

Police Reform Programs: Links to Post-Conflict Reconstruction
and Social Stability in Violent and Fragile States —
Building responsiveness and the connection to local civilian
needs - public security as good governance.

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INTRODUCTION (I)

Ineffective conventional public security is the hallmark of post-conflict societies. In nearly every post-conflict situation in recent memory, the reaction to this lack of security has been to focus on broad reconstruction of the security sector by demobilizing armed forces, establishing police forces, resurrecting and often reforming the legal code, reconstructing judicial and penal institutions and developing enough qualified personnel for these systems.

Unfortunately, the international community and the country in crisis rarely manages to push forward these reconstruction elements in a synchronized, culturally sensitive, and speedy fashion.

In 2000, Secretary General Kofi Annan requested Lakhdar Brahimi to head a UN panel to review United Nations peace and security activities and make recommendations as to how to structure such activities.¹ The Brahimi Report recommended, *inter alia*, a “doctrinal shift in the use of civilian police, other rule of law elements and human rights experts in complex peace operations to reflect an increased focus on strengthening rule of law institutions and improving respect for human rights in post-conflict environments.” This doctrinal shift included an increased use of international civilian police to act not just as monitors, but to restructure local police forces according to democratic principles. The report further advocated that the modern role of the civilian police needed to be “better understood and developed” and such efforts should be carried out under a team-based approach in which donors and the mission mandate provide adequate support for the whole range of rule of law activities.²

Since that time, academics and professionals have increasingly focused on the elements necessary for successful security sector reconstruction. In fact, as some have pointed out, the prevalence of the use of the word “reconstruction” in the literature on post-conflict security building is indicative of the extent to which international efforts to improve security, such as standing up a national police force, typically mirror closely the forces and institutions that were in place prior to the intervention.³ Where police forces are concerned, new post-conflict forces are often centralized and composed of a combination of newly-recruited members and vetted members of the old force.

Each post-conflict society and each intervention has had its own special context and dynamic. National government itself may or may not exist in the aftermath of the conflict, or its status may have been renegotiated as a part of the end of the conflict. The level of institutional capacity can be varied. In some cases institutions and buildings such as courts may exist and even function to some extent. In other situations, such as in post-conflict Liberia, judicial, police and penal infrastructure have been destroyed. Human capacity may vary as well.

At the end of the Kosovo conflict in 1999, many well-educated Kosovars were present and ready to take up positions in new government, judicial and security institutions. In other conflicts, skilled personnel have fled the country, leaving few educated or literate persons to take their place. It may seem that situations of extreme conflict may leave such an institutional and human vacuum that program designers have *carte blanche* to restructure the security sector, in particular the police. But, even in such a situation, it is well acknowledged that programs to rebuild police and other institutions must be designed with an eye to the historical and cultural context.⁴

¹ “Report of the Panel on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations,” 20 October 2000, http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/

² “Report of the Panel on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations,” 20 October 2000. para 40-41

³ Charles Call, 2003. *Challenges in Police Reform: Promoting Effectiveness and Accountability*. New York: International Peace Academy.

⁴ Organization for Economic Security and Development - Department of Constitutional Affairs (UK) Accra, Ghana Conference draft document, 2005

International efforts have recognized the need to reduce violence in the post-conflict environment so as to avoid “tipping” back into conflict. Unfortunately, international donor efforts to address this urgent need for service delivery in the security sector have often focused initial attention primarily on overarching structural reform and reorganization. In every case, the international community has chosen to focus on first reorganizing and training a police force, which is almost always centralized in structure. International donor attention to structural reform is also reflected in attempts to build capacity in other aspects of the security sector such as the armed forces, judicial and legal institutions. Even efforts to build democratic controls and good governance tend to focus on broad national institutions and processes such as holding elections, building parliamentary capabilities, and promoting free speech and human rights. This national or state-centered approach to rebuilding the security sector often leaves a grassroots security gap – a local level vacuum in which violence and insecurity continue to flourish.

