

Europe's Military Capability in Crisis Management

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INTRODUCTION

The term crisis management is very closely associated with managing conflicts, especially violent conflicts. Conflict usually occurs when two or more states disagree over territorial issues or other issues that have an affect on their country. Nations can be in dispute over economic, security, or environmental issues. These conflicts can be domestic or international and usually touch on differences in opinions and interests. If a non-violent conflict results in violence, diplomacy by definition failed. Research in understanding international conflict has shown that international conflicts have a life cycle of four stages.¹ Not all conflicts pass through these stages, but the intensity of the conflict itself can increase and make the next step more likely.

The first stage is reached when the possibility occurs that a non-violent conflict may turn violent in the near future. In order to stop such conflict from evolving further, preventative diplomacy has been used mostly by deploying UN peacekeeping forces. Such missions are seen as an opportunity to avoid the outbreak of fighting. As a matter of fact, the international community rarely deploys military forces to hot spots in the world unless war has already broken out.² The third stage is when all fighting has stopped and the conflicting parties have agreed to solve the conflict peacefully. That is the time when peacekeepers are employed under a UN mandate or of a regional organization. Usually, these troops are sent into the

¹ See especially Stedman, *Stephen. International Actors and International Conflicts*. Rockefeller Brothers Fund, Project on World Security, 1999; Lund, Michael S. *Preventing violent conflict: a strategy for preventive Diplomacy* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute for Peace, 1996); Miall, Hugh, Oliver Ramsbothan, and Tom Woodhouse. *Contemporary Conflict Resolution* (Oxford: Polity, 1999).

² A prime example for this reluctance was experienced by the Canadian General Romeo Dallaire who thought to prevent the Ruandan Genocide if he just had a more soldiers. However, the UN Security Council refused to authorize that.

conflict zone once the actual fighting has stopped and ensure that fighting does not re-occur. The last stage of a conflict cycle is building a stable peace among the conflicting parties. "In general, a crisis is a perceived turning point in relationships between actors or between actors and states."³

Other authors define crisis as a "situation where there is a perception of threat, heightened anxiety, expectation of possible violence and the belief that any actions will have far-reaching consequences."⁴ In the literature, there are two streams of analysis when looking at a crisis: If the decision-making process goes wrong during an international crisis events may rapidly escalate into aggression. They will also arise if both parties' interests are not met.⁵ The management of an international crisis then is the ability to control and guide events during a crisis and this is where diplomacy comes into play.

Historically, the general concept of crisis management became a conscious concept and area of analysis in the academic literature after the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. In the aftermath of the crisis Secretary of Defence McNamara is quoted as saying: "There is no longer any such thing as strategy, only crisis management."⁶ McNamara's realization was that the primary military objective is not to win wars any more but to manage crisis. Coral Bell supports this when she writes that a crisis is a "much smaller, more manageable, more clearly defined, more isolable phenomenon than conflict..."⁷ This definition of crisis evolved during the Cold War and does hold up with developments during the 1990s in which conflicts erupted inside states rather than between states. In the academic literature, there is no precise and commonly adopted definition of conflict management or crisis management.⁸

The academic debate is broad and complex; some authors argue that conflict is intrinsic in the human being and therefore unavoidable in the conduct of international relations. Others point out that all conflict can be solved if the right tools are employed. In contrast, the term conflict resolution goes beyond that definition and tries to show a way for the conflicting parties to analyze and overcome their conflict and to explore strategies of how to improve the system.⁹ Because the field of conflict resolution is so vast and complex, this essay will not look at specific EU conflict resolution mechanisms.¹⁰ This chapter acknowledges that there is a civilian aspect of European crisis management¹¹; however, because of constraints in time and space the analysis of this chapter is limited to the military side of European crisis management only. Therefore, the Petersberg Tasks will be evaluated with respect to their impact and abilities.

³ See Graham Evans & Jeffrey Newnham. *The Dictionary of World Politics: A Reference guide to Concepts, Ideas and Institutions* (London, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990). This definition is also used by Coral Bell. *The Conventions of Crisis: A Study in Diplomatic Management* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), p.4.

⁴ Lebow, RichardN. *Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis* (Baltimore : Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981).

