Civil-Military Measures of Effectiveness: 
What’s It All About?

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INTRODUCTION

Civil-military cooperation and coordination is an essential element of success in all international interventions, regardless of the type of intervention, its placement on the spectrum between peace and war, or its political cachet. The operations of the “post 9/11” period have only served to reinforce this understanding. Because, however, of the increased complexity, dynamism and danger of these interventions, civil-military operations, at the heart of synergizing success in stability and reconstruction operations, are likewise more difficult, not only to plan, execute and coordinate, but to measure their progress.

How do we know when we are doing well in civil-military operations? While there has been a great body of work emerging on determining, quantifying and qualifying success in military operations and in civilian humanitarian relief and reconstruction efforts, how do you measure success in an endeavor that takes place in an increasingly dynamic and complex operational environment involving stability, antiterrorism and counterinsurgency operations, and that is predominantly psychological rather than physical, often defying empirical

1 For the purposes of this discussion, the term “civil-military operations” will be used, vice CIMIC – civil-military cooperation, CA – civil affairs, or CMCoord – civil-military coordination, although it will mean these terms in the broader sense of the civil-military relationship in international interventions.
quantification? What about the increasing integration of civil-military operations not only with military operations and civilian humanitarian relief and reconstruction efforts, but with “information operations”, “strategic communications”, and “public affairs” – how does that impact the ability of civil-military operators to know how well they are doing, especially in a world where cultural and political determinants are paramount, and in which perception is often as important as reality? By its very interdisciplinary nature, civil-military operations take place in all of these worlds. So whose metrics apply? And not only how should you know you’re succeeding, but when? Can civil-military operations be “effects-based”?

The answer may come by first gaining a basic understanding of what civil-military operations really are, what their core competencies are, and what their goals and objectives are (or should be). Following this analysis, a “cognitive map” of success indicators may be drawn. In addition to more conventional and technological means such as econometrics, input/output analysis, sampling, surveying, questionnaires, and opinion polls, course-of-action selection models, “fuzzy mathematics”, and “approximate reasoning” techniques, and modeling and simulation methodologies, “low-tech” and more intuitive means such as “oral history” methods in interviews with civil-military players to compare and contrast with “hard data” should be applied.

In other words, the real question in civil-military measures of effectiveness (MoE) is: “What’s it all about?”

**SOLVING THE CIVIL-MILITARY MOE RIDDLE**

The first temptation in looking for a baseline for civil-military MoE is to refer to doctrine. The good news is that there is plenty of doctrine to refer to; however, the less encouraging news is that civil-military doctrines are too multifarious and constantly trying to keep up with reality in order to provide a basis for evaluation. (More than 60% of U.S. military doctrine has either been re-written since 9/11 or is under review. At the time of this writing, for example, the revision of the U.S. Army Civil Affairs manual is in its third drafting.) The military, of course, tends be more doctrinaire and programmatic than civilian intervention groups which are rarely large enough, consistently staffed enough, and have the overhead resources to develop and implement doctrine.

Even for the military, the applicability of doctrine is limited at the practical level, particularly in as dynamic an operational environment as there has been since the end of the Cold War. Then there is human nature. Soldiers often forget or loosely apply doctrine as they adapt to the situation on the ground. Instead, their education and training more often shapes their instincts in the field. And like many relief workers, soldiers are relying more on their experiences – or those of others. In this regard, many soldiers are assuming more of the creativeness and flexibility of their civilian counterparts, many of whom in turn are becoming less resistant to the programmatic responses and applied management tools to improve staff effectiveness longer in use in the military or many government agencies. Lesson-learning has moved beyond a cottage industry into a full discipline of its own in both communities.

