country – expatriate populations or regional governments hostile to the ruling regime. Control of resources also includes control of human capital. Governments under attack often rely on conscription, both as a source of military manpower and also as a mechanism for socializing youth within the country. Some of the ugliest chapters in many insurgencies occur as the rebels and government forces compete to recruit troops, often by strong arm methods. Resources are fungible – they allow the regime or the insurgents to purchase arms, finance publicity programs, and deliver services (schools, medical services, etc.) that generate support and loyalty.

Finally, the struggle between insurgents and a government includes their ability to create strong and responsive institutions. This is also a competition for human capital, but it includes much more than numbers of troops. Early in an insurgency it needs organizers, experienced military operators, financial experts, medical personnel, information and propaganda specialists and others whose roles directly support the military efforts. As it comes to control territory, however, the insurgency needs to build a government that delivers essential services – teachers, engineers, administrators, and others who can meet the needs of the population. Both sides are likely to try to intimidate or eliminate natural leaders and technical experts loyal to the other side as well as to recruit skilled people to their causes. This contest usually becomes most important during the later stages of an insurgency when the rebels control meaningful territory.

MEASUREMENT

Measuring terrorism is actually very simple. The critical terrorist events are attacks. These are the engines that create fear, cause government overreactions, and motivate people to either cooperate with the terrorists or (at a minimum) refuse to cooperate with the authorities. Hence, the gross measurement of interest is the frequency of attacks over time. When there are no attacks, there is no theater and fear recedes. When there are no attacks, there is no impetus to terror. Hence, the relative frequency of attacks over time is the best single way to measure the progress of a terrorist campaign.

Very often efforts are made to measure progress in counter-terrorism by examining input variables or measures of performance by the government's forces. Input measures include counts of police or troops committed to the counter-terrorism effort, budgets dedicated to gathering intelligence, or investments in improved capability (better information systems, helicopters to increase force mobility, etc.). Measures of performance include numbers of weapons seized, numbers of suspects arrested, numbers of terrorists convicted or incarcerated, and so forth. While these classes of measures may be very helpful in understanding the dynamics of a terrorist situation, they fall short of being measures of effectiveness – ways of assessing the impact of the terrorism and the counter-terrorism on the operating environment. Only the frequency and size of attacks provides direct measures of the ability to terrorize.

¹² Paul Collier, "Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and their Implications for Policy," *World Bank*, June 15, 2000.

Attacks also provide valuable insights into the progress of a terrorist campaign. The types of attacks will indicate the sophistication of the organization. Many terrorist groups have quite limited repertoires of action. Moreover, types of targets chosen also provide insight into the effectiveness of counter-terrorist measures. As a group finds it more and more difficult to attack hard targets such as government facilities because their defenses improve, they are likely to shift to softer, civilian targets, often symbolic ones. The targets selected will also indicate who the terrorists are attempting to influence. Many groups are careful not to attack the general population for fear of alienating them and destroying their actual or potential base of support. Hence, hypotheses about changes in the frequency, nature, and targets of attacks provide a rich and relatively unambiguous way to assess the progress of a terrorist group or campaign.¹³

Measuring the progress of an insurgency is more complex. Moreover, some of the data needed will be difficult to collect. However, the principles are pretty clear:

- As O’Hanlon and de Albuquerque argue in *The National Interest* (Winter 2003/2004) we should recognize that this is a multi-dimensional problem and “establish as broad a portfolio of data as possible.”¹⁴
- Work at seeing change across the four key dimensions of legitimacy, monopoly of coercive force, resources, and institutional strength.

Establishing a broad portfolio of data has two advantages. First, as O’Hanlon stresses, it focuses attention on data, not anecdotal reporting and not advocacy analysis. Both sides (or in some cases, all sides) in most insurgencies, and their supporters will, and from their perspective should, work to create the most positive possible impression of their status and success. Hence, there will be lots of relevant “stuff” reported and lots of interpretations about what that stuff means. Only by ensuring that the issues are reduced to data and hypotheses are clearly formulated about the trends to be expected in the data can we hope to develop a realistic understanding of what is occurring. The second advantage is that we will almost never get simple, unambiguous and meaningful indicators about the progress of an insurgency. There will almost undoubtedly be some degree of uncertainty about each individual measure or indicator. Hence, by building a portfolio of data that uses a set of indicators, the assessment team can have some confidence that it will be able to identify meaningful patterns and trends.

Focusing on change is also essential. Insurgencies occur in a wide variety of different political, social, economic, and social circumstances. They are found in failed states across Africa, in the aftermath of wars like those in Iraq and Afghanistan, when people are seeking autonomy as in Northern Ireland and Rwanda, and as tactical efforts in insurgencies like Colombia. Hence, there is no “normal” state of affairs against which to benchmark an insurgency beyond the idea that there is a “tipping point” in the balances of legitimacy,

¹³ Richard E. Hayes, “Negotiations with Terrorists,” in Victor A. Kremenjuk, ed., *International Negotiation: Analysis, Approaches, Issues*, (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Inc., 1991), pp. 364-376; Richard E. Hayes, Stacey R. Kaminski, and Steven M. Beres, “Negotiating the Non-Negotiable: Dealing with Absolutist Terrorists,” in *International Negotiation* (Hertfordshire, UK: Brill Academic Publishers, Vol. 8, No. 3, 2003)

¹⁴ Michael O’Hanlon and Adrian Lins de Albuquerque, “Scoring the Iraq Aftermath,” in *The National Interest* (Washington D.C.: The National Interest, Winter 2003-2004), pp. 31-36.

coercive force, resources, and institutional strength. Even these tipping points are likely to be determined by different factors in each context important enough to warrant serious analysis. Hence, establishing a “local” baseline (this country in this time period) from which to measure change is the best way to know whether the government or the insurgents are making progress.

ILLUSTRATIVE APPLICATIONS

In order to illustrate the utility (and limitations) of the proposed measurement schemes, we have undertaken three case studies:

- Terrorism in Iraq directed at US forces and members of the Coalition Provisional Authority (14 April 2003 – 29 February 2004);
- Insurgency in Iraq (for the same dates); and
- Terrorism in Colombia.

None of these is a full analysis. All focus on selected periods of time. The purpose of this paper is not to deal with the substance of these case studies, but rather to demonstrate the importance and value of organizing analyses around key concepts and the metrics that focus on their essences.

TERRORISM IN IRAQ

The data used here are lethal attacks on US and coalition members within Iraq as reported in news sources (see text box for a description of the data sources and Appendix A for the codebook used). They were chosen (a) because there is considerable interest in them, making it likely that the published data series do not contain serious errors or omissions and (b) because they have important policy implications. No effort was made to gather data on all attacks because that would introduce some challenging definitional issues.¹⁵

Note that the term terrorism here has nothing to do with linkages between the attacks in Iraq and Al-Qaeda or the global network of terrorists attacking the West in the name of fundamentalist Islam. In most cases there is no definitive way to identify the attackers or their specific agenda. Both survivors of the former regime and outsiders with a global agenda are suspected of using terrorism in Iraq. These data are not rich enough to make that distinction, nor does it matter for measuring the level of terrorism present.

