

Failed States and Intervention

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ABSTRACT

With an increasing number of complex humanitarian emergencies and failing states in the world, the domestic and international pressures on the United States to take a leadership role in alleviating and resolving these crises are sources of continuing frustration and debate. There is a very mixed consensus within the US about participation in such missions, largely the result of faulty understanding of what such missions actually require. Despite the polemic, the US military, as the result of its experiences in Iraq, Somalia, Haiti and the Balkans, and in multiple exercises around the world, continues to expand greatly its proficiency and capabilities. Nevertheless, for many reasons, not the least of which is the lack of policy clarity from its civilian and military leadership, US forces continue to suffer from both doctrinal ambiguity and inadequate planning tools which are not conducive to achieving the levels of international and interagency cooperation and coordination necessary to make these operations work. In this article, we examine the increasingly difficult operating environment, the critical planning issues and the stressful conceptual dilemmas which make these political-military missions so unlike what most military personnel have been trained to perform. The author advocates "victims-based" planning as the centerpiece for new international doctrine for intervention in failed states.

THE DETERIORATING WORLD POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

The phenomena of failing and failed states have become the focus of a great deal of academic and governmental interest since the end of the Cold War. From one perspective, a failed state has failed when it no longer can maintain order or protect its citizens. States also may fail when they lose international acceptability and credibility. However, a state has not truly failed unless its failure requires international intervention to restore order and to create the conditions in which civil society can be reconstituted.

Failure manifests itself in many ways, but it always has very high human costs. The revolution in Afghanistan (1978-92) probably took over a quarter of a million lives, and the country still is at war with itself. The long-term internal conflict in the Sudan has roots back into the 1960s and continues to this day, with as many as two million dead. Cambodia's genocidal civil war (1975-79) is believed to have caused the deaths of over a million of its inhabitants. Genocide also was the main thrust of the civil war in Rwanda (1994), with about 750 thousand victims, and the subsequent and related campaign in Eastern Zaire, now the Congo, added another 150 thousand dead to the grim totals in Africa's Great Lakes zone. Failed transitions in Somalia (1991-2000), with perhaps a half million dead, and East Timor (1972-present), with many thousands of fatalities, provide immediacy to the pressing international problem of handling state collapse (see Esty, et al., *State Failure Task Force*, introduction).

Nation states rise and fall with some regularity in human history, but we suspect there have never been so many cases in the space of a single decade as those which occurred during the 1990s. Although modern US military peacekeeping began in northern Iraq in the wake of the Gulf War (Operation Provide Comfort), the peace operation which still maintains the greatest residual (largely negative) impact on military planning and public attitudes was the 1992-1995 operation in Somalia, the misnamed "Operation Restore Hope" and "Operation Continue Hope," which will be looked at below.

The failed states of the 1990s, including Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, Bosnia, the Congo (former Zaire), Sierra Leone, and East Timor, manifested some, or all, of the following symptoms and responses:

- Substantial numbers of their citizens were displaced and suffered widespread misery. In Cambodia, Rwanda, the eastern Congo, and in the Balkans, these displaced persons/refugees frequently became objects of genocidal pogroms. Many of these unfortunates crossed political boundaries to become refugees.
- Evidence of famine and human rights abuses sparked responses from non-governmental organizations which, in turn, alerted the press and media to the alarming situations. With advances in communications technologies in the past decade, it became possible for the world public to watch people starve in real time.
- Failing governments turned to repression to control their restive populations. Resistance to state terror sometimes led to wide-scale rebellion and civil war.

