

Ask Not “What Forces Should We Deploy?” But Rather “What Is The Problem?”

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INTRODUCTION

My interest in the subject of operations other than war dates from the early 1990s when, as an operations analyst in the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of the [US] Army (Operations Research), I was instructed to become the office ‘expert’ on the subject. At the outset I recognized that there were two widely held beliefs in the Army and perhaps throughout the US military services. The first was that the mission of US military services was to fight and win the nation’s wars; the second was that there was something new about the deployments for peace missions and related operations (‘new’ meaning post-Cold War or possibly post-World War II or perhaps post-UN establishment). Both beliefs are now widely acknowledged to be invalid. Operations other than war, domestic and foreign, have been conducted by US military forces since the earliest days of the nation; and the mission of US military forces is to do whatever the nation asks them to do.

An early assumption I made, as I began to explore the long history of non-fighting deployments, was that there is something to be learned by having an appreciation of the earlier deployments. It became clear that observations from the earlier deployment, that is, earlier than World War II, were not only of little interest to planners and operators dealing with present day deployments but also that there was not a well designed approach to learning from the earlier experiences. In February 1999, Bob Thaves, the cartoonist who created and draws the strip *Frank and Ernest* produced a single frame strip showing a chick newly emerged from the shell. The chick is looking around at the world to which it has been introduced and is saying, with wide-eyed innocence: “Wow! A paradigm shift!” My interpretation of Mr. Thaves message is that, if you have no history, everything you see is new. That concept has been the driving force behind my efforts at gaining an understanding of the history of operations other than war.

HISTORICAL DATA

The first step in the analysis was the gathering of information about deployments other than those for war. A precursor to the first step, however, had to be a definition of what operations other than war were. The United States has implicitly defined war in its Constitution. Article I, Section 8, Powers of Congress, paragraph 11 says: "To declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and water..." Thus, every military operation carried out in the absence of a declaration of war by the US Congress is an operation other than war. However, among those operations there are many that look like, sound like, walk like, and quack like wars. Among these are 'incidents' such as the Korean War (or police action as it has been called by some), the Vietnam War, and the Gulf War from most recent history.

Although the US has been a relatively violent nation, both abroad and domestically, the nation has fought in only five declared wars: the War of 1812 (with Great Britain), the Mexican War (1846), the Spanish-American War (1898), The World War or The Great War (now called World War I or the First World War; with Germany, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and others; 1917), and World War II (with Germany, Italy, Japan, and others; 1941). As a matter of fact, there are cogent political reasons why presidents have not asked the Congress for declarations of war in many cases (e.g., the Korean War and the Vietnam War). So, another level of conflict needed to be defined to take up the deployments that were as war-like as the declared wars. I designated those events as "wars." Then, all operations other than wars (declared) and "wars" (undeclared) are operations other than war.

Other classifications may be more useful. For example the *Journal of Peace Research* has published articles with statistics on armed conflict, defined as minor, intermediate and war, using battle-related deaths, total and per year, as the principal characteristic. Further examination of alternative definitional structures are a task for the future.

A number of secondary resources have been used to provide data on military operations other than war and "war"; they are cited at the end of this paper. The source that got me started was a compilation of a chronology of US military events edited by Jerry K. Sweeney and prepared by a number of historians in addition to Prof. Sweeney. The compilation, *A Handbook of American Military History from the Revolutionary War to the Present*, divided US military history into six time periods. Each period covered a time of significant change to US military forces. Because the chronology ended in 1994, with the publication of the book shortly thereafter, I added a seventh period to cover the time from 1995 to 1999. The use of the specific time periods is a convenience to sort the data; rather than compile everything within the more than 220 years of US history in one block, the time subdivisions make the data gathering and analysis a bit more coherent. Also, the time divisions are useful in assessing the affect of external factors (e.g., growth of the labor movement, pioneering and westward movement, exploration) on the frequency and type of operations other than war. Other sources, including papers from the Center of Naval Analyses (covering US Marine Corps operations), reports of the Defense Department to the Congress, and volumes from the Army Center of Military History, contributed information and data on operations other than war.