Nor can the answer to the civil-military MoE riddle be found solely in the desired effects of stabilization and reconstruction, not only because there are differing concepts of end state and MoE among the players, but because – in truth – civil-military operations, particularly in
its aims, are not synonymous with those operations, although civil-military operations are related in that they may facilitate those goals. The first step is to gain an appreciation of the realities of the objective in mind:

In an ideal world, all the participants in any given humanitarian response effort would share a common understanding of one another’s capabilities and limitations, as well as their roles and missions. Overlapping efforts would be kept to a minimum while cooperation in the pursuit of progress and solutions would be instinctive. In the real world, however, mission analysis is often ad hoc; training is spotty and tends to focus on individual agency goals, and coordination with other organizations is worked out on the fly.2

The intent, therefore, of any organizational approaches to meeting the demands of the emerging peace and security operations environment should be humble and measured – not everyone needs to know and be able to do everything. And before focusing further discussion on training and education as one solution, it is worth reviewing organizational responses to such lacunas. Most organizations tend to deal with operational shortcomings through relatively standard approaches, among them: improvement of management tools such as operational doctrines, techniques and procedures; personnel management policies and practices; productivity-enhancing technologies in particularly the information management and corporate communications areas; and, of course, training and education.

The answer to the civil-military MoE riddle, therefore, is in the civil-military relationship itself, because the quality and effectiveness of that relationship is the key to success in civil-military operations. To understand the relationship, however, it is first necessary to understand developments affecting the civil-military operational environment.

As peace operations have become a permanent feature of the international landscape since the Cold War, new and unusual challenges to international and national security have proliferated in frequency, scale and unpredictability. Such threats – e.g., ethnic and religious conflict, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, international organized crime, incidental and deliberate population migration and environmental instability, and sharpening competition for dwindling natural resources – are transforming orthodox notions of national security. Because these threats are borderless, multi-technological, and asymmetrical, they call for response mechanisms and instrumentalities which themselves must integrate peace and security operations and combine both “soft” and “hard” power instruments. Military and diplomatic power alone cannot induce the changes necessary to the establishment and maintenance of durable, quality peace in affected areas. Economic and cultural power – the currency of the latter being information – have increasing importance in the transition to peace process. While there can be no reconstruction without security, security can also not advance without palpable signs of progress in people’s lives to have confidence in the stabilization effort. The events of 11 September 2001 have accelerated these developments, as the forces of both globalization and fragmentation tear even further at the fabric of nation-states and their traditional mechanisms based on ideas of frontiers and inter-national order.

U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld likewise observed that “…wars in the twenty-first century will increasingly require all elements of national power: economic,

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2 Training for Peace and Humanitarian Relief Operations, Robert M. Schoenhaus, United States Institute for Peace, Peaceworks No. 43, April 2002, p. 5.
diplomatic…”, and that “all the high-tech weapons in the world won’t transform the U.S. armed forces unless we also transform the way we think, train, exercise and fight.”

Thus, these overarching strategic truths are also playing out in the field of peace operations. Since international peace operations proliferated in the 1990s, they have involved an increasingly complex array of international and regional organizations, national and intergovernmental agencies, and both international and indigenous non-governmental and private voluntary organizations (NGOs and PVOs), as well as national and multinational military commands. Meanwhile, as the civilian entities among them have become more numerous and better resourced and organized over the last few years, they have increasingly taken the lead in the implementation of peace operations.

Improvements in civilian agency capabilities would enable them to espouse many of the nation-building tasks burdening the military so far. In the U.S., for example, “The Stabilization and Reconstruction Civilian Management Act of 2004” by Senators Lugar and Biden, as well as the State Department’s new Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization and the Humanitarian Information Unit aim to improve U.S. Government interagency capability to respond quickly and effectively to post-conflict situations, both unilaterally and within an international context. This, as much as anything else, has had profound impact on the civil-military relationship in the intervention community, because the military is no longer required to conduct “nation-building” as the lead player, but as one among many.

Other observations include, mostly as a result of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq:

- You can’t win the war without winning the peace.

- The operational environment in stability, reconstruction and counter-insurgency operations is more psychological than physical – and culture can be overriding.

- Coalition-building and maintenance are essential to mission legitimacy.

- Combat, stability, relief and reconstruction operations are often simultaneous as opposed to linear – this more complex environment requires greater planning and coordination of intervention elements.

