Analysis of Strategies for Future Conflicts: Lessons from Cornwallis XV and the Afghanistan Experience

Dave Mason
Defence Scientist (Emeritus)
Defence Research & Development Canada
Centre for Operational Research & Analysis

Abstract

This paper is a consolidation and synthesis of insights from the Cornwallis XV symposium, held in Washington in 2010, on the topic of 'Analysis and the Future of Afghanistan'. This symposium brought together a diverse, knowledgeable, and experienced group to discuss the full spectrum of issues involved in the international intervention in Afghanistan. The aim of this paper is to extract and summarize the common elements of strategy that emerged from this symposium, and present this summary as a 'framework' for involvement in possible future conflicts. This framework is summarized under the headings of: a safe and secure environment; the rule of law; stable governance; a sustainable economy; and social well-being. It also includes a simple timeline for implementation of major components of the framework.

Introduction and Aim

Cornwallis XV (C-XV) was held in Washington, DC, in March 2010 on the topic of 'Analysis for the Future of Afghanistan'. The excellent quality and quantity of papers delivered at that forum [1] led the Cornwallis Group's executive board to propose that the Cornwallis Fellows (of which the author is one) should develop a synthesis of the insights generated from the collective experiences in Afghanistan, as presented in this forum. The author accepted this proposal and, in light of the topic of Cornwallis XVI: 'Analysis for Future Conflict', has expanded this mandate to attempt to generalize the Afghanistan lessons to those that might apply in general to international involvements in future conflicts.

Therefore, the aim of this paper is to consolidate insights from Cornwallis XV into a strategic 'framework' that might be applicable in advising international interventions into future conflicts.

Building a Framework for Future Conflicts

There are numerous critical components in any situation involving a failed state which has resulted in the intervention of the international community, such as in Afghanistan. Table I lists these components, placed under five distinct categories, as employed by the

draft document Measuring Process in a Conflict Environment (MPICE) [2]: Safe and Secure Environment, Stable Governance, Rule of Law, Sustainable Economy, and Social Well-Being.

These framework components will be dealt with individually in this paper. These comprise a disparate list and each tends to have specific groups - national or international, government or non-government - that focus on them. For example, Safe and Secure Environment will engage military forces extensively, and Social Well-Being will engage a range of non-government organizations, etc. This accentuates the value of having a sound integrated framework for dealing with future conflicts.

The essence of this framework will be a series of summary statements, organized under the categories and components of Table I, that seem to capture the fundamental truths involved in any international intervention into a failed state. These statements will be listed in bold at the beginning of a paragraph or sequence of paragraphs. Examples generated by the experiences in Afghanistan, as provided by the Cornwallis XV authors and others Canadian contributors noted below, will be provided in support of these statements.

Some components can be dealt with simultaneously, and some are pre-requisites for others. This paper will attempt to identify those time-sequenced relationships, and includes a logical timeline as a part of this framework.

The reader may find that many of the statements comprising this framework to be self-evident truisms. But things that seem self-evident in retrospect aren't always so clear at the time key decisions are being made. It was felt that collecting the elements that emerged at Cornwallis XV together in a single document would be a useful exercise. The author hopes that goal has been achieved.

Table I. *Framework Components*

Category	Framework Component
Safe and Secure Environment	Initial Stability and Security
	Formal Peace Agreement
	National Army
Rule of Law	Justice System
	Police Forces
Stable Governance	Constitution
	Governance System
	Elections
	Free Press
Sustainable Economy	External Funding
	Public Works
	Corruption
	Economic Reconstruction
	Tax Base
Social Well-Being	Health
	Education

Information Sources

In the development of this framework, supporting comments and insights are drawn from many of the papers presented at C-XV. Table II acknowledges those authors whose comments are referenced in this paper, along with the titles of their papers. In each instance the surname of the author will be mentioned when a specific point raised by them is tendered in support of a fact or argument. Refer to [1] for the original papers.

Table II. *Selected Papers/Authors from Cornwallis XV:*
'Analysis for the Future of Afghanistan'

