

# Integrated Strategic Planning Toward Sustainable Peace

Dayton Maxwell

Special Advisor to the Administrator  
U.S. Agency for International Development  
1300 Pennsylvania Ave.  
Washington, D.C., U.S.A.  
e-mail: damaxwell@usaid.gov

*Dayton Maxwell is part of a new USAID initiative to address conflict issues. He is in the USAID office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM) in the Bureau of Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA). He re-joined USAID in 2001 after retiring in 1995. During the interim he worked with the NGO World Vision as a Senior Advisor, with George Mason University as an Associate Professor, and with the Institute for Defense Analyses as a consultant.*

## ABSTRACT

As the Cornwallis Group continues its mission there may be policy changes coming that will permit Operations Research professionals to make greater cutting-edge contributions in the analysis of complex crises originally intended for this group. The use of integrated strategic planning to address these crises in a holistic manner over a realistic time period is still evolving. Steps are being taken and opportunities are appearing to apply strategic planning techniques to current and emerging crises. USAID expects to contribute to a more holistic planning process as it evolves its new Conflict Management initiative. DOD's Effects Based Operations (EBO) and Operational Net Assessment (ONA) concepts are also examples.

USAID's new initiative to address conflict issues more substantially suggests a more integrated political approach to its traditional economic assistance mandate. Pol-Mil plans increasingly include economic dimensions. The USG foreign policy has included support for democratization in formerly authoritarian regimes, and USAID's Democracy and Governance office is an important implementation arm. Combining all elements — political, military, economic — into integrated strategic plans that connect objectives with programs designed to achieve the desirable End State will remain a challenge for all of us. But let's keep improving our analytical input to do that.

## THE SPIRIT OF CORNWALLIS GROUP PAST


At Cornwallis I in 1996, the founding fathers of the group held a contest to give it a name. The name decided at that time was: *Cornwallis Group: Analysis For and Of the Resolution of Conflict*. The second part of the name was both awkward and too far-reaching, so it dropped away, even though the theme of Cornwallis II reflected that title. Just how far a

reach addressing conflict resolution was at that time wasn't known. But the subsequent experiences of troops deploying to Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor and now Afghanistan, plus others, and having to stay because political end-state conditions are not easily achieved, is ample evidence of how difficult it is to resolve conflict.

From today's perspective, we can probably reach some conclusions with respect to our work. One of them could be:

*Operations Research has ably contributed to very specific compartments of OOTW analysis. Its contribution to achieving a comprehensive success has been limited because mission objectives were established by political decision absent holistic pol-mil analysis. As analysis grows to become the basis for mission planning, OR techniques can make broader contributions. It is important to anticipate that possibility.*

By Cornwallis III, the missing holistic analysis was beginning to be more clearly seen. As a result of experimental group work during this session and the ensuing discussions, the conclusion illustrated in Figure 1 below emerged.<sup>1</sup> That is, the military "End State" consists of achieving an end to hostilities, but the overall "End State" isn't achieved until a sustainable peace can be achieved politically. Military OR ceases at the former, even though a sustainable stability is not yet achieved.



*Figure 1: The End State requires a commitment by host country military leaders — is that a military role?*

The speakers in Cornwallis IV in 1999 examined the prospects for a "protectorate" due to the need for more assertive governance (Prins, Kinzer), the evolution toward a new international security paradigm (Morrison), and the need to seek more effective host country authorities to govern (Eriksson).<sup>2</sup> The more holistic analyses represented here, however, was mostly done outside government structures.

<sup>1</sup> Woodcock and Davis, *Analysis for Peace Operations*, The Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 1998, p. 214.

<sup>2</sup> Woodcock and Davis, *Analysis of Civil-Military Interactions*, The Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 1999, see a summary on p. 8.

My intended paper in Cornwallis VI was entitled “Anticipating the Future.” The assumption was, and remains, that the relative permanence of turbulence in today's world will sooner or later require a more holistic analysis approach. In anticipation of that vision, we'll need to prepare analytical methodology that is interdisciplinary, covers a longer time frame, and is integrated in nature.<sup>3</sup> The events of 9/11/2001 were certainly not anticipated, but they add a new dimension and urgency to the need for holistic analysis.

