

## Strategy in High Places: The Civil-Military Interface in Theory and Practice

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### ABSTRACT

This paper examines the civil-military interface at the strategic, operational and tactical levels, in theory and in practice.

The context for the paper was work undertaken for NATO C3 Agency (NC3A) in the area of force determination. NATO undertakes every two years a comprehensive Defence Requirements Review (DRR) and part of the methodology used by NC3A is to determine the force requirements to satisfy a range of tasks within a number of different mission types, scenarios and planning situations. The contracted work was to improve the representation of Command and Control (C2) in the force determination rules, i.e. the requirements for HQs, especially the types and numbers of trained personnel for NATO-led intervention operations.

Part of the work involved examining contemporary military doctrine for C2 and from this determining key 'norms' for establishing HQs. The doctrine was complete in many respects. However, an HQ requirement that has come increasingly to the fore has been the need to establish and maintain military-civilian interfaces at a number of different levels which has significant implications for force determination due to the requirement for trained liaison personnel. Here there seemed to be no military doctrine so the research team stepped back and examined the civil / military interfaces at the grand strategic, strategic, operational and tactical levels, drawing on International Relations theory, to determine 'what should be' and then researched a real operation (in this case IFOR) to see 'what was' and how much the theory was borne out by practice. A distillation of both should provide robust recommendations for the force determination rules.

The paper provides an overview of the principal actors and agencies that may be active both in theatre and at a remove and aims to offer a snapshot of the kinds of liaison links that are required to be established and maintained between these organisations. It identifies the kinds of mechanisms and infrastructure that should be in place whenever civil and military actors come into contact with one another. The paper draws attention to the benefits to be derived from communication and co-operation and illustrates the risks associated with failure to co-ordinate and de-conflict.

## INTRODUCTION

The nature of modern conflict, societies and armed forces has propelled the civil-military dimension to the forefront of contemporary operations. The imposition of a traditional military solution on a neat, simplistic security problem is no longer possible, if indeed it ever was. There is now the widespread acknowledgement, reinforced by recent experience that most military and civil actors cannot hope to function without reference to one another and still meet their objectives. Indeed, in many cases the achievement of military goals will be dependent on success in the civil domain and vice versa.

In a world of dangerous uncertainty and political ambiguity, at transition *and all other stages* there is a requirement for the principal military and civil actors to understand the mandate, roles and activities of the others and to communicate on areas of mutual relevance. In other words, a connection or interface needs to be established. Setting up and maintaining the interface requires communication and liaison. This applies in the strategic, operational and tactical spheres.

This Paper aims to do two things:

- Firstly, to identify some of the principal organisations between whom there should be an interface.
- Secondly, to identify lessons learned from a comprehensive examination of the extent to which the practice reflects the theory. This will be based on the empirical evidence emerging from a historic case study, in this case focusing on lessons identified in IFOR.

## PRINCIPAL ORGANISATIONS

In any operation, the (Multinational or Combined) Joint Force Commander (JFC) will be heavily committed with internal HQ affairs. Although his primary concern naturally will be the military dimension of the operation, it is vital that he (with the support of his staff) has oversight of how those in the non-military sphere operate and is aware of any upcoming issues that might impact, either positively or negatively, on his ability to carry out his assigned tasks. His chances of operational success and achieving the strategic end state will be substantially enhanced if there is a good two-way flow of communication between him and the other entities involved in the intervention, or indeed, party to the conflict.

The demanding task of opening lines of communication with the plethora of other actors and agencies operating both in and out of theatre is further complicated by the fact that no formal mechanism or procedure exists which articulates between whom and how these 'strategic connectors' are to be established and maintained. For every operation, therefore, an assessment needs to be made concerning with which other actors, both in theatre and at a distance a JFC ought to be in communication. On the military side, this is comparatively easy as Command and Control arrangements are laid out specifically within national and NATO doctrine. On the civil side, this is more difficult, or at least more complex, particularly when undertaking a comprehensive assessment of *all* relevant civil actors which is not restricted to those working at the operational and tactical levels. Identifying those actors with whom the JFC ought to have communication links *at all levels* involves looking at the highest strategic levels (e.g. the UNSC) down to the individual tactical-level implementers (small NGO field units) and so on.