Author	Paper
Christian Aulbach	Germany's Engagement in Afghanistan
JoAnne Hakala-Applebaugh	From the Ground Up: A New Approach to the Stabilization of Afghanistan
Beth Baumgarten	Measuring Progress toward Social Well-Being in Afghanistan
Thomas Blau	Aligning Concepts, Operations and Goals in Fragile States: Some Questions About Afghanistan
Walter Clarke and Gene Dewey	The Afghan Horizon – Lost, or Recoverable? Or, Are We Obliged to Again Snatch Unilateral Defeat from the Multilateral Jaws of Victory
Amy de Vries	The Human Terrain of Counterinsurgency Operations: Developing the Military Mindset and Social Science Support
Ethan Kapstein	Counterinsurgency Operations and Economic Decision-Making in War-Torn Countries: The Case of Afghanistan
Clair Lockhart	The Future of Afghanistan
Lisa Schirch	A Comprehensive Peace Process for Afghanistan?
Stuart Starr and Samuel Bendett	Assessing Corruption in the Afghanistan National Police (ANP): Escaping the 'Authority Minus Professionalism' Dilemma
Lynette Stehr	Using Economic Modeling to Prioritize Infrastructure Development Projects to Achieve Afghanistan's Socio-Economic and Political Goals
Taylor Wilkinson	Institution Building
William Young	Corruption in Helmand Province, Afghanistan
Additional contributors	
LTG (ret'd) Christian Delanghe	Keynote speaker at C-XV
Afghanistan embassy representative	An Afghan national sat in and provided comments and insights on occasion during C-XV
Adrienne Turnbull	Canadian deployed analyst provided insights to the author post C-XV
'CORA'	Insights from DRDC CORA attendees at a re-presentation of C-XV materials in Canada, May 2010

Table II also lists several additional sources that were used as input into this synopsis. As there were no Canadian papers presented at C-XV, the author (being Canadian) consulted with the analysts who have been deployed to support operations in Kandahar in recent years. Adrienne Turnbull of Defence Research & Development Canada Centre for Operational Research & Analysis (DRDC CORA) provided Canadian insights on numerous issues which have been incorporated into this report. The author would like to acknowledge her contributions in reviewing this paper as well. Also, the author presented some of the C-XV material to DRDC CORA staff in Ottawa in May 2010, which generated some comments and insights that have been incorporated. These will be labelled with the acknowledgement 'CORA'.

The framework produced will necessarily be resting on a subjective foundation, but it is hoped that the prevalence of opinion and the diverse experience and expertise of the assembled C-XV group will be recognized as strong validation for this product.

Some Over-Arching Fundamentals First

Before stepping through the list of framework components of Table I, there were a number of dominant themes that arose during C-XV that span an entire conflict.

Learn from past experiences. Although each conflict is unique, nations must seek to learn from past experiences, both their own experiences and those of other nations. Aulbach pointed out that there are numerous parallels in Afghanistan with a seemingly unrelated experience of the Marshall Plan for post-WWII Germany. Delanghe noted that the French experiences from Algeria decades ago, where the army captains became 'kings of their valleys', worked well then and such a localized integration strategy for the military could be equally productive in future conflicts.

The role of the United Nations (UN) is paramount. It is seen as extremely unlikely in the foreseeable future that any well-meaning nation or coalition of nations would intervene in any external conflict without the backing of a UN Security Council resolution. Diplomatic action needs to precede any intervention in order to obtain this mandate. But once engaged, the UN still needs to maintain an active presence with special advisors and specific teams in theatre. Clarke opined that the UN role in Afghanistan was not of a sufficiently high profile. It was seen too much as an American intervention rather than a UN mission.

Stability first, rebuild second. This would seem to be a self-evident, 'motherhood' statement. One cannot effectively rebuild anything while conflict still rages, yet the diverse organizations that get involved in a failed state situation will all want to get to work as soon as possible. Hakala-Applebaugh was clear that the counter-insurgency (COIN) sequence should be 'clear, hold, build'. Delanghe noted that if one tries to deal with an insurgency, provide force protection, and conduct reconstruction all at the same time then the reconstruction will suffer.

Nations need to exhibit consistent foreign policy. Public opinion in each engaged nation will inevitably sway decisions on national commitment. That can be considered democracy in action. Nations will enter, increase commitments, decrease commitments, or pull out of conflicts as their governments specify. However, it is important to the rebuilding state and the conflicted parties involved that a consistent resolve is demonstrated by the international community. Dewey noted that it was unhelpful in Afghanistan that he US changed its message from 'we won't forget you' to 'wait until after Iraq'.

Understand the 'human terrain'. Engaged nations need to better appreciate the local history and culture. Other cultures may have different value systems. They have a unique history as well, and can be driven by past injustices. The intervening nations must be well aware of these unique differences. As Delanghe noted, simple things like wearing headgear in a certain way or situation can set an unintended tone. Dewey points out that an Afghan seems to be much more attached to his home than those of other cultures might be, and so the policy of evacuating locals from their homes during military operations – even if they were much safer in leaving – didn't go over well.

There are universal human traits that have to be acknowledged as well. For example, de Vries pointed out that humans will look for confirmation of their preconceptions in the actions of others. If a stereotype has been developed in the minds of the locals concerning the people and soldiers of the intervening nations, then efforts must be made to negate the continuance of any misperceptions.