- Civil-military and information operations must be integral to the overall political-military effort in order to leverage the end state – they are at the fulcrum of transition to peace.

- The critical period of intervention is the first six months, when the majority of events and operations, willy-nilly, shape the overall operation downstream.

Winning a war is fairly straightforward. It involves defeating a fairly clearly defined enemy, usually an opposing military force, often in order to depose the political leadership holding the population in its grip. Although the prosecution of war has recently evolved to

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“network-centric warfare” involving sub-national actors and an emphasis on small-unit actions, it remains, in essence, the application of “hard power” to coerce an adversary to bend to your will, or simply remove him.\(^4\) Winning the peace, however, involves a much more complex and ill-defined process of convincing the host population, now devoid of leadership and in a state of chaos, to embark on a course of political and economic change it may or may not want to take (at least as you would like it). It is, in essence, the application of what Joseph Nye calls “soft power” – “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals, and policies… Winning the peace is harder than winning a war, and soft power is essential to winning the peace… Winning hearts and minds has always been important, but is even more so in a global information age. Information is power, and modern information technology is spreading information more widely than ever before in history.”\(^5\)

Ideally, as the effort shifts from winning the war to winning the peace, as soft power is applied over hard power, and as civilian agencies move in to become the major players in the stabilization and reconstruction process, the military are its initial and key enablers. They must lead the transition to peace effort – the essence of civil-military operations.

THE CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONSHIP

All the above factors above have transformed the civil-military relationship to the point where it is more important than ever to attain a fundamental understanding of that relationship and its purposes. Much of this fundamental understanding is in examining the nature and comparative advantages of each of the two major intervention communities – military and civilian. The third major community in the transition to peace process is the local population, culture, and leader groups.

While the military normally focuses on reaching clearly defined and measurable objectives through linear operational (planning and execution) progressions with given timelines under a unified command and control structure, civilian organizations are concerned with a process of fulfilling changeable political interests through a fluctuating sequence of dialogue, bargaining, risk-taking, and consensus-building. Civilian intervention organizations – among them private firms that bring money, jobs, business opportunities, and global connectivity – are essentially instruments of soft power, deriving their cachet from the legitimacy of (at least) their intervention. The humanitarian NGOs in particular enjoy being able to work within “humanitarian space”, incorporating one or all of its principles: humanitarianism, independence, neutrality, and impartiality. In addition, they often have a much deeper appreciation of the political-social-cultural situation, often with a long view, and have better developmental and public administration knowledge and skills. Operating with much lower political and financial overhead than the military, they are more adept at negotiation and bargaining. Along with their local (government) partners, they are agents of change within that society much more than the military.


Thus, the most useful way to look at the civil-military relationship in an international intervention is to see the military as “enablers” in the process and civilians as the “change agents”. This means that, while the military no longer have to be as directly involved in providing humanitarian relief, re-engineering a failed state or troubled society, their role in enabling that process – primarily by providing a safe and secure enough environment for the change agents to work in – is critical. The paradox of the civil-military relationship is in the need of the military to engage in the process in order to structure it for success.

This paradox may be better understood by acknowledging three levels of friendly “center of gravity” (i.e., the crux upon which a policy, campaign or battle succeeds or fails) in international interventions or stability, reconstruction or counterinsurgency operations:

- The strategic center of gravity – the support of the constituent population or donor community and public opinion leaders of a contributing nation for the intervention.
- The operational center gravity – the presence, willingness, ability and unity of effort of international change agents such as IOs, IGOs, NGOs, PVOs, private companies and investors, et al., to enter and operate in the host nation or region.
- The tactical center of gravity – the attitude of the host population and opinion leaders towards the international intervention, the presence and operations of both enablers (e.g., military forces) and civilian change agents (IOs, NGOs, PVOs, private investors, etc.), and the general process of political, social and economic change.