Ideally the JFC would endeavour to establish strategic connections with all these parties both those active in theatre and those involved at a remove. The sheer weight of numbers however (which can be in excess of 1500 in-theatre and hundreds more at a distance) often renders this impractical and unrealistic. Indeed, even when considering a case study in isolation with the benefit of hindsight, it was impractical and unrealistic to try to come up with an exhaustive list of actors with whom the JFC should have had interface. Hence for the purposes of this paper, it was feasible only to produce a snapshot of the minimum connections that ought to exist.

For simplicity, the principal actors and agents can be grouped into three generic categories: grand strategic; strategic; operational and tactical. This is an oversimplification since the interaction between these actors cannot be so cleanly compartmentalised (for instance a so-called tactical-level actor may be able to effect strategic impact) but this classification serves to provide a framework for the discussion and analysis. Many acronyms and abbreviations are used – many of which may be wholly familiar to the reader. However at the end of the paper a comprehensive Glossary of terms is included.

### GRAND-STRATEGIC LEVEL

The requirement for the JFC to liaise with the highest level actors in the grand strategic domain is self-evident (Figure 1). Examples of such principal players include the following:




Figure 1: The Grand-Strategic Level.

- **UN Security Council (UNSC):** The UNSC assumes primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and has a number of ‘instruments’ at its disposal: conflict resolution mechanisms; cease fire directives; enforcement measures; economic sanctions; or collective military action. UNSC consent, which results in the passing of a Resolution (UNSCR) constitutes international endorsement of an action and confers legitimacy on those implementing it.
- **North Atlantic Council (NAC):** The NAC is the forum for the permanent representatives of the NATO Member governments to discuss all issues affecting their security and decide on appropriate action. The scope of the Council’s jurisdiction incorporates: the settlement of international disputes; the maintenance and development of the individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack; and actions arising in order to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.
- **European Council (EC):** The main decision-making body of the EU, the EC is responsible for the passing of European laws, the conclusion of international agreements between the EU and other countries or international organisations and the development of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).
- **National-level Institutions:** These institutions are responsible for national strategy and policy. They also impact particularly in the national caveats that may be placed on nations’ contributing forces as well as the ability of the JFC to use national assets and information – generating therefore an important and on-going need for high-level liaison.
- **Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE):** The world’s largest regional security forum, the OSCE offers a vehicle for political negotiations and decision-making in the fields of early-warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation. Its Permanent Council is its main regular decision-making body and this group convenes weekly to discuss current developments in the OSCE area and decide on appropriate courses of action.

The above and other grand-strategic level actors are, for the most part, concerned with the political and strategic elements of any operation, in particular its role, mandate, authority and legitimacy. They will often be front-loaded in terms of consultation, in that the majority of their influence and input will occur in the pre-deployment phases of an operation. That said, they will retain oversight for the duration of the operation and receive regular report from the JFC. They may be called upon subsequently in the case of any potential extension of the

mission or alteration to its mandate or Terms of Reference, e.g. a change to Rules of Engagement.

Any failure or disconnect in the lines of communication between the JFC and grand-strategic level actors could have serious and wide-ranging implications. Since the strategic-level bodies are responsible for the definition of the mission, in both the military and civilian contexts, any miscommunication or misunderstanding has the potential to threaten operational success. An unrealistic mandate, inadequate force allocation, a lack of unified purpose or a failure to take account of possible shifts in national interest or the domestic political climate could all immobilise the JFC further downstream and put at risk the cohesion of the coalition or Alliance.

### STRATEGIC LEVEL

At the Strategic level, the number of relevant actors with whom the JFC needs to communicate, is increased (Figure 2). Not all of these players are represented in the figure above but those worthy of note include the following:

	UN	NATO	EU	Nat	Other	
Strategic	Mil Staffs	Mil Committee	PSC	MOD	FCO	ICRC
	OCHA		Mil Committee			OHR
	DPKO		EUSR			
	Agencies					

Figure 2: The Strategic Level.

- UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)<sup>1</sup>: Part of the UN Secretariat, the UN OCHA is tasked with developing coherent approaches to tackling humanitarian crises. The Office's mission is to mobilise and co-ordinate the collective efforts of the international community and in particular, those of the UN system. Its functions include information dissemination, early warning and contingency planning by facilitating inter-agency and departmental consultations and the organisation and management of the mobilisation of resources.
- UN Agencies (UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, WHO etc.): Each of the UN Agencies has its own remit and area of responsibility. Depending on their mandate, scope of activities and the degree to which they wish to be viewed as impartial, the extent to which the agencies will co-operate and co-ordinate with the military forces in theatre will vary (this is particularly the case at the tactical level). At the strategic level, some communication and information exchange is required to ensure operational parameters and norms are defined and understood.

<sup>1</sup> Formerly the UN Department for Humanitarian Affairs.

- The NATO Military Committee: The Committee is responsible for recommending to NATO's political authorities those measures considered necessary for the common defence of the NATO area. Its principal role is to provide direction and advice on military policy and strategy. In addition the Committee provides guidance on military matters to the NATO Strategic Commanders (whose representatives attend its meetings) and is responsible for the overall conduct of the military affairs of the Alliance under the authority of the Council, as well as for the efficient operation of its agencies.
- EU Standing Political and Security Committee (PSC): This body is charged with keeping track of the international situation in the crisis region, defining policies and monitoring implementation. It sends guidelines to the Military Committee and, at the same time, receives its opinions and recommendations. It is the EU PSC that, under the auspices of the European Council, takes responsibility for the political direction of the development of military capabilities, exercises political control and issues the strategic direction of any EU response to a given crisis.
- EU Military Committee (EUMC): The highest military body established within the European Council, the EUMC is composed of the Chiefs of Defence represented by their military representatives in Brussels. The Committee gives military advice and makes recommendations to the PSC on all military matters within the EU. These include the development of the overall concept of crisis management in its military aspects, the risk assessment of potential crises as well as the elaboration, assessment and review of capability goals.
- Some International Organisations, e.g. International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC): The ICRC is an impartial, neutral and independent organisation concerned with the promotion of international humanitarian law and the monitoring of conformity with it. Its mission is to protect the lives and dignity of victims of war and internal violence and to provide them with assistance.
- National-level Organisations (MoD/Foreign Ministries): Ministries of Defence are responsible for the formulation and conduct of defence policy and for providing the means by which it is conducted. Foreign ministries are responsible for co-ordinating and pursuing that country's policies abroad. Both often provide expert advice and support to the whole of national governments in order to enhance the strategic position of that country and bring about international actions that advance its interests.
- Other Strategic-level organisations, often case-specific, e.g. OHR in IFOR: The Office of the High Representative (OHR) in IFOR was a special case and one that is useful in attempting to illustrate the differences between establishing and maintaining the interface in theory and in practice. The OHR was set up under the terms of the Dayton Peace Agreement as the chief civilian peace implementation agency in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The High Representative was charged with overseeing the implementation of the civilian aspects of the Peace Agreement on behalf of the international

community. He was also tasked with co-ordinating the activities of the civilian organisations and agencies operating in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The High Representative was designated the final authority in theatre to interpret the agreement on the civilian implementation of the peace settlement. His specific tasks included maintaining close contact with the parties to the agreement to promote their full compliance with the civilian aspects of Dayton and co-ordinating their activities, facilitating the resolution of any difficulties and reporting periodically on progress to the UN, EU, US, Russian Federation and other interested governments, parties and organisations.

The above provides a non-exhaustive cross-section of the organisations involved at the strategic level. In the case of some of these actors, there are existing channels or organisational chains of command, particularly in the national domain and conforming to established NATO procedure. However, some of the organisations are not configured in a way that is easily compatible with military processes, there will be no lines of communication already in existence and there may be cultural or impartiality issues which are a barrier to easy co-ordination and communication. Such difficulties will be felt most keenly at the tactical level but may originate as a result of poor communication and co-ordination at the strategic levels. In other words, failure to establish connections with these organisations may have disproportionate impact later on.