The attending Afghan diplomat made some good points about their underlying perspective. Intervening NATO nations seemed focussed on 'winning the hearts and minds' of the locals, but the Afghans really don't care if they like outsiders or not, as long as security goes forward, not backward to previous situations.

Be patient. Sources of conflict don't get resolved overnight. The rebuilding of a state or nation takes time as well. When nations engage in assisting a failed state they do so with a short-term view, or medium-term view at most. They believe once the initial conflict has been quelled and things have been put on the road to improvement that they can safely exit the scene. That is seldom the case. Old sources of tension and conflict die hard, and states that have failed have often done so because there was little substance to the 'state' in the first place. Delanghe claimed it will take one full generation to resolve problems in Afghanistan, where decades of war have destroyed all vestiges of the nation/state. Aulbach predicted a military presence will be required for up to 10 more years in Afghanistan, with reconstruction continuing indefinitely. These are extreme time periods foreseen for Afghanistan, and they may not be expected to be quite that long for future conflicts elsewhere.

Project permanency. The CORA group noted that mission fatigue can result in degraded performance over time, hence both military and civilian leaders generally commit to short terms in their deployments (one year or less). Schirch believed that the international community should project permanency by posting top diplomats and

military commanders for several years or longer. Turnbull noted success with keeping posting cycles moderate, but having key personnel returning to the same theatre a number of times and to more influential command positions each time.

Division of duties between nations needs to be well thought out. One of the first functions of a coalition is to decide how each of the engaged nations will contribute. For example, after the initial routing of the Taliban in Afghanistan, it was decided that the US would take the lead in building the Afghan National Army (ANA), Germany would lead in the development of the Afghan National Police (ANP), Italy would lead the institution of a justice system, etc. Both Aulbach and Delanghe concluded that this didn't work well in Afghanistan. Perhaps dividing up the pie, each piece to a different nation, introduces a partitioning and divergence into the overall effort that is less- (or, in the worst case, non-) productive. Turnbull noted that now the entire pie is NATO-controlled in Afghanistan, which appears to be working better.

Safe and Secure Environment

Initial Stability and Security

'Clear, Hold, then Build'. As discussed in the previous section, this will be a universal strategy in any future COIN intervention. As Hakala-Applebaugh noted, the 'Hold' part can be problematic and has been so in Afghanistan, noting the UK experience in the Nad Ali district in Helmand. Turnbull stated that there is difficulty in effectively 'clearing' (e.g. Kandahar). A COIN intervention in any future conflict must perform the 'Clear' and 'Hold' functions well.

Understand the threat. Hakala-Applebaugh noted that the Taliban are, in reality, a quite diverse mix, ranging from religious fundamentalists (which comprise maybe 15%) to economically motivated opportunists (maybe more than half), and will not be militarily eliminated.   Delanghe declared the importance of distinguishing 'enemy' from 'adversary'. Some of the latter may one day be on our side, but the former likely won't. It was pointed out by de Vries that we must learn about the insurgents from their messages: their publications, websites, even YouTube videos, etc.

An insurgency's strategy will be 'Discredit, Exhaust, Inherit'. Hakala-Applebaugh made this point strongly as a key to understanding how an insurgency will behave in any conflict. She pointed out that the Taliban see the establishment of control by a national government (in this case GIRoA, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan) as its largest threat. Wilkinson pointed out a good example of this policy in action, where the Taliban cut the power lines from the Kajaki Dam, a strategy designed to discredit the competency of the powers in charge. Hakala-Applebaugh concluded that "Insurgents don't win insurgencies, governments lose them".

Communicate well with the locals. It should be self-evident that communications by the intervening forces with the people they are trying to help are a key to success.

Language and cultural barriers will always be an issue in an unfamiliar region of the world.

Avoid Collateral Damage. It's a given that intervening forces need to be precise with the application of force. Rules of engagement have to be clearly defined, and precision in the types of weapons employed and in the application of weapons effects must be a top consideration for the intervening forces. As Delanghe confirmed, accidental deaths of civilians due to intervening forces certainly galvanize locals against the international security forces, so every effort has to be taken to minimize such events.

Align military doctrine. In general, national military doctrines have tended to focus on traditional military operations, with much less attention paid to processes and procedures for those asymmetric operations that have dominated the international scene since the end of the Cold War. Delanghe admitted that French strategy and doctrine was outdated for Afghanistan. A CORA comment noted that even in a country like Canada, that has been engaged in peace support operations continuously for fifty years, the military have only slowly come to acknowledge that asymmetric operations are 'part of their day job'.

