

## Syndicate 2: Bosnia-Herzegovina Civil-Military Interactions in Bosnia-Herzegovina

Briefer: Larry Wentz

Advanced Communication Systems  
Fairfax, Virginia, U.S.A  
e-mail: larry.wentz@advcom.com

*Larry K. Wentz is Vice President of Advanced Communication Systems Services. He assumed this position after having served thirty years with the MITRE Corporation, a not-for-profit Federally Funded Research and Development Center. The last two years with MITRE were spent on a special government assignment to the National Defense University (NDU) as the Acting Director of the Command and Control Research Program (CCRP), Institute for National Strategic Studies. Prior to his assignment to NDU, he held the position of Technical Director of the MITRE Joint and Defense-Wide Systems Division for 10 years and before that led the U.S. National Expert support to the NATO Communications and Information System Agency (NACISA) in Brussels, Belgium for 18 years. Mr. Wentz has extensive experience in NATO C3, National/Theater/Tactical C2 (Nuclear through Operations Other Than War missions), and C4I support to Coalition Joint Task Force operations, including leading a number of Lessons Learned studies for operations such as Desert Shield, Desert Storm, and Restore Hope. Recently, he led an NDU study of the Coalition C2 structure and supporting C4ISR for the NATO-led Bosnia operation, Joint Endeavor. Mr. Wentz has a BSEE from Monmouth College and an MS in Systems Engineering and Operations Research from the University of Pennsylvania. He has completed the Executive Management Program at the University of Pennsylvania's Wharton Business School and the Harvard John F. Kennedy School of Government Program for Senior Executives in National and International Security. Mr. Wentz was awarded the AFCEA Meritorious Service Award for his contributions to International C3 and was a contributing author to the AFCEA Information Press books, *The First Information War* and *CYBERWAR 2.0*. The NDU press recently published his book, *Lessons from Bosnia: The IFOR Experience*. Mr. Wentz has presented papers at professional conferences and lectured at the Canadian International Pearson Peacekeeping Training Centre, the NDU School of Information Warfare and Strategy, and the DIA Joint Military Intelligence Training Center. Mr. Wentz holds the position of Outside Director and Chairman of the Government Security Committee for the Board of Directors for Systematic Software Engineering, Inc. He is also a member of the American Institute for Aeronautics and Astronautics Information and C2 Systems Technical Committee.*

### INTRODUCTION

The Bosnia scenario sets the stage for three phases of the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) the operation. The purpose was to highlight the changing needs of civil-military cooperation and collaboration as the nature of the operation changed from Peace Enforcement to a Peacekeeping mission. Phase one considered the situation on 20 December 1995 when IFOR deployed into Bosnia to enforce the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA). At this time, the operational emphasis was on Peace Enforcement and implementation of the terms of the Military Annex to the DPA. Phase two addressed the Spring of 1996 time-frame when it became more clear that the Warring Factions were abiding by the terms of the Military Annex and the Civil aspects of the DPA increased in priority and attention. At this stage, the operational emphasis began to shift towards the Civil, Political, and Humanitarian aspects of the operation. The third phase addressed the situation on the ground as SFOR (the Stabilization Force) took over the operation on 20 December 1996. The priorities and emphasis at this time were heavily focused on the Civil, Political, and Humanitarian aspects of the operation.

The Dayton Proximity Talks culminated in the initialing of a General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina on 21 November 1995. It was initialed by the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). Representatives of the Contact Group nations — the United States, Britain, France, Germany, and Russia — and the European Union Special Negotiator, witnessed the Agreement. The Dayton Peace Agreement and its Annexes are summarized below.

### **GENERAL FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT**

1. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia agree to fully respect the sovereign equality of one another and to settle disputes by peaceful means.
2. The FRY and Bosnia and Herzegovina recognize each other, and agree to discuss further aspects of their mutual recognition.
3. The parties agree to fully respect and promote fulfillment of the commitments made in the various Annexes, and they obligate themselves to respect human rights and the rights of refugees and displaced persons.
4. The parties agree to cooperate fully with all entities, including those authorized by the United Nations Security Council, in implementing the peace settlement and investigating and prosecuting war crimes and other violations of international humanitarian law.