- After central authorities collapsed, evaporated or became inoperative, local warlords and/or illegitimate rump governments attempted to arrogate sovereign authority upon themselves. In some cases, warlords successfully gained legitimacy through inattention, collusion or mistakes made by representatives of the world community.
- The international community decided to intervene, usually after the crises were well advanced, and it was too late to reverse the major effects of the suffering or the killings.
- Many warlords and leaders without legitimate grounds for their power and prerogatives capitalized on international legal ambiguity to hide behind some notion of “sovereignty” and were able to continue their abuses even in the presence international peacekeepers.
- It became increasingly difficult for foreign military forces and international civilian personnel to maintain impartiality in the face of seemingly intractable domestic, inter-ethnic and regional rivalries.
- In every case, it became clear that existing international technical, security and political tools are inadequate and/or unavailable to meet the multiple tasks of securing the peace, fostering reconciliation and rebuilding civil societies.

In brief, failed and failing states share common symptoms: desperate humanitarian situations caused inadvertently or willfully by people, usually unprincipled or inept individuals, who seek personal gain from chaos. Perhaps it is yet another response to globalization, but the past decade has seen a spectacular rise in the number of people or groups who profit from “complex humanitarian emergencies”(CHEs). CHEs are large-scale disasters, affecting significant numbers of people, which requires some form of international intervention; although it may be exacerbated by natural events, the root causes of a CHE are political. A CHE usually involves the displacement of many thousands of people with resulting exposure to disease, hunger, exploitation and fear (Lute, introduction, and USIP, *Taking it to the next level*, section 1, p. 8). These kinds of disasters usually become sufficiently compelling to trigger significant international responses involving foreign militaries, international humanitarian and technical agencies, non-governmental organizations and private individuals. Failed states and CHEs are the grim twin specters of the 1990s.

Because people are at the root of these emergencies, the practitioner/planner must turn to politics, that black art for defining relationships and establishing order, as one of the intrinsic planning tools for re-establishing order and re-creation of civil society in those areas where impunity reigns. “Nation-building” is an essential ingredient to the solution of any CHE situation, and the negative connotations about taking such actions are unrealistic, dysfunctional and probably reflect a disregard to the normal phases of recovery after a state has failed and external forces have intervened. These phases are well-known: humanitarian, reconciliation and rehabilitation. The military roles change in each phase: preliminary establishment of security, major facilitation of the humanitarian response and subsequent support to the restoration of civil society. Within the military, which is often the key player in responding to ongoing CHE situations, there remains an almost romantic notion that,

somehow, it is possible to focus solely on military skills and hardware in preparing its response to man-made disasters. Before we examine the political elements of intervention planning, let us first look at some of the varied issues associated with the decision to intervene.

WHY SHOULD WE WORRY ABOUT FAILED STATES?

Given the level of international activism to save peoples in the post-Cold War decade, it now seems almost surprising that the primary justification for intervention in failed and failing states is that the breakdown in authority and order in one state threatens the security of its neighbors. Under traditional international law, no amount of victimization, suffering or chaos is eligible for community response until it disturbs the neighbors. To the writers of the UN Charter, these guarantees to the maintenance of international peace and security were the centerpieces of the instrument. These are contained in article 39 of the *Charter of the United Nations*, which states:

“The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.”

This is certainly not a license to go after rotten leaders. During the Cold War, article 39 was invoked when one country threatened another. During the 1990s, it was used when state breakdowns provoked heavy refugee inflows into neighboring states. Article 39 is now used to protect minorities from their oppressive governments. The UN Charter was written during the Second World War with the depredations by the Axis powers on their neighbors prior to and at the outset of the war very much in mind.

Deciding when to apply article 39 still presents significant moral and legal dilemmas. The Charter has a specific article (2.7) which specifies non-interference in the internal affairs of member states. The past decade has led to considerable erosion of that principle, at least in failed and failing states, and military power projection into such troubled areas is never an easy decision to take. The intervention dilemma is well-expressed by Father Bryan Hehir in a recent essay: “Military power holds the ambiguous role in world politics of being simultaneously the decisive threat to life and order and the instrument of protecting both ... ” (J. Bryan Hehir, p. 33).

