
Getting Missions Started ¹

Major General John Drewienkiewicz, CB CMG

Royal College of Defence Studies
London, England, United Kingdom.
e-mail: mg@redsone.demon.uk

Professor Alexander E.R. Woodcock, Ph.D.

Chief Scientist and Vice President
BAE SYSTEMS, Fairfax, Virginia, U.S.A.
e-mail: woodcock@syncorp.com

Major General John Drewienkiewicz was commissioned into the Royal Engineers in 1966. He has served in the UK, Germany, the Gulf, and Canada. He was promoted to the rank of major general to become Engineer in Chief (Army) in 1995. He was then assigned to NATO as Director of Support HQ LANDCENT in Heidelberg. While in this post HQ LANDCENT was ordered to Sarajevo as HQ SFOR. He was selected to be Chief of Staff of the restructured HQ and formed, trained and deployed the HQ from Jun 1996 until August 1997, returning to Sarajevo as Military Advisor to the High Representative in Jan 1998. In October 1998 he was attached to the OSCE in Vienna to plan the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM), subsequently being appointed Deputy Head of Mission for Operations in Kosovo. He finally left the Balkans in April 1999, and joined the Royal College of Defence Studies as the Army Senior Directing Staff in May 1999. He was appointed CB in June 1998 for his services in SFOR, and CMG in Jan 2000 for his services in the Kosovo Verification Mission.

*Alexander (Ted) Woodcock is Chief Scientist and Vice President at BAE SYSTEMS (formerly Synectics Corporation), Fairfax, Virginia. He is a Member of the Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences. He is also Guest Professor at the National Defence College, Stockholm, Sweden, Distinguished Visiting Professor at the School of Public Policy, George Mason University, Fairfax, Virginia, and a Visiting Professor at the Royal Military College of Science, Shrivenham, England. He is actively involved in the development and implementation of societal dynamics models of military, political, economic, and other processes for the modeling and analysis of low intensity conflict, peace and humanitarian operations, and related areas. He has published several textbooks, including *The Military Landscape: Mathematical Models of Combat* for which he was the co-author, and is the senior editor for several international conference proceedings. He has a Ph.D. in Biology and an M.Sc. in Biophysics from the University of East Anglia in England, and a B.Sc. (with honours) in Physics from Exeter University in England. He is a Full Member of Sigma Xi.*

INTRODUCTION

Before the Dayton Peace Accord was signed in late 1995 there were two operational NATO headquarters in the Southern Region. AFSOUTH was the superior headquarters, based in Naples, and covering Theatre level issues. AIRSOUTH was based in Vicenza, covered all air aspects and was subordinated to AFSOUTH. Both operated out of their peace-time locations in a fashion that was similar to the way they had trained and planned for in the Cold War. Although the intensity of operations was less, the duration was much more extended than envisioned in the Cold War days. The UN Forward headquarter was in Sarajevo, having been there in various configurations for almost three years. The UN Chain of Command led back to Zagreb in Croatia, and links were maintained across to AFSOUTH.

When the DPA was brought into force NATO carried out a Relief in Place from the UN. AFSOUTH established a small Forward Headquarters in the Residency in Sarajevo in place of the UN there. Headquarters ARRC set up in a hotel complex 5 miles west of Sarajevo in the suburb of Ilidza, leaving much of its logistic support in Kiseljac, some fifteen miles NW of Sarajevo, across a range of hills. The UN Headquarters complex in Zagreb was taken over by a third NATO HQ, which had limited operational responsibilities and was set up in a very ad hoc fashion. This new Headquarters was Headquarters IFOR Support Command, and was planned to bring together national logistic support into Multinational arrangements.

In the event this last Headquarters was not in place and effective early enough to offer nations significant benefits from pooling resources and role specialisation. Logistics remained essentially a set of national “stovepipes” and the hoped for economies of scale were not achieved. Nonetheless the Headquarters remained in being and performed a useful role in liaising with the Host Nation, in co-ordinating passenger airlift within theatre, in co-ordinating fuel delivery and in de-conflicting first road and eventually rail movement.