### **ANNEX 1-A: MILITARY ASPECTS**

1. The cease-fire that began with the agreement of October 5, 1995 will continue.

2. Foreign combatant forces currently in Bosnia are to be withdrawn within 30 days.
3. The parties must complete withdrawal of forces behind a zone of separation of approximately 4 km within an agreed period. Special provisions relate to Sarajevo and Gorazde.
4. As a confidence-building measure, the parties agree to withdraw heavy weapons and forces to cantonment/barracks areas within an agreed period and to demobilize forces that cannot be accommodated in those areas.
5. The agreement invites into Bosnia and Herzegovina a multinational military Implementation Force, the IFOR, under the command of NATO, with a grant of authority from the UN.
6. The IFOR will have the right to monitor and help ensure compliance with the agreement on military aspects and fulfill certain supporting tasks. The IFOR will have the right to carry out its mission vigorously, including with the use of force as necessary. It will have unimpeded freedom of movement, control over airspace, and status of force protection.
7. A Joint Military Commission is established, to be chaired by the IFOR Commander. Persons under indictment by the International War Crimes Tribunal cannot participate.
8. Information on mines, military personnel, weaponry and other items must be provided to the Joint Military Commission within agreed periods.
9. All combatants and civilians must be released and transferred without delay in accordance with a plan to be developed by the International Committee of the Red Cross.

#### ANNEX 1-B: REGIONAL STABILIZATION

1. The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federation and the Bosnian Serb Republic must begin negotiations within 7 days, under Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) auspices, with the objective of agreeing on confidence-building measures within 45 days. These could include, for example, restrictions on military deployments and exercises, notification of military activities and exchange of data.
2. These three parties, as well as Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, agree not to import arms for 90 days and not to import any heavy weapons, heavy weapons ammunition, mines, military aircraft, and helicopters for 180 days or until an arms control agreement takes effect.

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3. All five parties must begin negotiations within 30 days, under OSCE auspices, to agree on numerical limits on holdings of tanks, artillery, armored combat vehicles, combat aircraft and attack helicopters.
  4. If the parties fail to establish limits on these categories within 180 days, the agreement provides for specified limits to come into force for the parties.
  5. The OSCE will organize and conduct negotiations to establish a regional balance in and around the former Yugoslavia.

#### ANNEX 2: INTER-ENTITY BOUNDARY

1. An Inter-Entity Boundary Line between the Federation and the Bosnian Serb Republic is agreed.
2. Sarajevo will be reunified within the Federation and will be open to all people of the country.
3. Gorazde will remain secure and accessible, linked to the Federation by a land corridor.
4. The status of Brcko will be determined by arbitration within one year.

#### ANNEX 3: ELECTIONS

1. Free and fair, internationally supervised elections will be conducted within six to nine months for the Presidency and House of Representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina, for the House of Representatives of the Federation and the National Assembly and presidency of the Bosnian Serb Republic, and, if feasible, for local offices.
2. Refugees and persons displaced by the conflict will have the right to vote (including by absentee ballot) in their original place of residence if they choose to do so.
3. The parties must create conditions in which free and fair elections can be held by protecting the right to vote in secret and ensuring freedom of expression and the press.
4. The OSCE is requested to supervise the preparation and conduct of these elections.
5. All citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina aged 18 or older listed on the 1991 Bosnian census are eligible to vote.

#### ANNEX 4: CONSTITUTION

1. A new constitution for the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which will be known as "Bosnia and Herzegovina," will be adopted upon signature at Paris.
2. Bosnia and Herzegovina will continue as a sovereign state within its present internationally recognized borders. It will consist of two entities: the Federation and the Bosnian Serb Republic.
3. The Constitution provides for the protection of human rights and the free movement of people, goods, capital and services throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina.
4. The central government will have a Presidency, a two-chamber legislature, and a constitutional court. Direct elections will be held for the Presidency and one of the legislative chambers.
5. There will be a central bank and monetary system, and the central government will also have responsibilities for foreign policy, law enforcement, air traffic control, communications and other areas to be agreed.
6. Military coordination will take place through a committee including members of the Presidency.
7. No person who is serving a sentence imposed by the International Tribunal, and no person who is under indictment by the Tribunal and who has failed to comply with an order to appear before the Tribunal, may stand as a candidate or hold any appointive, elective, or other public office in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

#### ANNEX 5: ARBITRATION

The Federation and the Bosnian Serb Republic agree to enter into reciprocal commitments to engage in binding arbitration to resolve disputes between them, and they agree to design and implement a system of arbitration.