In some cases, this vacuum is temporary; it lasts until the new police forces are adequately trained and equipped and have gained experience and legitimacy within the local communities. In other cases, the new police force lacks legitimacy, expertise, or equipment such that it never becomes able to provide adequate security to local populations. Or it provides security to only a segment of the population – one ethnicity, race, religion or socioeconomic class, one power group, one sex, or only in urban locales. This ongoing security vacuum can seriously cripple economic development and can hamper the goal of establishing effective, legitimate and democratically-run state government.

At the same time that international donors are focusing on security sector reconstruction, relief and reconstruction program designers are intervening in a situation where, out of the force of necessity, local leaders and citizens have often organized some ad hoc form of security strategy which engenders a more organized local security mechanism. This mechanism is devised to respond to local needs and is locally led; although, as with every public security apparatus around the world, it is subject to the power structures in place. But, it is there, and it is responsive at some level to local security needs. This local security mechanism responds to local concepts of what order should be and what type of order is required. It is a manifestation of the primary need that the 12,000 member NYC Police Department and the lone police officer in Shidler, Oklahoma (population 717) respond to – public order as defined by civilians and as directed by local leaders.

Ideally, this concept of public order is defined through a democratic process – elected representatives initiate statutory and constitutional reforms, create executive branch control over police forces, and carry out legislative oversight. Administrative rules and policies are established that guide the police force in its training philosophy. Media attention and civil litigation processes are effective in calling attention to, punishing and adjusting adverse police practices. National and international standards and expectations guide the overall direction of the police force. In the post-conflict environment, these democratic constraints are partially or totally absent and their absence permits armed group to gain traction in the security vacuum .

As centralized police forces are stood up they come up against local needs and sometimes against armed local security forces. While these local security forces may be able to provide some security, they are often dangerous local militias who gain legitimacy from their ability to provide security at the grassroots level despite the lack of democratic control over their actions. Their growing legitimacy can often become counter-productive to broader

peacebuilding and reconstruction efforts. Central police forces may also come up against a local fear of police acting as the agents of yet un-legitimized political actors.

Recently, thinking, study, and guidance on developing better public security and policing has begun to focus more on the disconnect between police and local civilian control⁵. This paper is an attempt to identify and bring to the discussion the components of that disconnect and examine the delivery of policing more in line with the locally-managed development approach that has taken root in the provision of other public services such as water, public health, and power. This approach attempts to improve the provision of public services while at the same time building or strengthening local democratic civilian institutions to effectively direct that public service.

In the policing context, this community-based approach requires a delicate balance. The potential benefits of local participation in improving effectiveness and democratic governance must be balanced against the danger of creating a mechanism for local political leaders to subvert control of local security forces for their own benefit. Section II of this paper briefly describes some concepts and context in the reform of police forces in a post-conflict environment. Section III reviews a few examples of civilian-led public security activities. Section IV highlights some themes and problems for consideration by future program planners seeking to increase local involvement in public security planning.

- *Note on centralization.* This discussion will deal with the need for responsiveness of police to local needs, the role of effective local civilian control in post-conflict situations, and issues in locally-led policing and public security apparatus. We note that many national police forces are considered efficient, responsive, and democratic, controlled centrally from a capital that may be relatively far removed (e.g. France). In these police forces, the chain of command goes to the capital – not to the local level. How and why that type of force works and remains responsive and the relative merits of centrally controlled police and locally controlled police is the subject of another paper. For our purposes here, we note the points made above: that in all post-conflict situations, some form of local security is organized by communities themselves, that this is often done in lieu of effective formal state-organized police – and sometimes in spite of or in opposition to state-organized police – and that this need for local order is a critical component of the social stability that is a central goal of post-conflict programs.