⁵ Usually, for this approach game theory is applied trying to explain when a crisis leads to violent conflict.

⁶ Quoted in: Coral Bell, *The Conventions of Crisis*, p. 2.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

⁸ See Ho-Won Jeong, "Conflict Management and Resolution", *Encyclopaedia of Violence, Peace, and Conflict*, Volume 1 (Academic Press, 1999), p. 390.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 391.

¹⁰ However, we acknowledge that there are various methods for dealing with conflict employed by the European Union such as negotiation, adjudication, arbitration, ombudsmanry, mediation, and negotiated rule making.

¹¹ Currently, civilian police missions are under way in the former Republic of Macedonia under the ESDP mandate. For an overview of all civilian missions please refer to the Annex.

Lastly the terms Europe, Europeans, and the European Union need to be defined. When we use the term 'Europe' or 'Europeans' the political-geographical entity is meant. When we talk about the European Union we refer to the organization located in Brussels. There are at least five phases of crisis management that this chapter will make reference to. It is important to define the key terms being used as well.¹² The term conflict prevention entails a range of preventative actions used to detect, monitor and identify causes of conflict; early warning, for example, is one aspect of that. Secondly, peacemaking refers to the activities conducted after the end of a conflict to, for example, establish a cease-fire. The tools used can include diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, etc. Thirdly, peace building is defined as a concept of how to stabilize a country that experienced a violent conflict. The fourth concept used in this analysis is peacekeeping. Peacekeeping missions are designed to monitor and facilitate the implementation of an agreement.

During the Cold War, the opinion of the military establishments was that these types of operations only required niche capabilities. This, however, changed in the early 1990s with the disappearance of the Soviet Union and the eruption of the conflict in the Balkans. Europe's existing military capabilities were almost obsolete and the new ones not yet procured. In fact, the Balkan conflict started a transformation of European forces. The Petersberg Tasks were a conceptual rethinking of traditional military structures and resulted in re-structuring Europe's forces along those crisis management phases. Along with these military alterations, political transformation took place.

There are many actors involved in trying to solve international crisis and to solve those conflicts by using diplomatic and military means. The international community engages in this process by assigning diplomats of the nation states to develop strategies of problem solving and involve international organizations such as the United Nations, NATO, OSCE and others. However, not only international organizations might be involved in trying to prevent conflicts, but also regional organizations such as the European Union. Some institutional changes had to be made to existing European treaties in order to prepare the Union to carry out crisis management missions, or what they called the Petersberg tasks, which include humanitarian and rescue missions, peacekeeping, and peacemaking. These institutional changes will be looked at in part one of the chapter.

Part two of this chapter turns the focus of analysis away from historical developments in European crisis management to the actual missions in which the Europeans have deployed forces as part of their crisis management capabilities.

HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN EUROPE

FROM THERE TO HERE

The notion of crisis management made its way into the official European language of the present day for the first time with the treaty of Maastricht. The Treaty of Maastricht was

¹² The following key terms have been defined by referring to Government of Canada, Department of National Defence, Joint Doctrine Manual Peace Support Operations, B-GJ-005-307/FP-030 and North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Peace Support Operation doctrine, AJP 3.4.1.

signed by the Heads of State and Government in 1992 and, among other things created a European Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as the second pillar of the European Union.¹³ This treaty was a historical moment for the community, because it was the first time since 1954 that the European Community successfully adopted steps towards pooling its foreign and defence policies. An explicit provision was included in the treaty that a CFSP might lead to a common defence in the future.

After the failure to ratify the European Defence Community in 1954, a coordinated European defence was in practice taboo and remained so until the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Up until 1992, there was a division of labour between the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance. For more than four decades, the European Union was preoccupied with promoting the integration of European markets whereas NATO's responsibility was to maintain cohesion between the Germans and the Americans. Traditionally, when it came to defence issues the Europeans were internally divided. The diverging concepts were most obvious between British and French ideas about European autonomy. London was always in favour of the Alliance's primacy and reluctant to transfer more military authority to the European Union. The French, on the other hand, very much favoured more European autonomy and wanted to strengthen its relationship with Germany. In other words, for almost four decades the continent was divided between the 'Europeanists' and 'Atlanticists'. This division had a tremendously negative impact on boosting European military capabilities.