#### ANNEX 6: HUMAN RIGHTS

1. The agreement guarantees internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms for all persons within Bosnia and Herzegovina.
2. A Commission on Human Rights, composed of a Human Rights Ombudsman and a Human Rights Chamber (court), is established.

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3. The Ombudsman is authorized to investigate human rights violations, issue findings, and bring and participate in proceedings before the Human Rights Chamber.
  4. The Human Rights Chamber is authorized to hear and decide human rights claims and to issue binding decisions.
  5. The parties agree to grant UN human rights agencies, the OSCE, the International Tribunal and other organizations full access to monitor the human rights situation.

#### ANNEX 7: REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS

1. The agreement grants refugees and displaced persons the right to safely return home and regain lost property, or to obtain just compensation.
2. A Commission for Displaced Persons and Refugees will decide on return of real property or compensation, with the authority to issue final decisions.
3. All persons are granted the right to move freely throughout the country, without harassment or discrimination.
4. The parties commit to cooperate with the ICRC in finding all missing persons.

#### ANNEX 8: COMMISSION TO PRESERVE NATIONAL MONUMENTS

1. A Commission to Preserve National Monuments is established.
2. The Commission is authorized to receive and act upon petitions to designate as National Monuments movable or immovable property of great importance to a group of people with common cultural, historic, religious or ethnic heritage.
3. When property is designated as a National Monument, the Entities will make every effort to take appropriate legal, technical, financial and other measures to protect and conserve the National Monument and refrain from taking deliberate actions that might damage it.

#### ANNEX 9: BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA PUBLIC CORPORATIONS

1. A Bosnia and Herzegovina Transportation Corporation is established to organize and operate transportation facilities, such as roads, railways and ports.
2. A Commission on Public Corporations is created to examine establishing other Bosnia and Herzegovina Public Corporations to operate joint public facilities, such as utilities and postal service facilities.

#### ANNEX 10: CIVILIAN IMPLEMENTATION

1. The parties request that a High Representative be designated, consistent with relevant UN Security Council resolutions, to coordinate and facilitate civilian aspects of the peace settlement, such as humanitarian aid, economic reconstruction, protection of human rights, and the holding of free elections.
2. The High Representative will chair a Joint Civilian Commission comprised of senior political representatives of the parties, the IFOR Commander and representatives of civilian organizations.
3. The High Representative has no authority over the IFOR.

#### ANNEX 11: INTERNATIONAL POLICE TASK FORCE

1. The UN is requested to establish a UN International Police Task Force (IPTF) to carry out various tasks, including training and advising local law enforcement personnel, as well as monitoring and inspecting law enforcement activities and facilities.
2. The IPTF will be headed by a Commissioner appointed by the UN Secretary General.
3. IPTF personnel must report any credible information on human rights violations to the Human Rights Commission, the International Tribunal or other appropriate organizations.

#### PHASE ONE CONSIDERATIONS

At the outset of the operation, a principle concern of IFOR was the faction's "Political Will" to make it happen. The factions possessed combat power, had a robust intelligence capability in place and were using it, and they had control of the local media and population in general. As a result, it was not clear how the factions would react militarily to the IFOR deployment. The possibilities of civil disturbances had to be considered as well. Terrorists, organized crime, and petty criminals would need to be factored into the threat equation. Minefields and snipers were threats as well. As a result, force protection became a key consideration of

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deploying forces, especially the US forces in the IFOR Multinational Division North. This was also a first time out-of-area peace operation for NATO, including working with non-NATO nations. Hence, there was doctrine, cultural, language, and C4ISR system interoperability issues that needed to be accommodated. Liaisons became important in helping resolve many of the differences encountered. Finally, a political-driven Military End State was established for withdraw of IFOR military forces at the end of one year. This placed a heavy emphasis on the military to get in, get the job done quickly, and then get out.

In addition to the threat considerations, there were displaced person and refugees (DPRE) everywhere. The factions refused to cooperate with each other and there was strong faction resistance to allow DRPEs to return to their homes in support of the political desire on the part of many Western nations (the US in particular) to re-establish a multi-ethnic environment in Bosnia. Public infrastructure had largely been destroyed, i.e., water, gas, electricity, telephone service, roads, bridges, rail service, and so forth. The media were everywhere reporting on the situation. There were numerous other actors on the playing field such as humanitarian relief organizations that IFOR needed to deal with and communications among and between the various actors was poor at the outset. Commercial businesses, banking, law enforcement, and the legal system were dysfunctional. Where police existed, they were generally not trusted due to their participation in ethnic cleansing activities. The population was generally literate and used to all forms of media including newsprint, radio and television. There was an active faction-driven information campaign targeted at NATO and IFOR; therefore, IFOR's information campaign was launched in an environment where they were not in control.