REFORMING POLICE IN A POST-CONFLICT ENVIRONMENT – CONCEPT AND CONTEXT (II)

Concepts of police reform or reconstruction in the context of the larger security sector reform supported by international donors are often quite similar in their overall framework. The police must be effective and accountable to the public, and their work must dovetail with other security sector actors such as the armed forces, judiciary and non-state justice systems. Increasingly, tools and best practices are being elaborated by international agencies such as

⁵ Organization for Economic Security and Development - Department of Constitutional Affairs (UK) Accra, Ghana Conference draft document, 2005.

the UN, the OECD, bilateral donors and the World Bank so that planners can adequately assess the cultural and conflict-based contexts which will impact security sector development plans.

CONCEPT

POLICING AS PUBLIC SERVICE

In its most pure form as public service, policing is a direct response to the need for public order. The police force is a group of officers directed by a community to address the human excesses that affect and disrupt all communities – from drunkenness to organized crime. The history of police development is a history of organizations developed as mechanisms for public order. In the United States, these forces have grown out of the democratic forms subject to the electoral process. In Canada, following more closely the development of policing mechanisms in the United Kingdom, professional policing was influenced by Peelian reforms in the early 19th century that were supported by a benevolent centralized government. Regardless of their origins, modern police forces in all stable democracies are at some level subject to public referendum and expected to perform public service to local communities.

By contrast, in countries where the international community has intervened and engaged in post-conflict reconstruction, the existence of a police force subject to public control and bound to provide public service is almost always *not* the case.⁶ Instead, in most cases the police were active in the dynamics that created the conflict and chaos resulting in the international intervention. Instead of serving state interests as synonymous with public good, the police have often served state interests as synonymous with the interests of powerful political leaders or groups. Policing as a public service typically becomes alien in practice and often in concept, regardless of the state of the police forces prior to the conflict.

CONCEPTS OF “ORDER”

In the concept of democratic policing, the rules that police officers enforce come from the jurisdiction that they serve. But rules, regulations and laws that constrain unacceptable actions and behavior clearly differ from culture to culture, and it is common for program designers from western countries to disagree with laws and local rules of behavior in the countries for which they design recovery and reconstruction programs. This is particularly true for rules that regulate acceptable police activity. Discussions with practitioners reveal that recent guidance on program design for public security notes this phenomenon. Designers and implementers should be open to concepts of order considerably beyond those

⁶ A notable exception is the Somali police force. Trained by western governments, the Somali Police adopted a high degree of professionalism, continued to operate without pay and provided significant stability in the first weeks after the government collapsed. Lack of pay and political support eventually eroded all resources for the force and consequently its ability to operate.

of their own cultures, though this sort of guidance appears little in the training literature.⁷ Among these cultural concepts of order may be rules around the application of human rights norms, rules deriving from religious application and freedom of religion, and rules about the treatment of and freedom of action of women.

CONTEXT

CHAINS OF COMMAND

In most societies undergoing post-conflict reconstruction, police have operated as a centralized function of an authoritarian government. Chains of command have led to senior political actors in the capital and to civilian or military leadership, upon whom there are few pressures for local responsiveness. Local public order is often in the best interests of national leaders, and police can perform that function. Some police forces in these societies have been encouraged to develop a sense of professionalism and to perform according to codes of conduct. Many feel a genuine responsibility to the communities that they serve. But, it is more often the case that chain of command, demands for responsiveness to political needs of the national leadership, and little or no requirement for accountability to local communities or their leaders have led police to become dismissive of local leaders and predatory toward local populations.

THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER

Closely related to the chain of command issue is the struggle for power that exists in all post-conflict situations; a struggle which often accelerates to a high pitch of violence and thus contributes to the chaos and continued conflict in these societies. The goal of all international post-conflict programs is typically to build a new political structure that provides more equitable access to decisions that affect public policies, protect minorities, and develop justice according to rule of law. Assistance programs will attempt to re-channel all struggles for power away from resolution of struggles through arms and violence and towards solutions in which power is derived from peaceful elections and/or other expressions of public will and consensus. Democratization of police forces often challenges those who have held power through some control over armed forces. As armed units with a unique right to use force, police will be under constant pressure and enticement to use force and its attributes to serve one or more in their struggle for power.