This situation came into being in December 1995, and the involvement of NATO was initially set at one year. As 1996 wore on it became clear that the pace of reconstruction fell far behind that envisioned by the DPA and that the Mandate of the Military Implementing Force would need to continue beyond the 12 month point. While the small AFSOUTH forward Headquarters in Sarajevo was manned by personnel on a trickle basis, the brunt of the year’s deployment had fallen heavily on personnel based in Naples. Moreover Headquarters ARRC was the only NATO Headquarters of its size that was genuinely deployable and the majority of its personnel had been deployed in Sarajevo for much of 1996. There was therefore a need to conduct a relief in place of both Headquarters AFSOUTH and Headquarters ARRC, but no NATO Headquarters was an obvious candidate for the task. All other NATO HQ were static, optimised for a Cold War role and with fixed communications and administrative assets.

In early June 1996 Headquarters LANDCENT, based in Heidelberg, Germany, was given an informal warning to begin limited planning to scope the task of restructuring and re-equipping itself in order to relieve both Headquarters AFSOUTH and Headquarters ARRC in Sarajevo later in the year. This was followed by an ACTWARN from NATO in late June and an ACTORD in mid September. Headquarters LANDCENT restructured and expanded over a three month period, incorporating 65 per cent of its staff in the new Headquarters, and absorbing 450 new staff from outside. The expanded Headquarters was worked up in Heidelberg in early October and deployed to Sarajevo from mid-October, taking over first from Headquarters AFSOUTH at the Theatre level and then in November from Headquarters ARRC.

BACKGROUND TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE KOSOVO VERIFICATION MISSION

The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, (OSCE), consists of representatives of the 54 member states and is based in Vienna. It is the successor organization to the Conference for Security and Co-operation Europe which was highly involved in Conventional Arms Control about 10 years ago. The OSCE has a very small Permanent Secretariat and a Permanent Delegation from each of the member states. Ever since the Dayton Peace Accord the OSCE has had a role in the Balkans. In Bosnia the OSCE had responsibility for Elections, some Arms Control issues and some Reconciliation and Democratization issues.

By early 1998 there was also an OSCE presence in Croatia, in Macedonia and in Albania. All were small missions, from less than 20 international staff in Macedonia to around 300 in Croatia. All had been built up gradually over many months, with significant reinforcement of several hundred election monitors for the specific period of elections. The Bosnia Mission took over 6 months to build up to its desired strength in 1996, and required extensive reinforcement by the NATO Implementation Force in international staff and resources in order to run successfully the Autumn 1996 Elections, despite having had a presence in Bosnia since early 1996. The Mission Support section of the OSCE Permanent Secretariat is less than 20 strong, configured to give routine support to a number of small missions. The only other planning or organising capability embedded in the OSCE Staff in Vienna was a 10-man team of seconded military planners working on a possible deployment to Nagorno-Karabach and an even smaller team under an Italian General working on regional Arms Control issues. None were available to plan other contingency operations.



Figure 1: Kosovo.

The situation in Kosovo had been deteriorating over the Summer of 1998, and in October 1998 US Ambassador Richard Holbrooke brokered an Agreement between the Yugoslav Government and the OSCE. The Agreement was signed on 16 October 1998 between Foreign Minister Jovanovic and the OSCE Chairman in Office Geremek. It mandated an OSCE Mission of 2000 unarmed personnel to verify the Agreement on the ground in Kosovo and to set the conditions for elections in Kosovo (Figure 1). The duration of the mandate was 12 months, effective immediately. However, the establishment of the mission, to be known as the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM), had not been planned nor even scoped at that stage. There was no knowledge of the situation on the ground, there was only the very small Mission Support Section of the Permanent Secretariat, there was no plan, no equipment, and no money.

The KVM was to be six times bigger than anything the OSCE had previously had to do in a hurry. Everything had to be put together quickly in order to establish an effective presence on the ground. This was achieved by borrowing military planners to form an ad hoc team that was assembled in Vienna. The nucleus of the team was a group of eight British military and ex-military, headed by a British general, and seconded by the British Foreign Office. They moved at six hours notice the day before the FRY/OSCE Agreement was signed and began work immediately. There was the aspiration for a separate agreement between the OSCE and the Kosovar Albanians, and the understanding was that this would be put in place later. In the event it did not materialize (Figure 2).