## RECENT DEVELOPMENTS TOWARD HOLISTIC ANALYSIS

### SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

The OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) established in 1995 a DAC Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation (CPDC). Conflict causes are multi-dimensional and must be addressed in an interdisciplinary manner, as becomes clear in reading the DAC guidance developed by CPDC; “We will strive to increase coherence among our policies — trade, finance and investment, foreign affairs and defence, and development co-operation — that impact on conflict prevention.”<sup>4</sup>

One specific focus area of the CPDC is the security sector. In a wide-ranging report, it notes that the relationship between development assistance and security has converged in many respects as a result of the “rising internecine conflicts.” It says:

*“Consequently, there is growing concern over the developmental impact and role that security actors (military, paramilitary, police, intelligence, private security forces) play in shaping the lives of people in developing and transition countries and creating or destroying prospects for peace, and social and economic progress. The way in which security actors interrelate with political, judicial and penal systems, and the rule of law, or lack of it influences the overall security system of a country.”<sup>5</sup>*

This report contains 28 recommendations in six broad areas toward mainstreaming security issues into development policy and practice, including, “Elaborate a comprehensive security system reform policy that outlines the appropriate roles for actors across all areas of foreign affairs, financial, trade, security-defence, and development cooperation.”<sup>6</sup> This initiative is recognized as being long-term in nature, and will probably be developed through experiences gained in specific countries. The United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DfID), now a ranking Cabinet office, has begun some very active programs addressing security sector issues in a few countries. Notable among them is a signed agreement with the Government of Indonesia to work on TNI (Indonesian military) reform.

<sup>3</sup> Maxwell, in Woodcock and Davis, *Analysis for Assessment, Evaluation and Crisis Management*, The Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 2002, pp. ix-x.

<sup>4</sup> *The DAC Guidelines - Helping Prevent Violent Conflict*, OECD, 2001, p. 13.

<sup>5</sup> Informal DAC Task Force on Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation, “Security Issues and Development Cooperation: A Conceptual Framework for Enhancing Policy Coherence,” OECD/DAC, DCD(2000)4/REV2, 12/5/00, p. 3.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid*, p. 33.

## OPERATIONAL NET ASSESSMENT (ONA)

The U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) has launched experimental programs to help the U.S. armed forces increase their effectiveness in working with the civilian agencies in crisis response. JFCOM is incorporating two recently developed concepts in their programs: ONA and EBO (Effects-Based Operations). EBO is intended to address the wider aspects of conflict and not just the military role. This includes the effect on societies and governance of the countries in conflict if military intervention of one kind or another is necessary. Knowledge of that works back into management of the operations. ONA puts tools in place to do that:

*“The Operational Net Assessment is a process that supports effects based operations by developing the knowledge base for the efficient application of diplomatic, information, military, and economic actions to an adversary’s key nodes and vulnerabilities.”<sup>7</sup>*

While this process is clearly designed to help the military meet its mandate, it provides at the same time a database which permits the civilian community to input its information and analyses to influence the conduct of security operations. JFCOM is examining the military’s institutional steps to effectively act on that information. It is proposing to stand up a unit which “allows a pre-crisis planning capability on CINC-directed focus areas. This capability is based on a more timely and improved situational awareness and understanding of the adversary and friendly capabilities.” It will be a “knowledge centric, cross-functional organization (which) takes advantage of knowledge and information flow.”<sup>8</sup>

A significant exercise has just been conducted (August, 2002) to test the interagency play of these concepts, Millenium Challenge 02.<sup>9</sup> This exercise was designed to stand up a Post-Conflict Recovery Sub-working Group immediately at the outset of the crisis to provide advice and recommendations to the military operations officers on ways to conduct operations which would also contribute to addressing End State matters more effectively. One illustration of this during the exercise was the need to act on criminal and terrorist elements.

The Department of Justice interjected the advisability to work with the international partner law enforcement network, e.g., Interpol, alongside the intervening military forces, to apprehend the outlaws. In the governance sphere, the need for policy reform in the transition and post-conflict period could also be addressed during the intervention in a manner that would facilitate post-conflict actions.

This evolving process is indicative of the current trends to integrate planning and operations. One gap to which we all need to contribute is how to provide the most effective situational analysis in ongoing events, including these exercises. One example is the standard practice in military pol-mil planning to create extensive “synchronized matrices” of tasks as the basis for planning and management. The ONA process also does this. USAID, on the other hand, designs its activities around Strategic Objectives, which require strategic

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<sup>7</sup> This definition of ONA was included in an unclassified briefing by JFCOM on Jan. 30, 2002.