The high human cost in the deterioration in international order has naturally led to heightened concern about the human rights of the victims of disorder. The most fundamental human right is the right to live. The second basic right is to have food to eat. These were both instrumental in triggering the 1993 intervention in Somalia, where Mohamed Farah Aideed closed the warehouses in Mogadishu in order to ensure that the Marehan refugees in the triangle of death would be too weak to return to reclaim their homes and properties that Aideed had taken to reward his marauding troops. The critical need to open the warehouses in the port of Mogadishu was the situation which triggered the Somalia intervention.

The menace presented by a failed or failing states works in both directions. A weakened state may become the object of threats or illegal interventions by its neighbors. In modern

CHEs, either or both of the above factors may lead to intervention. The Republic of the Congo (former Zaire) is such a case; it has eight neighbors, each of which has its own internal problems but which are also influenced by the collapse of authority in the Congo. The country is also subject to illegal interventions by some of these neighbors, and other interests farther afield. The UN Security Council recently authorized a peacekeeping operation in the Congo, but certain Western countries, particularly the US, were unwilling to provide a forceful mandate, or sufficient funding, for a successful operation. The presence of Ethiopian troops in central Somalia for over two years was probably one of the reasons why the recent UN civilian effort to facilitate the reconstitution of a central political authority in that chronic disaster state has been initially successful (a vast reporting on the multiple steps by Somalis to rebuild their state is available on the web at www.reliefweb.org.)

Although there are people who feel that compassion for victims is perhaps less vital than observation of traditional rules of sovereignty, that issue was decisively put aside to protect the Kurds in Northern Iraq from their government in the wake of the Gulf War (see Stromseth for an excellent discussion of these issues.). This action was the first military intervention specifically authorized by the Security Council in the name of humanitarian protection. While it was principally a punitive action against Saddam Hussein, with consent imposed at the end of war, Operation Provide Comfort provided the precedent for the subsequent decision to move into Somalia, where there was no state to claim sovereignty or give consent to the intervention.

The absence of a clear definition of “consent” in modern peace operations will remain a considerable problem for senior civilian and military planners until there are internationally-accepted rules for humanitarian intervention. Although it is unlikely that the power with the greatest interest in the establishment of such conventions — the United States — will take the lead in developing such rules, the essential intervention issues are already apparent to world policy-makers. Perhaps hoping to foster such a debate, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan recently put the matter of sovereignty bluntly:

“... State sovereignty is being redefined...States are now widely understood to be instruments of their peoples, and not vice versa ...” (Kofi Annan, 1999).

Beyond the international legal ramifications of intervention, there is no clear consensus in the US about the use of its military in such activities. The public consistently approves humanitarian intervention (unless the question is phrased to indicate approval of US casualties). In an interesting examination of issues pertaining to humanitarian intervention, the Council on Foreign Relations invited serious academic, military and humanitarian authorities to draft hypothetical recommendations to the President on US interests in humanitarian intervention. In the covering memorandum (introduction), one of the authors suggests that it very much in the US national interest:

“to foster an international environment that is compatible with our values--including democratic norms, human rights, and free markets--but from a purely pragmatic perspective, our moral authority is an indispensable element of American leadership and influence...” (Arnold Kantor, in Alton Frye, et al, *Humanitarian Intervention*, p. 7)

None of these considerations about failed states and the interests in intervention are particularly easy for military participants in interventions to include in their planning. The

military is required to take part in peace operations because of its capacities for the quick mobilization of resources, its well-tested force projection capabilities, its natural leadership and discipline and its intrinsic command and control sophistication. Although these are things in which the US military excels, the fact is that these are tools developed to accomplish victory in combat, not peace. There remains a considerable reluctance within the US military to participate in peace operations.

To the credit of the US military, it has committed itself to become a better partner in CHEs, and no other agency of the US Government has invested a meaningful fraction of the military's effort to understand intervention issues. The author has had the honor to be involved in several dozen military exercise development conferences and exercises in the past six or so years. Although the challenge of fitting humanitarian goals into military deliberative and crisis action planning processes remains problematic, the utility and sophistication of these exercises increases every year.

