

Session II: Crisis Response (1)

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The first session on Crisis Response consisted of papers by Mike Neighbour, Lieutenant Colonel Wolfgang Möllenbrink, Larry Wentz, Molly Jean Inman, and Robert Perito. Summary materials from those papers are presented below.

- *Restoring Peace and Stability – The OA Contribution in Kosovo: June to October 1999* by Mr. Mike R. Neighbour, Head, Operational Analysis Branch, HQ ARRC, Rheindahlen, Germany.

The paper observes that, on the 12 June when the worlds television cameras were focused on the entry of NATO troops (more correctly, KFOR, as the force consisted of non-NATO troops as well as NATO) into Kosovo little reporting was devoted to the non combat elements which accompanied the Force. This was particularly true of the staff that supported General Jackson, the commander of KFOR. This paper outlines some of the work of one of those staff branches, the Operational Analysis Branch. General Jackson's Headquarters consisted of the Headquarters of NATO's Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) augmented by officers from the non-NATO nations contributing to the KFOR force. Within HQ ARRC's permanent establishment is a small operational research branch, the Operational Analysis Branch (OAB) which deployed with the HQ to Kosovo. This paper sets out the work conducted by OAB in to provide assistance to the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), including core civil functions until transferred. In addition to the work presented in this paper OAB was heavily involved in providing support to the more military lines of operation stemming from other responsibilities of the mission. While OAB deployed to Kosovo in June the entity had along with the rest of the HQ been involved in a great deal of planning and preparatory work. A great deal of that work conducted while deployed to Macedonia from March onwards.

- *Experiences Obtained from the Perspective of the Supply Battalion 1 Contingent of the KFOR Mission* by Lieutenant Colonel Wolfgang Möllenbrink, Commanding Officer of the Main Equipment Bork, Selm, Germany.

This paper describes the political and operational circumstances of the transition from Kosovo Verification Mission, KVM to the KFOR mission from the perspective view of the Supply Battalion 1. Contingent from the period extending form February until July 1999. The numerous and short term changes in the political situation (failure of negotiations in Rambouillet, decision for NATO air attacks, stationing of troops along the Macedonia-border, streams of refugees, Serbia's Compliance) forced rapid changes in the deployment and restructuring of the military force to fulfil the ever changing tasks. It became evident, that the effectiveness of logistics is heavily dependent on adequate telecommunication facilities and the experience of the General Staff to relate to logistics. The special situation for the engagement: dispersal of the battalion over a large area from Thessaloniki in the area of Prizren, Cooperation with allies and the Host Nation Macedonia (Fyrom) and the application of basic engagement principles are explained with several examples. The various subordination and area assignments are shown with the use of organizational charts and map sections.

- *Coalition Information Sharing: Lessons from the Balkans* by Mr. Larry Wentz, C4ISR Cooperative Research Program (CCRP), Washington, D.C., U.S.A.

The paper observes that increased civil-military involvement in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations around the world is matched in part by the rise in the number and complexity of these situations. There are many more actors on today's peace operations battlefield with competing as well as common interests and expectations. The need to improve coordination and more open information sharing is on the rise. Efforts to improve and facilitate more open information sharing among the disparate participants must overcome a continuing lack of trust among the civil-military actors and outdated organization cultural traditions and behavior patterns. All actors need to better understand each other and the roles they can and should play in an increasingly complex operational environment. In order to obtain closure and improve information sharing in the future, the actors must develop relationships based on mutual trust and there must be a clear understanding that information sharing operates on a two-way, transparent basis.

Since no two operations are really the same, one should be careful not to generalize too much on experiences and lessons learned. Each experience is different but lessons from previous operations can place the community on a higher level of awareness and facilitate the tailoring of actions to meet the needs of the new operation. The Balkans is certainly an example of this. Kosovo was not Bosnia for a number of reasons and therefore, although many things have been learned in the Bosnia operation not all lessons are directly applicable to the challenges of Kosovo. For example, despite extensive Bosnia civil-military experience, information sharing in the Kosovo operation was problematic. Although some progress has been made through local collaborative initiatives, there is still a ways to go to meet expectations. Experiences such as the Balkans are highlighting the urgency to improve and this coupled with the information technology revolution offers a means to an end.

- *Information Sharing for Peace Support and Humanitarian Assistance Operations* by Ms. Molly Jean Inman, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Fort McNair, Washington, D.C., U.S.A.

This paper discusses the need for an effective information-sharing mechanism for peace support and humanitarian operations. Such a mechanism would be of benefit to the military, international organizations and non-governmental organizations in helping them to achieve their goals as well as improve their efforts collectively. Though all three have developed information-sharing networks which are described in the paper, these efforts must be built upon, since there is still an information gap among the different entities participating in different sectors of these operations. The final section of the paper discusses what elements an effective information-sharing mechanism must incorporate.

- *The Role of International Police in Peace Operations* by Mr. Robert Perito, Deputy Director, International Criminal Investigative Assistance Program, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., U.S.A.

The paper observes that international civilian police forces have become an essential element in peace operations. The authorized number of United Nations Civilian Police has increased to 8,684 in nine peacekeeping missions, an increase of nearly 300 percent in the past year. The original force of United Nations Civilian Police is still keeping the peace in Cyprus. The largest U.N. police mission is now in Kosovo with an authorized strength of 4,700 personnel. Other U.N. missions are in Bosnia, Western Sahara, Guatemala, Haiti Central African Republic, Sierra Leone and East Timor. In addition to U.N. police missions, international police officers from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Western European Union are monitoring local police following peace operations in Croatia and Albania. The United States has become the largest contributor of personnel and

resources to international police missions with over 800 police officers serving in Bosnia, Kosovo, Croatia, Haiti and East Timor.

Civilian police were first included in United Nations peace operations in 1960 in the Congo when a Ghanaian unit was attached to the U.N. military force to assist the remnants of the Congolese colonial police to maintain order. When the Ghanaians withdrew after becoming involved in local politics, a 400-man Nigerian police unit provided by the U.N. Technical Assistance Program replaced them. The Nigerians served with distinction, staying in the Congo to protect U.N. personnel and property after U.N. military forces withdrew. The term "United Nations Civilian Police" or "CIVPOL" originated when the U.N. Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was established in 1964. The Secretary General's Special Representative suggested including a military police unit in the peacekeeping force. The U.N. military force commander proposed adding a civilian police unit instead, thus the term "CIVPOL" to differentiate "civilian" from military police.