

The Iraqi Prisoner Scandals: Beware the Amity of Public Opinion

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INTRODUCTION

Civil-military relations are worthy of serious study because, as Hew Strachan remarks, the “dash in the title is [not free] of the tension with which it is customarily associated”¹. The triangle of relations between civil authorities, the military and civil society is fraught with the tension, in the form of critical questioning, between authority (the civilian leaders), execution (the military) and expectations (civil society). I suggest that tension between the military and civil society can be useful but has been absent of late, especially in the United States (US).

Much of the literature has focused on the “gap” between civilian and military attitudes and values – the *American Triangle Institute of Strategic Studies (TISS)* research on civil military relations is the most comprehensive and well known. But even the TISS study does not probe to what extent support for the military may be skewing relations. In other words, few are examining whether or not the high level of support for the armed forces by civil society in the United States (US) and United Kingdom (UK) is interfering with civil military relations by insulating the forces from criticism. This paper hopes to contribute to the literature by examining the reactions of the American public to the Abu Ghraib prison scandal involving American service men and women and the British public reaction to the Basra detainee scandal involving British soldiers in order to probe the nature of public opinion vis-à-vis the armed forces. While this paper examines the reaction of the two publics immediately after the scandals came to light, an attempt will be made to note where time has witnessed a change in reaction.

While theory would dictate that both publics would react similarly due to a number of shared factors including the nature and circumstances of the scandals, similar democratic systems and similar military structures, preliminary research suggests otherwise. Both publics initially accepted the “few rotten apples” theory advanced by the elite of the armed forces.

However, the American media and public were less critical of their military than the British public and media toward the British military initially.²

This paper will explore this difference in public reaction. My hypothesis is that high public opinion of the armed forces, especially in the US, prevented general, public criticism thus shielding the members (especially the elites) of the armed forces from serious and ultimately helpful criticism.

Before we begin, one must acknowledge the methodological difficulties of comparative studies especially with regard to civil-military relations. Douglas Bland outlines the difficulties in his article, "Who Decides What? Civil-Military Relations in Canada and the United States."³ Although he compared Canada to the US, the fact remains that "there are few measures [in this field of study] that can be reliably applied across state boundaries, political ideologies and time."⁴ For all intents and purposes, this paper can hold the "time" and "political ideologies" constant as the scandals occurred within the same year, within the same war and both the US and UK share liberal-democratic ideologies. However, the fact remains that an American is not a Briton and vice-versa and that these differences tied to "state boundaries," including a country's history and sense of national pride, have tremendous impacts on public opinion which are extremely difficult to capture and measure. Furthermore, if a scandal calls into question the pride of a country (as did the cases under question), media coverage can be extreme in terms of presentation and analysis. Therefore, acknowledging these limitations, this paper will focus largely on polls and opinions as expressed in various media of the respective countries. An attempt to balance "left-wing" and "right wing" sources and opinions was made. Lastly, Dr. Lukits, points out the dangers of bias, especially when a Canadian analyzes its two closest allies⁵ – the tendency is to be too lenient on the British and too hard on the Americans. With this caution in mind, we begin with a brief analysis of the theory of civil-military-civil relations in order to compare it to the actual state of affairs.

GENERAL THEORY

The sanitized, ideal version of civil-military relations is described thusly: civilian authorities have complete and total control over an obedient military whose members are the mirror image of their civil society (demographically-speaking). This is entirely appropriate when the political situation is highly unstable, the undisciplined and untrained conscript militia is plotting a coup d'état and the state is surrounded by enemies hovering at the border ready to attack. But this is certainly not the case for either the US or the UK. The civil-military relations' goal for the US and UK in today's world is the continued maintenance of effective, subjective control of a professional, volunteer, military whose members share the overarching values of its civil society. Arguably, the US and UK have attained this goal.

CIVIL AUTHORITY—MILITARY

In mature liberal democracies like the US and the UK, both based on the Westminster tradition, Dr. Douglas Bland argues that the civil authorities do not "control" the military in the ideal sense as prescribed by Samuel Huntington.⁶ Rather, both bodies share in the

decision-making process of national defence and the control of the armed forces.⁷ Rules, norms personalities, quality of leaders, domestic politics, the nearness of threat, and the political systems all influence the degree of sharing.⁸ However, the amount of “sharing” is much greater in the US than in the UK specifically because the US system invites and encourages input from the military.

The military “chief” of the armed forces is the principal military advisor to the government. General Richard B. Myers is the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the US and Sir Michael Walker is the Chief of the Defence Staff for the UK. They are statesmen, diplomats and career soldiers. Their allegiances are not to the politicians but to the Constitution (or its equivalent) of their respective states.

The civilian head of each department of defence (or ministry in the case of the UK) is the primary civilian advisor to the President or Prime Minister on defence and national security policy. The Secretary of Defense for the US is Mr. Donald Rumsfeld and the Secretary of State for Defence is the Rt. Hon. Geoffrey Hoon. They are appointed by the President or Prime Minister.

This provides only the broadest of sketches; a more complete picture will be revealed in later sections. What is important to note is that it is widely accepted and encouraged that the military, through the Chief, contributes to defence and security policy decisions in both countries and, in particular, the US. Therefore, when a country goes to war, the military has had a “say” in the decision. However, the public often lumps the military decision makers together with the regular forces. Because the latter enjoys wide public support, the elites are shielded from specific scrutiny because of the goodwill toward the “boots on the ground”. This is potentially problematic because this amity affords the military elite a level of public opinion leeway that is not afforded decision-makers of other government institutions. The danger of a public’s amity is the loss of critical questioning and examination of bad policy decisions or lack of decisions.

MILITARY—CIVIL SOCIETY

There is a tension associated with militaries and most western, societies. On the one hand, militaries need to have distinct values, attitudes, procedures and organizations to be successful at war fighting, but must, on the other hand, represent the society at large⁹. That is why one refers to “America’s armed forces” and “Britain’s armed forces” and not just “the” armed forces.

The general public in both the US and UK do have great confidence in the military as an institution and also respect for the men and women of their armed forces. In fact, in both countries, the armed forces represent the most (or one of the most) respected public institutions.

While one would assume that support of the military is “as it should be,” in fact, the public should have the same healthy skepticism for the military as they would any other bureaucracy. The fact that they have exceptional jobs with unlimited liability, *in theory*, should not detract from the public’s assessment of how they “do” their job. And yet, these factors **do** matter especially *unlimited liability*. As Richard Gabriel remarked “no [other]

profession has the awesome responsibility of legitimately spending lives of others in order to render its service.”¹⁰ Furthermore, the military reinforces that sense of exceptionalism through training and culture to strengthen that notion of specialness.