EXPECTATIONS AND MOTIVATIONS FOR REFORM

The goal of international intervention in the public security arena is a reformed, responsive, democratic police force which is integrated into the larger security sector. By and large, this would also be the goal of most citizens of the countries in which the international community

⁷ Informal interviews with post-conflict police practitioners.

has intervened during or after conflict. As noted above, international efforts at reform begin in a context where there are few models for professional policing and previous models suggest to future policemen that among the rewards for policing are the exercise of arbitrary power and the exploitation of that power for personal gain. Citizens – especially those who are not connected to political power – often expect this of police and tend to look elsewhere for effective responses to their needs for personal security. Even where there are public expectations that police should perform impartially and professionally, there is typically no mechanism for demanding this type of performance in a forum that is transparent and protects reform-minded individuals from corrupt political power structures.

Reform programs must take into account the impediments in the system to motivations for reform and will need to address: (1) changing the expectations of professionalism, both the personal expectations of police officers and the public expectation and (2) changing the system of rewards to police such that rewards support professionalism and accountability. Accountability to community needs, and thus relevance to stability at the local level, is most closely linked to both organizational architecture that supports reporting and responsiveness to local leadership and the development of professional expectations to do so. In addition, such organizational police architecture must be coordinated with reforms in other components of the justice sector such as broader legal and judicial reforms, as well as penal system and media reform.

CIVILIAN MANAGEMENT

In most post-conflict societies elements of returned police, vigilante groups, and other forms of ad hoc security will be put in place to address the need to protect community assets as well as the public itself. As leaders begin to assert themselves, few will have any experience in directing and managing security mechanisms or professional police forces. Conversely, police forces – some of which may have maintained some professionalism and distance from an authoritarian political ruler – will have relatively little experience in responding to democratic mechanisms. Some forces (returned police, vigilante groups and militias) will be tempted to consolidate power in their own hands, particularly in communities where local leadership has not been adequately prepared for their role in supporting democratic reforms in the new security framework.

Police that are centrally trained and managed will return to the local context in a vacuum of management expectations at the local level. Centralized and authoritarian structures for public security will have left local officials with neither expectations of nor skill sets for managing police. In most case, local officials will have developed only skills for avoiding confrontations with police and will treat police as superiors or forces to be avoided. With few exceptions, police will be inclined to fill the vacuum of management skill, expectations for order, and initiative and will assume the primary role for defining rules of behavior and priorities for security. In the best case scenario – when police training and personal goals have produced a sense of professionalism – police may make genuine contributions to equitable delivery of order, but with little civilian oversight or attention to some real but unperceived needs of the community. It is more likely that police will address this vacuum by reverting to old models and use their unchecked authority to develop opportunities to increase power and wealth.

Recent interventions have attempted to address this issue by providing training for police officers at the reformed police academies, but public security management training for local officials is rarely provided. Few programs provide opportunities to develop relationships, working agenda, and expectations of responsiveness jointly between local leaders and police. Also rare are programs which seek to build relationships across the various streams of the justice sector within a local community, i.e. among community leaders, police, and judicial, legal and penal officials.

EXAMPLES OF POST-CONFLICT CIVILIAN-LED PUBLIC SECURITY ACTIVITIES (III)

Several recent experiences highlight the need to build successful local civilian-security force relationships in order to build sustainable security at the local level. This paper examines three recent programs in Liberia and Kosovo in which efforts were made to build relationships between local leaders and formal or informal security mechanisms.

LIBERIA

Liberians have lived in a state of conflict since 1989, when Charles Taylor and his National Patriotic Front of Liberia led a rebellion against President Samuel Doe and his government forces. Beginning as early as 1990, other countries became involved in trying to mediate the Liberian conflict. The African regional organization, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) undertook to encourage peaceful settlement and sent its Military Observer Group (ECOMOG), with the support of the UN.