<sup>8</sup> Fact Sheet from JFCOM, Joint Experimentation Directorate, February, 2002.

<sup>9</sup> For a news story on this exercise, see [http://www.ananova.com/news/story/sm\\_632440.html](http://www.ananova.com/news/story/sm_632440.html)

planning. USAID development assistance is generally long-term, thus strategic planning is essential.

One direction to explore is to graft on longer-term strategic planning processes onto the military task matrix. DfID would like to do this for Afghanistan, for example. Such a process would involve host country officials, making them part of the solution. (This is clearly one aspect of the “nation building” anathema/debate.) Given another direction is to make more effective use of information systems technology, the “facilitated problem-solving” methodology developed by Professor Davis and myself at George Mason University could be helpful. The use of Microsoft Project Critical Path Method software could take a task list and convert it into a planning schedule projected over time with participation with and ownership by the host country officials.

### MAINSTREAMING CONFLICT PREVENTION

The OECD/DAC CPDC work has stimulated volumes of “think-tank” work and real efforts to merge theory into policy and practice on conflict issues, beginning in 1995, at least among donor countries if not globally. The Swedish government was one of the first to move in this area (independent of OECD) because Sweden's State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Jan Eliasson was formerly an Undersecretary of Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs at the UN. Sweden developed an Action Plan in 1999 with five goals addressing conflict:<sup>10</sup>

- To promote a culture of prevention.
- To identify structural risk factors.
- To develop the international system of norms and strengthen its implementation.
- To strengthen the international institutional framework and its preventive instruments.
- To strengthen Sweden's capacity for international conflict prevention activities in various policy areas (foreign policy and security, trade, migration and development assistance).

Under the Swedish Presidency of the European Union (2000/2001), the EU significantly raised the profile of conflict prevention and civil crisis management. The Dutch government has also funded important studies on conflict through the Clingendael Institute. The EU's Conflict Prevention Network (CPN) 2001 annual conference in The Hague addressed Mainstreaming Conflict Prevention as its principal theme. The conference's yearbook is perhaps the most thorough treatment of the issues faced in addressing conflict prevention among donor governments.<sup>11</sup> In the Introduction to this book, Luc van de Goor (of Clingendael) and Martina Huber lay out the challenge:

<sup>10</sup> *Preventing Violent Conflict — A Swedish Action Plan*, The Printing Works of the Government Offices, Stockholm, 1999, pp. 12-14.

<sup>11</sup> Luc van de Goor, Martina Huber (editors), *Mainstreaming Conflict Prevention, Concept and Practice*, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, 2002.

*“Despite the truism that early action concerning violent conflicts is generally better than late responses, the actions of the international community often still add up to ‘too little too late.’ One could therefore ask the question whether conflict prevention is an objective to which the international community only pays lip service, or whether serious efforts are made to improve the record. ... Discussions on conflict prevention have made clear that it is a crosscutting issue, which requires proactive short-term moderating action as well as medium- to long-term strategies aiming at structural transformation and, eventually, structural stability.”<sup>12</sup>*

If the old adage that a clear understanding of the problem is 90% of the solution, this book should significantly help us. It truly focuses on laying out the major constraints to taking effective action to prevent conflicts. Some highlights:

- Governments suffer from poor horizontal integration across agencies/ministries with respect to developing effective conflict prevention strategies (p. 72).
- The lack of political will is a result of the lack of capacity to recommend effective action (p. 29).
- Political will is also constrained by the opportunity cost of pursuing conflict prevention, a diffuse intellectual climate about foreign relations, and a greater electoral interest and understanding of crisis reaction vs. the more amorphous and onerous aspects of prevention (pp. 90-91).
- While many talk about the need for a “paradigm shift” in policy and practice, it is unlikely to come soon, thus we must proceed in small steps (p. 48).
- The bureaucratic process weighs heavy on attempts to rapidly change things (p. 69).
- Cost effectiveness of prevention is clear, but action depends on breaking down estimates into manageable chunks (pp. 69-88).
- Conflict vulnerability assessments and early warning studies achieve two different objectives, policy/program recommendations for the former and evaluation of a pending crisis for the latter (pp. 60-68).

## POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION PROJECT

The potentially fruitful dynamic among think-tanks, the Administration and Congress is demonstrated in a current project undertaken by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the Association of the U.S. Army (AUSA). Their Post-Conflict Reconstruction project is developing a “framework (which) presents the range of tasks often

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 11-12.

encountered when rebuilding a country in the wake of violent conflict.”<sup>13</sup> This framework is “organized around four distinct ... ‘pillars’: security; justice/reconciliation; social/economic well-being; and governance/participation.”<sup>14</sup>

Detailed papers have been written in each of the pillar areas through a significant consultation process. A Commission on Post-Conflict Reconstruction has been established to review their work that includes former top Administration officials, current and former Members of Congress, and senior representatives of NGOs. Officers of this project have already been called to testify before Congress and intend to continue to advise both Administration and Congress on the results of their work.

The papers produced to date include over 60 recommendations which focus on the main issues facing the international community in restoring normality in today's conflicts. Some of them are contentious, yet serious consideration would force attention on the most difficult of the issues. Examples:

- “Create new “Director of Reconstruction” (DF) posts within the U.S. Government responsible for directing U.S. efforts in specific countries ...”<sup>15</sup>
- “Create an integrated mechanism within the State Department and USAID to support special envoys and Directors of Reconstruction.”<sup>16</sup>
- “Dramatically enhance support for quick-disbursing community-based approaches that can immediately reach grassroots constituencies and provide them the means to enhance the participation of marginalized actors at the local level. ... Charge OTI with ensuring linkage of these local processes to a national peace implementation strategy ...”<sup>17</sup>
- “USAID, supported by DoD, should integrate HAST and DART concepts to include the broader inter-agency and NGO communities with the task of providing comprehensive assessments to the NSC, combatant commanders and JTF.”<sup>18</sup>
- “Congress should mandate the establishment of a bipartisan expert Commission to examine the feasibility of organizing a U.S. or international integrated security force for use in Post-Conflict Reconstruction.”<sup>19</sup>
- “Develop and implement a National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) on post-conflict reconstruction that, among other things, addresses U.S. strategy, capabilities, and interagency responsibilities and coordination in the area of post-conflict justice and reconciliation assistance.”<sup>20</sup>

<sup>13</sup> *Post-Conflict Reconstruction Task Framework*, CSIS/AUSA, May, 2002, p. 2.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 3. See also the website <http://www.pcrproject.org> for further information.

<sup>15</sup> Robert Orr, “Meeting the Challenges of Governance and Participation In Post-Conflict Settings”, CSIS/AUSA, 7/8/02p. 4.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 4.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 5.

<sup>18</sup> Scott Feil, “Building Security Capacity for Post-Conflict Reconstruction”, CSIS/AUSA, 7/3/02, p. 4.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 5. This is the concept of developing a constabulary-like force to establish effective security, an important missing link in post-conflict countries.

- “The president should create an Office for Economic International Security (to) bring together all the relevant tools of the USG in a timely manner.”<sup>21</sup>

The Presidents of CSIS and AUSA, in their paper covering the range of issues, finished with a “Preparing for the Future” section. They concluded by saying:<sup>22</sup>

*“If we have learned one thing over the last decade of crisis it is that we cannot wait for the next crisis to begin before we prepare. Even in Afghanistan, where we have clear national security interests at stake and high-level government commitment, we have used ad hoc mechanisms to try to address pressing needs. ... U.S. leadership will only be credible if we get our own house in order. ... We can no longer afford to face every task with nothing but a hammer at our disposal.”*

## USAID’S ROLE

### HUMANITARIAN AND RECOVERY ASSISTANCE

The USG has always employed more than the “hammer,” however. USAID has worked alongside the military – and often without the military – in nearly all the international crises in leading the humanitarian assistance efforts. USAID’s Disaster Assistance Response Teams (DARTs) have become well known and respected. The example of DART in Northern Iraq was the focus of discussion in one session at Cornwallis IV.<sup>23</sup> The need to expand the DART concept to perform more comprehensive tasks was mentioned in the CSIS/AUSA recommendations above.