PLANNING DILEMMAS OF ARMED HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

There are many constraints on intervention. There is a natural instinct among Americans to avoid situations in which we may be charged with usurping sovereignty. On the legal side, the matter of sovereignty has become increasingly ambiguous, although the UN Charter is still regarded as an instrument to protect sovereignty. There is the institutional habit of bureaucracies everywhere to hope for the best and to wait until a crisis happens, rather than take preventive measures (Alger, "Failed States and Governance"). At a time when the US military is most interested in receiving essential political guidance, the State Department is usually a very silent partner in peace operations and simply invisible in exercises (see Blanton, "Lessons Learned..." for an in-house analysis of State Department intervention issues).

The US Government, despite a Presidential Determination (PDD-56) calling for comprehensive planning at the agency level for humanitarian interventions, still has a long way to go before there is any notion of interagency teamwork. When the author recently proposed the creation of a crisis management training program for high-level State Department officials, in order to have them better understand principles of comprehensive interagency planning, a Department crisis expert sniffed that he "failed to see the relevance of military crisis action planning to the State Department."

In all governments, there is a lot of uncertainty about foreign operations, especially in areas about which the supporting citizenry have little information. In any bureaucratic situation, there is a deep and abiding desire among politicians, diplomats and military leaders to avoid risks. Despite efforts to establish rules and procedures for the conduct of political and military relations in the post-Cold War period, preventive measures have a low priority and are even distasteful to a certain segment of the political community. These feelings are partially rooted in the fact that moving military personnel and materiel long distances is a very expensive proposition. Again, the lack of agreed international rules for intervention is a deeply complicating factor.

As an indication of the seriousness with which the US military, particularly the US

Army, but also including the Marine Corps, has attacked the multiple issues of responding to orders to take part in peace operations, there is now a fairly vast library of doctrine which has emerged, especially in the past 10 years. For the military, “doctrine” represents a collection of rules and standards which serve as illustrative guidance for leaders. Although doctrine can serve as a crutch for certain military officers and enlisted personnel, the military prides itself on the ability of leaders at all levels to know doctrine, but operate, nonetheless, flexibly.

The post-Cold War explosion in military doctrine consists literally of hundreds of guidebooks which cover everything from nuclear campaign planning to motor pool supervision. As the result of late 1980s Congressional legislation mandating joint experience for promotion to senior levels, there are now dozens of guides for joint planning for peace operations (See Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff). Not all are equally useful, or used properly or uniformly, but they are essential to achieve an understanding of military planning techniques. As we will note below, some of the admonitions in the doctrinal guides are misleading or simply ignored. Some of the peace operation issues which still plague the military include the following.

A LACK OF CLARITY ABOUT HUMANITARIAN MISSION REQUIREMENTS PERSISTS AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT

There are many in the military who feel uncomfortable about any kind of military mission which does not end in direct force-on-force confrontations. As a former Commandant of one of the war colleges declared to his faculty not so long ago, “the middle name of this school is war, and peace operations are not going to be the focus of our studies.” Because, in the author’s view, at the Lieutenant Colonel and Colonel levels, the ranks of officers selected for the war colleges, the most innovative thinking takes place. The war colleges serve as excellent think-tanks for the military of the future, and there should be no artificial barriers created to stifle creativity.

The advantages which derive from broader thinking about the specific requirements of the military in peace operations include greater economies of force and a better division of labor. This is a battlefield in which responsibilities should be very clear. Yet, there is confusion. In a press conference in July 1999, referring to Kosovo, Secretary of Defense Cohen stated defensively:

“... Professional soldiers should not be expected to adopt policing, administrative and judicial roles whilst grappling with huge population flows, de-mining and aid distribution...”

This declaration really turns the matter of roles and missions in peace operations upside down. The international humanitarian community accepts responsibility for handling displaced persons and refugees, and it will do so if it has the necessary support. De-mining can be a military responsibility, but there are a number of international organizations, NGOs and private consultants which handle these problem. There is no reason whatsoever for the military to take on primary responsibility for aid distribution unless the humanitarian community cannot do the job.