While these three levels are distinct, they are not separable – one can have substantial impact on the other two, often with dramatic results. The most (in)famous example of this interplay is the Tet Offensive of January 1968, when the strategic center of gravity of the Vietnam War was lost due to the images of disintegrating order shown on television sets in American living rooms. While limited, there are some parallels to that situation with Iraq more than 36 years later. If the operational level center of gravity of winning the peace is the willingness, ability and unity of effort of civilian change agents like the CPA and other government agencies, NGOs or the UN and its agencies to conduct relief and reconstruction, then perhaps the greatest operational level shortfall was the dearth of such organizations visible to the Iraqi people, lending international credibility to the effort. “Often in postwar environments it is not what is accomplished in what amount of time that is important but an impression that things are getting better. Nation building is not merely a physical process but also a psychological one.”

The most difficult of these to understand is the operational level, while many are familiar with the strategic and tactical levels and their interaction. Although civilian organizations have increasingly taken the lead in crisis response and “nation-building”, the military maintain certain comparative advantages which compliment the operational shortcomings of much of the civilian peace operations community. These advantages include, for example:

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operational management and coordination; planning and organization; field logistics and engineering; institutional training and education; and reach back to and infusion of additional, non-military capabilities. Beyond its primary role of securing and stabilizing the operational environment, the military can play a vital role in leveraging the success of the civilian peace operations community.

This is particularly true in the early phases when civilian organizations are not as well-deployed and resourced in the field as the military, yet at the very time when certain actions, taken or not taken, can have long-lasting impact on the legitimacy and effectiveness of the international presence (i.e., second or third order effects or unintended consequences). This, paradoxically, is in the direct interests of the military and their sending states in order to minimize the military’s role – i.e., in supporting the “exit strategy” and reaching the “end state”. In fact, civil-military operations as known by most have come to encompass almost every aspect of military peace support operations so that much of civil-military operations is largely conducted by non-subject matter expert military personnel. (NATO, British and U.S. doctrines express civil-military operations as a command mission.) Beyond the overall success of civilian-led peace operations, certain aspects such as judicial, legal, judicial and law enforcement capacity-building, also have impact on areas of more direct interest to military security operations, e.g., anti-terrorism and anti-organized crime.

Because of the growing abundance of players with disparate organizational and sponsor/donor interests, these increasingly complex operations have been largely uncoordinated, particularly at the level where policy is translated into implementation at the theater joint task force (military) or the UN mission or other lead agency headquarters (civilian) level. The operational level is where resources can at once be most effectively identified and mobilized in appropriate economies of scale. It is also the level of decision-making authority centralized enough to have sufficient depth and breadth of impact in theater and which can elicit appropriate political-diplomatic and institutional support to lend power and legitimacy to such decisions. Thus, the operational level is where the challenges – and opportunities – for the success of an international peace intervention are the greatest. Among these are issues such as post-conflict peace building and compliance with agreements (particularly monitoring, verification, and enforcement). These challenges and opportunities lie not only in the coordination of the myriad activities and resources of the expanding number of donor-funded IOs and NGOs/PVOs but, perhaps more importantly, in the flow and management (and perception) of knowledge and information. Knowledge and information are not just valuable to inter-entity coordination and to efficient and effective mobilization and distribution of resources, but for perception management – at all levels, key to success or failure of an international intervention.

The goal, therefore, of the civil-military relationship is to transition to peace by transitioning from military to civilian lead in the peace process and structuring for success, first by enabling the change agents – i.e., leveraging and synchronizing civilian control of core competencies in relief and reconstruction and facilitating transition to peace, and then building the capacity, competence and legitimacy of local authorities to do likewise. Simply stated, it is about “civilianizing” and “localizing” the transition to peace effort. Mission legitimacy of both stability and reconstruction operations comes through promoting the legitimacy of the indigenous government/forces by facilitating change agent governance and

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public administration capacity-building (i.e., support to civil administration), with emphasis on the rule of law and economic development, as the figure below illustrates. At key “tipping points”, the main effort shifts from military to civilian to local lead.