Common pitfalls include:

- *Mandate/Ethos Incompatibility*: Not all the organisations operating at the strategic level will share similar principles. For instance, “the ICRC is somewhat reluctant to closely co-ordinate its activities with those of the military. This reluctance to become overtly involved in joint activities with them is due to its special mandate, principles and culture.”<sup>2</sup> The ICRC is dependent on its impartiality, neutrality and independence and cannot be seen to be compromising this by engendering any close ties with military actors who may be partial and whose mission may be “... dependent on politically-motivated decisions.”<sup>3</sup>
- *Structural/Institutional incompatibility*: In cases where strategic-level organisations are ethically complementary, and where the impetus to work together exists, structural and institutional incompatibility may prove a barrier to co-operation. The structure and ways of working of some of the UN Agencies reflects a fundamentally different rationale from that of a military HQ. The latter is organised on hierarchical lines, with clear vertical chains of command, areas of responsibility and Rules of Engagement. Other humanitarian actors are less hierarchical, have no obligation to take orders and are organised along less rigid ‘horizontal’ lines.

In Kosovo, “Military-led meetings were instinctively viewed with suspicion by the NGOs who expected those meetings to be highly structured and for ‘orders’ to be given. Not surprisingly, many NGOs stayed out of those

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<sup>2</sup> Meinrad Studer, 2001. “The ICRC and Civil-Military Relations in Armed Conflict”, IRRIC, Vol 83, No 842.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid

meetings or were reluctant participants, and throughout the NGO community, there was a noticeable determination not to be controlled or commanded. The end result was that military resources were not optimally utilised”<sup>4</sup>.

- *Lack of unified understanding of context:* Without interaction between the JFC and the other organisations at the strategic level, and some contextual and political analysis prior to deployment, there may be a failure to understand the backdrop against which operations are taking place. This is likely to lead to a failure adequately to prepare for and address the reality on the ground.
- *National-level difficulties:* Disconnects at the national contingent level can also affect seriously the operational success. Political wrangling, interference with assets and their global allocation and divergent agendas can all have a detrimental impact.

### PRINCIPAL OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL ACTORS

The actors at the operational and tactical levels are numerous and multifarious and it would be extremely difficult to provide an accurate list of them all (Figure 3). Therefore, this paper attempts to provide only a snapshot and, for this purpose considers the operational and tactical actors in conjunction.

	UN	NATO	EU	Nat	Other
Operational	ERC IASC CMCS ELB IPTF ICTY DPKO Mil Div	IMS	EUMS	GOs	OHR Offices NGO/IOs OSCE Field Mission

Figure 3: Principal Operational and Tactical Actors.

The operational level is the bridge or the socket between the strategic and tactical levels and represents the ‘gearing’ between the two. At both levels, the JFC will be required to communicate and co-ordinate with a wide range of individuals and organisations. Many of these will be UN bodies, some will be the military arms of other regional or national organisations, others parties to the conflict. In addition there is likely to be a multitude of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and International Organisations (IOs) operating in the region (e.g. more than 300 NGOs established missions to assist in Kosovo after the escalation of the crisis in 1999.) Some of these IO/NGOs will participate in Civil Military

<sup>4</sup> Brigadier T Cross, 2001. “Comfortable with Chaos – Working with the UNHCR and the NGOs: Reflections from the 1999 Refugee Crisis”, Wilton Park Conference, PG 21

Co-operation (CIMIC) schemes such as those run by the CMCS – see below – or the UN OCHA but others will operate entirely in isolation.

At the very minimum, the JFC is required to be in liaison with the following:

- A number of UN bodies including the UN Emergency Relief Co-ordinator (ERC): The UN ERC is the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs. He chairs the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), an inter-agency forum for co-ordination, policy development and decision-making involving the key UN and non-UN humanitarian partners. Under the leadership of the ERC, the IASC develops humanitarian policies, agrees on a clear division of responsibility for the various aspects of humanitarian response, identifies and addresses gaps in response and advocates for the effective application of humanitarian principles.