In the initial phase of a peace operation, the military component must be prepared to

restore security, which may require some police-like duties, and to undertake administrative and judicial responsibilities. These are not duties totally foreign to the military. Just as in the period following the Second World War in Europe and in Japan, the US military fostered the re-establishment of civil administration in liberated and conquered areas. Just because the Cold War created a significant hiatus in the utilization of these skills, it does not mean that modern warriors cannot learn exercise these functions on a very temporary basis. Military Planning must include an understanding of these all-important processes, if only to be able to support the non-military elements responsible for the re-creation of the functions.

THE TRIGGER FOR FOREIGN INTERVENTION IS USUALLY HUMANITARIAN, BUT THE BASIC PROBLEMS ARE POLITICAL

Failed states usually do not collapse overnight. There is a gradual process which usually begins with poor leadership that either loses its legitimacy through its own actions or has come to power through illegitimate means. The slippery slope to failure then often includes efforts of the poor leadership to resort to domestic repression and other actions leading to civil strife. International agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) may then respond to the needs of the victims, which is reported in the international media. International concern escalates, and civil strife shuts down relief efforts, which then triggers an international response. As previously stated, the US military is a reluctant partner in political-military operations. In peace operations, once the commander's intent is provided, and appropriate rules of engagement (ROE) are made available to the troops, the military tends to shift its attentions to purely tactical operations. The military lacks internal procedures and a competent delivery system to provide ongoing political guidance at the battalion or company levels.

As the author has reflected many times, there is no such thing as a humanitarian "surgical strike." Once a military force becomes involved in a CHE, it has few choices: (1) It can fold its tents and go home, not a useful option politically; (2) It can take on multiple responsibilities and then wait passively until someone else comes along who is prepared to handle them; and (3) Support the process of recovery actively, understanding the phases of a peace operation with the knowledge that recovery takes time. If it understands the process which led to the collapse of state institutions, the military force will find the necessary clues to planning effectively its role in completing the operation successfully.

THE PHYSICAL PRESENCE OF A FOREIGN MILITARY FORCE CHANGES THE LOCAL POLITICAL DYNAMIC

All military interventions are political interventions. The introduction of a foreign military force into a troubled state impacts on both the domestic and international political environments. If there is a local authority, legitimate or not, the military should anticipate it will do everything it can to get the intervening force to fight its wars. Military planning must take into account that, on the humanitarian side, the arrival of a military force increases the risk levels for those humanitarian agencies which do not fall immediately under the umbrella of protection provided by the military. The anticipated political impact of intervention must be included in military operational planning.

In Somalia, the UNITAF and UNOSOM II military forces were astride the internal lines of communication for at least a dozen distinct rebel militia groups, the most significant of which was led by Mohamed Farah Aideed. Rather than using this strategic position to diminish the impact of these militias, the relevant forces focused their political energies on the warlords themselves, controlling the margins but compulsively remaining (mostly) neutral about how the militias abused their own people. The result, of course, was that the clan and sub-clan wars started up again immediately after the final withdrawal of UN military (and civilian) forces in March 1995. The military force cannot impose political solutions, but it must, by its actions, remain sensitive to the natural evolution of the crisis.

THE MILITARY TENDS TO FOCUS ON IMMEDIATE TACTICAL ISSUES

Military planning is not oriented to capture the process of political decline which leads to its deployment; it tends to be tactically oriented. The military planner has a whopping machine to move usually significant distances. In the early days of the post-Cold War era, most military exercises presented little more than logistical problems. Exercises are now much taxing on both senior and intermediate leadership, and ethical, legal and political problems are regularly introduced. In a recent study of command issues which involved interviews with all senior US military commanders who have served in the Balkans, it was agreed that the most important person in the training audience was the commander (Olsen and Davis).