Society holds the military in high esteem – certainly higher esteem than civilian authorities and (most assuredly) politicians. However, while gaps in values between civil authorities and society can be “fixed” by society with calls for new elections or demands for changes to senior staff,¹¹ society has no part to play in military “fixes” – military courts, promotions and demotions are not within society’s scope of influence, generally speaking. However, while the US has tread lightly in criticizing their military (principally out of respect and support for the soldiers currently at war), the UK has maintained more public pressure on the military to correct quickly. Such pressure can be helpful in guiding the process of correction especially to ensure inclusion of societal values.

THE UNITED STATES

CONFIDENCE IN THE MILITARY

Much has been written on civil-military relations in the United States – in fact the study of civil-military relations came to the fore with Samuel P. Huntington’s publication: *Soldier and the State*. Huntington, an American, described the ideal relationship between civilian authorities and the military as a relationship in which civilian leaders had ultimate control and the military silently acquiesced. The civilians were said to have “objective” control.¹² Of course, in practice, objective control is not only elusive but in an American system, unwanted. The system not only encourages military participation in national security decision-making but also actively promotes it.

In the US, doing one’s civil “service” duty is naturally woven into the fabric of society but military service is a special type of this duty. The National Guard service is an example of what Eliot A. Cohen refers to as the “citizen-soldier” concept that is central to national defence as well as unique to the US.¹³ The US has the most powerful, mobile army in the world. Many in the US and around the world are familiar with the US elite forces (the Marines, Navy Seals, Rangers etc.) even more so than their own (e.g. How many Canadians are aware of Canada’s Joint Task Force?) The US military is world-renowned.

There have been many movies made glorifying the courage and heroism of American soldiers and there is an unmistakable public pride that is demonstrated by ribbon campaigns, companies that use “support our troops” advertisements to boost sales, as well ceremonies and monuments dedicated to the military. Even the funerals of Presidents evoke military traditions such as the cavalry boots placed facing backward in the stirrups of a riderless horse as a reminder of the President's role (and for many Americans, the most important role) as Commander-in-Chief. All of these public gestures and symbols are evidence of the pride Americans feel for their armed forces; there is unwavering support for service men and women. The public opinion pendulum for the military has hovered over “unconditional support” of late, especially when troops are actively engaged in battle.

This, however, was not always the case. Throughout much of the Vietnam War, the military “was widely perceived as a duplicitous, ineffective, an inefficient organization, beset by terrible racial problems, rampant drug abuse, under-skilled officers and noncommissioned officers, and a general inability to adapt to the times”.¹⁴ The pre Vietnam “Can do!” confidence of the military was replaced with a “No can do!” attitude post Vietnam.¹⁵ Public confidence in the military had reached its nadir. *Apocalypse Now* (1977), *The Dear Hunter* (1978) and *First Blood* (1982) are taken by David King and Zachary Karabell as further confirmation of the poor opinion the public held of the military. In less than a generation, however, there has been a profound shift in public opinion. This is the generation of *Top Gun* (1985) and *Saving Private Ryan* (1998) Furthermore, public opinion polls showed that the military’s “approval rating” remained high even after the Somalia debacle and the Tailhook and Aberdeen scandals shone the spotlight on sexual harassment in the military.¹⁶

The American public does treat the military differently from other professions affording soldiers far more leeway when mistakes are made especially when at war.¹⁷ Furthermore, it is unpatriotic to be critical of them even in cases that warrant criticism. The reason for this reverence toward the military is that they represent the “the last hope.” As Douglas Bland remarks, “there is no fall-back position, no Great Power to come to the rescue of a failed defense policy or military defeat.”¹⁸ Quite literally, if the US forces do not succeed in protecting the US and its allies, there is no alternative. “To fight and win the nation’s wars”¹⁹ (and I would add the allied wars as well), means that the American people must have faith in their military. Furthermore, because the rest of the world is critical of the war in Iraq, the American public feels compelled naturally to “rally-round-the-flag” to counter such criticism. Therefore, purposely linking the war in Iraq to the greater *War on Terrorism* has benefited the military and civilian authorities – the latter being a necessary war that the American people, by and large, respect and support.

<i>Ranking Of Institutions Inspiring a “Great Deal of Confidence” in the “people running” the Institutions. (Source: Louis Harris Polls, 1971, 1973, 2001)</i>			
Institution	1971 %	2001%	Change %
Medicine	61	32	-29
University	46	35	-11
Organized Religion	27	25	-2
Major Companies	27	20	-7
The Military	27	44	+17
Supreme Court (1973)*	23	35	+12
Executive Branch	23	20	-3
Television News	22	24	+2
Law Firms	20	10	-10
Wall Street	19	23	+4
Congress	19	18	-1
The White House	18	21	+3
The Press	18	13	-5
Organized Labor	14	15	+1

* *Roe v. Wade decision*

Table 1: Ranking of Institutions (From David C. King and Zachary Karabell’s study entitled “*The Generation of Trust: Public Confidence in the U.S. Military Since Vietnam*”. pg. 4. http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~dking/generation_trust.pdf.)

American confidence in their military is both natural and surprising. It is natural that the public has confidence in their military because it is, simply, the premier military institution in

the world. However, it is equally remarkable that public hold the military in such awe when there has been a history of mistrust of the armed forces that has been the success of America's liberal democratic tradition.²⁰ Above all, standing armies were to be avoided in order to protect the civilian authorities of the day – or at least this was the thinking prior to the American Revolution. Today, however, while trust of public institutions is declining, that for the military is on the increase. Paul Gronke and Peter Feaver point out that this confidence in the military is even more surprising given that “fewer Americans have a direct connection with the military either through prior service or through friends and relatives with military experience”²¹ than did past generations.

David C. King and Zachary Karabell completed a large study entitled “*The Generation of Trust: Public Confidence in the U.S. Military Since Vietnam*” in which they provided statistical confirmation of Gronke's and Feaver's assertion that confidence in the American military is on the rise (Table 1).

Compilation of two graphs from “Uncertain Confidence: Civilian and Military Attitudes about Civil-Military Relations” by Paul Gronke and Peter Feaver. p. 5 & 6. Gronke and Peter had created two graphs: one showing the military versus government institutions and the second comparing the military with public institutions. The two graphs have been combined for ease of comparison (Figure 1).