In 1992, the UN imposed an arms embargo and sent a Special Representative to assist ECOWAS in the mediation process between the warring parties. The Cotonou peace agreement was secured in 1993 and resulted in the establishment of the UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL). Elections were to have been held in early 1994, but unfortunately, continued conflict made elections impossible until 1997, after additional peace agreements were negotiated.

Charles Taylor won the 1997 presidential election and formed a new government which claimed to pursue reconciliation and unity. By this time, approximately 150,000 Liberians had been killed in the civil war, 850,000 had fled to neighboring countries, hundreds of thousands more had been internally displaced, and Liberia suffered in general from a total breakdown of law and order, widespread loss of infrastructure and poverty.⁸

A UN peacebuilding operation in Liberia (UNOL) was established to assist in the transition to peace and consolidation of democratic governance. But, government and opposition leaders continued to argue over governance arrangements. By 1999, these disputes, in addition to systematic human rights abuses, political oppression and a lack of security sector reform, contributed to the resumption of conflict. A new rebel movement, the

⁸ Figures from UNMIL website. <http://www.unmil.org/content.asp?ccat=history> (See the top paragraph, 1989-1997.)

Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) began to operate against Taylor near the Guinean border, but spread rapidly within Liberia. Taylor and his forces were accused of encouraging conflict in neighboring Sierra Leone.

By 2003, a LURD splinter group, the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) began fighting in southeastern Liberia. Fighting intensified, the government neared collapse, and the looming humanitarian disaster resulted in intensified international pressure for a peace agreement and an international peacekeeping force. As a result the warring parties agreed to a Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Accra, the terms of which requested a UN force to support the new National Transitional Government. Security Council Resolution 1509 mandated a new peacekeeping force, the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), to be composed of approximately 15,000 military personnel and an additional 1,115 civilian police officers.⁹

Resolution 1509 (2003) tasked UNMIL with rebuilding the Liberian National Police. The UNMIL Police opened a new police academy and began recruiting, vetting and training cadets in a manner consistent with “a professional orientation that emphasizes democratic values and respect for human rights, a non-partisan approach to duty and the avoidance of corrupt practices.”¹⁰ By July 2006, only about half of the targeted 3,500 police officers had graduated from the new police academy. As of March 2006, the Liberian National Police still suffered from a lack of basic equipment, rehabilitated facilities and reliable monthly salaries.¹¹

The reconstruction of the Liberian National Police force was to take place in the context of broader security sector reform. The government of the new, democratically elected president, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, took over from the National Transition Government of Liberia (NTGL) and soon released a new 150 Days Action Plan which promised to strengthen national security institutions and the Liberian National Police and build a democratically accountable military – no easy task considering the history of Liberian security forces as instruments of fear and oppression controlled by political elites.

Louise Anderson has noted the dichotomy between state-centered and society-centered approaches to security sector reform and advocates a combined approach in Liberia.¹² State-centered reform views the government as the main conduit for activities which strengthen state institutions such as the army, police, judiciary, executive ministries and the legislature. This state-centered approach fails to consider the informal institutions which play a key role in practical security. Anderson warns that,

by focusing exclusively on the state, the international community may render its own assistance irrelevant. People continue to rely on the resilient informal structures and coping mechanisms which determined politics and facilitated survival and conflict resolution both before and during the war. Ignoring these institutions is done at the peril of the chances for lasting peace. Some of them – even when based on divisive categories such as ethnicity, clan or

⁹ This makes UNMIL the second largest peacekeeping mission in the world.

¹⁰ UNMIL/UNPOL page @ unmil.org

¹¹ See 10th Report of the Secretary General, p. 6, S/2006/159.

¹² Louise Anderson, DIIS Brief – Post-conflict Security Sector Reform and the Challenge of Ownership – The Case of Liberia, July 2006, p. 3 - 5.

religion – could be important building blocks for a peaceful post-conflict order.¹³

One example of a more society-centered approach to improving security can be found in CHF International's Locally Initiated Networks for Community Strengthening (LINCS) Program in Liberia. The program was designed to carry out activities that focus on strengthening and expanding constituencies for peace, mitigating conflict and violence and addressing root causes and consequences of conflicts.

