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Science and Technology

The Origins and Emergence of Australian Joint Operations Doctrine: 1946 to 1976

Presentation to 33 ISMOR

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Science and Technology for Safeguarding Australia

Scope

- Background
- Historical Context
- Development of the Australian Manual of Joint Warfare
- Initial Application of the Australian Manual of Joint Warfare
- Explaining the Emergence and Development of Australian Joint Doctrine to 1976

Research Problem

- Key feature of modern military forces is that they possess explicitly articulated guidance, i.e. joint doctrine
- From the WWII era onward, Australia has maintained modern – if modestly sized – armed forces
- Yet Australia did not possess any national joint doctrine prior to 1972, and did not have a full body of doctrine until 1979
- Research question: what factors explain the specific character and apparently late development of Australian joint operations doctrine?



Joint Doctrine: Contemporary Australian Approach

- Officially sanctioned, formalised and written expression of principles and guidance about what armed forces do and how they do it
- Authoritative, but requires judgement in its application
- Influenced by a wide variety of factors
- In Australian usage has four key roles:
 - Informing military strategy
 - Institutionally accepted framework for analysing military challenges
 - Fundamental basis for professional military education and training'
 - Guidance for operational and tactical activities
- Provides guidance for Service doctrine
 - Expectation that Service doctrine will align with joint doctrine, as a general rule



Absence of Literature on Australian Joint Doctrine

- Despite the significance of (joint) doctrine, general lack of literature in the Commonwealth tradition (Latawski)
- In Australian context, the absence of published literature on the joint doctrine is particularly notable
- Limited/peripheral discussion of joint doctrine, generally in context of broader 'joint' arrangements
- Also reflected in grey/non-published literature; absence of Staff College papers on joint doctrine
- Hence: investigating the origins and early evolution of Australian joint doctrine must rely on archival sources



Australian Involvement in Joint Operations during World War II

- During early phase of WWII, Australian forces committed to Imperial Defence on a single service basis under British command
- After commencement of operations in Pacific theatre, pattern generally continued but under US command
- Limited 'joint' command arrangements established for defence of specific localities
- Number of institutions established for identifying lessons learned and developing inter-service doctrine
- Even in Tarakan operations (OBOE series) – high water mark of 'joint' operations – no actual joint command arrangements below theatre level



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Post WW II Arrangements

- Training institutions to preserve and build upon operational lessons from WWII (sponsored by Services)
 - Land/Air Warfare School
 - Australian Joint Anti-Submarine School
- Training materials essentially Australianised UK products
 - Limited capacity for development of specifically Australian training publications
- Supported by a Committee framework (based on UK arrangements) to advise Services
 - Land/Air Warfare Committee
 - Sea/Air Warfare Committee
- Establishment of Chairman – Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) in 1958; beginnings of strategic joint C2
- Alliance Framework and Forward Defence
 - Commonwealth Defence
 - ANZUS
 - Far East Strategic Reserve
 - SEATO



Atrophy of Post WW II Arrangements

- Comparatively limited resources for military spending in post WWII environment (though some modernisation and development), reflecting lack of existential threat
- Absence of strong central mechanisms (civil and military) mean that Service interests remain paramount
- As 'joint' establishments resourced by Services, accorded little priority contra 'core' Service interests
- Actual operational deployment of Australian Services follows traditional pattern of single Service tactical detachments under UK command
- Prevailing policy environment regards extant arrangements as fit for purpose, no incentive for change



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
The Emergence of UK Jointery

- Key strategic dilemma for UK from mid 1950s onward: how to maintain a global expeditionary capability when base access was becoming increasingly problematic
- By 1960 conceptual solution arises in form of a joint seaborne/airborne/land concept, entailing a brigade sized land force supported by naval and air assets
- Supported by a range of institutional reforms:
 - Establishment of a Joint Warfare Committee and Staff to support these developments
 - Unified Commands in Cyprus, Aden and Singapore
 - Joint Warfare Establishment (school)
- Creation of an integrated MOD also strengthened power of the centre against the Services



UK Joint Doctrine

- Initially articulated through a series of Joint Warfare Instructions in 1963
- First Edition Manual of Joint Warfare authorised for release in early 1964 in six volumes
- Anticipated scenarios: ‘limited war operations’ entailing:
 - Internal Security Operations
 - Counter-insurgency
 - Unilateral or supporting host nation limited war
 - Limited war as a part of an Allied or UN force
- Anticipated force: a joint task force comprised of a brigade with supporting naval and air assets
- 1st Revise (1965) first introduced discussion of joint command at the (joint) task force level
- Subsequent editions in 1967 (2nd), 1970 (3rd), and a limited 4th (1994)
 - Subsequently replaced by Joint Warfare Publication series by late 1995