Figure 1: Confidence in Public/Government Institutions

The military jumped from “fifth” position in terms of public confidence in 1971 to “first” position in terms of public confidence by 2001 (see Table 1). At a time when confidence in other government and public institutions is waning, “the general support for the military is a powerful counter-trend”.²² Gronke and Feaver believe the reason for this confidence, also demonstrated in Figure 1, is the simplest: the military is respected “because it is competent and, beginning in the mid-1980s, demonstrably successful in what it does”.²³ The military also solved the scourge of two problems plaguing society: racism and drug abuse, which reinforced its competent image. As a result, this confidence in the military is across most spectra of the American public as demonstrated in Figure 2 below.

The elite military expresses the most confidence in the military (which is to be expected), followed by the mass public (veteran status contributing a little bit) followed by civilian elites (where veteran status does have an effect).²⁴ Gronke and Feaver conclude that there is a gap between civilian and military elites in terms of confidence in the military institution. But I would ask: does that matter? In other words, are the civilian elites engaged enough in public policy decisions with respect to the military or numerous enough to make an impact? So long as the rest of society outnumbers the civilian elites, the military can depend on the general public for continued support. The fact that the public is generally at odds with the civilian elite in most other public opinion polls means the military and public are even more akin.²⁵ Furthermore, Gronke and Feaver have found that “on some measures, elite military officers appear far more similar to the mass public in their pattern of confidence in American institutions than do the presumed leaders of those institutions, the civilian elites!”²⁶ So much for the civil society-military gap. This lack of gap may contribute further to the general amity of the public toward the military.




Figure 2: Confidence in Institutions (From “Uncertain Confidence: Civilian and Military Attitudes about Civil-Military Relations”, p. 11. (Paul Gronke and Peter Feaver)).

Further evidence of support for the military is the fact that budgets for the military do not seem to be held hostage to other domestic issues such as health care or education. When there are choices to be made, somehow, the American public and therefore Congress finds a way to support spending for the military. As well, the military has learned to use the American system to its advantage wooing Congressional members to ensure that they see the strategic and political benefits of continued financial support for the military. This is far less the case in Britain as we shall see.

And yet, support for the US military is not universal as shown in Figure 3. In a discussion about how strongly events shape a generation’s view of the armed forces, King and Karabell plotted support level based on birthdays which clumped data by generation. Clearly, there is a large dip in confidence for those who came of age during the Vietnam War. (The authors insist they controlled for race, gender, education and so on.) Therefore, someone born in 1952, according to the authors, has the lowest predicted level of confidence

in the US military. On the other hand, young adults born since 1974 have the highest level of predicted confidence in the military which the authors believe can be attributed “to successes in the Gulf War, on the battlefield and on TV...”²⁷

The surge in confidence for the military in the Generation X cohort is curious given this generation has often been labeled as “selfish” and “cynical” and a generation “unambiguously distrusting of authority”.²⁸ Nevertheless, they have embraced the US military. Mind you, this does not mean that they rushed to enlist²⁹ nor does the study suggest how “deep” or “shallow” the convictions are. Now that the Baby Boomers are beginning to hand the reigns of power to the Generation Xer’s we may now see how “deep” the confidence is in the US military.




Figure 3: Confidence of the US Military by Birth Range (Taken from “The Generation of Trust: Public Confidence in the US Military Since Vietnam”, p. 15).

The next generation, the Millennials, represent the great hope for the military and other institutions. According to the authors, this generation “displays a commitment to community service and the public arena unlike any other since the World War II generation, born between 1901 and 1924.”³⁰ And yet, this enthusiasm for the armed forces and “commitment to community” is not translating into enlistment either; in 1997 far fewer high school seniors indicated they “[wanted] to serve in the armed forces.”³¹ Unless this age cohort begins to enlist, the American military will be faced with a very great challenge.

From the polls and studies listed above, we can conclude that there is a "remarkable trinity" between the people, the government and the army.³² Of late, the trinity has served the armed forces well; the public choosing to support the military rather than the government when push came to shove. “While it is quite socially acceptable to trash the media, bash Congress, and make jokes about the President, it is increasingly less acceptable to criticize our boys in uniform”³³ according to the TISS survey on civil-military relations. We now turn to the Abu Ghraib scandal to see how public support for the military fares during a scandal.

ABU GHRAIB

The purpose of this paper is not to re-chronicle the events of the Abu Ghraib scandal (which are by now ubiquitous) nor is the purpose to assign blame. Rather, I wish to answer two questions. Given what we have concluded is robust support of the US military by the public, how does this support manifest itself in a scandal like Abu Ghraib and what implications can one draw regarding the general health of civil-military-civil relations? (The latter question we shall answer reviewing Britain's Breadbasket scandal.)

Despite the fact that the abuses took place in late fall of 2003, the military only launched its first investigation with a news release by *Central Command* on January 16, 2004.³⁴ Few in the media commented on the release.³⁵ CBS 60 Minutes II broadcast the photos depicting the abuses and broke the story April 28, 2004 – nearly 4 months after Central Command's news release. Despite there being no shortage of evidence that abuses were taking place, "...the American news media seemed hesitant, almost dutiful"³⁶ in reporting about prisoner mistreatment in Iraq, Afghanistan and Guantanamo. "Several media experts hypothesize that since 9/11, the government has played on the patriotism of journalists, raising the terrorism banner to deflect press criticism...particularly when soldiers are dying in a foreign land".³⁷ Furthermore, "some correspondents may have problems reporting information that reflects badly on the US military"³⁸ especially when the news of abuses was coming from non-American sources (i.e. Iraqi sources).

The picture of the hooded man, standing on a box with arms outstretched and electric wires dangling from his fingers is now infamous. The response by the American public was immediate. The public was collectively disgusted. But, in the same breath, reminders of the beheadings and suicide bombings by insurgents and/or the cruelty of Saddam Hussein to prisoners in this very prison were almost always included in reports about Abu Ghraib.³⁹ One of the most outspoken critics of the 60 Minutes story was talk radio host Rush Limbaugh who accused the New York Times and others of using the scandal as a "battering ram on the Bush administration."⁴⁰ His 20 million listeners agreed – negative news stories, especially about the US military during war was unpatriotic. According to Limbaugh, military personnel at Abu Ghraib were simply having a good time and blowing off some steam.⁴¹ The host of Fox News' "The O'Reilly Factor" echoed Mr. Limbaugh and refused to show any of the pictures. On May 27, 2004 he noted that the *Los Angeles Times* had put Abu Ghraib on its front page "26 out of the past 28 days. Does this story rate that kind of coverage?"⁴² Jonah Golder, editor at large for *National Review Online*, wrote, "CBS should be ashamed for running photos [of prisoner abuse]."⁴³ Much of the public began demanding why the beheading of American businessman, Mr. Nicholas Berg, was not receiving the same level of coverage as Abu Ghraib.⁴⁴ The word "torture" in news stories reporting on Abu Ghraib was used sparingly.