Figure 2: Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) in Kosovo.

PROCESSES FOR SETTING UP MISSIONS HAVE EVOLVED

Over the past four years there has been considerable evolution in the way missions have been set up (Figure 3). In 1996 General Drewienkiewicz was in the static Germany based NATO Headquarters Allied Land Forces Central Europe, when it was restructured and expanded in strength and scope to become the NATO Theatre Headquarters in Bosnia as Headquarters for IFOR/SFOR. Later in 1997 the General moved to Zagreb to command SFOR Support Command, a small Headquarters created early in 1996 entirely of individual augmentees,

which by then was functioning well. It had taken several weeks to settle in but it had been allowed to do so.

Examples	
• Headquarters IFOR/SFOR	Form/Train/Deploy
• Headquarters SFOR Support command	In Place
• Office of the High Representative	In Place
• OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission	Form/Deploy/Operate

Figure 3: Examples of different types of Headquarters.

At the beginning of 1998 the General returned to Sarajevo as the Military Advisor to the Civilian High Representative. This Office had been built up gradually over the course of 1996, so that by mid 1997 it was at its desired strength. The staff were a mix of diplomats on secondment and experts each contracted individually, with a small military cell attached. In October 1998 the OSCE was given the task of setting up the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) from scratch. The General was seconded to the OSCE in Vienna to help plan the mission and was subsequently selected to by the Chief of Operations of the Mission. He was thus present as the KVM was formed, built up and deployed in Kosovo. The KVM was a mix of civilians, both seconded diplomats and contracted individual experts, as well as seconded military and ex military.

The General wrote the following personal note in August 1996, when he was involved with in NATO were doing something for the first time in their experience.

We are changing from a small cohesive HQ that does business using paper over days and weeks to a large fully automated HQ using e-mail – by the way, our augmentees (490 of 670) may or may not have seen a computer before!

We are taking over from 2 dissimilar HQ, that don't really like each other, and have different views of how things should be done.

To make all this work needs money, which is being controlled much more stringently than when the operation was set up; and the control is by a fourth party which is still working on a peacetime committee-driven decision making process.

At the time it was the hardest thing that the General had done, and certainly the hardest thing that the NATO Headquarters in Heidelberg had done. Now, four years on, the military have learned from the experience. The same Headquarters in Heidelberg was restructured again in 1999 and once more replaced the ARRC Headquarters in Oct 99, almost three years to the day after the general and his colleagues did it in 1996. But with the experience of SFOR, and with individuals still serving in the Headquarters who had been there in 1996-1997, much less pain and grief was involved the second time around.

The Office of the High Representative (OHR) was formed and had existed for two years when the general joined it in 1998. However, the memory of how difficult it had been to set

up was still evident. The general was not sure that the IC went through any institutional Lessons Learned. In setting up The Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) in October 1998, little use of legacy experience appears to have been made. Everything that the general had heard about the practical problems of devising and raising a new Civilian mission was repeated in late 1998. Equally, the process of setting up UNMIK did not draw on the hard-won experience of the KVM, despite the availability of many of the original members of that mission.

In 1996, while trying to draw lessons from previous experiences, the General concentrated on the weaknesses of some military Headquarters compared with others. He now understands better the many strengths that any military Headquarters has, however it is configured. Planners are a particular feature of military headquarters because planning is valued as an activity in its own right (Figure 4). This is not a notable feature of civilian missions. Another feature of military entities is that a visible hierarchy, such as military rank, allows one to know where one fits into the team quickly. This is beneficial when newcomers arrive in the later stages of preparing an organization, for example.





Figure 4: Military headquarters can provide a foundation for construction of other organizational entities.

