


[dst1] Cornwallis XV
‘Criminal insurgency’
31st March 2010




“The guilt of enforced crimes lies on those who impose them.”
- Seneca

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“Organised crime
constitutes nothing less than
a guerrilla war against
society”

- Lyndon B. Johnson, 36th POTUS,
1963-1969




Criminal insurgency

- Organised crime will dramatically increase the length of operations in Afghanistan
- Primarily occurs through supporting the Taliban
- However organised crime constitutes an insurgency
- Distinguishing “profit based” from “ideologically motivated” organisations is unhelpful
- Studies and models of instability (e.g. Afghanistan) must have account for;
 - Economics
 - Population
 - Kinetic
 - Geography
 - International factors

Modelling Stabilisation – PSOM

- Computer assisted war-game
- Population centric
- Represents:
 - Geography
 - Economy
 - Military / kinetic
- Full range of actors:
 - Military and insurgents
 - OGDs and NGOs
 - Civilians and NSAs
- Some representation of international dynamic




ID	Unit Name	X	Y	Stance	Sub-Stance
1	Joint HQ	4	3	Logistics/HQ	HQ Function
2	1st Lt Inf Bn	4	3	Control/Stabilise	Protect/Convoy
3	2nd Lt Inf Bn	8	3	Control/Stabilise	Patrol
4	3rd Lt Inf Bn	1	11	Control/Stabilise	Patrol
5	4th Lt Inf Bn	0	9	Control/Stabilise	Patrol
6	1st Police Bn	9	8	Transition	Policing
7	2nd Police Bn	1	11	Transition	Policing
8	3rd Police Bn	4	11	Transition	Policing
9	4th Police Bn	9	8	Transition	Policing
10	1st SF Sqn	6	10	Control/Stabilise	Patrol
11	1 Civil Construction Unit	4	3	Build/Humanitarian Aid	Build Infrastruct
12	2 Civil Construction Unit	8	2	Build/Humanitarian Aid	Train Human Cap



PSOM & Afghanistan

- Helmand region
- Ops and open source data
- 4 years in 5 days
- Included Marjah style op
- Narco-gangs included



Why organised crime? (PSOM)

- Game revealed some dynamics between:
 - Narco-gangs
 - Taliban
 - OEF
 - PEF
- Missed dynamics between narco-gangs and Government

3.5 Valuable contraband may make for

A second factor that may help systematically this period is the availability and use by rebels cocaine, precious gems, or opium. For rebels a dependable source of finance and weapons. support from foreign states or ethnic diaspora is not surprising that it can enable longer civil



Contraband has played a significant role in the following cases: Cambodia (cocaine; 37 years), Laos (opium; off and on since 1975), Chinese invasion (opium; 15 years), and Sierra Leone (diamonds; 11 years). Secondary literature on the U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. DEA, and the Assistant Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration (U.S. Department of Justice) coded 17 cases. The estimated median and mean civil war duration for these cases is 46.6, respectively, as compared to 6.1 and 8.9 for the rest. These high durations are because 11 of the 17 are coded as on-going, and are thus right-censored.

Professor James Fearon of Stanford University completed a study in 2002 entitled, “Why Some Wars Last Longer than Others.” The professor identified and studied 128 civil wars and insurgencies from 1945 to 2000, and found that on average they lasted about eight years. However, he identified and isolated 17 of the 128 that lasted on average about five times longer than the other 111—40 years or longer. The common thread between the 17 was that the antigovernment forces involved in the conflicts generated their own contraband revenue, most of which was through their involvement in one or more aspects of the global drug trade.




Prof. James Fearon, *Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer than Others?* (July 2002)

Opening (1) – Dstl commissioned study

- Joint study – Dstl and Kings College London
- Crime-Conflict Nexus project
- Part of Stabilisation Study work process

Stabilisation Study work process

Exploitation opportunity



Definitions – (1) Logistical

- Criminals are profit-seeking
- Insurgents are ideological
- Criminals funding insurgents are
- E.g. Statement by Michael Brauer (operations)
- Problematic in that no organisation is unitary e.g. D-Company, FARC,



(2) Law Enforcement

- Criminal organisations are breaking the law
- ‘Moral imperative’ to eradicate all
- Definition is state centric
- Global norms not
- Criminals may ha



(3) Alternative definition

- Crimes merely actions judged illicit by governing body
- Acknowledges evolution of actors
- Allows full range of actors




Definitions

- Organised crime
 - “Organised **crime is the activity of** engaging in an organised money-making enterprise defined as **illegal according to formally constituted state or international law**. It is distinct from petty, low-level or individual crime due to the existence of a level of social organisation and group cooperation involving a multitude of individuals with sufficient cohesion to carry out these activities in a sustained manner.”
 - Organised crime is an activity, not an identity, which any actor can become involved in
- **Governance**
 - “Governance is the application of a system of rule over any particular area of life.”
- **Governance** and Government are therefore separate

Governance and crime




- Governance determines the scope of criminal activity



- Indeed all governance decisions lead to opportunities
- Governance and crime are therefore inextricably linked

Arbitrage

- Criminals exploit areas where things are legal or are out of reach of enforcement
- Include the spaces between operations
- E.g. Phase 3 to Phase 4
- “Ungoverned spaces”



“Ungoverned space”

- Not ungoverned for long – alternative governance systems rapidly arise
- Criminal networks are ideally suited to exploiting these opportunities
- Any deployment subsequent creates a contest between the criminal governance and the new structure

Closing “ungoverned spaces”

- Established criminal structures can be “legitimate”
- Becomes a battle for legitimacy comparable to COIN competition
- Some of these actors may also constitute desirable partners for stabilisation

Implications

- Organised crime actors need to be modelled as part of the spectrum of political actors
- Drivers of crime must be modelled

Drivers of crime

- Highly corrupt security forces
- Use of criminal militias as proxies
- Insurgent / terrorist groups
- Conflict in neighbouring states
- Weak rule of law and justice mechanisms
- Lack of public goods
- Presence of natural resources
- Presence of international forces
- Huge influxes of international aid
- Arms and other embargoes
- Withdrawal of state support for non-state actors
- Unemployment / poverty
- Failure of traditional mediation and replacement by market dynamics
- Ungoverned / contested space
- Demographic factors
- Socio-ethnic factors
- Reduction of normative factors
- Disorganised crime
- Government over-regulation or over-taxation
- Emerging / new illicit opportunities
- Poorly handled DDR
- Border issues

Implications

- Organised crime actors need to be modelled as part of the spectrum of political actors
- Drivers of crime must be modelled, international and kinetic models are required and must interrelate
- Any scenario involving politically orientated end states requires such modelling
- This includes transitions between phases
 - e.g. Phase 3 to 4 transitions
- Otherwise problems appear simpler than they are

Questions?