In the early rotations of the US Balkan intervention, commanders were obliged to develop their own orientation and training programs; there is now in place a more comprehensive training scheme for general officers. It is the commanding officer who decides what skills his troops should be tested in exercises. All too often, the political element is not exercised because it is not on the list of approved military skills. This tends to distort both the exercise and the “after action review” (AAR) process which remain “the property” of the commander. In those exercises in which the commander is an active participant, and political issues are introduced, the commander’s “head is in the game,” and the benefits throughout the force — and to the commander — can be enormous.

PASSIVITY IN POLITICAL OPERATIONS CAN LEAD TO MILITARY DECISIONS WHICH THREATEN LONGER-TERM INTERESTS

For warlords, the implied political legitimacy acquired through interaction with intervening forces is a great prize. This can create conditions in which failure of the operation cannot be avoided. In Somalia, the special attentions given to Mohamed Farah Aideed by UNITAF and UN civilian staff greatly compromised the desired end-state, which was restoration of civil society and central authority. Aideed depended upon continued warfare to ensure his continued leadership. Daily contacts with Aideed caused many Somalis to believe that Aideed was indeed the preferred choice of the Americans and their allies, a view staunchly fostered by Aideed which he discarded only when he declared war on UNOSOM in early June 1993. The author and his colleagues were not surprised to learn that many Somalis,

including members of his *habr-gidr* sub-clan group, challenged the wisdom of the apparent US decision to select Aideed as their leader, protesting that he was a fearsome autocrat who had committed terrible crimes against both friends and enemies. The issue became something of a moot point after Aideed's death in combat in 1995.

THERE IS LITTLE PATIENCE FOR THE NORMAL PACE OF RECOVERY FOR FAILED OR FAILING STATES

The military's responsibilities in a CHE will normally change over time as the pace of recovery takes place. The military commander must be patient; the international community depends on donations of forces and materiel, and this process inevitably takes several months to show results. After first establishing itself in a secure area, the military will then be called upon to support heavily the humanitarian operations. This may involve special airlift, provision of surface transport facilities, health care and protection. It is during this initial period that the military will normally expend the most resources. Although, in most cases, the international humanitarian community may already be established in the area of operation, there are cases, such as northern Iraq, where the military was required to prepare the "humanitarian battlefield" for the arrival of the international community.

In cases in which the initial military force may be expected to turn over to another international force, there seem, frequently, to be few plans for the interim. One of the more unfortunate legacies of the Somalia operation is the concept of "mission creep." For the military, "mission creep" means that it has been surprised by a new set of requirements. The reality is that all missions change over time; "mission creep" is not only inevitable, but can usually be taken as a sign of success. The author has little patience for the concept, which as often as not, is simply an excuse for inadequate planning and/or training for the operation (see Pugh's final chapter for another [dissenting] view on "mission creep").

THE MILITARY GOAL SHOULD NEVER BE "TO TAKE CHARGE"

This may be the hardest lesson for the military to accept. Through training and temperament, military officers take charge. In the early 1990s, this was frequently necessary. The UN simply did not have either the personnel or experience to lead the response to CHEs. With the intensity of disasters around the world, the UN and the international humanitarian community has gained in both management and execution of CHE response. In situations where the humanitarian community has already established itself, it now usually has its own coordinating mechanisms (see Brahimi, et al., for an extensive survey of UN operational issues).

In some cases, cooperation and collaboration may be done by NGOs, as it was done in the early days of UNPROFOR, or by the United Nations, which has acquired considerable coordination experience through the UN humanitarian operations center (HOC). Unless there is a serious radiation or biological disaster, it is unlikely that the military component of a peace operation will include practitioners in public health planning or community development specialties. If the military takes charge of the humanitarian and/or nation restoration effort, it is difficult to see how it will ever be able to end the deployment.

Although the military, in its own doctrinal terms, is not the “supporting” force (which implies that it would be obliged to take its directions from the humanitarian community), it should definitely think support rather than “to take charge.”