The range of options for Missions and Headquarters is shown in Figure 5. The first bullet represents the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC). It is eminently usable but very expensive in terms of equipment and people. Due to its size and complexity it cannot be used for many different purposes in rapid succession. Rather, it can be considered to be a “one-shot weapon” which takes two years to reload. At the moment it is unique within the European armed forces. The options further down the list are cheaper in terms of the costs of people and equipment. However, these options either take a long time to prepare, in which case they have to be formed well before they are needed. Such entities could also deploy when needed, but be largely unprepared, in the hope that they will be allowed to learn on the job. The point of distinguishing between civilians and serving military is that the former, (including retired military as well as civilians) will have proper jobs if they are any good, so are not available to join a new mission at the drop of a hat. If they don’t have such jobs it is normally because they are less competent, so they may not be exactly what is needed for particular tasks. The serving military on the other hand can be made available quickly, if necessary in hours if not days, and do not have to worry that a job will still be held open for their return.



- Build from Modules
- Build from scratch with Military
- Build from scratch with mix of Civilian and Military
 - > Spine/Skeleton
 - > Vital Organs
- Build from scratch with Civilians
 - > National slices/quotas
 - > Individuals

Figure 5: Options for Mission Headquarters.

All of these unexciting but necessary aspects shown in Figure 6 have to be done by someone. A fortunate commander will have experienced people to undertake such tasks. The absence of such personnel can cause problems and delays and lead to significant increases in cost. A memorable example is the space rules for various ranks and grades of people in IFOR/SFOR. Here the Colonels saw themselves as policy makers, not staff officers. They wanted separate offices and separate bedrooms. The problem was that there were 43 Colonels and 17 Generals, but there were not that many decisions to go round. In similar vein, what does a commander do when sent someone who is more senior than asked for? A two-star general when the commander wanted and had allocated the slot for a one-star?

Necessary, but Unexciting Tasks

- Select and fit out office accommodation
- Set up local area networks
- Set up the administrative base
- Communications
 - > Across area
 - > Upwards
- Medical
- Establish work routine/SOPS
- Floor plan

Figure 6: Necessary, but unexciting, tasks must be performed to insure success.

The General has been on both sides of the divide, suffering an extra unbidden general in the KVM, and then being that extra general in KFOR. But in the latter occasion he knew that if he did not make himself useful then he would be sent home, and he did extract himself when he reckoned his usefulness had been exhausted. Similar problems involved receiving other senior people sent unbidden by their nations. There is a danger that such people can consume scarce resources. NATO overcomes this issue by holding a high-level Force Generation Conference where the size of a nation's contribution is considered and top posts assigned. It is a time-consuming process but it has the advantage of clearing the air.

So, unless the commander is lucky enough to be in charge of the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps, he will need a measure of pragmatism if he wishes to get a mission started in a hurry. The general's advice is then to avoid original thought wherever it is possible to draw on the work of others, and to compromise, borrow and shamelessly copy, or crib, to the greatest

extent possible (Figure 7). The advice is not quite as bald as: “Cheat, lie and steal,” but it is not far removed from that concept.




Figure 7: Shorts cuts can facilitate the setting up of a mission.

The list of areas where one may be prepared to compromise, or need to compromise, is very long. But the areas of Mandate, Mission Structure and Speed of build up are areas where a commander and his staff must be very careful over the extent to which they are prepared to make concessions (Figure 8).




Figure 8: Care must be taken in some areas of potential compromise.

Any compromise should be deliberate, and not taken lightly. For such compromises will affect the mission in ways that cannot easily imagine or explain, long after the initial decision-makers have finished in the mission. The KVM rushed to establish an Induction Centre which was designed to deal with up to 200 new arrivals at a time, but which was never loaded to full capacity. It proved difficult to anticipate the size of each new intake because nations did not let us know when people who had been called forward had been booked on flights, and the staff always expected more people to arrive than actually did arrive. In the worst case the staff was anticipating more than 100 new arrivals, but only 15 stepped off the plane in Skopje. A classic case of “Hurry-up-and-wait.”

THE MANDATE DEFINES THE KEY FEATURES OF A MISSION

A commander may not have much say about the nature of the Mandate under which he serves but if possible, it is worth trying to affect some changes. If a task or area is not covered by the Mandate, then it will be very difficult, if not impossible to insert it later. Similarly the Mandate defines the skill mix of the people deployed under its authority (Figure 9). For example, the KVM was unable to bring in any forensic experts when problems needing their attention occurred in Kosovo. The human rights abuses witnessed by the KVM from the outset meant that it became more involved in Human Rights issues, and needed Human Rights experts, to a greater degree that had originally been anticipated. Even so the Mission certainly had a turf skirmish, though not a turf war, over which agency did what. In the event, sadly, the need for experts exceeded the available resources.