It is important to understand that the model below describes the civil-military relationship across the spectrum of peace and conflict back to peace (indicated by the phases). The key transition point is when the military is able to hand over the responsibility for the continuation of the peace process to a lead civilian intervention agency, usually through a legal transfer of authority (to either an international or local authority). The prerequisite success indicators at that tipping point are, of course, the establishment of general security, adequate law and order, and the effective presence of (international) civilian change agents. The operation then shifts to being more reconstruction-intensive and less a stability operation. The change agents, in turn, become increasingly local (thus the growth and effectiveness, for example of indigenous NGOs as an indicator). Indications of the main effort shifting to indigenous capabilities would draw a picture of an increasing monopoly of the legitimate government structures on effective public security (i.e., rule of law instrumentalities) and public administration, as well as increasing popular support for the local government.

Figure 1: The Civil-Military Transition Process.

Getting in the way of all this are the “spoilers” to the process. Like the intervention community, they are also by no means a monolith, and may have varying motives and relationships to each other. In Iraq, for example, in they include:

- Former Regime Elements (FREs): These include Ba’ath Party loyalists, Saddamists, former Armed Forces, security, and intelligence personnel banned
by regime change. They are largely Sunni Arab Iraqis. Their ultimate goal is expulsion of the Coalition and return to Sunni-dominated Iraq. They are largely comprised of Sunni Arab Iraqis who once served the former regime, and are responsible for the most violent attacks.

- **Iraqi Nationalists:** These are Iraqis or other Arabs opposed to U.S. occupation of Iraqi soil for nationalist reasons. They are largely Sunni, and are motivated more by Arab or Iraqi nationalism than Islam. Their interests and operational activities are mainly local, and they may exhibit some tactical alliance/cooperation with FREs.

- **Criminal Elements:** These pose an indirect threat to the Coalition and its efforts in Iraq. Their main goal is to remain in business and profitable. The current instability allows ample opportunity for them to thrive. Most of their attacks target Iraqi security forces. They normally engage the Coalition only if caught during a crime.

- **“Pissed Off Iraqis” (POIs):** POIs may have been responsible for more casualties than thought. Many are relatives of FRE’s or civilians killed or injured or by Coalition forces. Other slights include: honor crimes; property damage; job loss – mitigating factors, such as the role of the *khams* (paternal vengeance group) or the role of *fashl* (blood payment). They take revenge for material damage, incidental injury or killings, and cultural affronts more as a matter of course than a personal vendetta. Due to their disillusionment with the Coalition, many may thus be involved in passively or actively supporting or condoning insurgent activities.

When considering particularly the last group, it becomes clear that “spoiler management” is not just a job for the military, but all three elements (military, civilian and local) and is thus a collaborative effort. Keeping also in mind that the center of gravity for an insurgency (the worst form of spoilers) is the base of support among the resident population, it becomes clear that any measures of effectiveness in civil-military operations related to spoiler management must take this into consideration. In many ways, therefore, the MoEs for civil-military operations related to spoiler management (and they almost always are) are synonymous to a broader approach to counterinsurgency operations:

Progress cannot be judged by the success or failure of one short-term operation, nor by statistics even over a period of a year or more. For example, variations in the monthly incident rate can be deceptive. A drop in the number of incidents could mean that more areas are under insurgent control with no incidents reported in them. Conversely, when the government initiates action in an insurgent-controlled area or even a disputed area, the number of incidents can be expected to rise rapidly as the insurgents begin to react. Casualty figures also are a poor indication, even if they are accurate… The two best guides, which cannot readily be reduced to statistics or processed through a computer, are an improvement in intelligence voluntarily given by the population and a decrease in the insurgents’ recruiting rate. Much can be learnt merely from the faces of the population in villages that are subject to clear-and-hold operations, if these are visited at regular intervals. Faces which
at first are resigned and apathetic, or even sullen, six months or a year later are full of cheerful welcoming smiles. The people know who is winning.\textsuperscript{9}