It is not that the public was blind to the abuse by the military; in a gallop poll in May 2004 shortly after the Abu Ghraib pictures were released 3 in 4 people in a USA TODAY/CNN/Gallup poll said such conduct by US troops could not be justified.⁴⁵ However, public and media cushioned any negative reports of the military with extenuating circumstances and/or blamed others. The Harris Poll⁴⁶, which polls over 2,000 Americans every week on different subjects asked for the public's opinion on the "situation for troops in Iraq" in May 2004. In late June 2004 they polled "how common was prisoner abuse?"

However, the Harris Poll did not correlate Abu Ghraib with public attitudes of the military.⁴⁷ The July 1, 2004 Harris poll found that:

- Over three-quarters (77% vs. 6% -unaware) of adults thought that mid-level army officers and six in ten (62% vs. 17% - unaware) of army generals were aware of the abuse of Iraqi prisoners before the news was reported in the media.
- Half (50%) think Secretary Donald Rumsfeld was also aware of the abuse, with 29% feeling that he wasn't aware.
- A third (32%) felt that President Bush was aware of the treatment of prisoners in Iraq, though more (47%) said that the president was not aware.
- A slight majority (53%) said that the abuse was common (23% saying very common and 30% saying somewhat common). Over a third (37%) said that the abuse was somewhat or very rare.

And yet, even though it was widely accepted by the public that many in the military were aware of the abuse and that it was widespread, there is no poll looking at “what should the military have done” or “what is your opinion of the military in light of the Abu Ghraib scandal” which polls in Britain did ask. The reticence in the US may be because a) researchers sensed the American public was not anxious to complete polls that may put their military in a negative light b) even polling companies are hesitant to publish negative polls about the American military. Instead, polling questions tended to centre on Bush's handling of the war, the level of casualties and general situation for the troops.

At a media scrum on May 4, 2004, hours after members of the *Senate Armed Services Committee* had received a closed door briefing on Abu Ghraib from Mr. Rumsfeld and General Myers, Martha Raddatz of ABC News stated that “General Myers, Chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had not seen the any reports [concerning prisoner abuse] yet” and guessed aloud that Mr. Rumsfeld had not either despite it being nearly four months after Central Command's news release that investigations were underway. While one would think the public would begin to question why the military had not: a) informed the Secretary of Defence earlier nor b) ensured that the Senate Committee were informed via appropriate channels, these questions were not asked by main stream media. Despite the military keeping the abuses “quiet” (and Abu Ghraib represented only one of several detention centres for which the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)⁴⁸ had reviewed and rebuked the coalition forces for their treatment of prisoners), the anger of the public was directed briefly toward senior civil authorities rather than the military. Meanwhile, Congress remained uncharacteristically quiet.

For their part, the military was quick to isolate the “few bad apples” and announce further investigations. The *Taguba Report* was followed by the *Schlesinger Report* which was followed by the *Fay Report* which was followed by the *Church III* report... in total eleven investigations and reports have been filed regarding Abu Ghraib and other detention facilities.

In each case, the reports were summaries of investigations by senior military officers⁴⁹ who could only “gaze down the chain of command, not up it, and who [were] each

empowered to examine only a limited and precisely defined number of links in the chain that connects the highest levels of the government to what happened on the ground in Abu Ghraib and elsewhere in the war on terror.”⁵⁰ General Taguba investigated the military police, General Paul Mikoslashek, reported on detention procedures, General Fay on military intelligence, General Schlesinger on detention operations and Vice Admiral Church III on interrogation methods.⁵¹ This style of limited enquiry benefits the military elite — individuals are accused, reports are produced, but blame is deflected down the chain of command.

The general public knows the American system; they know that a Republican-majority Senate and Congress will not call for a truly independent, bipartisan and far-reaching investigation into the scandal anytime soon especially now that control for Abu Ghraib and other prisons are being handed over to the Iraqis and the military trials are nearly completed.⁵² Other domestic issues became more pressing, such as pension reform. For their part, civilian authorities also were not keen to discredit their military — not when they need them so desperately to complete their mission in Iraq and elsewhere.

Nearly two years after the abuses began at Abu Ghraib, the US military is making changes to their training and procedures manuals to ensure Abu Ghraib-like incidents do not happen again. Respecting the size and scale of the US military, it is not unreasonable these changes would take time. The argument of this paper, however, is that American public support for their military means an important check and balance system is missing in the US civil-military “triumvirate” of authority, execution and expectations. If the American public was more critical and reflective in what their military was doing on their behalf from the beginning, perhaps more questions would have been asked about the training and capacity of the military to operate detention facilities via Congress. While Dr. Andrew Bacevich (col. ret.) suggests America has been “seduced by war”⁵³, I suggest the majority of the public has been isolated from the war in the sense that it has not impacted their everyday lives and so they are complacent and continue to afford the military unlimited support because it represents the path of least resistance. Really, the public’s unwavering support is for the men and women in battle and not the military elite who have demonstrated poor leadership with respect to Abu Ghraib.

THE UNITED KINGDOM

British public opinion of its military is respectful. This opinion is based on history and a sense of British national pride. Less overt and more understated than the American public, the British are very proud of their armed forces. However, whereas the American public seems to have overwhelming confidence in its forces, the British public is more discerning.

The British forces are described as “professional and well thought of” but they are another profession in British life and not necessarily exceptional. The experience of two world wars especially the Second World War was seminal to the development of public opinion because a generation of men, women and children become involved in a war effort and quite directly. The result was that the mystique of the profession of arms was revealed thus giving the British public insight and sympathy for soldiers.