Figure 9: The Mandate defines key features of a mission.

The Mandate also justifies the equipment that can be brought into an area of operations. The KVM wanted to include a helicopter for medical evacuation but the request was vetoed by the Serb Authorities, possibly because they wished to hire one of their helicopters to the Mission. The Mission did not see that flying around in Serb helicopters would enhance its reputation for impartiality, so the offer was declined. Finally, the mandate defines what is not allowed. Because the KVM was stated as being an unarmed mission, albeit with diplomatic status, this was taken by the Serbs as being utterly unarmed, and even the weapons normally carried by the Head of Mission's security personnel were not allowed. It goes without saying that all in cases, the Mission should have a good working knowledge of what the Mandate allows, to avoid unfortunate precedents being set by ignorance.

Early decisions to be made in setting up a mission are outlined in Figure 10. The top bullet defines the connectivity of the organization chart, or how the wire fits between the boxes in the wiring diagram. Even more basic is the need to have some wire in the wiring diagram. At least one mission in which the general served had hardly any wire in the diagram, and this complicated the way work was done and issues were dealt with. The specialist/non-specialist mix is important, because the choice can be between getting exactly the right specialist in weeks or even months or a non-specialist much earlier. In Kosovo the lack of civilian police in June 1999 was a real constraint. Military Police in significant numbers would have been a viable alternative, if the Armed Forces of nations had more of them. At the moment military police exist to discipline other military rather than to be an alternative to civilian police, and any increase to military police numbers would require adjustment to the force mix of the armed forces of the nations. But why should they not make that sort of adjustment to the structure of their forces if it makes them more useful?

The security of International Staff will always be an issue in its own right. It assumes a life of its own and the view of the mission security staff to react or overreact to a situation can change the security situation in a heart-beat. Get it wrong and the nations will recall their people and the mission would disintegrate. In similar vein, there is a need to decide which posts are filled by internationals and which by locally employed people. If a commander does not decide on the way to administer people, others will make the decisions for the commander by default, and he may not like what is presented.



- Mix of Specialists
- Level of Security
 - > Locally employed
- Administrative Backup
 - > Self-contained
 - > Piggyback

Figure 10: Early decisions influence the structure and other properties of a mission.

Turning to speed, what is a reasonable yard-stick aspire to and with which measure activities? It appears that 90 days is a useful measure, not least because of its extensive use by the military (Figure 11). It is worth noting that formed military units which have all their people at hand and who have a culture of moving quickly. Many Units with “Rapid” in their title do not expect to move at the drop of a hat. How much a commander is able to achieve in such a timeframe will depend on the starting conditions. However, if things have to be accomplished rapidly, early decisions have to be made, and it must be accepted that many decisions are taken in parallel, and with a considerable measure of delegation.

- Speed**
- 90 Days
 - Rate of Build-up
 - “Inkblot” or total coverage?

Figure 11: What is the most appropriate speed and scope of activities?

One very big decision is to decide between building up as quickly as possible, or choosing to remain balanced at all times, that is, to move at the rate determined by a limiting factor or factors. For example, one option would hold people back and not deploy them into field locations until next shipment of vehicles arrives to support their movement. A commander can then choose to set up one region at a time, using the “inkblot” principle, or cover the whole area very thinly and thicken up as quickly as possible. Having said this, a commander may not have much choice. The next short cut is to borrow needed resources (Figure 12).

More planners really help at mission startup. But they need to understand the commander’s way of doing business and be trustworthy (Figure 13). The OSCE was offered a ready-made plan which it rejected, and the general and his colleagues then spent three weeks producing something which was better, but not that much better, except that the OSCE felt that they owned the process. The result was no worse than what would have been produced by consultants and it had the benefit of being less expensive. Adjacent missions are a splendid source of good people who are available at short notice and in are formed into functional teams provided with vehicles and other equipment.