NO RELIABLE INFORMATION SHARING SYSTEM EXISTS BETWEEN THE MILITARY AND CIVILIAN HUMANITARIAN COMMUNITIES

This has been the subject a considerable number of conferences and meetings. In a recent conference sponsored by the US Institute of Peace and the 353rd Civil Affairs Command, it was stated that information sharing between the military and humanitarian communities “cannot be counted on and is difficult to mobilize at the appropriate time” (See United States Institute of Peace, *Taking it to the Next Level*). The military fears “mission creep” arising from the demands of the humanitarian community. The humanitarians, on the other hand, fear that close collaboration with the military will destroy their claims to impartiality and neutrality. Rather strangely, given the common reluctance of the military to be involved in peace operations, some humanitarians apparently believe that the military has come to take their jobs from them.

On information sharing, the most serious problem lies in the standards of the two worlds. For operational security and protection of sources, the military tends to classify everything, even information which is passed to them from their civilian community counterparts. It was also observed in the conference that “a CHE involves a variety of political mandates that complicate information sharing between the military and the civilians.” (*Taking it to the Next Level*, p. 18) The conference was unable to provide a solution to these dilemmas and decided only that additional cross-training was necessary. Not noted, but also a thorn in the side of the humanitarian community, is the propensity of the military to place its civil-military operations center (CMOC) inside its protected perimeter, with the result that humanitarians are obliged to visit the armed camps, go through a security check and then be closely escorted to the CMOC briefing area. This is not a process which breeds close friendships and open discussions.

CIVIL AFFAIRS RESOURCES IN THE MILITARY EXIST LARGELY IN THE RESERVES

It is both a strength and a weakness of the US Army’s civil affairs organization that just over 90% of civil affairs officers (CAOs) are in the reserves. It is a strength because these officers lead civilian lives, are perhaps more sensitive to civilian concerns about the military and, as such, are able to look at civil-military issues from a variety of backgrounds. The fact that so few civil affairs officers are regulars, however, is a weakness when operational tempo is high, and civilian careers tend to be shredded no matter what the legal guarantees are for reserve officers who are called to regular duty. I am told, however, that any consideration of raising the number of career civil affairs personnel by adding another civil affairs unit to the regular Army, is an intensely political issue. While the author has always found that reserve CAOs are highly professional and usually willing to “think outside the box,” there are just too few of them. The US military should establish a second full-time CAO battalion to handle the wide-ranging and diverse responsibilities in the Balkans and elsewhere.

COORDINATION TOOLS STILL NEED SOME WORK

For the military, coordination and cooperation with civilians, including diplomats, host nations, the international humanitarian community, has a price. Personnel must be allocated to act as liaison officers (LNOs), space must be provided for meetings, resources must be diverted to support emergency activities, some of which can be very costly. In a recent exercise, the author was astonished to see that the costs of military liaison with diplomatic and humanitarian staff were captured through the use of a targeting list system. The uncomfortable idea of being viewed as a “target” was not the major issue. The notion of being a simple cost item made it very difficult to convey the concept that civilians and military are a team in which each element contributes its expertise and abilities. It must be reported, however, that, on the ground, great strides have been made in coordination between the military and civilian components of peace operations. Based on discussions with several participants, the processes now employed in Kosovo to coordinate between UNMIK and the KFOR NATO forces appear to be an efficient model for such arrangements.

COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING SHOULD BE THE ULTIMATE GOAL

Military doctrine seems to be moving in a direction which could lead to cooperative mission planning between the military and civilian participants. In current Joint Operations doctrine, Joint Force Commanders are instructed to “ensure that joint operations are synchronized in time, space and purpose with the actions of other military forces (Multinational operations) and non-military organizations (such as USAID, NGOs, ICRC and the UN). Activities and operations with such non-military organizations may require considerable effort by Joint Force Commanders and their staffs ...” (Joint Pub 3-0).