As well, the fact that conscription is a fairly recent memory has also influenced public opinion. Reinstated in 1939 and only abolished in 1961, Hew Strachan reminds us that a large majority of British males have “experienced some form of service life [that] normalized the idea of military service and so underpinned the notion that there was a time when the armed service and British society were in harmony.”⁵⁴

The British armed forces today are composed of volunteers who consciously chose the profession of arms. “Britain has no tradition that men serve in the armed forces out of civic obligation, partly because it escaped the Rousseauist legacy of the French Revolution but principally because home defence has not been a prime requirement of strategy”⁵⁵ according to Strachan. Therefore, the notion of civic duty and specialness of the armed forces are not as acutely felt as they are in the US and therefore, the armed forces are not held in the same extreme esteem as it is in the US; soldiers are fallible. In the words of Mr. Rory Clayton, former Royal Artillery Commander, 1st Gulf War, “I have never heard of a military operation that did not screw up somewhere”.⁵⁶ Britain is well aware of its forces record of abuse in Malaya, Kenya, Aden and Cyprus (to name a few).⁵⁷ This is accepted as a fact of life. It does not unduly influence public opinion but seems to make the public more realistic in their assessment of their military.

Britain suffers from the same lack of direct understanding of the military in its Parliament as the US does in its Congress. No minister of Defence since the honourable Malcolm Rifkind in 1992 or any Minister since 1997 has been a member of the armed forces.⁵⁸ However, unlike the American system that actively invites the military to lobby the Congress and “educate” them as to their preferred priorities, the UK system lacks such overt mechanisms of contact with Parliamentarians. As a result, defence issues and priorities must compete with other domestic causes such as health care and education for their attention.⁵⁹ Therefore, the British armed forces is less likely to have as large a cheering section in Parliament as is found in Congress simply because votes for the military, especially in term of budgets, means votes against other constituent groups.

Britain’s “Vietnam” in terms of its impact on civil-military relations has been the terrorist fight with Northern Ireland. It divided the UK into pro and anti-military camps that were fuelled by, among others, stories of prisoner abuse. Added to this was the extra security and secrecy of the military during this time that “created physical and cultural barriers between the services and the society they [protected]”⁶⁰ which tends to make individuals more critical in the inquisitive sense. Therefore, the public does question the actions of their military more so than the US because there is a history of abuse in their “backyard”.

Similar to the US, there is a concern that the British forces are no longer representative of their civil society. While Britain has not benefited from a “TISS”-like survey, Hew Strachan conjectures there is a likely a gap between the military and civil society but that the British system has narrowed the gap because it has (paradoxically) fewer special services for the armed forces and their families as well as a different education system have done much to narrow the gap in Britain. For example, the UK does not have the numbers of base housing, base day care centers, base schools etc. that the US does thereby forcing more integration of the military into day-to-day civil activities that Deborah Avant and Stanley Arthur say is what further separates the US military from civil society and confers on the military a “special” status.⁶¹ Furthermore, British army officers-in-training are only schooled at military college once they have completed their undergraduate degree at a civilian university; only then do

they attend Sandhurst – the British Army Academy – thereby reducing the time and exposure to military doctrine.

Deborah Avant summarizes these differences to conclude that; “good civil-military relations depend on the degree to which the military looks like the society from which it is drawn”.⁶² While there is no reason to suspect the British armed forces “looks more like” its society than the US forces “looks like” its society. It is assumed that British civil society and the military have a better understanding of each other because the military, especially the officers are integrated into British society for longer periods of time especially during formative years.

	<i>Sex</i>		<i>Age</i>					
	<i>Male</i>	<i>Female</i>	<i>15-24</i>	<i>25-34</i>	<i>35-44</i>	<i>45-54</i>	<i>55-64</i>	<i>65+</i>
<i>Strongly Agree</i>	23%	13%	11%	17%	15%	18%	21%	26%
<i>Agree</i>	53%	47%	45%	48%	48%	52%	53%	54%
<i>Neither Agree nor Disagree</i>	17%	13%	33%	28%	28%	23%	20%	15%
<i>Disagree</i>	6%	7%	10%	6%	8%	6%	6%	6%
<i>Strongly Disagree</i>	1%	1%	2%	1%	1%	1%	1%	—
<i>Don't Know</i>	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

Table 2: Do the UK Armed Forces Have the Highest Professional Standards? 1,882 adults in Britain surveyed between 17th-22nd February 2000 (Poll completed by MORI for the Ministry of Defence, 2000: http://www.mod.uk/publications/foi/opinion_surveys.html. Polls were conducted face-to-face).

Across gender and age groups, a large majority of Britons do agree that their Armed Forces have high professional standards as revealed by Table 2. However, between 13 and 33% of Britons surveyed by age group were undecided, which means that events like the prison scandal could influence overall public opinion significantly. While most Britons do believe that their armed forces have very high professional standards, the British millennial generation (age 15-24) is the least convinced — this is the exact opposite finding of the US experience. This difference between the two countries requires further study. Like the US, however, the millennial generation is not rushing to join the armed forces.

Now turning to a poll conducted during the current war in Iraq. In polls conducted by MORI regarding public perceptions of government institutions, a plurality of individuals surveyed viewed the UK’s armed forces favourably. On its website, the Ministry of Defence shows a picture of a grateful young boy kissing a British soldier with the Ministry of Defence motto, “a force for good”, hovering over them.⁶³ This picture captures the basic feeling Britons have for their armed forces.

Interestingly, the gap between the military and other government institutions in terms of “mainly favourable” is very similar for the US and UK. For example, compare 43% vs. 24% favourability for the UK military vs. the Home Office for December 2003 (Table 3) to 44% and 21% for the US military and White House for 2001 (Table 1). While the dates are different, the fact that the gap is consistent is worthy of note. The UK and US seem to have similar opinions of their military versus other government institutions.

Organization	Very Favourable %		Mainly Favourable %		Neither Favourable nor Unfavourable %		Mainly Unfavourable %		Very Unfavourable %		Don't Know %	
	Jan	Dec	Jan	Dec	Jan	Dec	Jan	Dec	Jan	Dec	Jan	Dec
Foreign Office	2	2	30	25	51	54	7	8	1	2	9	9
Dept. of Health	9	8	49	39	27	34	11	12	2	2	3	5
Ministry of Defence	6	5	46	30	35	47	5	8	1	2	6	7
Education and Skills	7	6	42	34	31	39	11	12	2	3	6	7
The Police	--	12	--	49	--	26	--	7	--	3	--	2
UK's Armed Forces	19	16	55	43	20	32	3	3	1	1	3	5
Home Office	--	2	--	24	--	54	--	10	--	2	--	9

Table 3: Confidence in the Military—How favourable or unfavourable is your overall opinion or impression of each organization? Polls conducted January and December 2003. (Polls conducted by MORI. 2,094 adults aged 15+ were interviewed face-to-face in their home. See http://www.mod.uk/publications/foi/opinion_surveys.htm.)