- Borrow**
- Planners

- Specialists from Adjacent Missions
- Equipment
- Return or Backfill?

Figure 12: Borrowing resources can facilitate mission build-up.

Help from the Croatian mission was significant. However, the Croatian personnel had to be given back. There was a problem over obtaining a particular press spokesman. The right man for the job was already employed by the OSCE but his boss would not release him. Having got hands on good folk, sometimes it is better to backfill their positions in their initial organizations than to return those individuals within a relatively short time. It is clear that the whole problem of staffing needs a review at an appropriately senior level. Borrowing planners has the effect of forcing an organization to be behind the ‘power curve’: reluctant and late. It is not possible to plan everything in detail. Agreement has to be sought on where imperfect planning is acceptable and where planning has to be perfect and complete.

There are two sorts of planning and they include planning for the establishment of a mission and planning for the operation of the mission. Broadly speaking planning in order to get a mission started is necessary but is only an enabling activity. Such activities can represent A per cent of the overall planning effort, for example. The remaining planning effort ($100 - A = B$ per cent) involves planning for on-going operations once the mission has been set up. It is important to focus on operational activities rather than just planning the arrival into an area of the staff and equipment for a mission. Failure to plan for operational activities will almost certainly result in entities in theatre giving a force a test in its ‘trade craft’ at an early opportunity.




Figure 13: Planning involves establishing and then operating a mission.

It should be possible to contract out the tasks of assembling people and moving them into theatre since the same problems always recur. This would permit an increased concentration on operational planning considerations. Another short cut could involve obtaining ready access to the people who will make the mission stand up more quickly (Figure 14). If the mission staff can only negotiate hire of one building per week then it takes five weeks to take on and start up five locations, however good everyone else is. This was an issue in Kosovo in November 1998 as well as in June 1999. Appropriately trained specialists could expedite matters and provide a relatively rapid increase in readiness at the outset which would serve to reduce vulnerabilities.

Personnel selection procedures can equally be a rate-limiting factor. Allocating specific slots to nations can result in quicker staffing and does not result in the assignment of inferior

people, although the top jobs are generally filled much more quickly than the more humble ones. However, there is a need for agreed procedures for sending people home or at least putting them into less critical posts if they don't speak sufficiently good English. It is important to produce a procurement matrix to allow equipment and people to come together elegantly. Thus, building services specialists can help prevent a mission from taking on buildings that are potential death-traps in the event of a bomb explosion, for example. Furthermore, a small number of movement professionals will ensure prompt transit of people and material and properly trained security personnel can insure integrity of mission facilities and people.




Figure 14: Specialists can facilitate the setting up of a mission.




Figure 15: Technology can facilitate planning and operational activities.

Technology makes it possible to skip some stages in the planning and start-up processes. In Kosovo the KVM was reluctant to deploy away from Pristina until a radio net had been established so that it would be possible to call for help from anywhere (Figure 15). Construction of the net was accomplished in some three weeks. However, in Macedonia there was no such luxury, but good mobile phone coverage existed so the General and his colleagues as well as the UNHCR could use that system, and did so with much success. It is difficult to see how the mission could have worked without such gadgets. A need was identified for night vision devices but an export license could not be obtained. Thought was also given to attaching a locating beacon to each vehicle, along the lines of those used by the major international road haulage companies. It is highly possible that the next mission will have such devices, and the UN and UNPROFOR might not have lost so many vehicles if they had had beacons in 1993, 1994, and 1995. The lesson from these experiences is to use everything that is available commercially, but not to get seduced by equipment that is still under development and therefore of uncertain and even unknown capabilities.

TRAINING CAN DETERMINE MISSION SUCCESS

The nature and extent of assigned training will vary from mission to mission. Figure 16 shows the training protocol undertaken by the General and his colleagues in 1996 when they were setting up to become SFOR. It is important to decide who needs what type of training. The Key Leader Training for SFOR was only for senior individuals while the command post exercise (CPX) was for as many as could be assembled. It was assumed that basic skills were covered in national training activities. By contrast the Kosovo Verification Mission had to cover such activities as minefield activities, basic first aid, and radio procedures. Significant advantages can be achieved if specialized trainers can be obtained to facilitate training activities. Failure to obtain such assistance can create a need for the establishment of a dedicated permanent training facility. The General and his colleagues found this out by trial and error. Or more precisely, by error.