Australian Reception of UK Joint Doctrine

- Administrative distribution specifically included Australian addresses, centred on the limited 'joint' staff
- Content and references to UK JSPs incorporated into Australian Service doctrine (particularly the Army's new Division in Battle series)
- Individual training at Air Support Unit and Service schools reflected content of UK JSPs
- Major joint exercises expressly conducted to test UK joint doctrine
- Australian Service elements in Far East Strategic Reserve participating in an environment in which UK JSPs are in common use



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The Requirement for AS Joint Doctrine

- As early as the late 1950s, the potentially conflicting interoperability requirements for Australia were noted by the COSC
- By 1965 piecemeal adoption of UK JSPs by Services led to concerns regarding interoperability between the Australian Services
- Review of JSPs by Land/Air Warfare Committee in 1965 declared that outright adoption of UK JSPs would not suit Australia's strategic requirements
- However UK JSPs formed only viable basis upon which Australian joint doctrine might be developed
- Ultimate resolution by COSC: develop an Australian core doctrine publication based on UK JSP1, and authorise for Australian use UK JSPs 2 to 6 ahead of anticipated later development of Australian procedural publications

Developing the Draft JSP(AS) 1

- Working group drawn from the three Services, with a small secretariat staff provided by central Department of Defence established to develop a draft in early 1966
- Initial draft of the proposed JSP(AS)1 circulated for comment in the first half of 1967
- General comments from across the Services generally positive, with only minor proposals for change
- But Army comments specifically noted significant treatment of amphibious operations – a capability not then possessed by Australia – and expressed disagreement with approach to rotary wing operations
- On basis of these comments, writing team continued the production of a second draft, with a view towards presentation to COSC for endorsement in 1968

Approval and Dissemination


- Intended final text of JSP(AS)1 (less minor amendments) endorsed by the COSC in mid 1968, but final agreed version not complete until early 1972 (seven years from initiation)
- Between 1968 and 1969 essentially trivial edits took months to resolve
- More seriously, in late 1969 Army sought to abandon outright COSC agreed draft and restart drafting process
- Also some discussion of what impact of 3rd (1970) edition of the UK JSPs ought be on JSP(AS)1
- Staff processes continued at a slow rate through 1971, with final endorsement of JSP(AS)1 for dissemination in 1972

Overview of JSP(AS) 1

- JSP(AS) 1 retained the chapter structure of UK JSP 1 Revise 1 (1965)
- Overall content remained essentially similar, including treatment of capabilities not possessed by Australia
- Type/scale of force remains the same: 3 battalion Task Force augmented by naval and air capabilities
- C2 Arrangements broadly similar to UK JSP for JTFs; but has a command line to the COSC rather than to a theatre HQ
- Nature of scenarios similar to UK JSP but with addition of 'Confrontation' operations


Broader Patterns of Jointery in Australia to 1972

- Expanding role of Australian forces in Vietnam from 1966 had created a requirement for a (joint) Australian national force commander
- Through late 1960s some joint machinery established, but only at the strategic level
- Chairman COSC (Wilton) had pushed for greater command authority and a centralised Department of Defence, unsuccessful at time but later influential
- Key policy initiative of new Labor government in 1972 is Tange Review; creation of a unified Department of Defence and Chief of Defence Force Staff as the Commander of the Australian Defence Force by 1976
- Joint training institutions – key mechanism for dissemination of joint doctrine – become first genuinely joint units



Changing Strategic and Policy Environment

- By mid 1960s SEATO essentially moribund as an alliance framework, ceases to be a basis for interoperability
- 'East of Suez' declaration and the UK exit from Southeast Asia erodes one pillar of Forward Defence policy
- Guam Declaration and departure from Vietnam erodes US pillar of 'Forward Defence'
- Election of Whitlam Labor Party government in late 1972 formally ends 'Forward Defence' era, initially replaced by 'Continental Defence' policy
- Whitlam loses power in late 1975, but essentially bipartisan approach on defence policy – now characterised as 'Defence of Australia' first articulated in 1976 Defence White Paper, persists until mid 1990s



ANZUK Force: A Road Not Taken

- Established in November 1971 as a successor to the UK Far East Command to deliver treaty obligations to Malaysia and Singapore
- Under command of Australian 2-star; comprised units from Australia, UK and New Zealand, with Malaysian and Singaporean elements
- Composition reflects structure of a JTF as described in JSP(AS) 1: brigade supported by naval and air assets commanded by a JHQ
- But explicitly decided to continue using UK JSPs – now in 3rd Edition – rather than JSP(AS)1 as core doctrine
- Rationale for force ultimately collapsed in late 1972, disbanded at the end of 1974