Regardless of the identities of the perpetrators or larger agendas involved, the terrorism related goals of lethal attacks on US and coalition personnel are pretty clear. On the one hand, they are intended to provoke overreaction by coalition forces that will alienate the Iraqi

¹⁵ What is an attack? How do we know the target for each and every attack? How would we code a set of related attacks (for example, a set of improvised explosive devices aimed at the same convoy) – as one event or counting each item as an independent attack.

population and therefore strengthen the sympathy and support for the terrorists' cause. Secondly, they are designed to show and, by extension, so are those who cooperate with them. However, the primary target of lethal attacks on coalition personnel are clearly the people at home in the democracies who have sent them. Since Vietnam, those who have fought the United States have believed that US casualties can erode political support for a conflict and will lead to decisions to withdraw the troops. Commentators cite the Marine Corps barracks bombing in Beirut and US casualties in Mogadishu as more recent precedents for this belief.

Moreover, there are three key dates that press reports and commentators have focused on when describing the most recent conflict in Iraq:

- The day when President Bush declared an end to major hostilities (May 1, 2003).
- The day Saddam Hussein's sons were killed (July 22, 2003).
- The day Saddam Hussein was captured (December 14, 2003).

Iraqi Terrorism Events Database

The database for this project contains 424 records of attacks by Iraqi terrorists. Events were coded between the dates of 14 April 2003 (2 weeks before President Bush declared an end to major combat) to 29 February 2004, for a total of approximately 322 days. For the purposes of this project, we only coded attacks against U.S./ Coalition troops; if Iraqi civilians were injured or killed in the same attack, the casualties for those groups were recorded. We did not code events where only Iraqi civilians were killed or injured. Each coded event in our database includes the following: Date, Location, Type of attack, Suicide attack (Yes/No), Count of fatalities by group, Count of injuries by group, Ethnic group attacked, Ethnic group perpetrator, Comments, and Source of information.

Sources:

The primary source of data for coding the events contained within the database is the Iraq Coalition Casualty Count Web site's "Attacks by Date & Place" spreadsheet. The spreadsheet contains eight fields: Date, Time, Location, Cause, Fatalities, Wounded, Details, and Source. Each record corresponds to a single attack or event and dates back to 12 February 2002, and also includes a link to the original news report for that entry. The Iraq Coalition Casualty Count Web site cites three sources: (1) Department of Defense press releases, (2) CENTCOM press releases, and (3) British Ministry of Defense Web site.

Verification of Records:

In order to verify and cross-check the data, we compared the events contained within the "Attacks by Date & Place" spreadsheet with publicly available articles in open sources on the Internet. Articles from a variety of sources were used, including CNN, U.S. government Web sites, CENTCOM Web site casualty count, and the UK's Ministry of Defense Web site.

Event Coding:

Only "successful" attacks by Iraqi terrorists were coded in the Terrorism Events Database. For example, if Iraqi terrorists carried out an attack and there were no reported injuries or deaths, then the event was deemed "unsuccessful" and therefore not coded. However, if the report states that terrorists were killed, injured, or captured by coalition troops returning fire, then that event was coded, but not counted in the number of attacks carried out against coalition forces.

Codebook:

To ensure and maintain data integrity across all field and entries coded, we created the "Terrorism Events Database Codebook" (Appendix A).

Military leaders and official spokespersons have been careful to state that the terrorists in Iraq may be independent of the losses of these symbolic leaders and, indeed, that attacks might spike shortly after them as the terrorists attempted to show their continuing strength

and determination. However, press commentators have overtly argued, and senior officials had to be hoping that, decapitation of the regime survivor organizations would lead to declining morale and reduced willingness to continue these attacks. The people of Iraq (and the populations of the countries providing the coalition personnel) that the coalition's personnel are vulnerable

Figure 1 shows the frequency of lethal attacks on US and coalition partners over time. The data begin two weeks before the end of major hostilities (to provide a basis for comparison) and end on February 29, 2004. As that figure shows, lethal attacks start relatively slowly, build to a crescendo in the summer of 2003, then appear to decline somewhat and stabilize.




Figure 1: Frequency of Attacks.

The statistical tests show that the key dates hypothesized to make a difference are not associated with significant declines. Indeed, the early period (100 days from the beginning of the data set through the killing of the brothers) show relatively infrequent lethal attacks on US and coalition personnel, roughly one attack every two days. However, attacks start to rise shortly after that event. Between then and Saddam's capture (145 days) lethal attacks per day more than triples. This increase represents a statistically significant difference ($p = \text{less than } .001$), which means that it is very unlikely to have happened by chance. Moreover, during the 77 days in the database following Saddam's capture, there is only a slight, and statistically insignificant, decline in the frequency of these lethal attacks. This is somewhat counter-intuitive, not only because the morale, organization, and resources of the terrorists might be expected to decline during this period, but also because it includes a conscious effort by the US and major coalition partners to reduce their visibility and exposure by moving forces to bases away from population centers, reducing the numbers of their troops in the country, and by relying more on newly created and trained Iraqi security forces.

In terms of the measurements posited in this paper, it is clear that there has been no reduction in terrorism (in the form of lethal attacks on US and coalition personnel) during the period of interest. This is, of course, despite that fact that large numbers of arrests and incarcerations have occurred, some terrorists have been killed, many weapons and explosive caches have been identified, and improved defenses (better body armor, better vehicle armor, improved tactics, techniques and procedures, repositioning of forces, and so forth) have been put into place.

From the perspective of measurement, this underlines the importance of relying on the measures of effectiveness (numbers of terrorist attacks) rather than on the input measures (numbers of boots on the ground, money spent) or measures of system performance (weapons seized, suspects arrested, etc.).

Figures 2, 3, and 4 look at the same database from a somewhat different perspective. The data here are not frequency of attack, but rather numbers of personnel killed in these same attacks. The value for killed has been used, rather than casualties, to avoid coding decisions involving how severe an injury must be to be counted. These data also distinguish between US and coalition casualties and casualties among cooperating Iraqis.




Figure 2: Period 1 Lethal Casualties.

Period 1 (Figure 2) shows a mixture, though predominately US and coalition personnel killed rather than cooperating Iraqis. Period 2 indicates the same pattern (Figure 3) if anything more strongly.

However, Period 3 (Figure 4) shows a dramatic increase in the number of cooperating Iraqis killed and their percentage in the database. The data cannot tell us why that pattern occurs. However, it appears that the increasing number of cooperating Iraqis in the field

working with US and other coalition personnel means that they are increasingly suffering casualties along with US and other coalition personnel.




Figure 3: Period 2 Lethal Casualties.




Figure 4: Period 3 Lethal Casualties.

Finally, Figure 5, a map that shows both where the different ethnic and religious groups live in Iraq and the number of lethal attacks in each area holds relatively few surprises for those who have been following events in Iraq closely. The most important pattern is that the attacks are spread out along the waterways and population centers of the country. The Southeast, dominated by Shia Arabs, has been relatively quiet, though Al Basrah, by far the largest city on the region, has experienced a meaningful number of attacks. Baghdad itself has been the site of by far the most attacks, hardly surprising given that it is by far the largest city in the country and also includes a large number of Sunni, the group most closely aligned with Saddam’s regime. The Northeast, dominated by Kurds and long autonomous, has also experienced few attacks, though that could not be said of the cities that form the border between Kurdish and Sunni areas. Finally, the well publicized “Sunni triangle” North and East of Baghdad shows up as a hotbed for these types of lethal attacks.




Figure 5: Number of Lethal Attacks by City.

In summary, then, terrorism in Iraq (measured in terms of lethal attacks on US and coalition personnel during the period of interest¹⁶) has stabilized at approximately one and a half attacks per day. This pattern persists despite efforts to reduce exposure and improve defenses. Hence, the terrorists are continuing to keep pressure on the US and its coalition partners and to demonstrate their vulnerability.