Under LINCS, 70 Community Peace Councils (CPCs) have been formed in three districts in Lofa County, one of the areas hit hardest by the conflict and one which is experiencing a high number of IDP returns. These CPCs have representation of all tribes, are gender and youth-balanced and include ex-combatants. Members receive training in conflict resolution, trauma healing, human rights, community policing and security, youth capacity building and leadership development. Over the length of the program, the CPCs have successfully resolved hundreds of disputes. Many of these have been land disputes arising as refugees and IDPs return to their original community.

Another large segment of disputes pertain to domestic or marital conflict, including violence against women. Tribal disputes, thefts and problems pertaining to ex-combatants have also been addressed by the CPCs. This dispute resolution forum is critical in Lofa County, an area in which police presence is limited and the judiciary is only just beginning to function again.

As the LINCS program has developed, the CPCs have taken on a greater role in identifying local community security concerns and working with Liberian and international police and other security actors to address these security problems. The CPCs can provide an effective interface between the community and police and provide a conduit for police officials to present community information on new security policy and personnel.

The CPCs also provide community education on human rights and concepts of democratic policing. With respect to conflict resolution only, the CPCs are participating in a role formerly held by customary Town Chiefs, who may or may not be present in the post-conflict community. Town Chiefs formerly provided fee-based traditional arbitration services in addition to their other work. Even after the return of Town Chiefs, the CPCs provide an alternative dispute resolution forum. Increasingly, Town Chiefs are becoming integrated into the CPC activities or turning their attention to other responsibilities.

The combination of these CHF program strands creates a synergistic environment in which to nurture new skills in community leaders. These leaders gain practical experience in identifying community needs, proposing solutions and working with other institutions to accomplish goals. The community leaders contribute to creating local ownership and establishing local mechanisms for fair, transparent and accountable democratic governance. These skills become applicable to service delivery in the development sector as well as in the security sector.

¹³ Anderson, p. 3.

KOSOVO

After years of low-level political conflict and civil disobedience vis-à-vis the Serbian central government in Belgrade, conflict between Kosovar Albanians (who make up 90% of the formerly autonomous province of Kosovo) and Kosovar Serbs erupted into sustained violence. This violence, coming on the tail of several earlier Balkan conflicts between Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia, drew the quick attention of the international community. Early on a Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission (KDOM) was formed to report on the conflict. A ceasefire agreement was negotiated and permitted the establishment of a larger, more official group of peace monitors run by the OSCE.

Through 1998 and 1999, the international community pressured Kosovar Albanian civil and military representatives and Serbian authorities to find a negotiated solution to the violence. This pressure culminated in the Rambouillet conference, during which international diplomats dictated a set of non-negotiable principles for the resolution of the conflict and sought the agreement of the parties. Ultimately, Kosovar Albanians signed onto the Rambouillet Agreement, but Serb authorities did not.

As a result, NATO instituted a bombing campaign in order to eject Serbian authorities from Kosovo. Serbia instituted a campaign of violence against Kosovar Albanians, resulting in the displacement of approximately 1.8 million Kosovar Albanians into neighboring Macedonia and Albania.

By June 1999, however, Milosevic accepted the determination of NATO to continue to pursue military action, and Serbia accepted the terms of a peace plan mediated by the Finns and the Russians. The package called for the establishment of a UN international administration composed of four pillars: interim civil administration, humanitarian affairs, reconstruction and institution building. An international military force (KFOR) led by NATO was to provide security.

The UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was established with primary interim responsibility for governance of the province. Although the peace agreement officially maintained the territorial integrity of Serbia, Serbian governance of Kosovo ceased and was assumed by UNMIK, pending the establishment of new governance institutions and elections. The OSCE, which was given the lead in the institution building pillar, became responsible for the establishment of the Kosovo Police Service and created and ran a police training academy in Vuciturn, Kosovo. This function also involved screening police candidates. However, in the interim, KFOR provided initial security until the arrival of UNMIK Police (a period of about nine months) who were to provide basic public security. UNMIK Police, in turn, has transitioned approximately 80% of policing functions to the Kosovo Police Service which is composed largely of local officers, although key positions are still held by internationals.¹⁴

Gradually, authority has been transitioned from UNMIK to new Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG) for Kosovo. But, the PISGs are prohibited from exercising any

¹⁴ “Enhancing Civilian Oversight and Management of the Security Sector in Kosovo” by Ilir Dugolli and Lulzim Peci. Published by Saferworld and the Kosovo Institute for Policy Research and Development, p. 21. <http://www.saferworld.org.uk/images/pubdocs/Kosovo.pdf>

authority in the area of internal security, and six years after the entry of NATO forces into Kosovo, UNMIK still maintains control of internal security arrangements. This is due in part to the terms of the peace settlement, which technically maintained Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo while leaving the final status unresolved. This stalled transition and lack of resolution over final status created tension and contributed to continuing outbreaks of violence, the most serious in March 2004.

The March 2004 outbreak of violence spurred the international community to begin to reconsider how to increase indigenous participation in justice and security sectors and how to move to final status negotiations. A new Internal Security Sector Review (ISSR) is underway to provide an overarching security framework for Kosovo with more participation by local stakeholders. In addition, UNMIK developed plans to create new ministries of justice and interior. UNMIK Pillar One has also created in late 2004 Local Community Safety and Crime Prevention Councils (LCS&CPC), composed of local representatives from civil administration, KFOR, civil society groups, ethnic/religious communities, the business community, youth and others interested in reducing crime and improving public security. The creation of the LCS and CPC structure was pushed by international community members, thus, they do not report to the KPS, but rather to the Kosovo Community-Based Policy Steering Group that is responsible for coordinating and supporting community-based policing and other community security initiatives.

One small example of increasing cooperation at the grassroots level is a project to identify and address community safety and security concerns in the village of Germova, Kosovo. Saferworld, working together with a Kosovar partner, the Forum for Civic Initiatives (FIQ), established a collaborative planning process bringing together community members, security providers and local authorities to identify and plan to address community safety and security concerns.

Interestingly, the prime concerns in Germova were community safety issues such as road safety, the threat of wild dogs and environmental damage to a local river. Saferworld argues that after a year of working together on these community safety issues, the community is now willing to engage seriously on more difficult security issues. Local trust has grown towards security sector and governance actors.

LESSONS LEARNED/THEMES IN BOTTOM-UP SECURITY PROGRAMS (IV)

These examples of locally developed security programs provide some basis for further consideration of the ways in which such programs can be used to improve the democratic governance of security service delivery and increase real security at the grassroots level. The discussion above points to several areas that deserve attention in designing and implementing practical programs for improving security and draw attention to the dynamics of incentives and structure that often undermine effective security reform. They suggest several areas where better design can improve both fairness and sustainability in post-conflict security systems:

- *Security as governance.* Security delivery at the local level can benefit from an approach similar in nature to community driven development structures

used to incorporate local communities into planning and direction of development or assistance initiatives, and should be managed in ways that make it clear that security is a public service not unlike the provision of water and power. Design of democratic oversight and governance structures in policing can not proceed solely at the state or national level, and alone will be unlikely to create any real reform. Attention must be given to the creation of local structures to manage interaction between police or security actors and the local community. A more bottom-up programmatic approach must be incorporated into what are currently very top-down, state-centered views of security and broader rule of law mandates.¹⁵