Figure 16: Overview of a training and deployment schedule for SFOR.

Other training-related decisions center on who controls the training syllabus and on the length of such training (Figure 17). Where to hold training mission-related training and should this be undertaken in or outside the theatre are other matters for concern. The OSCE decided not to train in Vienna. A disused ski resort at Brezavica in Kosovo was also considered, but this would have created one more complication since that resort would be one more location that would have had to have been evacuated. However, the resort could have been a base to recover to and it could have served as an alternative Headquarters in case of evacuation if such an entity had to be up in Macedonia. It is possible that the alternative locations were not considered in sufficient detail. The need to provide training would appear to be an area for possible outsourcing to the commercial sector.




Figure 17: The need for training can create particular problems.

OPERATIONAL STRATEGIES AND THE COMMAND AND CONTROL OF MISSIONS

Strategies involving the command and control of multi-national operations are described in detail in the *ABCA* (America, Britain, Canada, and Australia) *Coalition Operations Handbook* (1999). The Handbook contains some very useful check lists that have already been agreed by the four nations, and so are not branded with the mark of only one nation and a unique doctrine that may not transfer well between nations. Had the KVM had access to such a handbook as this in October 1998 its life would have been easier and the Mission might have been able to move more quickly in the less contentious areas.

MISSION STRUCTURES

The ABCA Handbook describes a force structure concept involving command and control by a lead nation which generally is the nation that has provided the largest force contribution (Figure 18). Coalition operations are influenced by the political agendas of the participating nations, and many nations are reluctant to relinquish the command and control of their forces. This may result in the emergence of parallel chains of command so that the challenge of a coalition is to arrange the best possible relationships with the subordinate forces.




Figure 18: The coalition-building process involves transforming national contributions and objectives into a coordinated and functional international operation (modified after the *ABCA Coalition Operations Handbook*, 1999).

Two essential structural enhancements involving establishment of a liaison network and coordination centers can improve the control of coalition forces. Liaison permits confidence building between the forces and subordinate commands and permits the transfer of vital information. Coordination centers can control a variety of functional areas such as logistics and civil-military operations. Such centers can be the focal point for force sustainment, medical support, infrastructure, host nation support, and movement control. When control centers are activated member nations provide action officers who are familiar with the activities of such centers. It is beneficial if Coalition Forces are augmented with linguists and appropriate communication facilities that maintain contact with their parent headquarters.

KOSOVO AND BOSNIA

The Kosovo Verification Mission would also have had a less painful start if the Mission had been more realistic about the nature of the relationships that the Mission would have to manage. The major types of entities involved in Kosovo are illustrated in Figure 19.

Interacting with the overall Mission were the respective parent organizations, such as NATO, were demanding. And what should be the role and responsibilities of the Belgrade-based Ambassadors in the case of Kosovo, or the Sarajevo-based Ambassadors in the case of Bosnia all of whom want a slice of the action? In addition, the International Organizations (IOs), Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs), and other entities also played important roles, and were also very much influenced by their own parent organizations.




Figure 19: The major types of entities involved in Kosovo.

Non-governmental Organizations such as the UNHCR were not present in very large numbers in Kosovo, but the over 300 NGOs Bosnia in 1998 represented a significant presence and this created challenges for the military and civilian leadership (Figure 20). The international media provided significant amounts of information to the outside world, and reactions to such information served as important additional influences on activities in both Bosnia and Kosovo. The involvement of the media is an important issue in its own right, and its effect points to the need for a really competent media and public relations staff.

SFOR	32000
UN & IPTF	3000
OSCE Sept 98	2475
OSCE	936
OHR	500
ECMM	275
Others: 300 + Organizations: 2000 total.	

Figure 20: The size of the International Organization and Non-governmental Organization communities in Bosnia in 1998.