In 1995 the IASC decided to establish the Civil Military Co-ordination Section (CMCS) to ensure the most efficient use of military and civil defence assets in support of humanitarian operations. The CMCS serves as the UN focal point for governments, international organisations and military and civil defence establishments for the employment of these assets in humanitarian situations and co-ordinates their mobilisation when needed.

- International Police Task Force (IPTF): The IPTF is the organisation which, under Dayton (in the case of IFOR) was tasked with law enforcement and providing assistance in the establishment and maintenance of public order. An autonomous organisation, the IPTF was nonetheless expected to co-ordinate activities through the OHR, provide information and receive guidance as appropriate.
- The NGO/IO Community: A very large group of organisations, the NGO/IO community includes actors with diverse specialisations and mandates and is completely unregulated. There is considerable potential for co-operation between such groups and forces in theatre however many NGOs do not wish to be associated with military actors believing that this compromises their impartiality and may colour external perceptions of their operations or their freedom of movement. This is not to say, however, that such actors would always hesitate to call on military forces to assist should they find themselves in difficulties which they are unable to resolve themselves as has been the case in numerous crisis regions. Other NGOs, on the other hand, may rely on co-operation with military forces to ensure their own security, for transportation or for information.

The most scope for mutual assistance exists in the areas of security, logistics, medicine, transportation and communications and the JFC will often establish CIMIC Centres as a means of interfacing with non-governmental organisations, humanitarian groups and UN agencies. Hundreds of personnel are employed in these teams that liaise with NGO groups on reconstruction, aid-distribution projects, security and information on land mines and subjects of mutual interest.

However, at the operational and tactical levels, as well as the strategic, fundamentally-different institutional thinking and cultures, characterised by the distinct chain of command and clear organisational structures of the military vis-à-vis the diversity of the humanitarian community underlie entrenched harmonisation difficulties. (Also, some NGOs may find it easier to liaise with certain national force components, in theatre.) As a result, interactions between the two and their connections are often inconsistent, patchy and inadequate.

In addition, at the Operational/Tactical level, the JFC will be expected to interact with the parties to the conflict on the ground. This is highly-situation –dependent but often will require the Joint Force to remain as impartial and unaligned as possible to avoid inflaming tensions between protagonists and differing factions. This is best facilitated through the establishment of Joint Military Commissions (JMCs), a Dayton requirement.

Since the above is a limited snapshot only of the types of organisations with whom the JFC ought to interface at the operational and tactical levels, it is evident that whilst desirable, it is largely impossible to establish regular, comprehensive liaison with all actors in theatre. The size and scope of the task is prohibitive and there are many political, cultural, religious, operational and ethos barriers that stand in the way of doing so.

However, the penalties for not doing so can result in such problems as the following:

- Lack of situational awareness.
- Task duplication.
- Competition for resources.
- Divergent agendas.
- Inaccurate projections of the Joint Force leading to misperceptions by civilians in theatre.
- The amplification of strategic-level problems, particularly (to the extent that it may apply): incompatibility of organisational mandate; institutional incongruity; and a lack of unified understanding of context in which the Joint Force is operating.

## **SUMMARY OF PRINCIPAL ORGANISATIONS**

Figure 4 is an over-simplified representation of the number and complexity of links that ought to be in place across all levels. This, however, is theory. It can only be quantified by considering it in conjunction with historical data and assessing the extent to which the practice reflects the theory and if it diverges, for what reason. For this paper, the historical data was drawn from a thorough analysis of Command and Control in the IFOR operation in Bosnia. Clearly, an assessment of one operation alone is not sufficient to identify recurrent

themes and to establish ‘norms.’ However, it is possible to identify a number of lessons which are partly the result of the practice not reflecting the theory.




Figure 4: Major linkages between entities.