There was a lack of unified political direction for the overall peace implementation process and this was considered a risk to the success of IFOR military operation. The DPA established three structures for implementation. There was an Implementation Force for the military aspects, a High Representative to coordinate civil tasks, and Donors Conferences to stimulate reconstruction. The NATO-led IFOR was an internationally recognized military organization, it was well structured and disciplined, and took its guidance from the North Atlantic Council. On the other hand, the Office of the High Representative (OHR) was not a UN Special Representative with UN authority. His political guidance came from a Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council, which was not an internationally recognized political organization. Furthermore, the establishment of the OHR operation was delayed and this caused the civil activities to lag the military implementation activities.

The UN was reluctant to step up and take the lead. Hence, there was no internationally recognized political organization providing overall political direction. Consequently, the three structures remained virtually autonomous, operating within a loose framework of cooperation, without a formal structure for developing unified policy. The absence of a standing political organization with which the North Atlantic Council could coordinate policy exacerbated the inherent difficulties of synchronizing the civil-military implementation of the peace process at the strategic level and NATO's role in implementing the Peace Agreement. Civil-Military cooperation, collaboration, and information sharing at all levels were impeded as well.

Before the IFOR deployment, there was no common understanding of the capabilities, limitations, roles, and mission of Civil Affairs, or Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) as they are referred to in NATO terms, units and personnel. In the absence of an agreed NATO



doctrine, IFOR commanders and staff had to incorporate civil-military tasks into their overall operations based upon personal knowledge and experience. The individual commander's execution of the CIMIC mission reflected the various national approaches of the participating nations (many US commander's viewed CA activities as "mission creep"). The Russian approach to CA/CIMIC tended to be more peace enforcement or counterinsurgency oriented. France and the UK were much more active in assisting civil organizations with direct support to local "hearts and minds" projects.

The U.S. approach was more "high intensity" and stressed the need to achieve decisive "victory" and quick resolution of conflicts through securing popular support. The IFOR deployment illuminated the ground combat commanders limited knowledge and experience with civil affairs activities. This lack of knowledge was demonstrated in many areas, but was particularly obvious in the campaign planning stage. During the development of the OPLAN, there was only one Civil Affairs officer assigned to assist AFSOUTH in planning for the IFOR deployment. The campaign plan not only inadequately identified military tasks for CIMIC, but due to the lack of planing knowledge, negatively impacted CIMIC deployment, manning and communications, and the development of information and logistics support requirements.

Civil-Military cooperation in Bosnia was unique; members of the non-governmental and supra-governmental relief and development organizations were already actively engaged when the IFOR deployment commenced. In fact, there were an estimated 530 International Organizations/Non-Governmental Organizations (IO/NGO) personnel in theater at the start of the operation. This situation created its own set of problems. First, US CIMIC assets were delayed in their deployment-CA is primarily a Reserve activity requiring implementation by a Presidential Selective Reserve Call-Up. Hence, as UNPROFOR forces withdrew or were transferred to IFOR, valuable CIMIC turnover opportunities were lost. Lacking any advanced information on how the CIMIC mission would be executed, the NGOs assumed that IFOR would continue, if not increase, the same type of support that UNPROFOR provided to them. The philosophy advanced by IFOR, however, was quite different from UNPROFOR's. IFOR refused to provide what it thought the NGO community could provide for themselves. There was a fear that providing such support would create a long-term dependency on IFOR. Paramount in this philosophy was the promotion of self-sustaining activities in preparation for IFOR's eventual withdraw.

## **PHASE TWO CONSIDERATIONS**

In the spring of 1996 it became clear that the emphasis of the operation should shift to the Civil, Political, and Humanitarian aspects as a result of IFOR creating a safe and secure environment. The factions' were also in reasonable compliance with the military aspects of the DPA. There were political pressures for elections to take place and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) was to take the lead to make this happen. In the end, the OSCE not capable doing the job and had to rely on IFOR to help with the elections. Mine clearing was of major interest and being actively pursued. Location of mass graves and documenting human rights violations were of high importance as well. The International Police Task Force (IPTF) was created under the DPA to monitor, inspect, advise and train local police and law enforcement personnel. They were not armed and were not empowered

to enforce local laws. Hence, the IPTF could only function effectively with the consent of the parties. The IPTF was also used to monitor and report on civil rights violations and were used in support of the elections as well. Reconstruction and nation building activities were begun as a result of donor monies becoming available. Refugees also started to return creating a need to focus on humanitarian assistance, freedom of movement, and civil rights activities.