There are only scattered indications that the terrorism had provoked overreaction by coalition forces at the time the data collection ended. However, later reports of prisoner abuse by Coalition personnel indicate that a overreaction may well have been a factor during the period under analysis. However, because such abuses were not widely reported during this period, they may not have impacted the observed pattern of attacks. Clearly, perceptions of mistreatment can help galvanize support for a terrorist movement and must be avoided as a part of counter-terrorism campaigns.

INSURGENCY IN IRAQ

Obviously there are forces in Iraq that would like to go beyond carrying out terrorist attacks and replace the Coalition Provisional Authority and its successor Iraqi regime with a different regime. In this sense, there is an insurgency in Iraq. Its strength should be assessed in terms of the four key dimensions of any insurgency: legitimacy, monopoly of coercive force, resources, and quality of governing institutions. These assessments need to be based, as much as possible, on factual data and (given the uncertainties inherent in most of the available data) on multiple indicators rather than individual measures.

LEGITIMACY

The issue here is who should (in the opinion of the Iraqi population) govern Iraq. The most relevant data are polling data. Of course, all polling data from a country like Iraq is somewhat suspect, both because there is no quality census from which to derive a sample and also because the population may not be willing to answer questions truthfully given the recent history of repression. In addition, there has not been systematic polling over time, which means that trend analyses are not possible.

Moreover, no widely reported polls have actually asked Iraqis directly about legitimacy. Hence, we must look at questions logically related to legitimacy. They reveal very clearly that Iraqis are cynical. For example, a poll last fall found that 78% of Iraqi's "mistrusted Iraqi political parties."¹⁷ Hence, when the same poll reports that 79% have little or no confidence in US and UK forces and 73% have little or no confidence in the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), the underlying cynicism must be recognized. There are no institutions of governance that enjoy the confidence of the Iraqi population. Indeed, the poll

¹⁶ Data collection for this paper ended on 29 February 2004 in order to permit time to complete analysis and writing for the Cornwallis meeting. The patterns reported here obviously changed in April 2004 when the number of attacks reportedly increased and the Sadr militia became involved. That longer term pattern will be examined in later research.

¹⁷ Oxford Research International Poll (UK) (Sample Size = 3,244 Iraqis aged 15 and older) conducted across Iraq October-November 2003.

also found that 77% of Iraqis have “no interest in joining a political party,” despite the fact that 95% indicated that they believe an Iraqi-run democracy is the way forward.

In a somewhat more detailed poll, reported in February 2004, democracy was not necessarily such a strong preference when Iraqis were asked about the right form of government for their country. While a large majority of the Kurds polled (70%) preferred a democracy, only pluralities of Shiite (40%) and Sunni (35%) Arabs made that choice. The idea of “a strong leader for life” was favored by 35% of Sunnis and 23% of Shiites, though only 6% of Kurds. An Islamic state was the preference of 26% of Shiites, 15% of Sunnis and 8% of Kurds.¹⁸ The numbers for a strong leader for life may contain a not very subtle preference for a return to something like Saddam’s regime on the part of some of those who lived well during that era.

The picture is further muddled by a related question in the same poll – who should lead the country for the next 12 months and for the next five years, which is shown in Table 1.

Iraq needs in 12 months	Sunni Arabs	Shiite Arabs	Kurds
Single Strong Leader	65%	44%	20%
Iraqi Democracy	14%	24%	60%
Religious Leaders	5%	18%	2%
Iraq needs in 5 years			
Single Strong Leader	49%	32%	16%
Iraqi Democracy	31%	39%	67%
Religious Leaders	6%	17%	2%

*Table 1: Leadership.*¹⁹

Here the Sunni preference for a single strong leader is even more pronounced, particularly in the short run. The same response also finds more support from Shiites than in the “Form of Government” question. The Kurds continue to opt for an Iraqi democracy. Perhaps the good news for those working toward a democratic Iraq is the relatively small percentage, even among Shiites, who favor religious leaders. Here, again, the bad news may be the numbers who consider a “Single Strong Leader” the best alternative. It appears clear that while the abstract idea of democracy may have wide appeal, those polled have no ready reference model for what that idea means in practical terms.

Advocates for democracy can take hope from the fact that no single person was seen as the “most trusted national leader” by more than 7.7% of the respondents to the poll. Moreover, half a dozen others ranked higher than Saddam Hussein’s 3.3% in response to the question. Hence, the contest for national leadership appears wide open at this time.

Clearly Iraqis do not see the US and UK military forces or the Coalition Provisional Authority as the legitimate rulers of Iraq. Moreover, the Iraqi Governing Council is not seen as the answer. Only 16% see it as the best approach over the next 12 months, in contrast to the idea of an Iraqi democracy (72%) and a strong Iraqi leader (67%), the two strongest responses. The clearest finding with respect to legitimate authority is that it must be Iraqi and perceived as independent of outside influences. However, there is little indication of a

¹⁸ Oxford Research International Poll, “National Survey of Iraq,” Feb. 9-24, 2004. Sample of 2,652.

¹⁹ Ibid.

serious desire to return to the rule of the previous regime. Hence, the insurgents would not be scored as strong on the legitimacy issue.

MONOPOLY OF COERCIVE POWER

Clearly the ruling regime (CPA) and the Iraqi Council it is working with have failed to establish a monopoly of coercive power during the period under analysis. The data reported in the Iraqi Terrorism section makes it clear that the insurgents are able to mount limited attacks regularly. This appears to be a result of residual fear of the former regime, demonstrated capability to attack Iraqis who support the ruling regime, and the presence of a number of armed, trained personnel who want to change the regime. The data on the total number of attacks (which would include some primarily criminal attacks and some to settle old scores as well as those on US and coalition forces) would be many times those included in the limited data set in the Iraqi Terrorism section of this paper. Indeed, the Council on Foreign Relations Task Force on Post-Conflict Iraq concluded that, "the coalition has been unable to ensure a safe and secure environment within critical areas of Iraq." Their report notes that between December 2003 and February 2004 Iraqi civilians were believed to be the victims of some 150 separate attacks by insurgents."²⁰

Iraqi Security Forces

As of March 2004, the Dept. of Defense estimated that Iraqi security forces, numbering some 200,000 personnel, make up the majority of all forces in Iraq.²¹ The Pentagon further estimate that coalition and Iraqi forces conduct an average of 180 raids and lead 1,600 patrols per week.²²

In March 2004, the Defense Department estimated that Iraqi security forces are comprised of the following (Figure 6):

- 77,000 police officers.
- 30,000 members of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps, with another 3,800 in training.
- 20,000 Border Patrol Force personnel.
- 73,000 members of the Facility Protection Service, which provides protection to government buildings and vital infrastructure.
- 3,000 soldiers serving in the new Iraqi army.

The number of Iraqis serving in the security forces has increased steadily since May 2003. In December 2003, there was a period of decline in the ranks of the new Iraqi army, when an estimated 300 of the 700 of soldiers in the new army resigned over pay disputes.

²⁰ *Iraq: One Year After: Report of an Independent Task Force on Post-Conflict Iraq, Sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations*, Thomas R. Pickering and James R. Schlesinger, co-chairs, March 2004, p. 17, p.24.

²¹ Department of Defense, Office of Public Affairs, *Iraq Progress Report*. (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, March 19, 2004)

²² Ibid.




Figure 6: Iraqi Security Forces.

The numbers in Figure 6 are based on the *Iraq Index*, a regularly updated database put together by Michael O’Hanlon and Adriana Lins de Albuquerque of the Brookings Institute.²³ Data for March was collected from the Dept. of Defense’s *Iraq Progress Report* from March 19, 2004.