## RESEARCH METHOD

The theoretical analysis of the civil/military interfaces at the grand strategic, strategic, operational and tactical levels is based on International Relations theory and research, underscored by discussions held with a leading UK International Relations expert. The second part of the analysis was to take research data from a real operation – in this case IFOR – to determine ‘what was’. Any discrepancies that might have occurred between the theory and practice could then be analysed to determine ‘for what reason’ and ‘does the experience in any way modify the theory’? Clearly more than one operation must be considered to draw robust conclusions (and to provide credible recommendations for the force determination rules). In this sense the study is work-in-progress as only one operation – IFOR – has so far been examined. Nevertheless it is possible to draw down on this operation to a very considerable degree.

The data from IFOR was drawn from various reliable sources, though in many respects it was not ‘complete.’ It has already been said that there seemed to be no military doctrine in the area of HQ requirements to establish and maintain military/civilian interfaces. Thus IFOR data establishes what did take place, but rarely records the reasons why.

From this data the team identified a number of key principles pertaining to ‘the establishment and maintenance of military/civilian interfaces’. These principles were derived from contrasting the theory against the practice and arguably could be viewed as ‘candidate’ requirements for use in filling in the doctrinal gap. For the purposes of this project they were used to inform and shape interim recommendations for components of the ‘norms’ or rules.

The seven areas are introduced in turn and a summary of the analysis and findings for each is given.

### **CIVIL-MILITARY INTERFACE LESSONS IDENTIFIED**

1. *There must be extensive lines of communication between civilian and military actors. Provision must be made for regular co-ordination at the appropriate levels between those implementing the civil tasks and those implementing the military tasks of the agreement on which international action is based.*

In Peace Enforcement missions the civil and military components of an intervention are of overall equal importance, with each aspect having a greater or lesser importance during the intervention transitions. A climate of relative stability and security (albeit enforced by external military actors) must exist before the foundations of a lasting civil settlement can be laid. Equally, for military forces, progress in the civil dimension represents the only route to the strategic end state and paves the way for the exit phase and the end of the mission. The two components are closely inter-related and an interface should be in place from the outset.

However, civil and military organisations differ considerably in terms of their organisational structure, processes and procedures and cannot be expected to function together automatically. While goals may be common, temporal objectives, ways, means and methods of intervention can differ substantially.

In IFOR, responsibility for the implementation of the civil tasks fell to the High Representative (HR) established as part of the Dayton Peace Agreement. While SACEUR declared his intent “to establish a clear working relationship with the High Representative and his staff”, and Annex B to the OPLAN stated that “close co-ordination will be established between COMIFOR and the HR.. conducted by a military liaison team headed by a Flag Officer,” initially, at least, there was less liaison between the two than SACEUR and COMIFOR would have liked. This may well be a military-centric viewpoint – not shared entirely by the civilian counterpart who may have preferred less liaison, due perhaps to a civilian perception that the military was in some way keeping tabs on their civilian counterparts.

The big disparity in numbers (some 50,000 military compared to a few dozen civilians associated with the OHR) also contributed. Information on the ground was obtained through the military presence but much of that made available to the OHR required extensive filtering to become useful to the HR. Furthermore military-type tasks predominated for the first few months and

only after these were satisfactorily completed (and the former warring factions contained) could the military address civilian-type and reconstruction-related tasks.

As may be expected, communication and co-operation did increase and improve as the Operation evolved and by May of the following year, the HR was reporting the "IFOR continues to provide...as much support to the civilian agencies as its principal tasks and available resources allow." However, the initial delay in establishing and maintaining liaison between the two might have been detrimental and caused delays in the full implementation of the Dayton agreement.

A final point is the evident success of the IFOR operation (Intervention / Peace Enforcement) and the ability therefore to transition to the subsequent SFOR operation (Stabilisation / Peace Keeping / Building). If the IFOR operation had been more extended, then establishing and maintaining early and effective 'lines of communication' would have been much more crucial.