The US has conducted, since the 1790s, over 600 operations other than war; for comparison, the US has engaged in the five declared wars previously noted and perhaps 60 to 70 “wars” depending on how one views campaigns and wars against Indians from the eighteenth century to the end of the nineteenth. Table 1 provides summary data of the military operations for the seven convenient historical periods.

Period	Wars	“Wars”	Operations Other Than War		
			Domestic	Foreign	Total
1775-1815	1	>15	>6	>9	>15
1816-1865	1	>30	>14	>63	>77
1866-1914	1	>15	>80	>75	>155
1915-1941	2	0	>50	>50	>100
1942-1963	0	3?	>29	>40	>69
1964-1994	0	4?	>30	>115	>145
1995-1999	0	0	nd	>50	>50

Table 1: Military Operations in US History.

Note that most of the entries in the table for operations other than war and often for “wars” are indicated to be greater than the value in the cell. I am sure that I have not yet identified all the operations. The question marks accompanying the “war” entries for the periods 1942-1963 and 1964-1994 represent confusion over just when the Vietnam War began. Although full-fledged combat forces did not deploy to Vietnam until the latter period, advisors were in the country during the former period and the first war death (killed in action) of a US military advisor occurred during the period 1942-1963. Domestic operations other than war include dealing with labor, racial and social strife; disaster relief and humanitarian assistance; law enforcement; pioneering, exploration, surveying, and trail-blazing; and protecting settlers in the west. Foreign operations other than war include peacekeeping, punitive expeditions, exploration, non-combatant evacuations, protection of US property and civilians, disaster relief, and humanitarian assistance.

ANALYSIS

The first step was to compare ‘old’ operations with ‘new.’ I chose to consider the World War II period as the separation point between the old and the new. The choice is not arbitrary. World War II changed the way the US saw itself in the world, and the way the world viewed the US, and the roles it was to play in the future. In addition, the creation of the United Nations as well as significant regional institutions, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Pact organization shortly after the war established international arrangements and agreements never before seen. Interest in negotiation and communication opposed to conflict and confrontation grew in the post-World War II world. So, the war provides a good break-point between the old and the new. Table 2 summarizes the similarities between old operations other than war and new; Table 3 covers principal differences.

By poorly defined objectives and poorly prepared forces, I am not speaking pejoratively but rather pragmatically. Most military operations, whether within the framework of war or

“war” or operations other than war, initially start with poorly understood objectives. Such is due partly from poor understanding of the situations, the enemy (particularly the culture and beliefs of the enemy), and poor enunciation of objectives by political leadership. World War II stands out as an example of fairly clear objectives, particularly at the strategic level, which helped considerably as objectives were developed for the campaign and operational levels of war. But World War II was a ‘rare bird’ in the history of military operations. Forces, most particularly, US forces have been poorly prepared for the operations they have endeavored to carry out. That observation stems from the poorly defined objectives. If you don’t understand what you need to do, it is very difficult to be prepared to do it. I have often said that US military forces have never deployed doctrinally and have never employed doctrinally. I have been corrected by those familiar with the Gulf War, who point out that the ground operations were conducted according to US doctrine and training. I agree. I also point out that the deployment for the Gulf War was anything but doctrinal. The US had never planned or considered backing the US Seventh Corps out of Europe and re-deploying it to another theater of operations, for example.

Poorly defined objectives
Poorly prepared forces
Military and Political activities
Importance of ‘other ranks’
Conveyance of broad, fundamental values

Table 2: Similarities (old and recent).

Then as now, operations included both military and political dimensions, objectives, and problems. We often hear that the corporal at the checkpoint or crossroads can trigger an international incident if she doesn’t understand her responsibilities and authorities. The same was true in earlier days as well. There were few majors and colonels around and even fewer generals, so the captains (occasionally), lieutenants (often), and sergeants (regularly) did it all. And throughout the years, US military personnel have brought with them something of the democratic philosophy; the one-person one-vote notion; that in a democratic society, military forces were responsible to elected public authorities. Often, principles coming from a democratic, capitalist nation conflicted with ideas for resolution of problems rising from a wide separation of the ‘haves’ from the ‘have nots.’ For example, in many of the operations in the far east (e.g., the Philippines) or Latin America (Haiti and Cuba come to mind) it was clear to US military personnel that revolutionary tactics such as land re-distribution or the re-distribution of the means of production could resolve age-old disparities. But, coming from a nation where private property and limited role of government in economic matters was not only the norm but driving elements in the national political ethos made such a resolution an anathema. A solution was obvious but unacceptable, in that it was in conflict with the mores carried by the military personnel.