Relative levels of military, police, and election-related activities associated with a notional mission are illustrated in Figure 21. Societal instability requires the involvement of

military forces to restore order, and the subsequent deployment of police to maintain that order as the level of conflict diminishes. Increased stability can set the scene for elections. This pattern of activity calls for the use of different types of personnel capabilities. If the initial force has involved the deployment of a significant proportion of non-specialists in order to provide a sizable presence on the ground quickly, the composition of the force can be modified it as the needed specialists become available. Based on the performance of actual personnel, it is possible to dispense with the less flexible personnel, and re-deploy the more useful people to other tasks.




Figure 21: Planned tasks can occur in different phases depending on needs and the availability of resources.




Figure 22: The build-up process from initial warning to force deployment can take some 18 weeks to accomplish.

Rate of build up of the capabilities of forces deployed to support a mission is never as fast as one would wish. Figure 22 shows a typical pattern in which some 16 to 18 weeks might elapse from the issuing of an initial warning to deploy to the actual deployment of a mission. The intervening time interval can involve planning activities, formation of the force, and training and deployment of the mission. Such activities can create problems even for the military. Thus, SFOR only had 61 per cent of the necessary people for the command post exercise, and the remainder arrived later. Under such circumstances, there is a need to decide what to do with late arrivals since they will need some form of expedited training program that brings them up to the level already achieved by the early arrivals.

The pattern of force build-up for the Kosovo Verification Mission is shown in Figure 23. The Mission had only 90 days to achieve coverage across its area of responsibility with only 700 people compared with the total authorized strength of 2000. The Mission had planned on absorbing 150 a week, but found that only 100 a week actually arrived. At this rate it would have taken until the end of end April to get to the 2000 level, by which time there was a need to replace those at end of their tour.




Figure 23: The build up of the Kosovo Verification Mission.

Lessons Learned

- Easier to expand rather than re-structure a structure
- Staff planning capacity is a limited resource
- Headquarters can be formed and trained in 90 days if efforts are sequenced gradually
- Modules are better than individuals
- Don't re-equip as the force is being deployed
- Infiltration is preferable to a "Big Bang"
- In an alliance, everything takes longer

Figure 24: Lessons learned can provide guidance for future operations.

The lessons for both military and civilian organizations which were learned in 1996, and which are still valid, are outlined in Figure 24. It is apparent that the military organizations have better methods for applying lessons learned compared with the ability of civilians to learn lessons. Experience shows that adding to an existing structure can be accomplished more easily than reorganization of the structure since restructuring requires breaking old functional links and forming new links. Headquarters can be established in 90 days if the activities are carried out in an ordered sequence. This process as well as the formation of an overall mission can be facilitated by the use of modules in which functional links have already been formed. Using individuals requires the establishing of new links and the need for significant amounts of additional training. In addition, re-equipping a force as it deploys can create problems by generating uncertainty and reducing overall effectiveness at critical moments. Gradual changes in which functional linkages are established in an ordered and timely manner can lead to more effective organizations compared to those that have undergone massive changes that have been referred to as a “Big Bang” where massive changes have taken place. Finally, the complex organizational structure of an alliance creates delays in the policy- and decision-making processes and in the undertaking of agreed actions that should be recognized.

CONCLUSIONS

The conclusions that can be drawn from the General’s participation in four very different organizations are outlined in Figure 25. It is important to note that if a commander or decision-maker has not decided where to accept less than perfect solutions, events will overtake an organization and it will be forced to accept compromises in areas that have not been considered. It is important to distinguish between short-term and long-term decisions. The need to act quickly can limit future actions and will force compromises to be made. And the essential components of the mandate of a mission, the necessary mix of military and civilian participants, and their levels of specialization should be established as soon as possible,




Figure 25: Conclusions from involvement in four different types of mission.

The ubiquitous and pervasive nature of the media requires that proper attention should be paid to the establishment of good media relations. A failure in this area can create hostile perceptions and uncertainty. Negative publicity can lead to the rapid destruction of the credibility and public support for a mission. Positive media relations can lead to increased levels of public understanding and support. In the context of the role of public opinion and support, it is worth considering what constitutes the perception of success and what types of conditions might exist in which a mission could evolve to another phase of activity or be completed.

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1. This paper reflects the personal views of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the views, opinions, or policies of any governmental, corporate, academic, or other entity.
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