The treaty of Maastricht intended to change all that and allowed the EU as a political entity the first steps internationally even though the EU did not possess its own military capabilities and the decision-making in CFSP remained intergovernmental. Most of the debate focussed on ways to strengthen the operational capabilities of the new union. In reality, CFSP created a new link to the Western European Union (WEU). Germany and France favoured the complete merger of the WEU into the EU, but this proposal did not find the majority among the British and those countries that were not members of the WEU. Britain's attitude started to change under Prime Minister Tony Blair in 1998.

The Maastricht Treaty specified five general objectives for CFSP: safeguard the common values and interests of the union, strengthen its security, preserve peace and internal security in accordance with the UN charter, promote international cooperation, and finally develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law. Even though the Maastricht Treaty prepared the road for a CFSP, pooling Europe's military capabilities was a much more difficult process to start. One reason for this was that the majority of Europeans wanted to cash in the peace dividend after the end of the Cold War and were reluctant to devote more financial resources to the militaries. Politicians therefore were at odds with their citizens. They envisaged a common defence, but ran into resistance from their citizens. This picture started to change when violent conflicts broke out in former Yugoslavia in 1992, which led to a complete change in the debate about European defence capabilities. The crisis in Slovenia in 1991 underlined the inability of the Europeans to handle a conflict outside their doorstep. Later, the violent conflict in Bosnia showed that the Europeans were still divided about how to handle conflicts and how to react to them diplomatically and militarily. One of the main lessons of the conflict in Bosnia was that the EU lacked appropriate defence institutions to coordinate a coherent European approach to evolving crisis. In this sense, the wars on the Balkans were a catalyst for institutional changes in Europe.

¹³ The first pillar is the economic, social and environmental community, the third community deals with police and judicial co-operation in criminal matters.

INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES

In June of 1992 the WEU was tasked by the EU to develop a new concept for future European forces, stressing that the sole responsibility for defence will remain with NATO. The transformation process of European military forces should focus on force projection and the management of far off crisis. It developed the so-called Petersberg Tasks that marked the first recognition of a new strategic environment in Europe after the end of the Cold War and became the core of European Security and Defence Policy. In short, the Petersberg Tasks were an attempt to define what, when, and how Europe's forces should be used for. In some countries, this step towards more autonomous European forces was not very well received, especially in the United States. Washington very much objected to more autonomous European capabilities, but principally agreed to a European Defence Identity. The US proposed a solution that was centred on a compromise creating separable but not separate forces.¹⁴ This compromise allowed the WEU to act independently while using NATO military assets and was later formalized in the Berlin Plus agreement.

Later, in 1994 NATO introduced the Combined Joint Task Force concept that offered an instrument to deploy forces rapidly without duplicating them. It provided the alliance with a tool to organize themselves. The CJTF concepts intended to make NATO forces more flexible, rapidly deployable and multinational.¹⁵ It is a military concept that includes all three services (army, navy, and air force) from NATO's member states and provides multinational forces with a single command. Secondly, the 'new' system is able to include non-NATO countries and therefore enables the Alliance to carry out military missions with partners and friends in situations not necessarily related to collective defence. Thirdly, the CJTF concept was also compatible with the goal of building an ESDI within NATO and therefore provides military structures as well as doctrines that it can make available to the Western European Union (WEU) under the premise that forces are 'separable but not separate'.

In 1996, the Berlin Summit first tried to define the relationship between the EU and NATO, but no conclusive agreement was reached. A year later, in 1997, the European Union acquired its own military capabilities with the merger of the WEU into the EU, which meant that the WEU was required to define itself directly in relation to the EU rather than to rely on the WEU as a bridge between NATO and the EU.

A second turning point in the institutional reform process of European defence was the summit meeting in St. Malo between Britain and France in 1998. It was the first time the two countries consolidated their concepts about European defence. In this respect, the outcome of the summit can be seen as a breakthrough. This meeting took place in light of various developments on both sides. The British on the one hand, revised their military strategy in 1996 and made their forces lighter, more flexible, and more sustainable.