Coalition Forces

The number of coalition forces in Iraq has decreased since the end of major combat operations in May. At the outbreak of the war, there were an estimated 220,000 troops in the Persian Gulf region, including about 150,000 in Kuwait.²⁴

As coalition forces move out of theater, Iraqi security forces have taken their place. According to the *Iraq Index*, there are now an estimated 110,000 U.S. troops and 24,000 coalition soldiers in Iraq. Figure 7 is based on data from the *Iraq Index*.

²³ The *Iraq Index* can be found at <<http://www.brookings.org/iraqindex>>. The information was gathered from a variety of open sources including, Scott Wilson, “Bremer Shifts Focus to New Iraqi Economy: U.S. Occupation Chief Cites Progress in Restoring Order,” *Washington Post*, May 27, 2003; Alex Berenson, “The Struggle for Iraq: Iraqi’s New Army Gets Slow Start,” *New York Times*, Sept. 21, 2003; and John Banusiewicz, “Bush Cites ‘Steady Progress’ in Iraq,” *American Forces Information Services*, Oct. 5, 2003; the Coalition Provisional Authority; the Dept. of Defense. Other sources of information include the Coalition Provisional Authority and the Dept. of Defense, as well as briefings by L. Paul Bremer and Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez.

²⁴ *BBC News*, “US missiles target Saddam,” March 20, 2003.




Figure 7: Coalition Forces in Iraq.

The Insurgency

Measuring insurgent forces is obviously not as accurate as counting the number of Iraqi or coalition security personnel. In November, U.S. Central Command chief Gen. John Abizaid estimated that members of the insurgency numbered about 5,000.²⁵ Present estimates put the number of insurgents at between 3,000 and 5,000.²⁶

The composition of the Iraqi insurgency has apparently changed since November. According to coalition commanders in Iraq, indigenous and foreign Islamic extremists have replaced former Ba'ath party loyalists as the dominant force in the insurgency. Islamic extremists have emerged as the primary threat in Baghdad, according to the commander of U.S. Army forces in the capital.²⁷

While the insurgents are small in numbers, they are clearly well enough organized and led to prevent the regime (CPA and cooperating Iraqis) from establishing and maintaining the

²⁵ Cited in Eric Schmitt and David E. Sanger, "Guerillas Posing More Danger, Says U.S. Commander for Iraq," *New York Times*, November 14, 2003.

²⁶ Maj. Gen. Raymond T. Odierno, "4th Infantry Division Commanding General's, Briefing from Iraq, *Coalition Provisional Authority*, January 22, 2004.

²⁷ Brig. Gen. Martin Dempsey, cited in Rajiv Chandrasekaran, "Iraq Attacks Blamed On Islamic Extremists U.S. Says Hussein Loyalists No Longer Dominate," *Washington Post*, March 19, 2004.

monopoly of coercive power in the country. Of the four key areas for an insurgency, this appears to be the strongest one today in Iraq.²⁸

RESOURCES

Resources are crucial to any insurgency and to governments fighting them. With resources arms can be bought, personnel trained, programs of civil assistance can be organized and people can be employed. In Iraq the insurgents have reportedly also paid bounties for successful attacks on coalition personnel and Iraqis cooperating with them.

The insurgents in Iraq reportedly started with large amounts of cash looted from the former regime's bank accounts. The coalition authorities have made it a point to recover as much of this cash as possible and have told the press that they were generally successful. However, there is no way to know how large their reserves are or whether they have been replenished from sources outside the country. They are known to have a number of weapons caches, including many that provide the materials for bomb making. Hence, their need for resources is relatively modest and likely to stay modest as long as they are primarily operating as terrorists and do not actually challenge for power.




Figure 8: Oil production in Iraq.²⁹

²⁸ Official figures during the period under analysis do not include militias, who later proved to be important forces.

²⁹ *Iraq Index*

By contrast, the regime needs a great many assets, both to build a large and well trained force to defend the state and also to restore infrastructure, provide jobs, and build a new and robust bureaucracy. The CPA has been able to bring in considerable outside support. The US has already provided \$18.4 billion in aid and a donors' conference in October 2003 pledged another \$15 billion.³⁰ The long term solution of relying on the sale of oil is moving into place, with production reaching 2.5 million barrels per day (roughly pre-war levels) early in 2004 (Figure 8).

Hence, the regime and its successor government can be expected to continue to enjoy a major advantage in absolute resources for the foreseeable future. While the insurgents can be expected to trail in the battle to control resources, there has been no sign yet that they cannot afford to sustain their active terrorist tactics. However, the insurgents appear to understand the importance of minimizing the resources available to the government in power. They have consistently sought to disrupt the flow of oil to market, primarily by blowing up parts of the oil pipelines within Iraq.

RESPONSIVE BUREAUCRACY

Because the insurgents do not control territory in Iraq, they have not begun to field a bureaucracy except the illegal organization behind their military efforts. Those efforts have shown considerable resilience and some capability to learn over time.




Figure 9: Electricity Production.³¹

³⁰ *Iraq: One Year After: Report of an Independent Task Force on Post.-Conflict Iraq, Sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations*, Thomas R. Pickering and James R. Schlesinger, co-chairs, March 2004. p. 17.

³¹ Coalition Provisional Authority. <www.cpa-iraq.org>

For its part, the regime seems to have begun the process of building the mechanisms of government. Despite a lack of democratic traditions, the Iraqi Governing Council was able to develop and approve the Transitional Administrative Law (an interim Constitution) on March 8, 2004. This provides the shell of a way ahead from the formal transfer of sovereignty from the CPA to the Iraqis on June 30 through the end of 2005. This was a major test for the Iraqi capacity for give and take in the political arena. At this writing, 24 Iraqi cabinet ministers were in place and dealing with a wide variety of issues in day to day governance³².

According to the Department of Defense, a number of services have improved.³³ Some 3.3 million metric tons of food has entered Iraq over the past year. The CPA has purchased Iraqi harvests, including 450,000 metric tons of wheat and 300,000 metric tons of barley. Two-thirds of potable water production has been restored in Iraq. Three Baghdad sewage plants, serving 3.5 million people and treating nearly 800 million liters per day, will be rehabilitated by October, 2004. Power generation has been restored to pre-war levels and is expected to continue improving (Figure 9).

Moreover, Iraqis also perceive that their situation is better today than it was before the war:

- 69% of Iraqis view the job situation today as bad, but 70% view the job situation as better or the same as before the war.
- 50% of Iraqis view the current security situation as bad, but 72% view the security situation as better or the same as before the war.
- 64% of Iraqis view the current access to electricity as bad, but 75% view the access to electricity as better or the same as before the war.

Table 2 depicts more polling data on specific conditions including schools, household basics, medical care, crime protection and local government. Notably, the table also depicts Iraqi expectations for conditions a year from now; the conclusion being that most Iraqis believe that local conditions will be better rather than worse.³⁴ Hence, the existing regime and the one likely to take over in July, 2004 has a decided advantage in the arena of responsive bureaucracy.

OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF THE IRAQI INSURGENCY

Clearly the insurgents are largely confined to challenging the existing regime in Iraq (CPA with the support of the Iraqi Council) in the arena of coercive force. They trail badly in the other three key factors where insurgent progress should be measured – legitimacy, resources, and responsive bureaucracy. Hence, their fundamental tactic is to attempt to use force to reduce the capacity of the existing institutions of government and throw the society into a chaotic state where their limited capabilities will serve them better. Perhaps most important,

³² “The New Iraq: A Year of Progress,” *U.S. Department of Defense*, March 18, 2004.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Gary Langer, “Poll: Iraqis Report Better Postwar Life,” *ABC News*, March 15, 2004.

they have not found an approach that provides them with legitimacy – abroad perception that they should govern the country. However, there is clearly tension between the ideas of developing a representative democracy and the belief that Iraq needs a strong leader. Creating an image of an Iraqi government that is both representative and also capable of providing strong leadership may be difficult, but it would be a compelling image.