2. *There must be acceptance that the civil and military definitions of authority differ.*

One of the fundamental problems in IFOR, the failure of the JFC and the OHR to co-ordinate properly and synchronise activities, was due to the fact that the OHR did not possess corresponding/requisite authority to that of the JFC. Whilst the UN was involved in the Peace Implementation Conference (PIC) and thus able (to some degree) to provide the HR with guidance, there were problems. The HR did not possess authority in the military sense of the word. He could attempt to inspire, invite or convince actors to behave in a certain way or fulfil certain tasks. He was not able to compel them to do so. This stems from the different organisational cultures that exist in the military and civilian spheres. The JFC disseminates orders that filter down the hierarchical chain of command to all echelons. The HR, on the other hand, operates according to a flat structure: he is able to advise those he has invited (note invited not compelled), and who then decide to attend any given meeting but is unable to insist that his advice or suggestions are followed.

This is not to say that it would be realistic, desirable or even possible for civilian actors to be configured in a similar way to the military, but in civil-military co-operation and transitioning, these differences must be understood, accepted and allowed for.

3. *Mechanisms must be in place for co-ordination on civil-military policy Adequate mechanisms must exist at the grand strategic and political levels for co-ordination on civil-military policy, particularly over sensitive or complicated issues such as war crimes, mass graves and freedom of movement etc.*

The importance of CIMIC across all levels should not be underestimated, particularly in Peace Enforcement missions. When IFOR deployed, civil-military activities in support of peace operations were new for NATO. There

was no common understanding by commanders and staff at all levels of IFOR of the capabilities, roles and mission of the small numbers of CIMIC and Civil Affairs units and personnel that were deployed from the outset. Initially, therefore, CIMIC was conducted reactively rather than proactively. This was the case, not only in theatre, but also at the strategic and political echelons. Connections at these and all subordinate levels must be established and maintained so that policy and activities can be consistent, harmonised and de-conflicted. Trained CIMIC specialists are required.

4. *CIMIC requires forward planning The CIMIC dimension must be incorporated during the planning and deployment phases of an operation.*

CIMIC activities require as much forward-planning as other operational tasks and this should be taken into consideration at force allocation. This did not occur to any significant degree in the planning for IFOR, partly due to the fact that the concept of CIMIC was a new one for NATO and partly due to the heavy emphasis on the military enforcement aspects of the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP) and the demands of force protection.

The military planners gave scant consideration to the experience, expertise and activities undertaken by the international agencies and humanitarian relief organisations, other than as they may directly affect the military operations. Similarly the IOs and NGOs themselves were occupied with their own issues and viewed co-operation with the military as a peripheral concern, except, similarly, when it suited their purposes. Both the military actors and the IOs and NGOs failed to appreciate the need for all external actors in theatre to work towards a common goal and this inhibited greatly progress in developing the civil dimension. This was the case even at the highest levels: in the early days, the HR repeatedly ignored SACEUR's request to see his plans. This was an obstacle, or at least a hindrance, to progress.

The only planning conducted by the military, vis-à-vis the civilian activities in Bosnia, was focused upon trying to find out how and where harmonisation meetings could take place. This was based according to the timelines set out in the Dayton agreement which specified stepping stones.

5. *Joint Civil Commissions (JCCs) should be established. Joint Civil Commissions should be established to facilitate interaction between the military and civilian agencies. The Commission infrastructure provides for information exchange and co-ordination and humanitarian assistance activities.*

In IFOR the JCCs proved to be a useful mechanism for generating communication and encouraging co-operation. They were established from the outset in accordance with the Dayton agreement. The main commission was chaired by the HR or his representative and comprised senior political representatives of the Parties, the IFOR Commander or his CIMIC representative and representatives of those civilian organizations and agencies

that the HR deemed necessary to resolve civil issues. The HR established subordinate JCCs at the local levels. All of these Commissions convened periodically and on an 'as required' basis. The purpose of JCC was on the one hand to bring to the attention of the HR any complaints, questions and problems related to the civilian implementation of the peace agreement that required resolution. On the other hand JCCs were a very useful vehicle for the HR to pass on his guidance to the civilian community. In addition, since it was a body which was not convened by the military, it was more readily accepted by some of the civilian organizations who were otherwise reluctant to respond positively to a military 'invitation' to attend a meeting. Similarly, it was a fertile place for the military to gain information about the civilian dimension (including political) situation as well as to pass messages to the civilian community.