The French, on the other hand, had a reasonable fear that the United States would withdraw its responsibility of defending Europe, which in return would increase the financial burden on its territorial defence. In addition, Paris enjoyed a good working relationship with

¹⁴ Later on, in 1997 then Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, defined the conditions for European autonomy more closely by demanding three things: (1) no duplication of already existing NATO forces; (2) no discrimination against non EU but NATO members; (3) no decoupling from NATO.

¹⁵ In fact, the CJTF concept is ideally suited to command and control NATO forces and partners 'out of area'.

London during the war in Bosnia and thus it was a natural step to use this working partnership to boost Europe's defence capabilities. Moreover, the French assumed that by signing the Maastricht treaty, which said that collaboration in EU defence matters might lead to a common defence, would give them the necessary muscle to call for more European autonomy. Thirdly, the French revised their military strategy and published a Defence White Paper in 1994 that restructured the French forces and focussed on peacekeeping and crisis management. This friendly rapprochement between the two biggest military powers in Europe prepared the way for reforming Europe's military institutions in order to carry out the Petersberg Tasks of 1992. London, on the other hand, loosened its close relationship with the United States. "The St. Malo declaration should be read as a turning point in London's approach to Europe as much as a French concession to Alliance legitimacy."¹⁶ Germany, which held the Presidency of the European Union in 1999, transformed this bilateral initiative into a European reality and changed the European defence identity into a European security and defence policy.

The EU Council meeting in Cologne in 1999 agreed on the following institutional changes¹⁷: First, the council decided that Javier Solana should be appointed as the High Representative for the EU's CFSP with a mandate to closer co-ordinate Europe's foreign and defence policy. In short, Solana was thought to be the person to answer Henry Kissinger's famous question "Who do I call when I want to talk to Europe?" Secondly, it was agreed to set up a political and security committee (PSC) that would deal with all aspects of CFSP and ESDP on a daily basis. Its primary function is to manage evolving crisis as well as carrying out evaluation and planning of current missions. It thereby advises the council on all matters of foreign and defence issues and is in fact in charge of the day-to-day direction of military operations. Thirdly, the Cologne Council created a EU Military Committee that is composed of the Chiefs of Defence Staff of each member state and is responsible for advising the PSC in all military issues. This organization is the EU's most senior military body. It is assisted in its duties by the EU military staff that is responsible for early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning.

After setting up these new institutions, only one issue remained controversial and that is the complicated relationship between the two most important institutions responsible for European security, NATO and the EU. Initially, the European Council meeting in Berlin in 1996 intended to solve the problems between the two organizations, but no compromise could be found at that time. Based on these negotiations, a Berlin-Plus agreement was reached and now the relations between the two organizations are firmly established and constitute a vital part of ESDP. The agreement was finally signed at the EU Copenhagen Summit in 2002 and provides the EU secured access to NATO's planning capabilities as well as pre-identified NATO capacities.¹⁸ Thus, the agreement signed in Copenhagen opened the way for a strategic partnership between the EU and NATO in crisis management operations.

¹⁶ European Union Institute for Security Studies. *European Defence: A proposal for a White Paper* (Paris, 2004).

¹⁷ These institutional set ups were decided at the EU Cologne Summit in 1999, elaborated at the EU Council meeting in Helsinki in December 1999, finalized at the EU Council meeting in Santa Maria da Feira in June 2000, and agreed at the EU Council meeting in Nice in December 2000.

¹⁸ The reason why the Berlin Plus agreement took such a long time to reach was because of the ongoing conflict between Turkey and Greece over Cyprus. Turkey feared that Greece could use European Rapid Reaction forces to fight against Turkey while using NATO capabilities. The compromise found was that ESDP operations would not be launched against a Union's member.

OPERATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS SINCE MAASTRICHT

In December 1999, just one year after the breakthrough at the bilateral St. Malo meeting, the EU Council meeting in Helsinki developed a headline goal for future military capabilities and called for a European Rapid Reaction Force. This force should consist of 50 – 60,000 soldiers from all three services and would be highly mobile and flexible, rapidly deployable and sustainable for at least one year. The force should be self-sustaining in terms of command, control and intelligence capabilities as well as logistics. The force includes naval as well as air elements. In order to sustain 60,000 troops, it was assumed that the EU would need at least 200,000 highly professional and mobile soldiers that would rotate in at least three waves.¹⁹ In addition, the force will be equipped with autonomous intelligence and surveillance capabilities as well as its own command and control structure. According to media sources²⁰, Germany committed the largest amount of forces (13,500 troops, 20 ships, and 90 planes) followed by the British (12,500 troops, 18 ships, and 72 airplanes) and the French (12,000 troops, 15 ships, and 72 airplanes) for the EU Rapid Response Force (EU RRF).²¹

Most recently, the Council of the EU decided to enhance the structure and capacity of the ERRF with 13 ERRF battle groups consisting of 1500 troops per group ready to be fully deployed by 2007. This rapid response force was designed to be capable of carrying out the Petersberg Tasks set out by the WEU in 1992, which include conflict prevention, humanitarian and rescue tasks, crisis management missions, peacekeeping tasks as well as active combat tasks such as peacemaking²². In addition, it was decided at Helsinki to set up mechanisms not only for military but also civilian crisis management to better coordinate and use the various civilian means and resources.

At the Council meeting in Santa Maria da Feira in June 2000, the heads of state and government decided to boost European capabilities in four areas: police forces, the rule of law, civil administration, and civilian protection. The goal was set to have 5,000 police officers ready for deployment. The response to the request was greater than anticipated and the member states offered more officers than initially requested. Because of these fast commitments, the EU was in a position to take over the International Police Task Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina from the United Nations. The French used this initial success to propose a European military police force during the EU Defence Ministers meeting in Rome on 3 October 2003. This force would be modelled after the French Gendarmerie police unit. However, a final decision is still pending.

In a second step, the Council meeting in Helsinki listed several shortfalls of Europe's military capabilities to carry out crisis management operations successfully. The result of these deliberations and shortfalls were the foundation of the 'Helsinki Headline Goals'.

¹⁹ This is the typical military deployment circle: one group is deployed, the second is resting at home, and the third group is training for future deployment.

²⁰ Details about the force remain highly classified.

²¹ The EU RRF should not be confused with its NATO counterpart, the NATO Rapid Reaction Force that was created at the Prague Summit of 2002 upon an initiative of the United States. The distinction between the two units is still not clear. However, essentially, the two response forces make use of the same pool of soldiers.

²² However, the Europeans misleadingly use the term peacemaking instead of peace-enforcement, a term that the UN, NATO, and other countries commonly use.

Therein, it is stated that Europe had sufficient ground forces but lacked capabilities in air transportation, precision-guided missiles, and the deployment of headquarters to relative near theatres of operation, and mobility and intelligence. The Helsinki Summit reaffirmed Europe's position that the new EU RRF is not to be seen in competition to NATO forces. While the Headline Goal specifically targets EU member states, it also encourages third countries to contribute militarily to EU led missions. So far, Bulgaria, Iceland, Romania, and Turkey have shown interest. In addition, each national force and commitment target will need to be closely coordinated between the NATO military committee and its EU counterpart to avoid duplication of forces. In other words, if Germany specializes in heavy lift aircraft in the EU then it is redundant to instruct Britain with the same task.

In terms of actual delivery of the Headline goal, the Helsinki Task Force estimated that about 200,000 combat soldiers, 350 aircraft, 180 support aircraft, and about 20 frigates are needed. Particular attention will be devoted to improving capabilities that are necessary to ensure effective performance in crisis management such as deployability, sustainability, interoperability, flexibility, mobility, survivability, command, and control. The EU's military staff developed two catalogues, the Helsinki Headline Catalogue, which reviewed all European military capabilities, and secondly, the Helsinki Force Catalogue 2003, which listed commitments of all member states. After analysing the commitments of the member states and their shortfalls carefully, agreement was shared among academics and politicians that the EU has shortfalls in many areas. The second Commitment Conference on 19 November 2001 drafted the Helsinki progress catalogue, which documented the shortfalls and progress made since the Council's meeting in Helsinki.