Now to differences between then and now. Once, a large proportion of the operations other than war were conducted for punitive purposes; to punish a group of people for damage done to Americans (seamen, travelers), for slights to the American government or to allies. In

1864, the US Navy conducted a combined operation with French, Dutch and British ships and bombarded the city of Shimoneseki, Japan as punishment to convince the Japanese to keep the straits open for all vessels. Earlier, the Navy had bombarded Shimoneseki because an American vessel had been fired on. Since World War II, very few punitive actions have been carried out; most operations today come under the headings of peace support, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief. In the ‘old’ days the military forces were responsible for it all—military, political, social services, health and rehabilitative services—generally making do with the resources at hand or those that could be obtained easily. There was unity of purpose *and* unity of command. Now there are multiple organizations in addition to the military units, each with particular objectives and modes of operation. While unity of purpose may exist (at a high level of aggregation or abstraction) there is complexity of command.

Punitive vs. Peacekeeping
Military did it all vs. NGOs, PVOs,...
No ‘doctrine’ vs. Much doctrine
Multi-generations vs. High turnover
Unilateral (joint?) vs. Joint/Combined
Racism vs. Egalitarianism
Little oversight vs. Much! Oversight
Simplicity vs. Complexity

Table 3: Differences (old vs. recent).

No ‘doctrine’ in the early days refers to formal, governmentally produced, published doctrine. In the 19th century military doctrine was found, in many cases, in privately published writings; the US Army did produce some ‘doctrine’ in the form of field service regulations. The word itself (doctrine) is a product of the 1940s. Now doctrine is produced regularly and modified and re-published. There is a thriving industry in producing ‘lessons learned’ from operations. [It is unfortunate that such a phrase has become so popular, both within the military services and among the supporting civilian institutions. The US Army established a facility, located at Fort Leavenworth, designated the Center for Army Lessons Learned. What is produced by all those publishing ‘lessons learned’ are really ‘observations’ from operations. Until behavior is changed as a result of experience, training, and education, lessons are not learned.]

Once, military officers served many decades; it was not unusual for an officer, after 30 or more years on the frontier in the latter half of the 19th century, to retire as a captain. One of the most distinguished and competent general officers, Winfield Scott, served for over 50 years and was the commanding general (General-in-Chief) of the Army for more than 20 of those years; when he retired he had served under 14 presidents and as a general officer under 13 of them. There was ample opportunity for junior officers and non-commissioned officers

to, literally, sit at the feet of a experienced person and learn. Officers carried out repetitive operations, learning from each experience. Now, it is rare indeed for an Army officer to participate twice in the same type of operation. 'Ticket punching' is more important than experience and competency. Concern for the quality of life and short separations from family drive the number of operations military people participate in. Coupled with no senior people to learn from and short isolated operations of their own, it is not surprising that inefficiencies and ineffectiveness abound.

The mode in earlier years was for single service operations; occasionally the army and the navy would join forces for particular events. Today, there is an irresistible force directing that all operations must be joint—even when there is little justification for multiple service participation (Grenada comes to mind as a "war" in which all services joined without a clear indication that there was need for all). There really are operations in which the role of the Navy or even the Air Force might be supporting as the transporting service or alternatively a Marine element might be the only ground force needed.

Racism was often a factor affecting behavior and attitudes of US military personnel in earlier years. Concepts such as 'the white man's burden' were not limited to British military personnel; references to 'our little brown brothers, gooks, Chinks and Japs' were common. While all aspects of racism have not disappeared, there is considerably less of it publicly displayed by US military forces in operations.