USAID has also had an important role in post-conflict reconstruction. Within USAID’s traditional mandate, it is responsible for physical reconstruction, assisting to restore essential public services (e.g., water/sanitation, health, education systems), agriculture rehabilitation, etc. It also provides governance assistance (e.g., economic policy reform, establishing banking systems, creating an effective judiciary, elections and political party training). Under special circumstances it even ventures into the security sector by providing civilian policing training and supporting good civil-military relations, both oriented toward creating an accountability of security officials to the populations. In many ways, USAID is engaged in efforts across the range of the multidisciplinary issues.

### CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

<sup>20</sup> Michele Flournoy, "Discussion Paper: Supporting Post-Conflict Justice and Reconciliation", CSIS/AUSA, 7/9/02, p. 3.

<sup>21</sup> Johanna Mendelson Forman, "Achieving Socio-Economic Well-Being in Post-Conflict Settings", CSIS/AUSA, 6/9/02, p. 4.

<sup>22</sup> John J. Hamre and Gordon R. Sullivan, "Toward Postconflict Reconstruction", CSIS/AUSA, 7/9/02, p. 8.

<sup>23</sup> Dayton Maxwell, "Northern Iraq - Critical Incidents: Resolution in the Field", in Woodcock and Davis, *Analysis of Civil-Military Interactions*, The Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 1999, pp. 336-47.

With this Administration, however, the new USAID Administrator Andrew Natsios has established a new “pillar” for USAID — conflict management. His confirmation hearing testimony represents his intentions:

*“Nearly two-thirds of the countries with USAID field missions have been ravaged by civil conflict over the past five years, in some cases destroying years of economic and political progress. I have witnessed the horror of these conflicts, the widespread starvation of civilians, terrible atrocities, the collapse of governments and national economies. ... Should I be confirmed, USAID will begin a deliberate effort to focus its limited program funds on conflict prevention and resolution, in conjunction with already existing efforts at the State and Defense Departments. ... According to the Carnegie Commission for Preventing Deadly Conflict, total NATO peacekeeping and humanitarian aid efforts in Bosnia cost \$53 billion. Surely it is better to prevent disasters, such as Rwanda and Bosnia, before they occur, than to clean up the mess after it is too late.”<sup>24</sup>*

Almost all of USAID’s programs, it logically follows, need to be designed to address real or potential conflict issues. Since conflict is largely a political matter, this now requires USAID to work much more closely with the State Department and Embassy officers on political issues impinging on development, humanitarian and recovery assistance.

The Administrator has modified his objectives since taking charge, calling USAID’s work Conflict Management rather than Conflict Prevention, in humble acknowledgement of the size of the challenge. As this paper goes to print, it is anticipated that the new office of Conflict Management and Mitigation will be established in the Bureau of Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA/CMM). The new policies and strategies defining this initiative will be formalized soon. Funding to support this initiative has been requested in the FY 2003 budget submission.

## BROADENING THE APPROACH

CMM will be a new unit in the DCHA Bureau. The Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) and the Democracy and Governance office (DG) are also part of this Bureau. OTI was started in 1994 to provide short-term, high political impact activities in post-conflict countries that contribute to a more rapid return to stability.

*“OTI’s mission is to help local partners advance peaceful, democratic change in conflict-prone countries. Seizing critical windows of opportunity, OTI works on the ground to provide fast, flexible, short-term assistance targeted at key transition needs. It’s ability to assist local partners in addressing the root causes of conflict is key to bridging the gap between emergency relief and long-term sustainable development.”<sup>25</sup>*

<sup>24</sup> Andrew Natsios, Testimony before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, April 25, 2001.

<sup>25</sup> USAID/Office of Transition Initiatives: Guide to Program Options in Conflict-Prone Settings, USAID, September 2001, pp. 4-5. (See also [http://www.usaid.gov/hum\\_response/oti](http://www.usaid.gov/hum_response/oti))

USAID's democracy and governance programs began earlier and supported the US government's increasingly important foreign policy objective of democratization.