Even such seemingly unrelated activities and issues such as soldier behavior have qualitative and substantial impact on spoiler management. This is because: first, once hearts and minds are lost, the presence of troops perceived as occupiers becomes counterproductive (so the argument to draw down troops and operations makes sense, but mainly because the point of diminishing returns has come and gone); and second, the modus operandi of the military is more important than operational or tactical presence: “The predominant pattern of human behavior in the information age is network behavior. Network-centric warfare is about human behavior in a networked environment – and in warfare, human behavior ultimately determines outcome”.\textsuperscript{10} This gets at the fundamental question for every military commander (and their civilian partners) in stability and reconstruction operations: “What is the operational environment?” In major combat operations, the operational environment is largely physical – i.e., key terrain and political and economic infrastructure, enemy combat formations, opposing leadership, etc. When the effort shifts to winning the peace, however, it becomes predominantly psychological, as noted above – i.e., hearts and minds and legitimacy at strategic, operational and tactical levels. This likewise decisively shifts the focus of the effort such that, as one British staff officer at the Coalition Joint Task Force headquarters in Baghdad put it in mid-2003, “the combat operation should become a supporting operation to the CMO and IO campaign”. This understanding suggests a significant departure in the way the military has conducted not only civil-military operations and information operations, but military operations in general:

We live in a physical world... we traditionally conceptualize the battle space in physical terms, and develop, acquire and employ capabilities that have value in the physical world. In short, it is what we know and do best. Increasingly, however, the most complex elements of the battle space are non-dimensional. The liability of that term is that it suggests a battle space that doesn’t exist in fact or form, and is thus unconsciously diminished in importance. The emerging reality is that non-dimensional battle space now defines a new strategic commons, and comprises the most complex battle space in the conflicts of the 21st century.\textsuperscript{11}

The failure of military commanders to visualize the operational environment in its entirety and thus understand the centrality of the information and cultural dimension in particularly the post-intervention phases is the biggest operational reason why the U.S. military in particular have had difficulty winning the peace. Hence, the generally low priority for civil-military and information operations (often as an afterthought), the near-obsession with finding and eliminating “bad guys”, and the less than consistently strong record of personal involvement or leadership by example in winning hearts and minds. If the operational environment and its dynamics are therefore not properly understood, no amount of information – no measures of effectiveness, no matter how abundant, accurate or well prepared and presented, can help decision-makers make the right decisions to successfully transition to peace – i.e., to “civilianize” and “localize” the effort.

\textsuperscript{11} Cebrowski, p. 55.
Moreover, if the shift from a predominantly physical to a predominantly psychological operational environment is not understood as such, the measures of effectiveness employed will be too empirical and simplistic to gain and maintain an accurate understanding of this environment, its dynamics, and factors affecting these changes.

Information management, as an engine of both civil-military cooperation and information operations, can also have significant impact. How much information is shared and how well can be an indicator of relative civil-military operations success, including the levels of classification, the standardization or synchronization of databases and reporting formats, and overall presence and accessibility of coordination nodes such as civil-military operations centers (CMOCs) and their many relatives and variants. The other value of appropriate and accurate civil-military MoEs is that they feed the IM process and enable more effective civil-military and interagency coordination of both stability and reconstruction efforts and resources. Moreover, they also feed the strategic communications/information operations effort with plenty of facts and figures to illustrate progress and counter (or better yet, get ahead of) spoiler propaganda about the presence, intentions and effectiveness of both enablers and changes agents. After all, this business is more about perceptions than anything else - especially local perceptions, but at all centers of gravity.

Somehow taking all these factors into account cannot only have value in measuring the effectiveness of civil-military operations during an intervention, but the relative level of civil-military cooperation prior to deployment can perhaps have a predictive value as well. Indicators, however, are not prerequisites to success. They are merely suggestive and helpful in decision-making. Moreover, what to measure in the civil-military transition process, diagramed above, may be a matter or focusing on the tipping points and analyzing at each one both success indicators as well as relative risk factors before determining whether to move on the next level or phase. (After all, the main purpose of operational analysis is that it is a decision-making tool for commanders as well as their civilian counterparts.) These determinants could include12:

- General and local security – friendly vs. spoiler freedom of maneuver
- Presence, effectiveness (will, resources, local acceptance), and synchronization of transitional authorities or civilian intervention community (UN, IO, NGOs)
- Status and effectiveness of civil-military transition coordination capabilities/nodes
- The status and effectiveness of information-sharing/management nodes.