Ratings of Specific Local Conditions								
	Today		Compared to Prewar			Expectations 1 year		
	Good	Bad	Better	Worse	Same	Better	Worse	Same
Schools	72%	26	47	9	41	74	3	14
Household Basics	56	41	47	16	35	76	3	10
Crime protection	53	44	50	21	26	75	4	11
Medical care	51	47	44	16	38	75	3	12
Clean water	50	48	41	16	40	75	4	13
Local gov't	50	38	44	16	29	69	4	12
Additional goods	49	46	44	17	35	75	3	10
Security	49	50	54	26	18	74	5	10
Electricity	35	64	43	23	32	74	5	11
Jobs	26	69	39	25	31	73	4	11

Table 2: Iraqi Polling Data on Local Conditions.

The Iraqi insurgency, like weak and incipient insurgencies everywhere, can be expected to continue to pursue terrorism as a tactic. The obvious goals of persuading the outside forces interested in stability and democracy (whether they be the US, the coalition, the UN, or any other outside institutions) to leave, motivating the US and coalition forces to overreact and help them build support for their insurgency, and reducing the resources and responsiveness of the emerging Iraqi regime give the Iraqi insurgents plenty of incentives to continue pursuing terrorist tactics.

COLOMBIA: A CASE STUDY

In our introduction, we defined insurgency as “directed and focused political violence” aimed as “the overthrow of a constituted government” and “replacing the government’s legitimacy with their own.” We argued that an insurgency is the “struggle between an existing government and its opponents for the attributes of sovereignty: legitimacy, monopoly of coercive force, control of ‘sovereign spaces,’ human and financial resources, and control of institutions in order to deliver services.”

Terrorism is a tactic designed to sow fear, coerce or intimidate governments and/or societies in the pursuit of (the perpetrator’s) goals of diminishing the perception that the government is able to exercise effective sovereignty in its territory. Colombia is a variant on this theme, and over more an example of the phenomenon of a failing insurgency resorting to terror to prolong the struggle.

Colombia is a nation the size of France (Figure 10). It is the fourth largest country in Latin America (after Brazil, Mexico and Argentina) with a population of only 44 million. 74% of the population is urban and resides in the valleys of the country’s two parallel

mountain ranges (Figure 11). Colombia’s eastern lowlands provinces, which account for 54% of Colombian territory, have a population density of less than 1%. The government recognizes that exercising beneficial State presence in remote areas of the country is one of its most serious challenges.³⁵



Figure 10: Colombia in geographical context.

Political insurgency has been underway since the 1950s in Colombia (Figure 12). The two largest insurgent groups, the National Liberation Army (ELN or Ejército de Liberación Nacional) and the Colombian Armed Revolutionary Movement (FARC or Fuerzas Armadas

³⁵ See Colombia’s Defense and Democratic Security Policy: <http://www.mindefensa.gov.co/>

Revolucionarias de Colombia) grew out of peasant-based organizations which subsequently acquired Marxist ideologies, and more recently have become closely associated with drug-trafficking economic interests. A right-wing response to the insurgents, the Colombia United Self-Defense organization (AUC or Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia) emerged in the late 1980s to counter growing insurgent control of large tracts of rich Colombian territory, as a result of the Colombian government's failure to provide effective government presence in rural areas.³⁶ The AUC clearly has had at least tacit support from the Colombian authorities (police, military and civilian authorities) in some areas. In part, this reliance on vigilante forces is understandable, as the armed forces were sorely undermanned to deal with the violence in the vast country.



Figure 11: Colombian terrain features.

More recently, the armed groups have established a close and profitable relationship with the narcotics traffickers, precipitating a feeling of security uncertainty at almost every level. As a response, the Colombian government has centered its attention in the formulation of effective political and institutional instruments to counteract and undermine the negative effects of those actors contesting its legitimate monopoly of the use of force. More recently the level of intensity of the groups' terror campaigns- especially the FARC's - has increased and moved towards more populated urban areas where innocent civilians are frequently accounted as victims.

³⁶ Informed Anual de Derechos Humanos y Derecho Internacional Humanitario, Ministerio de Defensa, Republica de Colombia, 2001.




Figure 12: Armed Groups in Colombia.

Recognizing that the insurgents are Colombian citizens, Colombians refer to them “grupos alzados en armas (groups risen up in arms);” “grupos al margen de la ley (groups at the margin of the law);” and, reflecting their growing ties to criminal organizations, as “grupos ilegales (illegal groups).” They are not “guerrillas” in the romantic, freedom-fighter sense most often associated with that word. In this paper we refer to the various groups as “armed groups.”

Colombia’s insurgency is also multifaceted. The insurgency and the AUC reaction are for the most part rural phenomena, though the FARC has sought to bring the insurgency to major cities in recent times.³⁷ The most recent examples of this was the bomb explosion in Bogotá’s most exclusive social club, El Nogal, on February 7, 2003, the deadliest bombing in the Colombian capital to date.³⁸

³⁷ FARC have managed achieved a surprising attack capability that involves coordinated and simultaneous offensives by massing against multiple high profile targets, although lately they have resorted to more traditional guerrilla “hit and run” tactics combined with campaigns in identified urban and troubled social areas in the major cities’ slums.

³⁸ Scott Wilson, “Blast rocks Elite Colombian Club,” *Washington Post*, February 8, 2003 p A16; February 9, p A20. The bombing killed some 33 persons. This was more than the previous high of 19 civilians killed when insurgents launched RPG against the Presidential Palace during the Uribe inauguration.

The three groups compete for support and dominance in different regions of the country. Figure 2.2 shows the location of principal concentrations of Colombian insurgents. The FARC and ELN each dominate their own regions and also overlap and contest other regions where they frequently clash in armed confrontations aimed at vanquishing their rival (like street gangs). The AUC is primarily active in the north and along the Pacific coast, and contests both groups. Large segments of the Colombian Pacific coast from Ecuador to Panama have become active areas of dispute between paramilitary and guerrilla groups, particularly in the Chocó and Urabá regions (on the border with Panama and the Pacific Coast).³⁹

Over the years, various governments and civil society groups have sought to negotiate with the insurgent oppositions, generally without success.⁴⁰ Beginning in 1982 during the Presidency of Belisario Betancur, the Colombian government began to offer negotiations with the insurgents as a political option, responding to growing national fatigue towards the internal conflict.⁴¹ Unfortunately, the dialogues have more often than not been used by the Colombian insurgency to gain both political space and military momentum. The Betancur government did negotiate with the insurgent M-19, persuading the insurgents to abandon war and participate in the political process. The organization very shortly lost representation at the national level, an experience that may discourage current rebels from following the example. President Virgilio Barco waged a violent war waged between the government and the Medellín Drug Cartel.

The Cesar Gaviria government continued police and military operation against the infamous drugs cartels with a series of both positive and negative consequences in terms of both drug trafficking and terrorism in Colombia. President Ernesto Samper presidency responded to heightened violence, while undergoing a congressional investigation of Cali drug cartel penetration of his political campaign financing committee. His presidency also confronted the violence the resulted following the breakup of the Cali and Medellín cartels. The FARC increased their own activities and succeeded in outmaneuvering the armed forces on important occasions with significant military casualties resulting. During this period the FARC also extended its control of certain regions and its drug cultivation activities into regions like Putumayo, Caquetá and Guaviare.