Develop flexible military doctrine. Delanghe pointed out that the enemy in an asymmetric context will always try to engage on their terms. Intervening nations need to be strategically and doctrinally flexible so that the enemy can be engaged on terms favourable to the nations, not the enemy. Delanghe noted that strategy often has to be modified 'by valley', like in Bosnia. He summarized: "Don't resort to playing their game; make them play your game".

Formal Peace Agreement

A peace agreement is a cornerstone to success. The consensus from the CORA group was that a formal peace process or agreement is a cornerstone to success in progressing forward in any conflict situation. Notably, in Afghanistan a peace agreement was not pursued initially. This is possibly a result of the perception that the former ruling authority, the Taliban, was not a representative body in the nation, nor were they all in agreement. On this latter point, Hakala-Applebaugh added that in Afghanistan the relatively small 'religious fundamentalist' component of the Taliban is unlikely to negotiate any kind of peace agreement, whereas some portions of the relatively large 'economically motivated opportunist' component are more likely. It is an unanswered question as to whether a lack of an agreement in Afghanistan has hindered progress there.

A peace process must be regional, iterative, and all inclusive. Schirch made this statement strongly. Past grievances, justified or perceived, need to be addressed and redressed if possible. Lockhart also added that things like a simple acknowledgement of past actions are important, even if nothing can be done to redress them.

Parties will only negotiate if it is to their advantage. Human nature is such that a party to a conflict will not voluntarily pursue a course that is less desirable to that party than an alternative course. They will not come to the negotiating table if they believe they can

better achieve their goals by pursuing and promoting conflict. As Schirch noted, the intervening nations have to project sufficient power to make it clear to all parties that the pursuit of conflict will not be an advantageous course of action.

Don't expect a peace agreement to hold forever. Schirch noted that fully half of all peace agreements have failed. However, even a temporary agreement provides an indication of peaceful desire in the early days, months, or years that permits some stability and progress to be achieved.

National Army

Be patient – it takes time to build an Army. Eventually the host state must provide its own security. As previously noted, it may take years or even decades to accomplish, but eventually the mandate to provide security has to be passed from the intervening military forces to the forces of the host nation. As Hakala-Applebaugh noted, the Afghan people want to see their own government providing the security, not foreign troops or organizations.

Control of the national army must be clear, rational, and civilian. As a national asset charged with the protection of its people, the national army (including naval or air forces) must be wired in at the top of the chain of government. This relationship must be set up carefully. The army cannot be perceived as simply the henchmen of the leader. To this end, the international community will not see the state led by a person with official military rank.

Training, training, training. A well trained army is well on the way to being a good army. The international community needs to put a strong effort into the training and mentoring of any developing national army, including specific guidance for its leaders.

Army leadership must be well selected. Commanders that make poor decisions in operations, or project unprofessional attitudes to civilians, quickly lose the respect of the public. Training and invoking the proper culture into the army is a big part of the long term solution to this problem, but initially the international community must ensure that the appointed leaders of the army are well selected for their professional attributes.

Pay soldiers a fair wage. Aulbach pointed out that the potential for corruption amongst armed forces will be minimized if soldiers are paid a fair wage. Otherwise, one must acknowledge that it is a natural human tendency to use whatever powers and means are at a person's disposal to ensure the basics of life are provided. Turnbull noted that efforts to institute an automatic electronic pay system in the ANA are a way to address concerns of soldiers being paid (and a way to address potential losses due to corruption).

The army must reflect the people. Recruitment and unit compositions must try to achieve a representative demographic in order to attain widespread acceptance and respect.

Rule of Law

Justice System

Establish the laws of the land as quickly as possible. It is self-evident that, if they do not already exist, laws that protect the rights of the people will have to be established immediately. The constitution will provide general guidance and may specify certain fundamental laws explicitly.

The justice system needs to respect traditional law and processes. Bendett noted that traditional laws in tribal regions have gained acceptance over the years, and need to be respected. Imposed laws that are in conflict with traditional laws are less likely to be enforced. Traditional adjudication processes should be respected as well. It is important that the persons who act as judges in legal cases must be respected by the people.

There will be disagreement on what constitutes fundamental human rights. Traditional laws may not reflect the perceptions of fundamental human rights held by the international community. For example, the rights of women in society are not acknowledged in some of the traditional laws in countries like Afghanistan. And punishments for convicted crimes may be out of line with the standards used in western nations. It will take time and persistent international pressure to convince the people of the new state to bring their laws in line with internationally acceptable standards.