CAMP BREADBASKET

This section will probe the same two questions posed in the Abu Ghraib section, namely: given what we have concluded about British public support for their military, how does this support manifest itself during a scandal. As well, we will draw some conclusions regarding the general health of civil-military relations in the UK in the conclusion section.

The *Economist* summarized the basic attitude of Britons regarding the Iraq war in an article. It stated, “however uncomfortable many Britons have felt about the war in Iraq, they have at least been secure in the knowledge that their army has been doing a fine job. Compared with areas under American control, the area under British control [had] been relatively calm”.⁶⁴ At the top of this article was a picture of the front-page of a popular British tabloid, the *Daily Mirror*, released May 1, 2004. A British soldier is seen urinating on a hooded detainee. The word “VILE” is printed in bold letters above the detainee’s head and added, in small print, “... but this time it’s a BRITISH (with emphasis) soldier degrading an Iraqi”.⁶⁵ While American tabloid’s defended American troops, British tabloids broke the story and were much less respectful of their military than their American press counterparts.

The headlines in British newspapers described the events as “shocking and sickening.” It was coined “Britain's Abu Ghraib” and served to fuel growing discontent with Prime Minister Tony Blair's decision to join the US-led invasion and occupation of Iraq. *The Sun* newspaper ran an editorial entitled “The Army's Shame”⁶⁶. It began by stating “the country is asking one question today: How could the British Army let such terrible things happen?” Clearly, by headlines alone, one senses Britain’s general pride in their military did not prevent questioning their military’s actions.

There are some important differences between the British cases of abuse and Abu Ghraib that must be mentioned. First, the abuses were confined to a single day in May 2003 and the victims were not long-term detainees. Rather, they were Iraqi civilians who had been caught stealing food from the camp. The British-based *Economist* was almost sanctimonious in its assessment that “[the] alleged abuses of Iraqis by American soldiers is worse than anything alleged in [the British] case” even when all of the facts had still not come to light.⁶⁷ Furthermore, British articles focused on the length of time it took for these abuses to be made public.

The incidents occurred in May 2003 at a British-run camp in Basra. The abuse was discovered when photographs were published in *The Daily Mirror* as described above. The photographer had already been sentenced in a court martial hearing in 2004 regarding the pictures. He served eighteen months in a youth detention centre and was disgracefully discharged from the army. The soldiers had been ordered by Major Dan Taylor to capture and deter looters. The prosecutors deemed the mission, code named Operation Ali Baba, illegal. No criminal action was taken against Major Taylor despite the (apparent) illegal order.

When the news of the abuses first became public, many didn’t believe the allegations. British soldiers were somehow above this behaviour but it was widely accepted that the US soldiers were perfectly capable of such egregious acts.⁶⁸ The British public scrutinized the type of rifle used, the headgear, the way the boots were tied etc. and concluded the photos could be fake. Of course, the British had recently been accused of atrocities that had proven false.

Three British soldiers who abused Iraqi civilian were jailed and dismissed from the Army in disgrace by a military tribunal in Germany. L/Cpl Mark Cooley was jailed for two years, Cpl Daniel Kenyon received an eighteen-month sentence and L/Cpl Darren Larkin received a one-hundred-and-forty day sentence. Britain’s top soldier, General Sir Michael Jackson, apologized on behalf of the Army to the abused Iraqis.⁶⁹

Defense Secretary Geoff Hoon also expressed his profound disturbance by the case. General Sir Michael did not accept the concept of “endemic rotten apple” in the British Army.⁷⁰ Prime Minister Blair denounced the acts immediately. Since the trial, however, new evidence has come to light that suggests more detainees were abused and more soldiers were involved.⁷¹

In a You/Gov/ Mail on Sunday Survey entitled “Iraq - Prison Abuse”, the following poll results were released. One thousand, nine hundred and seventy-six (1,976) adults were asked the following questions between May 6-8, 2004.⁷²

Before the recent torture allegations what was your opinion of the British military?

Excellent	39%
Good	52%
Poor	5%
Very poor	1%
Don't know	3%

What is your opinion of the British military now?

Excellent	29%
Good	47%
Poor	12%
Very poor	4%
Don't know	8%

If any British troops are found to be guilty of brutal behaviour in Iraq, what should happen to them?

They should be punished more severely than if they had acted this way towards a British civilian	9%
They should be punished as severely as if they had acted this way towards a British civilian	68%
They should be punished, but less severely	8%
They should be discharged from the army, but not otherwise punished	8%
They should not be punished in any way	4%
Don't know	3%

If any Iraqi civilians are proven to have suffered brutality at the hands of British troops, should they and their families receive compensation from Britain?

They should receive as much compensation as if they had been British civilians	41%
They should receive some compensation, but not as much as if they had been British civilians	16%
They should receive no compensation	33%
Don't know	11%

Do you think the Iraqis seeking compensation should be eligible for legal aid paid for by British taxpayers?

Should be	17%
Should not be	70%
Don't know	13%

Do you think torture is sometimes justified in times of war in order to protect British lives, or is it never justified?

Sometimes justified	32%
Never justified	60%
Don't know	8%

If the allegations of torture by British troops are proven, do you think Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon should resign?

Should resign	35%
Should not	45%
Don't know	20%

If the allegations of torture by British troops are proven, do you think Tony Blair should resign?

Should resign	30%
Should not	54%
Don't know	16%

YouGov specifically asked, “what is your opinion of the military” as a result of the alleged scandals whereas US polls shied away from such questions. In addition, the YouGov polled even breached the possibility of compensation for the victims. While not willing to offer taxpayers’ money, the British public overwhelmingly felt compensation should be paid (presumably out of the pockets of the abusers).

Finally, only 35% of respondents felt Defence Secretary Geoffery Hoon should resign and only 30% of respondents felt Tony Blair should resign. This is taken as further evidence that the British public separated the actions of the military from civilian authority and was willing to lay blame specifically on the military. What is interesting, however, is that there is no poll asking if Sir Michael Walker, the Chief of the Defence Staff, should resign. The British military elites, it would seem, are equally as skilled as their American counterparts at deflecting attention.

The British public is very proud of their armed forces as proven by a number of public polls. However, at the same time, the public is not opposed to questioning their actions and demanding corrective action be taken – British tabloids exposed the story. Unfortunately, as is the case in the US, only low ranking service men (and women, in the US case) have been tried.