The Andres Pastrana government sought to negotiate with the main insurgent group, the Armed Revolutionary Front of Colombia (FARC), creating a safe zone (zona de distensión) in the middle of the country (See Figure 2.2) for the FARC and pursuing peace talks throughout the administration. The FARC refused to compromise throughout the process, demonstrating itself unwilling to enter the political process as Pastrana (and many international supporters) hoped. The Colombian population became increasingly frustrated with the government's willingness to continue the negotiations. Pastrana was succeeded by President Alvaro Uribe who campaigned on a platform of decisively defeating the terrorists and drug traffickers alike.

³⁹ The FARC has made a particular effort to wrest control of the Atrato river basin, a remote corridor of jungle connecting the Caribbean and Pacific Ocean, which also serves as a vital conduit for the import of arms and export of cocaine. In April 2002, Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC) guerrillas fought a pitched battle with hundreds of Colombian Self-Defense Association (AUC) fighters in the nearby village of Bellavista. See *The Economist*, "Staying Alive," 25 May 2002, 56.

⁴⁰ Maria Emma Wills: 'Las Políticas Gubernamentales Frente al Proceso de Paz: Entre el Peso del Pásado y un Futuro Incierto', in E. Ungar (comp.), *Gobernabilidad en Colombia*, (Bogota: TM eds, 1993), p. 131.

⁴¹ Alvaro Camacho: *La Colombia de Hoy*, (Bogota: U. Del Valle, 1986), pp. 43-70.

Alvaro Uribe's platform called for an end to the violence and to bring institutional coverage to all Colombians. His subsequent National security Strategy emphasized (1) rule of law and protection for the population; (2) Colombian government control of Colombian territory; (3) a fight against both drug-trafficking and terrorism, and (4) an agenda of transparency and transformation in the way government does business. In taking the war directly to the armed groups, Uribe was able to draw upon a strengthened Colombian armed forces – trained by the US; with new mobility and new doctrine more attuned to the demands of an irregular conflict.⁴²

Colombian insurgents have not enjoyed widespread popular support in recent times. Insurgent political leaders are tolerated because the government is not able to support government institutions in rural areas. Figure 13 shows that the leftist insurgents enjoy less than 5% of public support while the Military, the Police, and the Attorney General all have strong public support.




Figure 13: Public Attitudes Towards Major Institutions.

By contrast, Alvaro Uribe *is* popular. Independent polling in 2003 gave the president a 78% popular rating, while 80% of those polled had a favorable image of the armed forces. In contrast, more than 90% of those polled had an unfavorable image of the FARC, the ELN and the AUC (Illegal Paramilitary). Recently, Raul Reyes, a high-level spokesman for the FARC Secretariat, challenged the poll results, arguing bias from the media and government officials. For the FARC, “public opinion” is the opinion expressed by the 70% of inhabitants living in poverty and social exclusion in Colombia.⁴³

⁴² See Thomas Marks, “Colombian Army Adaptation to Insurgency,” Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, Monograph xxx, 2002) <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usassi/welcome.htm>

⁴³ “Las Farc le confiesan a Yamid Amat que no es posible un diálogo con el gobierno de Alvaro Uribe” *El Tiempo- (Colombia)*. July 24th, 2004.

We can summarize the Colombian insurgency as a mature (and possibly deteriorating) example of an insurgency that is not able to win sufficient support to effectively challenge the government as the legitimate authority, and therefore increasingly resorts to terrorist tactics to sustain its momentum. Such efforts reinforce loyalties among the insurgent supporters and, simultaneously, sow fear among the affected citizenry and reinforce the citizens' sense that government is impotent and either unable or unwilling to help them. Terrorist tactics were not always part of the FARC strategy. Their use of seems to result from three dynamics: a response to weakness when the group fails in military operations, as evidence of predominant militaristic ideological orientation, and as a rational logic aimed at debilitating and de-legitimizing the Colombian government. Terrorism is now regarded as a legitimate tool for fighting and demonstrating the State's weakness and vulnerabilities. This is, increasingly, a losing strategy.

FARC continue to have access to financial resources as a result of the windfalls from its drug trafficking activities, extortion, robberies, and ransoms from kidnappings. Their daily financial transactions are "laundered" through legitimate businesses that are covers for money laundering purposes and purchase of important logistical supplies.

ANALYSIS OF COLOMBIAN VIOLENCE INCIDENCES

The data examined in this paper are the weekly reports of military actions and human rights events provide in the Vice Presidency's Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law Observatory's Weekly Press Log.⁴⁴ The Press Log consists of reports on human rights related events as recorded in 11 daily papers and two radio stations. The Press Log began in 1999 and has continued with few exceptions through to the present. In this paper, we have examined a time period of seven and one-half months, from June 25, 2003 to February 14 2004.

The press log divides events into four categories: (1) Military Actions of the Armed forces (Military, National Police, and other federal and state authorities); (2) Actions of the "outlaws" (*grupos al margen de la ley*, including either of the two insurgent groups or the *Autodefensas*); (3) Violations of International Human Rights; (4) complementary categories (which tend to be criminal activities). See Annex for details.

Events in the Log cover a broad range of activities, consistent with its purpose to document human rights violations. In this analysis we have focused on actions of the Colombian Police and Military Forces, actions of the Armed Groups and on those human rights violations that are consistent with terrorist actions when the perpetrator is known.⁴⁵ We have coded attacks on police and army posts, clashes between government forces and the armed groups, clashes between the armed groups themselves, armed attacks on civilians,

⁴⁴ (Bitácora Semanal de Prensa, Observatorio de derechos humanos y derecho internacional humanitario, Programa presidencial de derechos humanos y derecho internacional humanitario, Vicepresidencia de la República.). See Appendix 1 for details on the content of the Press Log. The database includes, in its complementary category, an astonishingly large number of homicides for which author is unknown. These are testimony to the historical high level of violence in Colombia.

⁴⁵ The database includes, in its complementary category, an astonishingly large number of homicides for which author is unknown. These are testimony to the historical high level of violence in Colombia. These events are not coded in the present analysis.

bombs, mines, and other types of explosive devices used against civilians (or armed forces), attacks on critical infrastructure (power lines, pipelines, etc; political assassinations), kidnappings and hostage-taking, and captures of illegal group members. We also coded the nature of casualties (killed or wounded) and the number of casualties.

The review of the time period June 25 to February 14 generated 1100 coded events. The data used here covers a short time period, but it provides an opportunity to examine the characteristics of the current security environment in which the government appears to be gaining an upper hand several of the armed groups are indecisive about their future actions, and the FARC remains intransigent in its resistance to government (and international) overtures to negotiate and end to internal conflict. Colombia's struggle against its armed militias and insurgents is not unlike the situations in that of Afghanistan, Iraq, the Philippines, or Indonesia confront. There are lessons to be learned in analyzing and comparing these different insurgencies and the strategies used to suppress them.

A recent study conducted by Restrepo and Spagat,⁴⁶ using a different and longer Colombian dataset, describes the gradual upsurge of violence in Colombia over the past decade. For the period 1988 to August 2002 (the month that Uribe was inaugurated), the average number of armed group attacks per month were 61. During the Pastrana Exclusion Zone period (October 1998 to February 2002) such attacks increased to 87 per month, and were as high as 97 per month in the latter period (1999 to 2002) when a sharp upsurge in violence was apparent. In the time frame from August 2002 to the end of 2003, the authors document a return to the level of 61 armed group attacks per month. This figure is somewhat lower than our data (21 attacks per week on average from mid-June 2003 through mid-February 2004), but not disproportionately so. The Observatory's Press Log data permits us to examine the nature of the violence that took place in Colombia during the time period. Figure 14 shows the frequency of armed groups' attacks on civilian and government targets during the June 2003 to February 2004 period.