Define an enforcement transition point in time. Despite the need for speed in establishing the rule of law, Lockhart noted that it takes time to set up police forces to enforce the laws and a judicial system to enable the state (or individual citizens) to process accused violators. This may require specification of a transition point in time, where amnesty is declared for actions happening before that time, but the law is fully enforced from that point forward.

Corruption is a criminal issue. Many will consider corruption to be more of a social or political issue, or even one that the military should try to deal with. But Delanghe was clear that insurgents who ply their trade as 'economic opportunists' should be dealt with as criminals by the justice system, not as a military foe by the intervening security forces or national army.

Police Forces

Respect is the cornerstone for success of a police force. As the principal enforcers of the laws of the land, the police forces must be respected as knowledgeable, impartial, unbiased, and authoritative, both individually and collectively. Aulbach made the point that perceived corruption amongst the police forces will never permit respect to be attained in the eyes of the people. He also noted that Afghan National Police (ANP) officers were often vouched for by local elders in some areas, a positive contributor to the officer gaining the respect of the locals.

Pay police officers a fair wage.   Aulbach also pointed out that, like soldiers, the potential for corruption amongst police forces is minimized if officers are paid a fair wage, one comparable to the national army and other positions of authority.

The western model of police forces may be a forced fit.   Aulbach noted that no body similar to the ANP ever existed in Afghanistan before (and the rule of law and the judicial system have been traditionally weak there as a result), so they didn't even have a traditional model to begin with.   In the case of building a police force from scratch, one may usefully build upon the historical experiences of western nations.   Delanghe pointed out the successful structures of the (500 year old) Gendarmerie model in France, where the police reported directly to the head of government, and officers were forced to work in pairs and live in barracks to minimize the potential for corruption.

Training of police forces must be well organized.   Almost by definition, the stable, established nations of the international community must have developed successful police forces and police principles over time.   Hence, it is important to pass on those principles and experiences to the developing force.   The training process, however, is not always given the attention it requires.   Aulbach noted that the 'lead nation' concept was flawed and resulted in the German-led attempts to train the ANP being less than successful.   And Bendett noted that the decision by the US to employ contractors as trainers (pre-2009) wasn't successful either.   Bendett and Starr both pointed out that the Special Inspector-General for Afghanistan (SIGAR) is the ideal level of authority for ANP training.

Integrate training and mentoring.   Turnbull emphasized the value of integrating training and mentoring into the police forces, having the trainers both teach and patrol with the ANP officers (as the Canadian police officers do).   The combination of both allows for the development of an effective police force, as well as allowing locals to be more forthcoming in discussing topics of concern with someone local rather than a foreigner via a translator.

Stable Governance

Constitution

Establishment of a constitution is step one.   The foundation principles on which the new state will exist must be developed immediately.   As the CORA group noted, the Bonn Agreements were initiated within months of the fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan in late 2001.

The constitution must reflect and be accepted by the people.   The Bonn Agreements led to the establishment of a document for Afghanistan that was based on its 1964 constitution.   It was formally approved in 2004 by a Loya jirga, a traditional 'grand council' construct employed by the Afghan peoples over the centuries.

Governance System

The governance system may have to be built from scratch. Sometimes there are components of a viable, reasonable government remaining that can be salvaged and built upon. Hakala-Applebaugh pointed out that Afghanistan had lost all vestiges of government, at all levels, over three decades of civil war.

Consult the people on what form of government they want. In Afghanistan, Schirch noted that the Afghan people would prefer more regional diplomacy, and like to reach decisions by consensus. Turnbull confirmed the diversity of powers in the region, where a "patchwork of power" involving of local/tribal leaders and/or warlords may have as much influence in a region as GIRoA and Taliban. However, the Afghan diplomat attending noted that the local elders have lost much of their traditional power after three decades of war. The consensus seemed to be that Afghans would prefer a third option that is not GIRoA or the Taliban.

Western nations will typically operate with about three levels of government: national, provincial, and municipal. Lockhart estimated that Afghanistan has five natural levels of government: national, provincial, regional, district, and village. The levels and responsibilities of government at each level in a new state should acknowledge the logic behind and public acceptability of traditional governmental structures.

Wilkinson helpfully pointed out three ways to build a government. The first is 'top down', starting with a strong central government. It has the advantage of quickly establishing national ownership, but may feel imposed and not respected locally. The second is 'bottom up', building respected local governments first. This option has the advantage of empowering the people quickly and responsively, but typically results in poor resource management and connectivity. Turnbull noted that this is the model the Taliban employed, more out of necessity than design. The third option Wilkinson suggested, and the one which she recommended for Afghanistan, is 'middle out'. In this scenario a solid regional government is established first. It has the advantage of being able to reach both up and down in scope easily and, in the case of Afghanistan, matches the span of many of the most important resources such as water and electricity.