CONCLUSIONS

While theory would dictate that both publics would react similarly due to a number of shared factors including the nature and circumstances of the scandals, similar democratic systems and similar military structures, this paper suggest there was a difference. British public scrutiny of their military was more outspoken and critical than the US public initially. We may now be witnessing a “catching up” by the American public as more scandals come to light, especially at other detention facilities.⁷³

Following the 1991 Gulf War, CBS news anchor Dan Rather was asked about the relationship between patriotism and journalism during times of conflict. Without hesitation, Rather stated that, as an American, when it came to the crunch, he would always be on the side of the American troops. Rather summarized what Andrew Bacevich calls the, “ultimate diktat of present-day political correctness; never do anything that might suggest less than wholehearted support for [US] men and women in uniform”.⁷⁴ In Britain, confidence in and respect for the UK armed forces is less demonstrative and overwhelming.

The “few bad apples” that have been identified as the perpetrators of the scandals to date, have been tried and convicted in military trials. The militaries seem satisfied that the misbehaviour and sadism of a few are not representative nor a product of the larger military community. The US has launched a number of internal investigations but they look only down the chain of command not up. If the British are conducting more comprehensive investigations than the Americans, they are well-kept secrets.

So what can this paper tell us about the health of civil-military relations in both countries? The overwhelming support of the US military is a potential concern because the “expectations” and “execution” triangle are no longer conjoined. Not only does it shield the military from scrutiny, it makes it far too easy for attention to be deflected from the military elite. While the state of health of British civil-military relations is of lesser concern, the fact that they have not engaged in a TISS-like survey means there may be other factors influencing the health of relations that are still unknown. The danger is that the British public may become as equally uncritical of their military as the American public was (this is starting to change). Hopefully, this paper will serve as a warning to all: beware the amity of civil society.

FOOTNOTES

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- ¹ Strachan, Hew, “The Civil-Military “Gap” in Britain”, *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 26, No. 2 (June 2003): 44.
 - ² It must be noted, that currently, the media and public are much more critical of “top brass” and politicians.
 - ³ Bland, Douglas, L. "Who Decides What? Civil-Military Relations in Canada and the United States", *Canadian-American Public Policy*, Number 41, (February 2000).
 - ⁴ Bland, Douglas, L. "Who Decides What?.....:1
 - ⁵ Dr. Lukits, Royal Military College, Kingston, Canada.
 - ⁶ Huntington, Samuel P., *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*, (Cambridge, Mass, The Belknap Press, 1959).
 - ⁷ Bland: “Who Decides....”: 2-3.
 - ⁸ Ibid: 3.
 - ⁹ Johnson, Douglas V. and Steven Metz, *American Civil-Military relations: New Issues, Enduring Problems*, (US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute) April 24, 1995: 1.
 - ¹⁰ As quoted in Bland, “Who Decides....”: 15 from Gabriel, Richard, *To Serve with Honor: A Treatise on Military Ethics and the Way of the Soldier* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982): 86.
 - ¹¹ Curiously, neither country seems to hold civil authorities accountable; the exception being initial cries for Mr. Rumsfeld to resign immediately after the story broke. Since then, these cries have muted. For example, an ABC News/The Washington Post poll suggested that only 20 percent of those surveyed said the Defense Secretary should step down, while 69 percent said he should retain his position. Interestingly, the loudest cry for Mr. Rumsfeld’s resignation was by the Economist. See “Resign, Rumsfeld”, *Economist*, May 6, 2004 or “Mr. Rumsfeld’s Responsibility”, *The Washington Post*, May 6, 2004, A34. Presidential Candidate, Mr. John Kerry, also called for Mr. Rumsfeld’s resignation as did Veterans’ groups and human rights’ groups. It was revealed later that Mr. Rumsfeld had tendered his resignation twice but had been refused by President Bush on both occasions.
 - ¹² Huntington, Samuel, P., *Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*, (Cambridge, Mass, The Belknap Press, 1959): 83.
 - ¹³ Cohen, Eliot A., *Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen and Leadership in Wartime*, (New York: Anchor Books, 2002): 185.
 - ¹⁴ King David C., and Zachary Karabell, “The Generation of Trust: Public Confidence in the US Military Since Vietnam”, *American Enterprise Institute*: 6. http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~dking/generation_trust.pdg. Accessed March 7, 2005.
 - ¹⁵ Campbell, Kenneth J., “Once Burned, Twice Cautious: Explaining the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine”, *Armed Forces and Society*, (Spring 1998, vol. 24, no. 3): 363.
 - ¹⁶ Ibid: 7.
 - ¹⁷ This is the thesis and premise of Andrew Bacevich’s book *The New American Militarism: How Americans Are Seduced by War*, (London: Oxford University Press, 2005).
 - ¹⁸ Bland, “Who Decides....”: 20.
 - ¹⁹ America’s Armed Forces objective as quoted in Bland, “Who Decides....”: 20.
 - ²⁰ Gronke, Paul and Peter D. Feaver, “Uncertain Confidence; Civilian and Military Attitudes about Civil-Military Relations”, *Triangle Institute for Security Studies “Project on the Gap Between the Military and Civilian Society”*, Peter D. Feaver and Richard H. Kohn, Co-Principal Investigators. (New Haven: Yale