It is clear that attacks on government targets are more frequent than attacks on civilian targets. Since government targets include attacks on government buildings, police garrisons, state infrastructure (power lines and the oil pipeline), and political figures (especially mayors and judges) it is clear that the armed groups continue to seek to disprove the government's ability to maintain presence and provide security in the country. For instance, an examination of the underlying event description also shows that attacks against government installations and authority often increase during identifiable events such as local elections, as the armed groups seek to deny the government local civil authority support in outlying areas.

Similarly, over the last 4 years attacks against bridges has been one of the priorities of the FARC as it seeks to deny the Colombia army the capabilities of ground access and rapid response. The departments of Antioquia (20%), Caquetá and Norte de Santander (12%), Huila (10%) and Cesar (7%) have experienced attacks against their road infrastructure along with the use of roadblocks and hijacking of persons and vehicles. However, under Uribe's surveillance of bridges has become a priority and served as a deterrent to these groups.⁴⁷

⁴⁶ Jorge Restrepo and Michael Spagat, "The Colombian Conflict: Uribe's First 17 Months," Draft Manuscript (Department of Economics, Royal Holloway College, University of London) 1 April 2004.

⁴⁷ Road security has been one of the most notable accomplishments of the Uribe administration. Commentators agree that groups like the ELN have decreased their efforts at road sabotage and hijacking because of effective security measures in the zones in which they operate. However in the case of FARC




Figure 14: Armed Group Attacks on Government and Civilian Populations⁴⁸

Figure 15 explores the geographic distribution of armed violence during the period and provides an initially surprising result. During the seven-month period, violence was concentrated very heavily in a few departments, most saliently in Antioquia, a department dominated by the FARC and whose capital is Medellin, once capital of one of Colombia's most famous drug cartels.⁴⁹ Presence of illegal armed groups like FARC, ELN, and AUC is historical in this region.

There is also a considerable urban presence of the AUC. All of these groups seem to be wrestling for control of this rich region while government forces simultaneously have intensified actions against them. Recently conflict has escalated because of more frequent military operations by government forces which lead to clashes with the armed groups. The FARC in this zone also has escalated terrorist attacks against infrastructure, while ELN has decreased their actions as a result of effective military pressure against them by security forces and AUC militias.⁵⁰

Other departments with high levels of armed group activity during this time period, as seen in the chart, are Cauca, Valle del Cauca,⁵¹ and Cundinamarca (outside of Bogota), as

there seems to be a shift of such activities to less visible zones in which the security forces presence is lower. "La Seguridad en las Carreteras de Colombia" Informe Especial. Fundación Seguridad y Democracia, May 2004.

⁴⁸ The Press log data set is missing information for the week of 16 July 2003.

⁴⁹ It is worth observing that the AUC emerged out of elements mobilized by the Colombian police to counter Pablo Escobar's Medellin cartel (See Mark Bowden: Killing Pablo: The Hunt for the World's Greatest Outlaw (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2001). Once the cartel was dispersed and began to metamorphose, Colombian authorities could not control its criminal violence. .

⁵⁰ Throughout 2003, encounters in the east of Antioquia included clashes between the FARC's 9th and 47th fronts and with ELN's Carlos Alirio Buitrago front.

⁵¹ In Norte del Valle Department, previously more autonomous small groups are joining forces with the FARC and AUC militias. In Valle del Cauca there has been a significant consolidation of AUC militias in port zones like Buenaventura and in Santander de Quilichao, which are transit zones for drugs and weapons trade. FARC holds considerable influence in urban areas near Cali, Yunbo and Jamundi.

well as Santander, Sucre, and Bolivar. In all but Bogota, Bolivar, and Valle, attacks on government targets surpass those on civilian targets. The armed groups appear committed to demonstrating the government incapable of exercising sovereignty over its territory.




Figure 15: Geographic distribution of insurgent attacks.

To parallel the focus in the Iraq case study on casualties occurring from armed groups attacks, we looked at official casualties (Colombian military, police casualties), total armed group casualties, and civilian casualties. Casualties reported in Figure 16 include both deaths and injuries, and are as reported by the official source at the site.⁵² Armed group casualties are substantially higher than either government or civilian casualties, suggesting that the government is successful in its efforts to exercise its legitimate use of force against the armed groups operating outside the law. Non-combatant civilian casualties are also high, and appear to peak in October 2003 and in January 2004. Interestingly, Colombian government casualties, while continuing, are fairly low, given the frequency of engagements in which the public forces are involved. There may be a tendency to under-report government casualties.

Figure 17 illustrates shows that the government’s response to armed violence has been focused significantly more on capturing members of the armed groups, rather than killing them, in a conscious strategy to lead the followers away from the gangs and militias. In this chart, Military Actions include all clashes between the armed groups and patrolling military units, and assume that, by virtue of being in the field on patrol, the military is taking the initiative in the encounter. Also included are military de-mining operations. Captures have occurred in almost all departments of the country, as well as in neighboring countries Ecuador and Venezuela. They reflect one of the principal objectives of Uribe’s Democratic Security Strategy -- the demobilization of combatants from irregular illegal armed groups and their re-incorporation to productive activity in Colombian society. The principal departments affected are Antioquia, Bolivar, Cauca, Cundinamarca, Santander, Sucre, and Valle del

⁵² Commander of Colombian Armed Forces, General Ospina, to Margaret Daly Hayes.

Cauca. There are two to three times more military action in the single Department of Antioquia than in the other Departments.




Figure 16: Casualties in the Colombia Conflict.




Figure 17: Operations of the Public Forces.

Figure 18 shows the details of terrorist captures in the different Departments. The emphasis is clearly on the FARC, the largest group. The Departments of Caquetá and Cundinamarca (outside the Federal District of Bogota), have over 150 captures in the seven-month time frame. Tolima and Sucre each have over 100 captures. Captured insurgents are subject to government demobilization programs which seek to re-orient, train, and find jobs for them.




Figure 18: Armed Group Captures by Department.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Reference to a map of Colombia can help in highlighting the Departments in which we have seen the highest levels of violence in the time frame studied in this paper. Without diminishing the negative effects of violence across the country, such a map can highlight the concentration of violence in a handful of departments – the most populous and economically rich Departments of Colombia – Antioquia, Cundinamarca and Bogota, Sucre, Bolivar, and Santander, and on the Pacific coast, Cauca and Valle del Cauca. Military operations are also high in these departments, suggesting that Colombia’s military forces are able to demonstrate increased presence of government authority across the national geography, if not a definitive “effective monopoly of force.” Programs strengthening civil society follow. Recently, authorities have been able to announce the establishment of police posts in 158 municipalities that has not seen a government security presence in decades.⁵³

In other dimensions, the government has begun to attract defectors from the insurgent organizations to its programs for re-incorporation into Colombian civil life, albeit with a controversial program of potential forgiveness for past criminal and terrorist actions. During the spring of 2004, the government has been in continuous dialogue with elements of both the ELN and the AUC, seeking their demobilization. The FARC continue to reject this dialogue, and increasingly incorporate elements of the ELN into their network with a potentially reinforced and coordinated military and terrorist capability. In its effort to exercise effective sovereignty over all of its territory, the Colombian government has shown that it enjoys overwhelming legitimacy in the eyes of the populations. It is also making important gains in its ability to exercise a monopoly of military and law enforcement force, in its control of territory, human and financial resources, and in its ability to deliver services

⁵³ Robert B. Charles, Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, “U.S. Policy and Colombia,” Testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Government Reform, Washington, D.C. June 17, 2004.

to its citizens. The future is far from certain, though the trends appear to be moving in the proper direction. Sharpe and Harper will march again.