The EU Military Committee concluded in its analysis that the targets for the ground troops were met, but that the inadequacy in terms of air transport, C3I and others remained imminent. Therefore, the next logical step was to make up for the shortfalls and calling for a European capabilities action plan. Despite the respectable interests of the member states, the defence ministers were faced with various national difficulties in order to procure the capabilities they promised. The most obvious reason for the delay in more European capabilities is the lack of money and the decreasing defence budgets of the member states. The reason for the decreasing defence budgets are multiple, but probably the most imminent are the rising costs for the social welfare state in times of economic downturns. The second reason for the delay of capabilities is the overall transformation of European forces from an army of the Cold War that was trained to defend the home territory to an intervention military with expeditionary capabilities and to projecting forces abroad. The goal is to make Europe's forces lighter, more mobile, flexible and more sustainable.

The third obstacle in transforming European forces has to do with time and money. It will take many years to complete the transformation process. The politicians have realized this as well and extended the initial Helsinki Headline Goal deadline to 2010 by which significant progress in fulfilling the current deficiencies is expected to be made. This new target became known as the Headline Goal 2010. Besides extending the deadline for improving European capabilities, it calls for a European battle group that would be much smaller and lighter than the initial 50,000 troops of the European Rapid Reaction Force. The battle group concept was a Franco-British initiative, endorsed by the Germans in February 2004, and later submitted to the Political and Security Committee. The ARTEMIS mission in the Congo in 2003 was the first operations experience of the battle group concept.

CASE STUDIES

After the European crisis management debacle in the Balkans, which culminated in the bitter recognition of military incapability during the Kosovo war in 1999, Europeans finally learned that the times of institution building and conceptualisation about military capabilities are over and pro-activeness is paramount. As mentioned in the previous section, the Europeans adopted military and civil headline goals that would create the capabilities needed to manage crises successfully in the future. Since 2003, under the heading of ESDP, the EU has been running formal crisis management operations. This chapter will look at each one of them to examine current civil and military crisis management capabilities. The scope of examination will cover the different phases of crisis management as mentioned in the introduction, which are: early warning, conflict prevention, peace making, peace enforcing, and peace building. The measurement of success of Europe's crisis management capabilities will not only be short term, i.e. success in the employment of means and objective achievement, but also the long term impact on a potential crisis area and the international system (Table 1 and Figure 1).

Mission	Time	Place	Legal	Objectives	C2	Pers.	Count ries	Capabilities
Concordia	Mar 31 – Dec 31 2003	FYR Macedonia	UNSCR 1371	Monitor Support Liase	Operations HQ DSACEUR In Mons/B Force HQ Skopje	400	13 EU 14 Non- EU	Jeeps Lightly Armoured Transport helicopters
Artemis	Jun 16 – Sep 01, 2003	Bunia, D.R. Congo	UNSCR 1484	Stabilize Protect improve	Operations HQ in Paris Force HQ in Entebbe	1900	12 EU 3 Non- EU	Lightly armoured Mobile Engineers CAS Air Refuelling Strat/tact. Lift MEDIVAC
Althea	Dec 02, 2004 -	Bosnia and Herzegovina	UNSCR 1551 1575	Deter Secure Monitor	Operations HQ DSACEUR In Mons/B Force HQ Sarajevo	7000	22 EU 11 Non- EU	Lightly armoured Mobile

Table 1: Operations CONCORDIA, ARTEMIS, and ALTHEA.

Since March 2003, there have been ten EU led crisis management operations (3 military and 7 civilian) under the heading of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Seven of them are still ongoing (1 military, 5 civil, 1 mixed) in theatres all over the world (Figure 1). In the following, each mission is broken down into the essential information and complemented by additional information about events leading to the conflict. Finally, the whole information package will be analyzed and assessed as mentioned above.




Figure 1: Operations CONCORDIA, ARTEMIS, and ALTHEA.