Successful accomplishment of the IFOR military responsibilities constituted only part of what needed to be done to create a stable, solid structure in Bosnia. Recognizing this fact, the DPA provided for "supporting tasks" which IFOR could undertake within the limits of the identified principal military tasks and available resources. These supporting tasks included:

- To help create secure conditions for the conduct by others of other tasks associated with the peace settlement;
- To assist the movement of organizations in the accomplishment of humanitarian missions; and
- To assist the United Nations agencies and other international organizations in the humanitarian missions.

For the most part, the responsibility for coordinating the vast array of implied supporting tasks fell to a small, often unnoticed staff section-CIMIC/Civil Affairs. CIMIC was thus to play an unprecedented role in achieving the objectives of the DPA. The implementation of the civil aspects of the DPA was essential to IFOR's exit strategy and the return to normalcy for the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina. CIMIC was the vital link between military and civilian organizations operating in theater.

The primary and supporting military objectives outlined in the DPA that had civil or political implications were translated into a comprehensive CIMIC Campaign Plan which was to guide civil military activities during the IFOR deployment. This CIMIC Campaign Plan envisioned:

- Conducting civil military operations in support of the military implementation of the DPA;
- Promoting cooperation with the civilian populace, various agencies and national governments;
- Leveraging capabilities of NGOs, IOs, and national governments;
- Creating a parallel, unified civilian effort in support of the DPA implementation; and
- Being prepared to assist governmental, international, and non-governmental humanitarian, public safety, and health contingencies.

Translated into a comprehensive set of tasks, CIMIC operations were instrumental in facilitating a wide variety of activities in support of the OHR and other organizations. Some of the other organizations were the OSCE, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), World Bank, European Union (EU), International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) and others who were responsible for implementing a majority of civil actions outlined in the DPA. CIMIC personnel also participated in the Joint Civil Commissions (JCCs) set up by the Office of the High Representative at the regional level to facilitate civil actions throughout Bosnia Herzegovina. It also set up CIMIC Centers at the cantonal (local) level to implement civil reconstruction and improvement plans. These centers operated in each of the Multinational Divisions (MNDs) where there was a demonstrated need and available resources.

A Combined Joint Civil Military Cooperation staff element was implemented at IFOR headquarters to facilitate coordination of CIMIC activities and cooperation with the IOs/NGOs. The CIMIC organization was to focus on liaison with the civilian organizations from the government down to the local opstina level to regenerate national regulations and institute some limited nation rebuilding. The structure was also to provide an avenue for the numerous aid agencies to deal with the military on support arrangements related to their projects in theater. CIMIC Centers were established at all levels of the IFOR command structure to provide a location for NGOs to meet with the military. In Sarajevo, both IFOR and Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) had CIMIC activities and this created some confusion with the NGOs who preferred to deal with the one in-charge.

CIMIC activities at MND (N) best epitomize the combined impact that doctrine, command structures, and mission interpretations have on the promotion, or prevention, of civil coordination. The CIMIC Center, which doctrinally was the central location for all NGOs to meet with the military, was located inside the gate at Tuzla, whereas most of the NGOs were downtown Tuzla. Since access to the base by non-IFOR personnel was strictly limited, the effectiveness of the CIMIC Center as a tool for coordinating NGO and military activities was greatly reduced. US force protection measures contributed to hampering CIMIC personnel in their ability to make on-site visits. They were required to muster up four vehicles just to be able to leave the base and the heavy military presence (full battle gear) did not contribute to creating an impression among the local population that the internal situation was improving.

The wide range of specific CIMIC support to the coordination and implementation of civilian tasks demonstrates the pervasive nature of CIMIC operations. This support included:

- *Electrical Power and Coal:* CIMIC personnel worked on a daily basis to facilitate cooperation between IFOR and the Elektroprivreda. CIMIC personnel coordinated with IFOR for increased security presence when cargo of a strategic nature such as electrical transformers and hydroelectric turbines and turbine shafts was being transported through contested territory.
- *Natural Gas:* CIMIC facilitated installation of a temporary power line and a pre-heating boiler allowing for the restoration of safer distribution pressure and gas odorization to over 50 % of Sarajevo.