*“The DG Office helps USAID field missions design and implement democracy strategies, provides technical and intellectual leadership in the field of democracy development, and manages some USAID programs directly. ... The DG Office's primary objective, working principally with USAID missions in the field and with regional bureaus, is to make democracy and governance programs more effective and strategic in scope. ... (It) works closely with the State Department and the National Security Council on how democracy programming can contribute importantly to the achievement of U.S. foreign policy objectives in these and other countries. (It uses) ... four categories to describe its democracy and governance activities: **rule of law, elections and political processes, civil society, and governance.**”<sup>26</sup>*

As this picture unfolds, it shows the USAID focused from the 1950's to the 1990's almost entirely on *economic assistance* projects evolving from its historical mandate stemming from the Marshall Plan in the 1950's. Close Congressional oversight kept USAID's development assistance management distinctly separate from the US government political objectives in developing countries, fearing that effective, long-term development assistance could not occur if encumbered with short-term, politically motivated changes. In today's world, development assistance is much more closely linked with global politics, thus USAID is increasingly factoring political issues into its assistance programs. In today's crisis countries, political development ranks equally important with economic development, and USAID is adjusting. A new Conflict Management priority within USAID will now require USAID to develop political analysis skills and work much closer with our State Dept. colleagues. The State Department's Mission Program Plan process will facilitate that.<sup>27</sup>

## TODAY'S MANDATE

USAID's traditional mandate remains the same. The question we are now exploring is whether USAID can play a stronger role in the interagency given the trends.

Development assistance programs are long-term in nature. USAID's country strategies and projects are generally five years, although many projects are renewed, some several times. Thus USAID, as well as the World Bank and other donors, have developed highly professional capacities to perform strategic analysis to help developing countries achieve long-term objectives.

Crises, however, are generally approached in a highly short-term, usually *ad-hoc*, incremental, “effective muddling through”<sup>28</sup> style. As a result, the responses by the various organizations having to work together in crisis countries are very compartmentalized. Most

<sup>26</sup> From USAID's DG Office website, <http://usaid.gov/democracy/office/index.html>

<sup>27</sup> The Mission Performance Plan was instituted a few years ago by the State Department to encourage, *inter alia*, integrated interagency planning within Embassies. The burgeoning number of crises in the world due to power vacuums in the Post-Cold War period required greater attention toward crisis warning and mitigation.

<sup>28</sup> A former U.S. Ambassador to Bosnia used this term to describe the efforts in Bosnia. It applies to most conflict situations.

military after-action reports list compartmentalized efforts as a major problem, including *within* the military. Here is one example from a post-IFOR deployment in Bosnia:

*“Theme #1. The Need for an Integrated Strategic Planning Process, Rather than “Ad Hoc-ery.”*

*Problem: Stove-pipe, independent planning prevents integrated planning, invites “ad hoc-ery,” and sows confusion. Operations suffer when there is no strategic planning structure that includes a designated person tasked with responsibility for integrating the key multinational civil and military elements of a peace operation.”<sup>29</sup>*

There is not much evidence of improvement in subsequent deployments. USAID's UK counterpart, DfID, is sending an exploratory team to Afghanistan in August to examine the possibility of working with the Afghans on a holistic security sector effort there. The concern is that each donor contribution (U.S.: national army training; Germans: police training; Italy: justice system support) risks missing an integrating component, i.e., helping the Afghans master their security sector management as a whole.

The trends described early in this paper would indicate that we will reach a consensus among international policy makers in the not-too-distant future that strategic planning occurring alongside immediate crisis planning has an important role to play in crisis management. If so, the capacities of development assistance strategic planners, military operations research specialists, and the think-tank communities may be asked to contribute in a more significant manner.

As we in USAID anticipate and prepare for this possibility, here are some of the tools we are developing or exploring:

- *Conflict Vulnerability Assessments.* One huge missing ingredient in crisis management is the information and analysis around the conflict that permits decision-makers to reach their conclusions with the short-, mid-, and long-term aspects of the crises carefully balanced and weighed. We are now developing a conflict vulnerability assessment methodology that permits use in a wide range of pre-, during and post-conflict situations. The assessment itself can be a full-blown, comprehensive assessment, or a rapid risk assessment for a pop-up crisis.
- *Host country assessment capacity-building.* The much-referenced term “nation building” has developed a political significance exaggerating its meaning. In today’s discussions, it generally means that it is the responsibility of host country leaders and populations to solve their own problems, not that of the international community. Thus the transfer of the Conflict Vulnerability Assessment methodology to the responsible parties in these countries has to be high on our priority list.
- *Civil society strengthening.* The democratization process requires governments that are accountable to their populations. One important way to

<sup>29</sup> Bosnia-Herzegovina After Action Review (BHAAR II) Conference Report, U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute, 13 April - 17 April 1997, p. 27.

achieve that is for strong citizens' groups to demand it. Thus USAID provides considerable assistance to strengthen the capacity of civil society groups to interact effectively with governments in many areas. Some important areas where USAID has programs is election oversight, civil-military relations and civilian policing (although the latter are dependent on exceptional circumstances). One specific activity example was the support of Otpor in Serbia, a student group which helped generate popular support against Milosevic leading to his defeat at the polls.