- The source, management and perception of law and order instrumentalities.
- Control and status of public administration/services – e.g., security.
- Source and distribution of civilian supplies (goods/services).
- Enabling events – international decisions, elections, establishment of government instrumentalities, population re-settlement.
- Dominance/credibility in local public opinion – who has it?
- Perceived legitimacy of indigenous government.

All of these could go into an assessment of the level of effectiveness in each of the three communities – military, civilian, and local – in certain notional core competency areas or lines of operation, for example, in reconstruction, as shown in the figure below. Another way is to closely link the MoEs are with Maslow's hierarchy of needs. Security, for example, should be measured by the presence and effectiveness of legitimate security services that bid for the loyalty of the population versus the spoiler groups. If people have more confidence in the legitimate structures to provide them security (on a person level), then you may have reach the tipping point on that issue.

**Notional Lines of Operation or Core Competencies for Reconstruction, e.g.**

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*Figure 2: Notional Lines of Operation or Core Competencies for Reconstruction.*
In addition to measuring the level of effectiveness among each of the three communities in performing these tasks, more importantly is showing who among them has the lead – *de facto* more than *de jure* – in each of these areas, which would show how much these critical areas have been civilianized and/or localized.

Drawing this “cognitive map” (or intelligence map in military terms) should rely on multiple and complementary sources to gain a clear picture of the civil-military transition process. These could include:

- Database-oriented information sets such as econometrics, input/output analysis, sampling, surveying, questionnaires, and opinion polls.
- Decision-making models such as course-of-action selection models, and modeling and simulation, such as the Critical Infrastructure Protection Modeling and Analysis (CIPMAS) model.
- “Low-tech” and more intuitive means such as “oral history” methods in interviews with civil-military players to compare and contrast with “hard data”, as well as the use of “fuzzy mathematics” and “approximate reasoning” methodologies to fuse hard and soft information sets.\(^\text{13}\)

Figure 3 shows the example of Iraq in the spring and summer of 2005, as a decision-making tool for senior operational leadership and management, which may thus be the result of such an analysis:

The transition status line indicates where the overall process is, while the lines below show how well each of the three communities are doing not only in carrying out these functions, but more importantly for the military and civilian components, how well they are shaping the operation to effect transition to the next component. The chart or its parts may not necessarily reflect the actual status of these reconstruction lines of operation in terms of their end state, but it may give an indication as to the status of the process of reaching it, and thus explain why or why isn’t it being reached. For example, the overall situation in security and rule of law is “red” because, although the Coalition military has reached an appropriate level of engagement in training and developing Iraqi security forces, the overall security situation remains “red”, not because of the level of violence in Iraq, but because effective security and rule of law capabilities remain to be largely transitioned to local competencies and because there is little to no outside civilian involvement other than some judicial support. (There is, for example, no CIVPOL-equivalent civilian police training force in Iraq – the Coalition military is almost wholly training and monitoring the police forces there. In addition, the projected required indigenous security forces in Iraq is about 50% trained and fielded.)

Admittedly, the three-color chart below is a crude model for civil-military MoEs. Indeed, there are limitations to “traffic light” charts in terms of operational analysis; nonetheless, again, they provide a useful tool for decision-making and the suggestion of a way ahead. For example, while “traffic lights” are a useful tool for providing a “snap shot” of the situation,

they do not convey cause-and-effect.\textsuperscript{14} Further, although this treatise does not provide a detailed analysis of the civil-military MoE model posited, it does provide a framework for further study and work, based upon the key observations laid out above, i.e.:

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
 & ReliefHR & Security & Governance & Public Infra - & Economics & Public Information \\
\hline
Transition Status\textsuperscript{*} & & & & & & \\
\hline
Military Capabilities\textsuperscript{^} & & & & & & \\
\hline
Civilian Capabilities\textsuperscript{^} & & & & & & \\
\hline
Local Capabilities\textsuperscript{^} & & & & & & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