- University Press, 1997). This study focused only on the American armed forces and respondents were American citizens.
- 21 Ibid: 1.
- 22 Ibid: 5.
- 23 Ibid: 6.
- 24 Ibid: 12.
- 25 Ibid: 14.
- 26 Ibid: 14.
- 27 King and Karabell, "The Generation.....": 16.
- 28 Ibid: 16.
- 29 There have been a number of commentaries on the Army's inability to recruit enough new soldiers including "The Army Numbers Game, New York Times, June 13, 2005.
- 30 Strauss, William and Howe, Neil, *Generations*, (New York: William Morrow, 1991) and Howe, Neil and Strauss, William, *Millennials Rising: The Next Great Generation*, (New York: Vintage, 2000). As summarized by King and Karabell, *The Generation...*: 16.
- 31 Ibid: 16.
- 32 Campbell, Kenneth, "Once Burned Twice Cautious: Explaining the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine", *Armed Forces & Society*, 24, 3 (Spring, 1998): 364.
- 33 Gronke and Feaver, "Uncertain Confidence....": 15.
- 34 ³⁴ "Detainee Treatment Investigation", United States Central Command, Release Number: 04-01-43, January 16, 2004, www.centcom.mil/CENTCOMNews/news_Release.asp?NewsRelease=20040143.txt. Accessed February 26, 2005.
- 35 For example, the LA Times ran a very small story but on page A6 entitled "Coalition investigating prison abuse". See Ricchiardi, Sherry, "Missed Signals", *American Journalism Review*, (August/September 2004), accessed February 17, 2005. <http://ajr.org/Article.asp?id=376>.
- 36 Ricchiardi, Sherry, "Missed Signals, *American Journalism Review*, (August/September 2004), www.ajr.org/Article.asp?id=3716, accessed February 17, 2005: 4.
- 37 Ibid:4.
- 38 Ibid:4.
- 39 See Seymour M. Hersh, "Annuals of National Security: Treatment at Abu Ghraib", *New Yorker*, May 10, 2004, http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/?040510fa_fact accessed March 12, 2005 or "Abuse of Iraqi POWs by GI's Probed", CBS News, April 28, 2004, <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/04/27/60II/main614063.shtml> accessed March 12, 2005. or even Danner, Mark, "Abu Ghraib: The Hidden Story", *The New York Review*, October 7, 2004. or "Probe: Leaders Didn't Order Prison Abuse", Fox News, Thursday March 10, 2005, <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,149976,00.html>, accessed March 12, 2005. Wilson, Scott and Sewell Chan, "As Insurgency Grew, So Did Prison Abuse", *Washington Post*, May 10, 2004, A01.
- 40 Ricchiardi, "Missed Signals....": 5
- 41 Ibid: 5.
- 42 Ibid: 5.
- 43 Ibid: 6.
- 44 Ibid: 6.
- 45 Lawrence, Jill, "Abu Ghraib probes shift public focus", *USA TODAY*, August 24, 2004. www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2004-08-24-prison-probe_x.htm accessed March 1, 2005.
- 46 Harris interactive conducts weekly polls on American attitudes to a plethora of subjects. On average, over 2,000 American adults are polled for each survey. See <http://www.harrisinteractive.com/> for more information.
- 47 See http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harris_poll/index.asp?PollYear=2004 - May 24, 2004 and http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harris_poll/index.asp?PID=477 - July 1, 2004.
- 48 See "Report of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) on the Treatment by the Coalition Forces of Prisoners of War and Other Protected Persons by the Geneva Conventions in Iraq During Arrest, Internment and Interrogation", February 2004. It is important to note that these reports are not normally made public. However, a number of human rights groups and other non-governmental organizations have made this report available on the internet. See http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/archives/individual/2004_05/003886.php
- 49 The Schlesinger Report could be viewed as an exception as James Schlesinger was never a serving military member but he was Secretary of Defense under President Nixon and General Charles A. Horner (USAF-Ret) was one of the main authors.

- ⁵⁰ Danner, Mark, "Abu Ghraib: The Hidden Story", *The New York Review of Books*, October 7, 2004 No. 15. vol. 51:48.
- ⁵¹ See "The Taguba Report: Article 15-6 of the 800th Military Police Brigade", February 2004 and "James R. Schlesinger, Harold Brown, Tillie K. Fowler and General Charles A. Horner (USAF-Ret), "Final Report of the Independent Panel to review DoD Detention Operations (The Schlesinger Report), August 2004 and Major General George R. Fay, "AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th Military Intelligence Brigade", August 2004, See Vice Admiral Albert T. Church III's Review of Interrogation Policy, February 2005.
- ⁵² Lin, Judy, "Soldier Faces Court-Martial While Whistleblower Praised", *Globe and Mail*, (March 10, 2005, A17)
- ⁵³ Bacevich, Andrew, *The New American Militarism: How Americans are Seduced by War*, (London: Oxford University Press, 2005)
- ⁵⁴ Strachan, Hew, "The Civil-Military 'Gap' ...": 45.
- ⁵⁵ Ibid: 51.
- ⁵⁶ "Iraq Abuse Allegations: Military View", *BBC News*, May 11, 2004, <http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/3691111.stm>, accessed February 25, 2005.
- ⁵⁷ Burke, Joanna, "From Basra to Surrey, Abuse is Fact of British Army Life", *The Guardian*, February 26, 2005. Special Report.
- ⁵⁸ Strachan, "The Civil-Military 'Gap'": 46-47.
- ⁵⁹ Ibid: 43. Strachan was referring specifically to budgets but it can be extended to levels of attention as well.
- ⁶⁰ Ibid: 47.
- ⁶¹ Avant, Deborah, "Conflicting indicators of "Crisis" in American Civil-Military Relations", *Armed Forces & Society*, (Spring 1998, vol. 24, no. 3): 378.
- ⁶² Ibid: 379.
- ⁶³ See Ministry of Defence website at <http://www.mod.uk/> accessed March 14, 2005.
- ⁶⁴ "The Not-So-Good Guys", *The Economist*, May 8, 2004: 55.
- ⁶⁵ Ibid: 55.
- ⁶⁶ "The Army's Shame", *Sun Newspaper*, January 19, 2005. <http://www.thesun.co.uk/article/0,,31-2005090336,00.html>
- ⁶⁷ "Britain's Abu Ghraib?", *The Economist*, January 20th, 2005.
- ⁶⁸ "Iraq Abuse Allegations: Military View", *BBC News*, May 11, 2004 <http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/3691111.stm>. Accessed February 25, 2005.
- ⁶⁹ "Iraq Abuse Case Soldiers Jailed", *BBC News*, http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk_news/4296511.stm Accessed February 25, 2005.
- ⁷⁰ Ibid.
- ⁷¹ Gillan, Audrey, "Calls to Reopen Iraqi Abuse Inquiry", *the Guardian*, February 26, 2005. Special Report.
- ⁷² The author is grateful to Karen Dennison, Support Services Manager for UK Data Archive - a service provider for the Economic and Social Data Service (ESDS) of Essex University for alerting me to a number of British surveys including this survey from Yougov. See http://www.yougov.com/yougov_website/asp_besPollArchives/pdf/DBD040101005_1.pdf, accessed March 9, 2005.
- ⁷³ For example, a op-ed piece in the *New York Times* discusses the detainment and confinement of juveniles at Abu Ghraib and other detention facilities. See Arlie Hoschschild, "Arrested Development", *The New York Times*, (June 29, 2005).
- ⁷⁴ Bacevich, Andrew, "A Modern Major General", *New Left Review*, September/October, 2004: 123.