OPERATION CONCORDIA

In the aftermath of the Kosovo war in 1999, the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FYROM) was about to plunge into a civil war. Ethnic Albanians in FYROM had organized themselves into a national liberation army (NLA) and fought government forces to achieve a split and unification with Albania. With the help of international mediation, the government of FYROM and moderate ethnic Albanian leaders decided to solve the conflict peacefully. This process was supervised by NATO (Operations AMBER FOX and ALLIED HARMONY) and in the end, the NLA disarmed voluntarily. The Ohrid Agreement²³ of 2001 fixed the multi-ethnic democratic future of FYROM promising EU membership in some distant future. In spring 2003, the EU took over these missions from NATO and ran the operation making full use of NATO assets as agreed in the Berlin plus agreement. International military presence was terminated altogether in the autumn of the same year.

Operation CONCORDIA was a classical peacekeeping mission. Force size and composition shows that it had more a symbolic than a practical value. NATO's Peace enforcement operations in Kosovo and its robust appearance on the ground (KFOR) made an impression on the aggressors in the region. NATO peacekeepers in FYROM could work very effectively. When the EU took over, European forces were already deployed as part of a

²³ Named after a town in FYROM.

larger NATO force. Due to the logistic chain already in place, there were no containment problems either. The command and control set-up was blown out of proportion. Normally a troop body of 400 (i.e. one battalion) is commanded by a lieutenant colonel. In this case the tactical commander was a two-star general with a three-star general officer right above him at the operational/strategic level. Not underestimating the political implication of having the first EU military operation run under the command of the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR) and his planning staff (as agreed between NATO and the EU), putting generals in charge of tactical troop bodies, can easily lead to superfluous micro-management. This first military EU operation did not seriously challenge any military capabilities. It made politicians, soldiers, and functionaries apply new procedures and communicate with each other for the first time. This in itself is a capability, which does not come naturally and requires practice.

OPERATION ARTEMIS

Codenamed ARTEMIS, this operation deployed to Bunia, the capital of Ituri province in north-eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) on 12th June, 2003 and reached its full strength on 6 July. The province had suffered years of conflict, as fighting between ethnic militias had been exacerbated by the intervention of the neighboring states Rwanda and Uganda. In April 2003, the long awaited Ituri Interim Administration (IIA) was established, opening the way for the withdrawal of Ugandan forces from the province. Clashes between the militia of the Lendu and Hema tribes resulted in a humanitarian disaster. United Nations investigators reported massacres from February 2003, while some 500 000 to 600 000 people were displaced throughout the region. On April 23rd, UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) began the deployment of 700 Uruguayan "blue berets" in Bunia. However, those forces had neither the means nor the mandate to deal with the situation. They could not bring the violence that continued throughout May 2003 between the Hema militia and Lendu armed gangs to an end. As a result, given the seriousness of the situation, United Nations Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, called on France to head a multinational force to restore calm to Bunia.

On June 5th, the EU adopted a joint-action on the European Union's military operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, which was later confirmed by the EU Council on 12 June. Hence, on 16 June 2003, operation ARTEMIS became the first 'autonomous' EU military operation. Unlike Operation CONCORDIA, which made use of SHAPE NATO planning and command capabilities, Operation ARTEMIS was conducted without recourse of NATO assets. In accordance with the EU's framework nation concept endorsed on July 24th 2002, the command and control capabilities necessary for the planning, launching and management of Operation ARTEMIS was provided by one member state (in this case France), which acted as a Framework Nation. France provided the Operational Headquarters for the mission and the majority of personnel including the Operation Commander (Major General Bruno Neveux) and Force Commander (Brigadier General Jean-Paul Thonier). The EU Military Committee (EUMC) monitored the proper execution of the operation, whilst the Political and Security Committee (PSC) exercised political control and strategic direction. On July 25th, Javier Solana held separate talks with the presidents of the DRC, Rwanda and Uganda trying to settle a peace agreement in the Congo aimed at cementing the Congolese peace process. Operation ARTEMIS ended on September 1 2003, when a reinforced UN presence took over in Bunia.

ARTEMIS can be called a role model for the EU's envisioning the battle group concept. With a relatively short warning time and a distance into theatre of approximately 6000 km around from Brussels, EU members and other friendly countries deployed about 1900 troops and their equipment. Tactical air support, air refueling, air transport, as well as logistics were in place timely and ready to support operations. Initial necessary peace enforcement quickly led to peace keeping. The mission terminated, when the end state (UN peacekeeping reinforcements arriving in Bunia) was reached. Operational and tactical command and control vested with the framework nation and the major force, provider France. Strategic and political control remained with the EU in Brussels. NATO did not get involved this time. Considering EU's civil presence in the region before and during the mission, for the first time operation ARTEMIS became the ideal military composition of EU crisis management operations.