\textsuperscript{*}Transition status:
- Green – More than two-thirds led and sourced by indigenous capabilities
- Amber – More than two-thirds led and sourced by civilian intervention community
- Red – More than two-thirds led and sourced by military intervention community

\textsuperscript{^}Military, Civilian, and Local Capabilities and Organizational Effectiveness
- Green – 75% required capability/effectiveness in transition
- Amber – 50-75% required capability/effectiveness in transition
- Red – Less than 50% required capability/effectiveness in transition
- Blank – Transitioned or not deliberately engaged

\textbf{Figure 3:} A Sample Civil-Military-Local Transition Matrix for Iraq.

- Civil-military MoEs must focus on the effectiveness of the civil-military relationship.
- The key to civil-military MoE is not the final effects of the process it supports, but the transition of public services and civil administration competencies themselves.
- Civil-military MoEs must reflect an analysis of what shapes tipping points for “civilianization” and “localization”.
- Lines of operations may be the same as for S&R operations, but don’t confuse ends with means – it’s about transition.

The cognitive map must include both empirical and intuitive information and knowledge – that includes cultural factors and indigenous perceptions of success (civil-military operations are both science \textit{and} art).

\textsuperscript{14} There is an excellent review of the relative value of “traffic light” and other metrics in the notes for Working Groups 1-3 of Session VI of Analysis for Stabilization and Counter-Terrorist Operations (Cornwallis IX), The Canadian Peacekeeping Press, Cornwallis Park, Nova Scotia, 2005, pp.379-392.
In addition, civil-military MoEs, like all success indicators, need to be realistic. They are often viewed from the prism of what we think is important in our culture and not what the “customer” or end-user thinks is in his. For example, some "rule of law" MoE sets list "resolving disputes peacefully; providing equal access to justice; protecting minority rights; confronting impunity and criminal networks". What does all that mean to a tribal leader? These indicators must be set up as objectively as possible, with greater consideration for the indigenous point of view (after all, if they don’t perceive success, then there really isn’t any). The rule of law is first about police, courts/lawyers, and jails. Are they up and running? Are they working effectively? Are they corrupted? What about the public’s perception of the legitimacy and effectiveness of these instrumentalities, as well as criminal activity? How confident are people in going to the police and judges and lawyers to resolve issues or seek protection under the law? The status of property laws and private ownership instruments, for example, may also tell a lot not only about security, but whether you can reasonably expect a business class to develop, and so on.

Last but certainly not least, as with all of the above-discussed means of improving operational effectiveness, training and education, to varying degrees, bring value-added as well. There is growing consensus in especially the civilian community that “regular participants in humanitarian and crisis intervention would benefit from increased peacetime interaction and communication, as well as from an ongoing synergistic process of building a common understanding of mutual strengths, weaknesses, and responsibilities in the field. In recent years, there has been some movement toward common training in joint exercises, seminars, and planning forums, but this effort has been largely hit-and-miss; what progress there has been must be institutionalized and the experience broadened to include more potential players in complex humanitarian relief interventions”. The more common the operational picture is for both enablers and change agents, the more universally civil-military MoEs may applied and understood, bringing about greater unity of effort and a faster and more effective transition to peace. Moreover, the gaps between expectations and reality that civil-military MoEs may or may not fill can be better managed. That which we do is never as pretty as that which we think.

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15 An excellent summary on the attributes for measures and criteria in military operations can be found in Appendix B to Enclosure B of the Universal Joint Task List Version 4.2 (CJCSM 3500.04C), 1 July 2002. More specific doctrinal discussion of civil-military measures of effectiveness are in Chapter 7 (Evaluating Measures of Effectiveness) of U.S. Army Field Manual FM 3-05.401, Civil Affairs Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, July 2003, as well as Chapter 4 (Measures of Effectiveness and Normality Indicators) of U.K. Interim Joint Warfare Publication 3-90, Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC), November 2003.

16 Schoenhaus, p. 8.