Design sound interim government solutions. No suitable governmental system can be established fast enough to function in the immediate aftermath of a failed state. Hakala-Applebaugh pointed out the value of the 'government in a box' concept. The Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan have been established to perform that role. Transition can be difficult to manage, however. Turnbull noted that there have been many criticisms of the PRTs, therefore it is important to ensure that their work is only in support of the current government as the people's confidence in their representatives will grow only if they perceive that GIRoA is responsible for delivering services.

Representative government is essential. The CORA group felt strongly on this point, yet the west need not fall on its sword over the term 'democracy'. There is a spectrum of governmental systems that can reflect the voice of the people. The CORA group noted Canadian research that has shown monarchies to be relatively stable structures historically. In theory, even a dictatorship could function acceptably as long as the head individual had the willingness to make decisions that are in the best interests of the people. However, these outcomes are dependent on the good graces of the person in charge, never a guarantee.

Elections

Elections are the face of representative government. Whatever form of representative government is employed, the voice of the people will universally be expressed through some form of secret ballot election. Even if there are issues with how the elections are structured, the CORA group reiterated that elections are important perceptually. The people will have a realistic understanding of the impact of what their vote can achieve, but providing them the simple reassurance that they have a voice has immense value.

Hold elections sooner rather than later, but not too soon. It is important for the comfort of the people and the international image of the newly created state to have elections conducted as early as possible. Certainly stability needs to be established before a viable election of any sort can be held. If the people are threatened or harassed when they participate in an election, then the positive image of the process will quickly turn negative. The international community will be called upon to help ensure that such problems do not arise.

Monitoring elections is important. The urge to cause undue influence on voters is hard for humans of all cultures to resist, so the international community is obliged to help ensure elections happen fairly. The UN and its supporting nations take the election monitoring role seriously.

Free Press

A free press is an essential component of any state. The contribution of a free press was not debated heavily in C-XV, but its role in producing an internationally respected nation is inarguable. Young pointed out that a free press exposes corruption issues and helps bring those cases to justice and thereby minimize the role of corruption in the country. It also has an essential role in ensuring free and fair elections.

Sustainable Economy

Economic Reconstruction

Conflict can destroy a national economy. This has clearly happened in Afghanistan. Lockhart pointed to the 1950s, when Afghanistan had an economy similar to modern-day

Turkey. Kapstein observed that legal land titles are a foundation for self-investment and Afghanistan's system was obliterated, except in a few key districts (e.g. Lashkar Gah in Helmand province).

People just want a job. It is no surprise that people want to be able to provide the basics of food and shelter for themselves and their families. Baumgarten noted that Asia Foundation surveys showed unemployment to be one of the two top concerns of Afghans (the other was corruption). Stehr quoted a figure of 40% for unemployment in Afghanistan. In fact, Turnbull noted an insight from surveys in Kandahar province that employment was considered a higher priority to locals than security.

Security is an essential prerequisite to rebuilding an economy. Ongoing conflict will strongly deter the investment of resources. No person or organization wants to have progress in business developments negated by the effects of conflict, be they the direct effects of weapons or indirect effects of denying essential utilities, such as electricity, water, gas, etc. Kapstein noted that the construction sector is particularly sensitive to security, and construction is so important to a rebuilding economy.

Encourage entrepreneurship. Kapstein was adamant that an economy is built from the grassroots level up. Individual citizens have the local knowledge and networking to make things work. Fulton commented that multinational corporations that enter a developing state are more focused on extracting profit, and don't tend to create lasting jobs. They also won't generally re-invest their profits into their businesses in the host state, like a local entrepreneur will tend to do.

Maximize the state's geographic, geologic, and climatic advantages. External assistance has to acknowledge the inherent advantages and disadvantages imposed by geography. Both Lockhart and Turnbull pointed to the historical status of Afghanistan as a crossroads of Asia. It was part of the ancient Silk Route, and this has been a traditional source of income. The early focus on an efficient ring road system not only promotes internal development, but also has the potential to generate external revenue. Lockhart recommended that, in Afghanistan's case, it should focus on construction, textiles, and gem stone industries, as those reflect its natural resource strengths. Turnbull pointed out that the United States Geological Survey predicts huge reserves of oil and gas in Afghanistan.

Be selective about monopolies. Although monopolies stifle competition and, hence, can be an economic drag, Lockhart was clear that monopolies can be a critical component to economic success. The provision of key utilities, or the mining of certain minerals, or the extraction, refinement, and distribution of fossil fuels may be areas in which it is preferred to operate monopolies, be they nationally owned or private. The international community must ensure it is operating in the best interests of the host state when advising the government on the set up and operation of monopolies.