Partially a function of communication and transportation constraints, particularly until the early part of the 20th century, there was almost no oversight of US military operations, including "wars" while they were underway. There was little attempt by political authorities or, for that matter, higher command figures, to manage the operations from afar. And, the various publics took very little note of operations other than war during their conduct. There was, often, considerable post-operations oversight and criticism. In today's world with real-time communications, including visual, the oversight comes from all levels of government and the publics simultaneously. Such oversight changes the way military personnel behave and operate and not necessarily for the good, that is, improved effectiveness and efficiency. Finally, there is a belief that operations have become more complex, although the belief should be questioned. It may be that the intense oversight has made life tougher, implying more complexity, when the operations themselves are not more complex. Alternatively, increased emphasis on reduced 'collateral damage' (a popular euphemism for friendly or neutral civilian casualties and destruction of non-military structures) and minimal casualties (friendly and enemy) may actually cause the operations to be more complex. This, too, may be related to the intensified oversight and overwatching.

ARE THE LESSONS LEARNED?

Is it sufficient to identify, even as grossly as I have done here, the similarities and differences between operations 'then' and 'now'? Can we take the similarities and focus on them as we face the need for future deployments in operations other than war? Can we take the differences, perhaps a function of the types of operations most prevalent today (e.g., peace operations), and use them to tailor, if not permanent organizations, then task forces designed to meet the contingencies of the peace operations? I think we can, but it is still a difficult job. As I pondered what can be gleaned and learned (in the sense I previously defined learned—

that is, information that is used to change behavior and organization) I realized that something more ‘elegant’ than brute force, operation-by-operation histories is desirable. Fortuitously, something came to the fore.

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, two distinguished faculty members of the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May conducted seminars with groups of government and private sector ‘executives’, examining crises and reactions to crises. A popular device at Harvard, originally pioneered in the business management school, was and is the case study. The case study process involves selecting real incidents in the government and private sectors and dissecting them to identify why and how decisions had been made in the cases, using the information available to the key players in the incidents. Much effort has been expended over the years in developing libraries of cases to help hone the decision analysis capabilities of government and private sector leaders and advisors. As a result of the experiences of Neustadt and May in their particular seminars, a series of qualitative analytic tools began to be developed and tested, in the environment of the seminars. The two compiled the experiences in a most interesting book, *Thinking In Time. The Uses of History for Decision Makers*, published in 1986. It was the book and the experiences of Dick Neustadt and Ernie May that provided me with a clue as to how the operations of the past might influence the operations of the future.

A QUALITATIVE ANALYTIC APPROACH

It is important to recognize immediately that Neustadt and May do not offer a model or a series of models or black boxes into which one can place information and data, grind the milling wheels, and pump out force plans, alternative courses of action, and recommended decisions. The focus of their work is on a suite of ‘tools’ which they very carefully and specifically designate ‘mini-methods.’ The mini-methods consist of a set of suggestions, not rules, for applying history (observations about the past) to assist in analyzing emerging crises and help lead to approaches to ameliorate the crises. The mini-methods often incorporate a simple device: asking questions. To emphasize the notion of asking the right question, here is an anecdote, derived from one of the cases Neustadt and May use in the book (the book consists primarily of cases to illustrate the application of the mini-methods). In the first few months of the Kennedy administration (1961), the president was faced with decisions about a planned operation to incite and support a counter-revolution in Cuba.

The operation, historically named Bay of Pigs, was under the management of the covert component of the Central Intelligence Agency. Briefings were held at the White House for the president and staff; questions were asked and answered. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were asked to comment on the CIA plan; a favorable response was received from the Pentagon. In the aftermath of the debacle that occurred, with recriminations flying about as to who was most at fault for the failure of the invasion of Cuban expatriates who were to form the nucleus of the counter-Castro revolution, two questions emerged that should have been but were not asked during the planning of the operation. The first question, which should have been put to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (instead of the one asking them to critique the CIA plan), was: “If you were to plan this operation as a US military invasion, what forces would you employ and how would you carry out the operation?” It was suggested, after the fact, that if it had been a military plan, the peninsula of Florida would have sunk under the weight of military matériel and personnel assembled. At a minimum, the response would have raised

some doubts about the force proposed by the CIA for the operation. The second question which should have been asked of the CIA planner was: "What evidence do you have that the Cuban populace or some reasonable portion of it will rise up against Castro when the invading force arrives in Cuba?" In retrospect, it appears that it was wishful thinking that supported the idea of a revolution needing only the spark of an invasion by other Cubans.