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- *Roads and Bridges:* CIMIC personnel facilitated the repair or reconstruction of roads and bridges by coordinating between World Bank, IMG, IFOR/ARRC Engineers and local agencies. CIMIC personnel also performed numerous bridge, overpass and road surveys.
  - *Telecommunications:* In collaboration with the staff of CJ6 AFSOUTH, CIMIC personnel proposed an alternative short term Global System Mobile (GSM) solution that could have provided limited cellular telephone communications for the period before and during the elections. The Telecommunication Infrastructure cell monitored the development of telecommunications legislation, regulations and plans for privatization that were being led by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).
  - *Water:* CIMIC performed periodic joint environmental inspections of the recharge aquifer at the Bacevo well field outside Sarajevo. This source provided 80% of the potable water for the Sarajevo area. Assistance was also provided to facilitate the cold chain shipment of laboratory materials for water analysis.
  - *International Police Task Force (IPTF):* With the organization's strength just over 1600 personnel, IPTF was able to make major developmental strides. The CIMIC Police Working Group was instrumental in generating the plan and subsequent employment of the IPTF with Federation police throughout the country. CIMIC also developed the plans for the reorganization of Federation and Republik Srbska (RS) police forces.
  - *Legal/Property Rights:* CIMIC personnel worked closely with the Commission on Human Rights and the Commission for Real Property Claims of Displaced Persons and Refugees, as well as the Human Rights Task Force Property Subcommittee, which operated as a watch-dog committee for the Dayton commission. CIMIC personnel also worked closely with Federation and RS committees appointed to review and revise property laws. This activity resulted in the drafting of changes to property law, and procedures for taking claims of displaced persons and refugees.
  - *Refugees and Displaced Persons:* CJCIMIC provided a liaison officer to the OHR and the UNHCR to work on issues dealing with refugees and displaced persons. The staff also worked closely on freedom of movement and repatriation issues.
  - *Non-governmental Organization Liaisons:* CIMIC NGO Liaisons coordinated transportation requests to move hundreds of tons of food and other goods throughout BH and the Federation to aid in feeding the civilian population. CIMIC personnel shared information of interest with the NGOs and provided them with an opportunity to obtain clarification of their questions from IFOR's perspective.

- *Office of the High Representative:* A CIMIC officer filled a critical role at OHR as the Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff. This position required liaison with senior officials from all international organizations. CIMIC personnel also augmented OHR staff located at the Regional Joint Civilian Commissions in Banja Luka and Tuzla. CIMIC teams provided administrative and logistic support to include performing infrastructure assessments and compiling information as part of a countrywide database. In addition, CIMIC personnel interfaced with local authorities to facilitate and coordinate civil military and civil agency assistance.
- *World Bank:* CIMIC financial functional specialists provided valuable assistance to the World Bank sponsored "Emergency Recovery Program." This program funded working capital and capital improvement loans up to DM 300,000 to war impacted businesses. The IFOR team analyzed and recommended for approval, in excess of 20 loans worth DM 4,000,000 and trained local nationals to perpetuate the program. They also used experience gained in this involvement to provide direction to USAID as they brought on line a working capital program that complimented the World Bank's program for lending to Federation enterprises.

Under the Dayton Agreement, the Office of the High Representative was tasked to coordinate the activities of the civilian organizations in Bosnia to ensure the efficient implementation of the civil aspects of the agreement. The OHR was also to remain in close contact with the commander IFOR to facilitate the discharge of their respective responsibilities. The civilian institutions began operation under considerable disadvantages. They had to be created, funded, and staffed in country after the IFOR military deployment occurred. This delay caused public pressure to be applied to IFOR, demanding that IFOR take on a larger role in implementing civil tasks. This public pressure resulted in a limited self-fulfilling prophecy. Once the OHR established itself in theater, the impression created was that where the OHR should have been taking the lead on projects, such as providing gas, electricity, and water, it was expecting that IFOR would take the lead. As a result, "mission extension" was a natural occurrence because of the competence and ability of the military CIMIC organization.