Just do it. Kapstein observed that whether we understand how they work or not (and even the experts are not sure they do), national economies will simply exist. So he

encouraged the international community to simply dig in and contribute where it seems to make sense in trying to get the economy moving. He also noted that the rest of the world is financially motivated to develop a good perception of the likelihood of a government's economic success, as this will be reflected in the interest rates on government issued bonds.

External Funding

A rebuilding economy needs external funding initially. Until a tax base can be established by the new government to tap a developing economy, there is no source of funding available for the host state to build with. The international community will have to fill that void.

External funding breeds corruption. This statement comes as no surprise. A new government has huge voids to fill. Conflict has often cut off or seriously reduced supplies of food. Many people are homeless, either due to the direct (physical destruction) or indirect (migrating refugees) effects of conflict. Basic provision of food and clothing, and construction of shelters, utilities, roads, and public buildings need to happen quickly, and there is seldom a strong, dependable system in place to control the expenditure of injected funds. Corruption is a basic flaw of human nature, and it will rear its ugly head when money is present and the justice system is weak. Blau concluded that "money is a weapon system" that can destroy as much as it repairs.

Be prepared to provide external funding for a long time. Economies take a considerable time to build, measured in decades, not years. In the meantime, there is a lot of money required to get a government and an economy on track. Funding commitments need to be for a longer term, not shorter term.

Public Works

Restoration of public utilities is one of the first jobs. The safety, health, and comfort of the people depend heavily on the provision of basic utilities: electricity, water, gas, sewer, etc. The importance of each depends somewhat on how much reliance the people had on those utilities historically, but it is important for the international community to begin helping to restore the most important utilities almost immediately.

Functioning utilities are a prerequisite to jump-starting an economy. Businesses depend on the availability of reliable utilities. Indeed, Stehr claimed that electricity and telecommunications are needed more than a skilled workforce.

Economies run on the beds of trucks. This CORA comment is hard to refute. A passable road system is essential and should be the focus of early public works projects. It is also important to ensure that early efforts go into ensuring the supply network for gasoline and diesel is reliable.

Let others take credit. Optics is important. Turnbull noted that in Afghanistan the practice of putting an international stamp on projects to meet public image objectives back home can be problematic. It would be better for Afghans' confidence in their own government if it looked like GIRoA accomplished the project.

Promote entrepreneurship with externally funded public works projects. Fulton felt strongly that building something with external resources and simply handing it over to local authorities is a recipe for failure. The infusion may create some temporary local employment, but long-term benefits are questionable. He believed a better solution was to engage local entrepreneurs to conduct the project. That way, it injects business profits into the local economy, which can be reinvested. Also, an intimate knowledge of the project is gained, meaning the local community will be able to maintain that particular infrastructure item into the future.

Tax Base

One cannot escape two things: death and taxes. This old saying is worth reiterating in this context. Nobody wants to pay taxes, but all societies deal with forms of taxation and there is a universal, resigned acceptance of the concept of taxation.

Criminals will fill a taxation void. Monies will get collected one way or the other. If the government doesn't tax the people then criminals will.

Accept that a large percentage of the economy will be informal. No one can escape death, but one can escape some of the taxes. Kapstein notes that taxes not paid are often reinvested in the business, growing the economy and the captured tax base. He observed that even successful western nations accept this fact, noting that an estimated 40-50 percent of the Italian economy is informal.

Plan the transition away from external funding. Certainly, the emerging government needs to be weaned from external funding and establish its own tax base. Over time, a growing economy will generate a suitable tax base for running a government. In the transition period, however, these two sources can create problems. Young pointed out that pumping money in the 'side door' undermines the government, yet at some point the emerging government has to be trusted to handle these external funds fairly. Turnbull reiterated the importance of trustworthiness in the emerging government. The people have to be confident that tax dollars are being handled in the best interests of the taxpayer.

Corruption

It is worth starting the discussion on corruption by presenting some points raised by Young in his presentation on the agricultural situation at Lashkar Gah, in Helmand province. It provided excellent examples and perspective on how corruption manifests itself, and provides lessons on how it might be dealt with. This region straddles the Helmand River and was irrigated through a large USAID project, beginning about 60

years ago. Irrigated land is valuable, and consequently a strong land titles system has been maintained. The crops originally were wheat, cotton, and fruit. Warlords took over after the Soviet invasion and introduced poppies, which the Taliban alternately tolerated and then banned, depending on whether the 'economic opportunists' or 'religious fundamentalists' were making the decisions. Poppies are tolerant of dry soils so failures in the irrigation system have gone largely unrepaired. The farmers are happy to grow whatever pays, and right now poppies pay more than wheat or cotton. Their choice is easy. The land owners, Taliban, government officials, and the police (who are paid a mere $50 per month) all collect their rent, taxes, or protection money (to divert eradication attempts) from farmers, which are simply considered the price of doing business. If wheat or cotton prices rise, and the improving roads permit the farmers to get their crops to market, then they will likely change to those crops. Leaked plans to improve the USAID irrigation infrastructure generated moves by the mayor and governor to buy up targeted land and gain financially. But despite local corruption, money continues to pour into the region, benefitting all, but to different degrees. As in most economic mini-systems, corruption hits the pockets of the poor labourer at the bottom, and lines the pockets of the wealthier middlemen.