The mini-methods, then, are an organization of approaches to determining important questions to ask about an emerging crisis, as efforts get underway to designing approaches to the crisis. The fundamental, underlying principle of Neustadt and May is that the first question that should be asked about a crisis is: "What's the story?" and not: "What should we do about it?"

THE MINI-METHODS

I do not present much detail about the methods here; it is preferable that interested parties read for themselves. I recommend the book without reservation as a useful set of ideas for anyone interested in decisions and crises; in addition, the book with its collection of case histories is fun to read.

The first step in understanding a crisis is to divide information about the crisis or event or situation into what is known, unclear and presumed. That is, specifically categorizing information into three classes:

1. What do we really know, what is truly confirmed, about the situation.
2. What is unclear or fuzzy about the situation, at this time.
3. What are we presuming about the situation.

One of the most difficult things to ascertain, particularly in the early moments of an emerging crisis, is the distinction between what is known and what is presumed. Presumptions are very powerful forces contributing to decisions. It is extremely important that presumptions be labeled so as to be sure that the links between them and emerging decisions are transparent—and thus open to question. Clearly, relations among the things that are known, unclear and presumed will change over time. Things that are unclear may become clearer or perhaps move into the known category; some presumptions may go away to be replaced by others. In any event, the handling of information is a dynamic process and the categories of known, unclear and presumed must be repetitively re-visited, if that is not too much of a redundancy.

The second step (subsequent mini-methods may not follow in specific sequence) is to seek analogies. Are there circumstances like the emerging one that have occurred in the past? There are advantages and disadvantages to the surfacing of analogies. Previous incidents may bear misleading similarities to an emerging event, and may result in inappropriate actions. Neustadt and May provide definitions or classes of analogies to help test an analogy that may 'pop up' when a crisis emerges. One bit of guidance provided by the authors is to explore the similarities and the differences between the earlier event, seen as the analogous situation, and the new situation. Here is another opportunity to ask questions, such as: What is there about

the earlier case that makes it look like the present case and what is there that is different? Of those things that are different, how important are the differences? It may well be that only selected facets or pieces of the earlier event are similar to the emerging event and care needs to be taken with the lesson that is carried away from the earlier event. This may become clearer in the case discussion presented below, in my own application of the mini-methods as a demonstration of the possible use of the Neustadt and May approaches.

Another mini-method, not necessarily in sequence but of application at anytime in the assessment of the emerging crisis, is the issue history. The issue history is a major step in understanding the crisis, building to a great extent on that first step, the clarification and classification of information into known, unclear and presumed. The issue history is subdivided into three components. The first is called the Goldberg rule; Mr. Avram Goldberg was the chief executive of a chain of grocery and discount department stores in New England who attended seminars at Harvard. The rule, as proposed by Mr. Goldberg was, when he was faced with a problem brought forward by one of his managers, to say: "Tell me the story?" rather than "What's the problem?" What Mr. Goldberg, and Neustadt and May, are saying is: Tell me how we got here; what's the background; what led up to this situation—in other words, the history leading to the crisis. Coupled with the question to draw out the background is the second component, the timeline. When did this situation start becoming a situation; when did the contributing events occur?

The timeline should go as far back as one can reasonably go and be assured of understanding the linkages and the proximal relations. Should one carry the timeline for the problems of present day once-Yugoslavia (Serbs, Croats, Muslims, etc) back 50 years, 100 years, or 400 years? What makes sense? The third component, working with the timeline, is to ask the journalists' questions: Who, What, Why, When (partially answered by the timeline itself), Where, and How. Not all of the journalists' questions will make sense in all situations. Ask those that do make sense. Neustadt and May treat the next item of the mini-methods as a separate element; I like to think of it as part of the timeline construction. It is called placement and refers to locating the principal players in the crisis on the timeline. Placement helps identify events, experiences and circumstances affecting the key persons and influencing how and why they act as they do in the emerging crisis and possibly provide clues as to how they may act in the future, depending on new events and actions.