As noted earlier, late into the IFOR phase of the operation, a Joint Civil Commission was established by OHR to facilitate interactions between the civil and military agencies on Dayton Accord civil matters, reconstruction activities, and humanitarian assistance activities. To the contrary, a Joint Military Commission was established by IFOR at the outset of the operation for dealing with the factions on DPA military matters.

### **PHASE THREE CONSIDERATIONS**

In the fall of 1996, it became clear that a reduced level of military presence would be required for some time to maintain a safe and secure environment to allow the accomplishment of the civil aspects of the DPA. In response to a NATO announcement that they were prepared to lead a force to replace IFOR, the UN Security Council approved a resolution that authorized NATO to establish a Stabilization Force (SFOR) as the legal

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successor to IFOR. SFOR was activated on 20 December 1996 and had the same rules of engagement as IFOR and its mission was to stabilize the peace. In view of the importance of the civil aspects of the DPA, SFOR planned to continue to provide support for these tasks. However, with fewer forces at its disposal, SFOR would need to prioritize its efforts and carefully select where they could be applied. Resettlement and reconstruction were primary activities where successful resettlement was not viewed as being too encouraging.

Restoring civil, political, economic, judicial, and law enforcement stability were of high importance as well. The postponed municipal elections were being scheduled for the summer of 1997. From the outset of the IFOR operation, there had been a deliberate disconnect of the military effort from the prosecution, even the investigation, of war crimes. There appeared however to be a shift towards being more hard line, to take a tougher stance and possibly go after war criminals. Strategic territorial issues such as the Posavina-Brcko corridor and Mostar continued to pose a danger to the peace process. Furthermore, the Serbs were preparing for partition, the Croats doubtlessly the same and only the mediators and Bosnian government was trying to preserve a multi-ethnic, multi-religious Bosnia-Herzegovina.

## Syndicate 2: Bosnia-Herzegovina Syndicate Discussions

Scribe: Jan Vink

Department for Operations Research and Business Management  
Physics and Electronics Laboratory  
Netherlands Organization for Applied Scientific Research (TNO-FEL)  
The Hague, The Netherlands.  
e-mail: J.K.Vink@fel.tno.nl

*Jan Vink is a senior scientist in the group Operations Research studies Army, part of the department for Operations Research and Business Management at the Physics and Electronics Laboratory of the Netherlands Organization for Applied Scientific Research (TNO-FEL). His main focus is on the Operational Effectiveness of military units. Jan graduated Econometrics on the University of Groningen with a specialization in Operations Research.*

The Syndicate consisted of the following members:

- *Briefer:* Larry Wentz, U.S.A.
- *Facilitator:* David Frankis, United Kingdom
- *Scribe:* Jan Vink, The Netherlands.

- *Participants:* Geoff. Beare, United Kingdom; Par Eriksson, Sweden; Edward Ketchum, William O'Mara, U.S.A.; David Davis, U.S.A.; Robert Bailey, United Kingdom.

This paper presents the results of the Bosnia Syndicate's findings, including the following:

- 1 A brief account of the plan and process adopted during the day is noted.
- 2 A comprehensive account is given of the chronology of the events in Bosnia Herzegovina (BH) over the period December 1995 to December 1996, the period of the IFOR mandate. Informed comment and analysis relating to the successful Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) is included.
- 3 A consolidated outcome of a brainstorm and discussion to consider CIMIC in this scenario is recorded.
4. The possible areas of research, which arise, are then recorded.
5. It was hoped to include an account of possible research techniques, but there was insufficient time to address this properly.

### **CONSOLIDATED OBSERVATIONS OF CIMIC IN THIS SCENARIO**

The consolidated outcome of a brainstorm and discussion to consider CIMIC in this scenario is recorded. There has been a retrospective attempt to group these observations by political, military and non-military considerations.

#### **POLITICAL OBSERVATIONS**

- Can the political will to comply with a peace agreement be created, and what is the role of the media in helping or hindering this?
- Who are the key players in the operation? The personalities of the key players are most important. Some form of team building before the operation will help each key player to understand the motivation of the other and avoid personal agendas from upsetting good co-ordination.
- It is important to ask the question: who is the customer? What are their interests? Sometimes the 'customer' is outside the area of an operation (for example one country flooded with refugees from another).
- What are the long-term effects of certain decisions? These may not be 'to the fore' when undertaking initiatives.
- There is an important issue of local legitimacy. This means that re-establishing a country's institutions needs to be undertaken with care.