Expect corruption. Young pointed out that it is incorrect to claim that corruption exists in Afghanistan because "it's their culture". Corruption is a universal human tendency that has manifested itself throughout history. Indeed, every modern society has dealt with it, and continues to deal with it. CORA comments pointed out the (possibly positive) contributions of corruption in the evolution of major cities like New York and Chicago.

People notice corruption, and people abhor corruption. Corruption manifests itself at the lowest levels. Individuals are forced to pay exorbitant fees to criminals, or bribes to government officials or police, and each instance may leave a strong negative impression. Baumgarten noted that corruption was one of the top two concerns of Afghans in an Asia Foundation poll (unemployment was the other). Indeed, Bendett quoted estimates that bribes comprised as much as 23% of the Afghan economy.

External funding breeds corruption. This point was raised earlier, and is worth restating. Wilkinson presented estimates from the Special Inspector-General for Afghanistan (SIGAR) that 30 percent of the money leaving Kabul (estimated at US$10 million per month) is lost to corruption. Turnbull added that a considerable fraction of the money, for example that funnelled through bulky international charitable organizations, is peeled off before it ever gets there. In fact, Young quoted the UK's Department for International Development that found "for every $100 spent only $20 actually reaches Afghan recipients, and 15-30 percent of aid money is spent on security."

Underpaying government officials invites corruption. This point was also noted earlier and is restated here for emphasis. Ensure that government employees are fairly paid. If judges, police officers, customs agents, soldiers, etc. are underpaid then it invites them to abuse their assigned powers to compensate for a lack of salary.

Minor levels of corruption are more acceptable. Young made this claim, which seems reasonable in light of the property of a transition period where external money injections are large and the national justice system has not yet developed the instruments required to deal with corruption as a criminal activity. Even in the long term there is a tolerance for minor levels of corruption. Baumgarten pointed out that Afghanistan's historical position as a crossroads of Asia has led to bribery being considered an acceptable part of transportation costs, as long as it is kept at modest levels. Young proposed that funds should be dispersed into smaller, more widely-scattered development projects to at least minimize the potential for corruption.

Social Well-Being

Health

Work together to deliver long-term health care solutions. People of all cultures want to enjoy good health, and the availability of medical services and facilities is fundamental in delivering that. The engaged organizations, government and non-government, need to jointly develop and execute a sound long-term plan for the provision of health care services and facilities to the developing nation.

Education

Conflict decimates school attendance. Blau made the point that at least one full generation of Afghans have gone uneducated during three decades of war.

Education facilities are important to people. All humans have an innate understanding of the value of knowledge, and the earning potential that education can deliver. Certainly, some cultures are keener to promote the education of their children (and adults) than others. Lockhart noted that currently there is no education beyond age 11 in Afghanistan.

Nations need an educated populace. This is a motherhood statement. Otherwise where are the doctors, lawyers, teachers, engineers, trades people, etc. going to come from?

Notional Time Sequence

The components of this framework as presented in Table I and discussed in this paper, have some natural orderings amongst each other. Establishing stability and security seems to be a logical prerequisite for virtually all other components. A constitution should precede the development of governing bodies. A functioning economy with a viable tax base will be preceded by a period of external funding. Public works to restore important utilities will precede the building of new schools or hospitals. Figure 1 summarizes some of these relationships.

Figure 1. *Notional Time Sequence of Framework Components in Terms of Lines of Operations and Effort*

Conclusions

Cornwallis XV was held in Washington, DC, in March 2010 on the topic of 'Analysis for the Future of Afghanistan'. The excellent quality and quantity of papers delivered at that forum led the Cornwallis Group's executive board to propose that the Cornwallis Fellows (of which the author is one) should develop a synthesis of the insights generated from the collective experiences in Afghanistan, as presented in this forum, to produce a general 'framework' to inform international interventions in future conflicts. The author hopes that this paper has taken the collective wisdom from Cornwallis XV, added the Canadian perspective where possible, and delivered the requested product.

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