The final two mini-methods, Alexander's question and Bets and Odds, are methods for testing ideas arising as ways of dealing with the crisis. Alexander's question stems from experience with the swine flu epidemic issue of the Ford administration. Dr. Russell Alexander, a public health professor, was one of a large group of physicians and epidemiologists who had been called in (March 1976) to advise the president and others developing a plan to interdict what appeared to be a dangerous pandemic on the horizon. The application of Alexander's question is: What information, not presently available, would cause me to see this problem differently? The implication of the question is that if certain information were available, the decisions, plans, perspectives of the crisis would change. To a degree, Alexander's question relates to the presumptions targeted in the first mini-method.

Bets and odds relate to the extent to which one feels comfortable with the emerging decision or understanding of the crisis. In essence, one test is to try to estimate the probability that one is right or, alternatively, to establish a level of confidence by suggesting how much personal treasure one might wager on being right. One of the pioneers of military operational research, P. M. S. Blackett stated an axiom useful to analysts contributing to decisions. He

said: "I think the essential prerequisite of sound military advice is that the giver must convince himself that if he were responsible for action, he would himself act so."

Regularly, the mini-methods should be re-visited, as the assessment continues to the decision point or points. Information should be continually sorted into the known, unclear and presumed categories. The issue history should be elaborated; the journalists' questions asked again and again. Should the crisis analysis continue at length? Should we be paralyzed by analysis? The mini-methods are not a recipe for detailed, conventional and time-consuming analysis. The contributions (history) to be fitted into the various mini-methods must come from the immediately available knowledge and memory banks. For this approach to contribute to emerging crises, the application of the mini-methods can assume only a few days or so. The distinction here is that many crises do not require action in minutes or hours—nor, except in the most unusual and dangerous crises is the US prepared to respond in minutes or even hours.

To think about the crisis for a day or two is not demanding much, particularly if the time taken to think about the matter results in an improved approach than would otherwise be the case. The example below clarifies the point, I believe. Before moving on to the example, however, there is one more point to be made. My work suggests that the mini-methods are useful but not necessarily without constraint. While many crises do not require instantaneous action, some do. I do not advocate application of the analytic process to disaster relief crises. Immediate action is necessary, to save lives following disasters. Some analyses can be undertaken as relief is being delivered, perhaps to improve the quality and efficiency of later relief efforts. The analytic process is most applicable to the often complicated and poorly understood conflict crises that are prevalent today.

A DEMONSTRATION OF THE MINI-METHODS

On 5 June 1993, 24 Pakistani peacekeeping soldiers were killed in an ambush in Mogadishu, Somalia. At the outset, what was known? An ambush had occurred; 24 soldiers were dead and some other number were wounded. What was unclear? Why did the ambush occur at this time? What was presumed? That the Habr Gidr clan, a major force in Somalia and partially responsible for overthrowing Mohammed Barre, long-time dictator of Somalia.

On 6 June, the United Nations Security Council issued Resolution 837, a remarkably well-written and comprehensive resolution for the time, calling, among other things, for the detention of those responsible for the attack on the Pakistani soldiers.

An analogy comes to mind. In the early morning hours of 9 March 1916 a detachment of Mexican soldiers (perhaps para-military, perhaps bandits) attacked Columbus, NM, a small town near the border. What was known? An attack took place; a small number of Americans were killed and wounded; a larger number of the attacking force were killed (a US Army unit happened to be stationed near the town and reacted very well when the attack started). What was unclear? The reasons for the attack, at the time that it occurred. What was presumed? That General 'Pancho' Villa had ordered the attack and the soldiers were men of his revolutionary army. Other observations can be added to the known, unclear and presumed categories, but the examples shown will suffice to illustrate the process.

The day after the attack on Columbus, President Woodrow Wilson ordered the Army to cross the border into Mexico, in force, find and kill General Villa. The order was subsequently modified to destroy Villa's army as an effective military force.