- *Information systems technologies* can provide a more efficient tool for host country officials to understand, analyze and reach conclusions in a participative manner with their populations (civil society). One example is the SENSE simulation<sup>30</sup> developed by the Institute for Defense Analyses. It is a highly sophisticated market economics simulation that grows an economy from crisis through 10-20 years into the future. It is a participative, experience-based game that requires strategic planning, negotiation and effective communication among the government, private sector, donor and NGO players. There are several other IT tools that can be applied to crisis situations, also.<sup>31</sup>
- *Civil-military relations.* The military in developing countries has often been a factor in creating a crisis. It has also been a stabilizing force, such as recently in Madagascar. USAID has programs in a few countries which promote military accountability to the population through civilian groups advocating legislation increasing civilian oversight over the military, civil-military confidence-building measures, and encouraging military engagement in development activities.

The question that has yet to be fully addressed is whether long-term, integrated strategic planning is possible, practical and acceptable by a range of authorities when dealing with crises. In one sense, that question can't be answered without posing it as a hypothesis and putting it to the test through practical experiences.

## CONCLUSION

There's an old joke that goes:

"I could never be a window washer!"

"Why not?"

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<sup>30</sup> SENSE — Synthetic Estimates for the National Security Environment. SENSE was developed at the encouragement of General Clark when he was NATO commander, as his contribution to assist meet civilian objectives. The simulation was conducted in Bosnia twice, in the Republic of Georgia once, in The Hague for Montenegrans and in Washington for both Georgians and Montenegrans.

<sup>31</sup> See, for example, Davis, Maxwell and Makalou, "Conflict and Development: Inherent, not Irrelevant - Role of Information Systems Technology to Address Complex Issues," George Mason University Program on Peacekeeping Policy, August 31, 2000.

“I like to step back and admire my work.”

Many practical constraints exist to trying to address long-term issues simultaneously with the immediate crisis requirements:

- People will never agree now to what they will eventually agree to in the immediate term. An iterative process is the only way to get there.
- The cost implications of long-term plans are prohibitive. Once that door is opened, someone has to take charge, and it can't be us. Don't open it!
- The immediate issues must be solved now! Long-term considerations will be distracting and counter-productive.
- It is not possible to know enough about the long-term environment to address it in any practical way in the immediate term.

We do need to maintain a sober view of our prospects, such as the one Ambassador Morton Abramowitz (ret.) wrote recently:

*“Three features pervade the making of foreign policy in Washington today: massive overload, internal warfare and the short term driving out the long term. ... the load has grown exponentially. ... Any administration has to balance competing priorities, including the frequent conflicts between short- and long-term goals. ... The war on terrorism has made the long-term goal much harder. ... Thus democracy promotion, human rights, economic development and nation-building are certainly desirable goals, but their priority has diminished.”<sup>32</sup>*

But if we CAN step back to examine and project the trends into the future, integrated strategic planning seems inevitable. Important questions which can't be addressed when only short-term issues are considered can then carry more weight, such as:

- What training will be required to transform an authoritarian leadership to understand and become practicing democratic leaders?
- How can the economy be shaped if criminal elements are not incarcerated?
- Can engaging their leaders in long-term economic planning efforts neutralize ethnic hostilities?
- Will international private investors be more interested in investment if included in transparent strategic planning efforts? If so, will their interest serve to mitigate hostilities?

The debate is open on how best to proceed. It is a healthy one. We need to anticipate and even seek the opportunities to do integrated strategic planning.

<sup>32</sup>

Morton Abramowitz, Foreign Policy Inflight, *The Washington Post*, August 19, 2002.

The views expressed herein are those of the author only. They do not reflect the positions of the U.S. Agency for International Development nor the U.S. Government.

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