CONCLUSIONS

This paper has limited goals. We set out to:

- Define terrorism and insurgency in ways that make it clear how they are different and how they are similar.
- Explore how they can best be measured over time to support meaningful analysis.
- Provide limited, but suggestive applications of the recommended techniques and approaches.
- Discuss how these phenomena can be usefully analyzed in the future.

We were hopeful that we might gain some substantive insights, but also recognized that our specific data were a subset of the material needed to examine the complex situations in Iraq and Colombia from which we drew our illustrations. We think we have achieved our goals and are in a position to build on this exploratory work.

While there is no consensus on the definition of terrorism, the richly interpreted definitions used by the U.S. Government are adequate to carry out analyses in the situations of interest. The concept of insurgency is easier to define, consisting of a battle for the attributes of sovereignty: legitimacy, monopoly of coercive force, control of resources, and strong institutions. *The key conclusion is that terrorism and insurgency are different phenomenon*, though they are not unrelated. An insurgency is more ambitious than a terrorist effort. In both Iraq and Colombia during the periods examined the dominant phenomenon was terrorism, because groups of would be insurgents lacked the support to challenge across all four arenas and have been reduced to using terrorism as a tactic in the hope of building the base needed to launch a true insurgency.

The use of event data, and particularly the frequency of different types of events over time, proved to be a powerful approach to measuring terrorist activity. Since the purpose of terror is to terrorize, the authorities are seeking to alter the frequency of attacks, the types of attacks, and the targets of the attacks. While there are important qualitative factors that must be taken into account, including the context of the terrorism and the degree of surprise and drama inherent in the attacks, event patterns over time provide the basis for measuring progress in these struggles. This approach avoids the trap of measuring inputs (numbers of troops and police deployed, numbers of raids conducted, etc.) as a surrogate for assessing the terrorism itself. These data are also relatively objective, which reduces the likelihood that analysts will misread a pattern because of the “spin” put on a situation by advocates for the sides in a terrorism conflict.

Measuring the progress of an insurgency is more complex because all four of the key dimensions must be addressed and because they are best understood as balances. The issues

of monopoly of coercive force can be partly measured by looking at event data over time. However, this ignores balance issues. Legitimacy can be measured through polling data, since the issue is really a perception, but is best measured more richly using sources such as editorial opinions, political demonstrations, and/or chat room monitoring, all of which require some analytical interpretation. Of course, ballots cast in free and fair elections are the ultimate indicator of perceptions, but they are relatively rare and far between in conflicted societies.

Control of resources can be estimated by looking at the results of taxation policies. However, like monopoly of coercive power, analysts must be aware that it takes fewer resources to support an insurgency than it does to suppress one. Finally, measuring the strength of institutions remains as much an art as it is a science. The international community (international banks, NGOs, international institutions such as the OAS and the European Commission) have developed assessment teams that have been able to identify symptoms of effective and ineffective institutions. The efficiency of delivering services and signs of corruption are among the indicators they use. However, in a society torn apart by conflict, this is arguably the most difficult area to measure.

The most important conclusion reached about measuring the progress of an insurgency was that each situation is so unique that there must be “self-baselined.” That is, no one set of indicators will work across all countries. Hence, area expertise and historical patterns are essential elements in these measurement efforts.

Examining the periods of interest in Iraq and Colombia, however, we were able to find relatively strong indicators, and even consensus about each of these four areas. The most challenging, institutional strength could be seen through examination of the differing administrations in Colombia. In Iraq the measurement was crude and the period of interest very short for this topic, but the fact of Iraqi institutions standing up to take over from the CPA, coupled with the absence of visible insurgent institutions made the analysis manageable. Resource strength could also be measured in both cases through the use of indicators. Monopoly of coercive force appears to be best measured in event data, though the Iraq data used only focused on a part of that conflict – direct attacks on CPA troops. Finally, polling gave dramatic indications of the perceived legitimacy of the different parties in both Colombia and Iraq.

The illustrative analyses do suggest one substantive conclusion: that “wanna be” insurgents are likely to employ terrorism as a tactic. This enables them to (a) reduce the support for and intelligence provided to the authorities, (b) demonstrate that they are a factor in the society and cannot be ignored, and (c) most important, put pressure on the authorities to overreact and treat the general population in ways that alienate them and create the base of support needed to launch a true insurgency. This last goal is the crucial one. Governments battling would-be insurgents, whether they are remnants seeking to regain strength as in Colombia, or new groups seeking to form effective violent opposition as in Iraq, must do so in a way that provides confidence and security to the larger population. If the authorities overreact, they will lose legitimacy, create more support for the dissidents, and more people willing to use violence against them. This is not a pattern confined to these illustrative applications. It has been detected in a wide range of situations from Europe to the Middle

East, Asia, and Latin America.⁵⁴ The fact that it can be seen in these limited applications provides some indication that they may be valid.

ANNEX 1: DATA FROM THE PRESS LOG

I. Military actions of the Colombian armed forces

- Captures, by public authorities, of members of the insurgencies or their sympathizers.
- Confrontations between military forces and GML.
- Deactivation of explosives set by the GML.
- Desertions by the GML.
- Dismantling of Guerrilla camps.
- Capture of arms stashes of the GML.
- Rescue of hostages.

II. Actions of the subversives

- Attacks on Polices Stations or posts.
- Attacks on military installations or posts.
- Ambush with superior force on military patrols.
- Harassing attacks on either government forces or armed opponents.
- Confrontations between the Subversives and the Autodefensas.
- Surprise attacks on population centers.
- Armed coercion of populations.
- Road Block or other actions aimed at coercing civilian populations.
- Sabotage of infrastructure.
- Prisoner retention (refers to GML actions against the public forces.

III. Human Rights Violations

- Homicides; civilian casualties collateral to armed conflict.
- Indiscriminant armed attacks on nonmilitary targets.
- Attacks on civilian infrastructure (food supplies, harvest, cattle, drinking waer, etc.).
- Attacks on critical infrastructure (dams, dikes, electrical energy lines; oil pipe lines, public buildings, etc.).
- Attacks on cultural patrimony (art, historic buildings, churches).
- Human shields.
- Forces displacement of populations.
- Intimidations.
- Pillage.
- Robbery.
- Torture.
- Hostage taking.

⁵⁴ Richard E. Hayes, "Negotiations with Terrorists," in Victor A. Kremenyuk, ed., *International Negotiation: Analysis, Approaches, Issues*, (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Inc., 1991), pp. 364-376; Richard E. Hayes, Stacey R. Kaminski, and Steven M. Beres, "Negotiating the Non-Negotiable: Dealing with Absolutist Terrorists," in *International Negotiation* (Hertfordshire, UK: Brill Academic Publishers, Vol. 8, No. 3, 2003)

Acts of terrorism (indiscriminant or excessive attacks on civilian population for purpose of terrorizing them).
Attacks o medical clinics.
Antipersonnel mines.
Forced recruitment of minor.

IV. Complementary categories

Homicides (for which author unknown).
Sequesters.
Theft of fuel.
Torture.
Disappearance.
Liberation (by GML of a hostage or prisoner).