The elements of the 1916 event that are important to the 'analogy' process for relating to the 1993 event are not so much connected with the attack-ambush but rather to the decision taken by authorities in response to the attack-ambush. The president of the United States in 1916 and the Security Council in 1993 reacted almost identically. "Find the perpetrator and take him out!"

The newly promoted Brigadier General John J. (Blackjack) Pershing was placed in charge of the Mexican expedition. The history of the operation, the application of new technology (motor vehicles, aircraft and radios), the political interactions, the 'go to war-movement' on the part of US owners of mine properties in Mexico and Army personnel, the linkage with the European war underway for the previous two plus years all make for a wonderful, interesting and complex picture. If one were to prepare an issue history for this incident, a delightful and exciting one would emerge. It is sufficient for the present purposes to point out that Pershing's force, about 12,000 strong in total, spent about 11 months over the border, in another sovereign nation, chasing a will-o'-the-wisp. In the main, the US Army never caught sight of Pancho Villa (one source says that a sighting did occur), never mind place him in custody. A number of engagements took place between US forces and Villistas; a smaller number took place between US forces and Carranzistas (General Carranza was the newly recognized—by the United States—president of Mexico, who was also interested in catching Villa).

The US Army was under severe operational constraints; required to avoid towns and villages and avoid contact with Mexican military units (that is, Carranzistas). Logistics and intelligence were serious problem areas. Pershing did use much of the 'down' time for training and improvement in tactical operations. To some extent, the experiences of the US Army, including the mobilization of National Guard forces to help guard the border during this time, contributed to the preparation of the Army for the World War. The expedition was eventually called off; victory of a sort was declared by stating that Pancho Villa's army was no longer a significant fighting force and that, after all, was the main objective.

If there had been some knowledge, at high levels of the US government, of the events leading to the Mexican expedition, the experiences of those 11 months chasing after Villa, and the ultimate conclusion of the operation, would Security Council Resolution 837 have been written as it was? Would the months following the resolution's promulgation have been spent seeking Mohammed Aideed and the senior elements of his clan? Would the tragic event now commonly referred to as 'Black Hawk Down' have occurred?

The Mogadishu situation offers a good case for the development of an issue history. The issue is the intransigence of the Habr Gidr clan and its leadership. Goldberg's question: What's the story? Habr Gidr played a major role in the removal of the 20-year dictator Mohammed Barre. Did that role give the Habr Gidr some authority in the re-development of Somalia? During the rule of Mohammed Barre, the ambassador of Egypt to Somalia was one Boutros Boutros-Ghali. While stationed in Mogadishu, Boutros-Ghali became a close friend of Mohammed Barre. The questions: who, what, why, when, where, and how can be used to flesh out the time-line, which has to run for at least 20 years before the overthrow of Mohammed Barre. On the time-line one can place Boutros-Ghali and Mohammed Aideed, as

well as others for elaboration and clarification. But, for purposes of the example, we've come far enough. We can now ask Alexander's questions: How did Mohammed Aided view the UN forces deployed to and employed in Somalia? What might be the interpretation by the Habr Gidr of the relation between Boutros Boutros-Ghali (a friend of their enemy) and the UN forces; are the UN forces in Somali under the control of the friend of their enemy? What actions might the Habr Gidr take as a result of a worst case interpretation of that relationship?

I can now ask questions similar to the one asked earlier about the impact of knowing the history of the 1916-1917 Mexican expedition on the decision to support the publication of Resolution 837. Was Boutros-Ghali seeking revenge on the Habr Gidr? Was Mohammed Aided seeking more international attention (by the attacks on UN elements)? If the US public had been aware of the earlier connection between Boutros Boutros-Ghali and Mohammed Barre, and had been aware of the perspective of the Habr Gidr clan, would it have supported the employment of US troops to destroy the clan? Could Black Hawk Down been foreseen or better yet, avoided?

CONCLUSIONS

There is good, available history of US operations other than war. There are good data to be drawn out, if the effort is made.

There are many lessons to be learned.

There are very few lessons now being learned.

The Neustadt and May mini-methods may be a way to take the history and learn from it.

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