- There is also a risk in initiating co-ordination, such as a CIMIC implies. An organisation may lose its neutrality and the central body may stifle initiatives and innovation.

### MILITARY OBSERVATIONS

- Military intervention can raise wrong expectations within civilian parties. For example, IFOR differed in its tasks from UNPROFOR while civilian parties expected a continuation of similar assistance policies.
- The reliability of information is a crucial issue; there can be many different views on this. The spokesman or public information officer for the military is a very important person; he/she has to be trusted, be reliable and be believable, with direct access to the Commander
- Information exchange arrangements between an international force and the other military factions is also important and cannot be neglected.
- Education and training of the military in civil military interactions could have prevented a lot of problems with IFOR.
- It would be useful to be clear on what are direct military tasks and what are implied tasks. Are these implied tasks in fact also military tasks?
- Force-protection is crucially important. Being trained for and being prepared for conflict is the best way of providing force-protection. However, how should this be squared with undertaking successful civil military interaction (for example, see above under CJCIMIC)?
- Military planning tends to be for a short time-frame, e.g. for IFOR it was for 1 year. The civilian organisations however are often working to different, usually longer, time-horizons.
- There is no well recognised military doctrine for the 'psyops campaign.'
- Civil Affairs is seen as 'rear operation,' i.e. not uppermost in the military planners mind.
- Duplication can confuse matters. In Bosnia both ARRC and IFOR had their own civil/military organisations.
- The location of national support elements outside the border of a country also leads to customs issues and logistic needs.
- There is a need for taxonomy of operations and tasks so as to be able to compare different operations. This would enable learning from the past.



### NON MILITARY OBSERVATIONS

- Long term aims for stability and reconstruction and short term aims for reducing tension can be in conflict.
- A lack of alignment of tactical aims between different civil organisations can cause confusion and overlap. A process is required to enable the agendas of the various civil organisations to be co-ordinated. In Bosnia the ICVA (International Co-ordination Volunteer Organisation) tried to achieve this.
- Not all NGOs are impartial or unaligned. This exacerbates the above problem. Also lack of experience of certain relevant organisations can be a big problem.
- However, the worse a disaster, the greater the will is to co-operate!
- The focus of, and within, NGOs can change during an operation, e.g. from re-establishing human rights to assisting the return of refugees to the recovery of governance.
- In support and reconstruction activities, the choice of contractors is a big issue. Should these be from within the nation or from outside? Use of host nation support can lead to loss of control and therefore not be the best solution in many cases. (cf. Allegations within Bosnia today!).

### POSSIBLE AREAS FOR RESEARCH

It was hoped to include an account of possible research techniques, but there was insufficient time to address this adequately within the workshop. Historical analysis backed up with interviews can contribute to answering some of the above research questions. In areas such as co-ordination, issues of optimisation of resources for a common purpose arise. In other areas, simulation can be used to focus data collection. Finally, motivational analysis is clearly important, though the syndicate could not identify any immediately applicable techniques. The possible areas of research, arising from the above, are now recorded. These are grouped by four main headings: training, communications, planning and monitoring, and co-ordination.

#### TRAINING

- How is it possible to create a situation where a common level of (requisite) education and training for the military and civil actors within an operation can be undertaken, both on a contingency basis and as part of any pre-deployment?

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## COMMUNICATION

- What degree of understanding of the culture of society and factions within a problem country should be conducted prior to an operation?
- What are the key factors causing the troubles and are there suitable mechanisms for resolving these underlying issues?
- To what extent does inter-organisational differences in IT-related systems create disruption to the flow and dissemination of requisite information?
- What mechanisms or methods should be established to improve the co-ordination of information in operations between the many different audiences (both pre-existing and interventionist).
- What are the various 'user needs' for such information?

## PLANNING AND MONITORING

- Research is required to develop a civil 'doctrine' for intervention and an overarching 'strategic doctrine' for civil/military interaction.
- Issues to be addressed include:
  - > measures of effectiveness, particularly relating to the civilian contribution;
  - > how to build a framework of legitimacy, accountability and governance;
  - > how to balance short-term aid with long-term reconstruction;
  - > how to develop exit strategies and criteria, both for military forces and for civil agencies.

## CO-ORDINATION

- To what extent does 'motivational alignment' differ between the various actors?
- Define or develop a process to link the main actors and agendas together.
- How can this process be extended to the local population and factions?
- What resources are to be assigned to each civil-military task?