The doctrine goes on to repeat the obvious and suggests that comprehensive planning may be of considerable utility: “... NGOs and IOs do not operate within either the military or the Governmental hierarchy ... NGOs can lessen the civil-military resources that a commander would otherwise have to devote to an operation. In the final analysis, activities and capabilities of NGOs must be factored into the Commander’s assessment of conditions and resources and integrated into the selected course of action ...” (Joint Pub 3-08, chapter II, p. 18). This is something less than a comprehensive campaign plan in which both the military and humanitarian communities would actually state their goals and lay out the resources they would bring to the fight. It is indicative, however, of the forward thinking which exists in some parts of the military.

FORCE PROTECTION ISSUES MAY DISTORT MISSION PLANNING

Force protection has always been one of the primary responsibilities of command, just as a commander is responsible for ensuring that his troops are properly armed, trained, and fed. The commander must conserve his force and not needlessly expose them to dangers. Since the October 4, 1993, raid on the Olympic Hotel in Mogadishu, and the resulting deaths of 18 heroic Rangers, force protection has been elevated to the status of being the mission, rather than a significant responsibility of the force. This may lead to situations in which the US mission may conflict with overall unity of effort or become unduly ambiguous. Needless to

say, the humanitarian community is fully aware of the US fixation on risk avoidance. And, of course, the warlords of the world also look at US force protection doctrine as a means of developing their own strategic advantages and achieving understanding of US military tactical predictability.

On a broader level, it is difficult to establish a common sense of mission in political-military operations when the US military places self-protection at the top of its list of priorities. For the humanitarian community, mission analysis, such as it exists, usually focuses on the victims of complex emergencies and it wonders how its own safety and mission will be affected as the result of close collaboration with the military. Whether public concerns about potential military losses in the pursuit of humanitarian goals are as intensive as politicians and the media report, or are a device used by those who are opposed to US participation in peace operations to muddy the national political waters, the result has been to shut American soldiers behind the armored doors of their caserns and to minimize contacts with local communities. For those of us who can remember when US soldiers were considered America's finest Ambassadors, this is regrettable.

LOOKING AHEAD

The US military has invested great energies in an effort to reform its institutions and procedures to fit the technologies present now and expected to be developed in the near future. The "Army After Next" (AAN) and the "Revolution in Military Affairs" (RMA) have been the subjects of a number of seminars at the US Army War College and elsewhere, with various publications that illustrate the latest variations on plans for the future.

In 1995, under the auspices of Joint Chief Chairman, General John Shalikashvili, "Joint Vision 2010" was published. The military vision of what the force would look like in fifteen years was entirely technology-driven. Greatly influenced by the weapons and technology which won the Gulf War, there seemed to be little room for the kinds of missions in which the military had been engaged since the Gulf War. These missions require extensive interactions within the US Government as well as the international humanitarian community. Cruise missiles cannot restore security and order to distressed communities.

Fortunately, we did not have to wait very long for improvement to the tech-laden vision of the mid-1990s. In May 2000, the Pentagon released a new planning concept: "Vision 2020." This document builds upon the earlier vision but now includes greater emphasis on the human factors, especially the US interagency community and collaboration with allies in multinational operations. The new vision still ignores the non-governmental humanitarian community and makes no reference to the critical role of the United Nations and the specialized UN humanitarian agencies.

There will be no satisfactory US domestic or international doctrine for dealing with failed or failing states until the intervening international community adopts a common focus to such operations. In the author's view, this common focus is already available in traditional military doctrine. The standard five paragraph field order, which must be cited on command by all cadets at West Point and other military training institutions begins with an admonition to describe the enemy forces. On the humanitarian battlefield, the principal enemies are:

- Fear.

- Bad water.
- Displacement.
- Lack of shelter.
- Lack of food.
- Impunity.

Until political-military planning can adopt a “victims-based” focus to thwart this impressive list of “enemies” on the humanitarian battlefield, international intervention in failed and failing states will remain incoherent, inefficient, problematic and with uncertain results.

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