OPERATION ALTHEA

The EU force (EUFOR) executing ALTHEA replaced the NATO-led SFOR operation (Stabilization Force). Since the end of 1996, SFOR had considerably contributed to the stabilization in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It emerged from IFOR (Implementation Force), which after the Dayton-Agreement in 1995 had taken over the task to provide security for Bosnia-Herzegovina. Initially, the size of SFOR's was around 32,000 troops - approximately half that of IFOR. Because of the general compliance with the terms of the Peace Agreement, the significantly smaller SFOR was able to implement the Dayton Peace Agreement to: stabilize the current secure environment in which local and national authorities and other international organisations are working. Secondly, SFOR provided support to other agencies. When EUFOR took over from SFOR, there will be little change in the composition of the military units of participating European nations. European participant nations were already present in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Its tasks were the following: to liaise with the ALTHEA force, pursue military and security objectives in connection with the reform of the Bosnian armed forces, the fight against international terrorism, and track down criminals sought by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). With operation ALTHEA, the EU is now in charge of the whole spectrum of crisis management in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the political, the military, the security, the economical, and the social.

No doubt, operation ALTHEA is not as spectacular as operation ARTEMIS. Yet ALTHEA has become of unprecedented value to the EU. It started as an operation right at Europe's doorstep and European forces were already in theatre as a larger NATO contingent, which was led by the U.S. who accomplished the giant task of peace enforcement in the previous years. The whole range of crisis management tools are now under European control. The integration of civil and military operations in an area vital to EU interests allows Europeans to transition from peace keeping to peace building. Day-to-day operations are not a challenge in the military sense. Learning from civil-military cooperation in crisis management operations will provide skills and confidence inside the EU. Externally, this presents an example of the European way of crisis management could become exemplary and pave the way for future operations and even more important function as a shop window for future crisis handling thus becoming a reliable tool for UN missions and creating acceptance in other regions of the world.

CONCLUSION

With the closing of the Cold War, a new period has evolved for European foreign policy. During the 1990s, Europe carried out numerous institutional transformations to meet the criteria for the second pillar (CFSP). Over the years, European Security and Defence Policy defined the roles and capabilities of future European forces. Europe as a civilian power is a myth; Europeans are definitely not from Venus and are indeed willing to use force if certain conditions apply.²⁴ First and foremost, there will be no European military deployments without a resolution of the UN Security Council; the only exception being humanitarian interventions to save lives. Because of legitimacy and burden sharing, European forces will always not only consist of forces of member states but also of third countries. Multilateralism is a significant characteristic of European military operations. Finally, European military operations must be doable. This means that the overall length of an operation has to be short and confined. Moreover, the end state of a military operation must be clearly defined. Further, military operations must be embedded into a larger context of civilian crisis management.

As shown in our assessment of past and current military operations, Europe is generally capable of deploying and employing forces for all phases of crisis management as defined earlier. To carry out classical peacekeeping operations, current military capabilities are not only sufficient but allow Europe to be the leading force provider for UN peacekeeping missions. However, in situations where crisis escalates into armed conflict, as operation ARTEMIS showed, European forces can only do peace-enforcement operations at the tactical level. Here, the battle group concept has shown to be successful and resourceful for constrained military budgets. Despite the fact that the concept evolved out of insufficient capabilities, it seems to become the most practical way for engaging in a crisis militarily. Therefore, it seems that the Helsinki Headline Goals of creating a rapid reaction force of 60,000 troops does not serve European security interests and is beyond European budgets. To engage militarily in a crisis with such a force requires absolute control of the crisis area and thus runs the risk of inheriting a multi-dimensional conflict that is difficult to stabilize and extract from.

²⁴ The picture of Europe as Venus versus the American Mars was first used by Robert Kagan in his book "Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the new world order (New York : Vintage Books, 2004). His picture implies that Europe denies the use of military force to solve international conflicts while the United States is quite willing to use military forces.