Joint Individual Training

- Efforts to enhance joint individual training dated back to mid 1960s
 - Partly motivated by actual (Vietnam) and potential (Far East Strategic Reserve/SEATO) military commitments
 - Also informed by Chairman COSC Wilton's personal agenda to enhance joint arrangements
- Proposal for an Australian Joint Warfare Establishment first considered by COSC in 1967 (but ultimately took until 1975 to materialise)
- Became more pressing as 'East of Suez' decision led to closure of Far East School of Joint Warfare and fewer opportunities for Australian students at the UK Joint Warfare Establishment
- Interim decision to enhance the joint training aspects of the Air Support Unit (ahead of commissioning of Australian Joint Warfare Establishment)
- JSP(AS)1 became the focus of the curriculum of joint warfare courses delivered by Air Support Unit (for prospective staff of JFHQ that might be formed) in 1972
- JSP(AS)1 also part of curriculum for Joint Service Staff College (for senior staff to serve in strategic joint appointments in the Department of Defence) in 1972
- When established in August 1975, the Australian Joint Warfare Establishment was staffed both to deliver individual joint training as well as develop joint doctrine

Exercise KANGAROO I

- Most evident application of the new joint doctrine was Exercise KANGAROO I; largest Australian military exercise since WWII
- Conventional warfare exercise involving significant maritime and amphibious operations
- Exercise also involved US, UK and NZ forces; inter-operability also a crucial aspect of exercise
- Establishment of the joint force HQ C2 arrangements – as articulated in JSP(AS)1 specifically tested
- Procedural joint doctrine still relied on UK JSPs vols. 2 to 6 (absent any Australian procedural joint doctrine)
- For next 20 years, KANGAROO exercise series – absent actual operational commitments – became the basis for testing and development Australian joint operations doctrine



Development of Joint Core Doctrine

- Whilst some issues had been identified in JSP(AS)1, motivation for change had arisen primarily out of lessons from Exercise KANGAROO 1
- Policy direction: Australia would not conduct COIN operations in the future; focus of doctrine to be defence of Australian continent and its approaches
- Interim updated JSP(AS)1 produced in limited quantities, to be tested on Exercise KANGAROO 2 in late 1976
- Complemented by JSP(AS)2 – initially designated JSP(AS)7 – which described Australian military capabilities and responsibilities
- Structure and content of JSP(AS) depart significantly from UK JSPs; content reflected growing influence of US joint doctrine

Development of Joint Procedural Doctrine

- First procedural publication developed JSP(AS)8 Command and Control; reflecting key lessons from Exercise KANGAROO 1
- JSP(AS)8 explicitly developed from US generic SOPs for a JTF
- Other procedural publications developed for trialling in Exercise KANGAROO 2 (from UK JSPs):
 - JSP(AS)10 – Joint Tactical Communications
 - JSP(AS)11 – Offensive Support
 - JSP(AS)12 – Seaborne Support
 - JSP(AS)13 – Joint Tactical Air Defence
 - JSP(AS)14 – Air Transport
- Numbering explicitly intended to avoid confusion between JSP(AS) and JSPs (which remained authorised for use)
- UK JSPs only finally deauthorised for Australian usage in 1978

Explaining the Development of Australian Joint Doctrine: 1965 to 1976

- Imitative adoption (in support of inter-operability)
 - Key intent of joint doctrine is inter-operability with key allies (UK, then US)
 - Transition from UK influence, to hybrid UK/US influence, to largely US influence reflects inter-operability judgements

- Impact of Strategic Environment
 - Late development of joint doctrine reflected Service sense of the strategic threat environment; strategic challenges could be addressed by single Service commitments
 - Whilst nature of the strategic environment changed in 1972, remained essentially a low threat environment for Australia; hence whilst joint doctrine was ultimately necessary, resolving such was not regarded as a pressing priority
 - Strong imperative for enhancement of joint doctrine – and joint arrangements more generally – did not occur until mid 1990s

- Policy Direction
 - Prior to 1972, the policy setting of 'Forward Defence' put little emphasis on the Australian Services being able to work together
 - The replacement of 'Forward Defence' by 'Continental Defence' in late 1972 explicitly emphasised joint inter-operability for the Australian Services, and also specified what contingencies they would be involved in (and NOT involved in)

- Organisational Factors
 - Lack of a strong centre (both civil Department and strategic military command) arguably meant that essentially minor disagreements became intractable in the COSC committee process
 - Absence of a strong centre meant that joint doctrine development was persistently under-resourced
 - Whilst resources devoted to joint doctrine remained meagre after 1975, it did represent an improvement

Conclusion