- *Motivation for reform.* Motivation for reform must be examined carefully at both the national and grassroots level. The existence of a national government committed in principle to security sector reform is not adequate to change the motivations of individual police officers to serve the citizens at the grassroots level. Greater community cooperation and participation is one avenue used to instigate changes in the motivation for reform at the level of the individual officer or commander. A related method is to employ reporting structures that link police evaluation by local leadership to promotion and salary increase. This can be linked closely to:
- *Donor coordination.* Donors must coordinate their efforts, not only in order to create a coherent security sector and rule of law framework, but also to ensure that security programs include both a top-down and bottom-up approach.
- *Mechanisms for responsiveness.* International and national officials planning reconstruction or reform of the security and rule of law sectors must consider how to incorporate mechanisms to increase responsiveness of security actors to local security concerns. Although a coherent, democratic institutional architecture and oversight mechanism is necessary in the security service and rule of law sectors, these are not sufficient to ensure real comprehensive security at the level of the individual citizen. Both increased emphasis on training and incentives in mechanisms to increase local police responsiveness to local leaders will be required to counter the many contradictory incentives and the momentum of traditions that encourage police to ignore local needs and concerns.
- *Holistic approach.* Security sector reform at the national level requires holistic integration with other areas such as rule of law, democratization, oversight and institution building efforts. In addition, security programs at the community level should be considered in the context of other safety and

¹⁵ Police forces in North America and Europe - and sometimes in Latin America - are more and more focused on increased legitimacy in the eyes of the community as a way to decrease disorder, increase effectiveness, and reduce costs. Increased use of community policing is one consequence of this focus. Rachel Neild discusses the problems with reform in communities where neither civilians nor police expect the police to be responsive to the community (see Neild, *From National Security to Citizen Security: Civil Society and the Evolution of Public Order Debates*. Montreal: Paper Written for the International Center for Human Rights and Democratic Development, 1999.).

security needs, including the broad range of development and assistance programs.

- *Temporal issues.* Increasingly, the international community has acknowledged the importance of attempting to mitigate the security gap left at the end of a conflict by ensuring that international interventions have the mandate and tools to address a complete range of security concerns in an integrated fashion. Often, however, there still exists a security gap lasting months or years, during which time the average citizen may find some increased protection from warring parties, but still experiences a serious absence of security in other areas of life. The international community must reduce the time between agreed cessation of violence and the delivery to these communities of assistance in managing security, if not formal domestic policing.
- *Cultural sensitivity.* Security problems are intimately related to traditional mechanisms for order (e.g. public shunning; role of clan leadership; traditional adjudication mechanisms; role of sacred sites and religion) and pre-existing relationships within the community. Program planning in security at the local level must take into account local norms and history. While North American or European templates that bring new methodologies and structures for security management might be useful, such templates must incorporate a systematic consideration of cultural and historical differences in policing and security.
- *Sensitivity to conflict/politics.* Security problems are also often related to power struggles or imbalance. Program planning in security must be attentive to the history of the conflict and its legacy as well as political dynamics.
- *Involvement of local leaders.* All advancement of community security must involve local leaders and community members, even prior to election or other legitimate methods to identify such leaders. To fail to include community members immediately in security planning creates a dynamic favoring disconnection of local security needs from the overall security reform process. Programs that build the confidence and skills that local leaders – most of whom instinctively avoid police interaction – will need to work together positively with police and to demand responsiveness is critical to building expectations of police responsiveness.
- *Identification of indicators and monitoring & evaluation of change.* As with any program, community security programs must identify indicators of security or lack thereof and monitor changes in these indicators through the program period. Some of these indicators will be tangible markers such as decreases in reported crime, or increases in prosecution or arrest, but others, such as increased community trust, may be more difficult to measure. They are, nevertheless, equally as important and can not be neglected despite these difficulties.

CONCLUSION (V)

Over the span of the last five to ten years, the international community has increasingly refined top-down security sector reform approaches. These typically include construction or reconstruction of institutional actors such as military forces, police forces, the judiciary and penal systems. However, even today, examples of programs which promote the development of physical security at the local level are rare. Increasing attention should be paid to the development of programs that build genuine responsiveness to local leaders and local concerns if transition from post-conflict settings to long term, legitimate security settings is to be successful.