JCCs require participation by CIMIC personnel from the JFHQ and this implies an HQ requirement.

6. *There must be effective liaison at all levels between military and civilian actors This is related to the first point but worthy of further consideration at the practical implementation level. Liaison across all levels should exist between military forces, IOs and NGOs. Military Liaison Officer (LOs) should be:*
  - i. *of appropriate seniority and experience.*
  - ii. *specialists in their field.*
  - iii. *familiar with the operation and the plan.*
  - iv. *have the personality and charisma to fight for information if necessary.*
  - v. *competent in the appropriate language.*
  - vi. *equipped with the necessary communications means.*

Good and effective liaison lies at the heart of Peace Enforcement. It represents a function that cannot be resourced by traditional establishments. The requirement spans all phases, indeed liaison in the early phases is particularly important. Peace Enforcement requires a large number of senior LOs with supporting staff and C2 infrastructure. The quality of the LOs in IFOR was inconsistent. Nonetheless, HQ ARCC generated over 90 different liaison teams – none of which were originally planned for. Key to this was the establishment by the military of 'CIMIC liaison structures' and 'CIMIC centres' with, from the military perspective, the aim of "achieving a civil-military unity of effort, where IFOR forces (focus upon military tasks) and support the establishment and functioning of a...civil structure" (from the IFOR OPLAN).

7. *Specific liaison requirements need to be established and maintained between certain organisations. Another lesson that was identified as a result of the analysis of the IFOR operation is that liaison at the appropriate levels should exist between military forces and the following organisations (or equivalent):*

- OSCE: IFOR was mandated specifically to provide support to the OSCE. LOs were placed in each OSCE Regional and Field Office. Support to the OSCE constituted: confidence-building and arms control (inspections), support of human rights (information and advice, provision of secure environment, emergency support) and crucially assistance with elections (enforcing compliance and ensuring freedom of movement, media and association).

IFOR accorded priority support to the OSCE in preparing for and conducting the 14<sup>th</sup> Sept 1996 elections. In addition to providing a secure environment for the elections, IFOR support was forthcoming in the areas of planning, logistics and communications. Guaranteed communications were established to ensure the early identification and resolution of problems. On election-day itself, IFOR operated a Joint Emergency Response Centre with the OSCE and provided and maintained an extensive communications network. The elections were conducted peacefully with no major disturbances or violence. The HR went on to say that “without this support the elections could not have taken place”.

- IPTF: Similarly, IFOR was mandated specifically to provide support to the IPTF. The IPTF was the lead agency with civil policy and enjoyed closer IFOR liaison and support, including the provision of security and check points which enabled the Task Force to carry out its duties in a more effective manner. Although IFOR and the IPTF were the two international actors concerned with maintaining a safe and secure environment, their authority was derived from different organisations: IFOR falling under the authority of the NAC, whilst the IPTF derived its authority from UNMIBH. In spite of this, liaison between IPTF and Civil Affairs personnel proved to be a resounding success. An example of this was the establishment of the IPTF Command Centre. The Centre’s operational procedures and communications network linked IPTF HQ with stations in the field and with IFOR.
- UNHCR: Support to the UNHCR, also, was specified in the IFOR mandate. The obligation to support UNHCR is a recurring theme within Peace Enforcement. IFOR worked closely with the UNHCR in its efforts to promote the repatriation of refugees and the return of displaced persons, including by contributing, as and where possible, to the improvement of conditions in the UNHCR’s 23 target areas.
- ICTY: Similarly, IFOR was mandated specifically to provide support to the ICTY and supported the Tribunal through the provision of preliminary information, the deployment of liaison teams and the providing a security structure in which the Tribunal could carry out its work. IFOR also undertook aerial and ground surveillance of alleged mass grave sites to which ICTY had given priority status.

## CONCLUSION

This work has highlighted the potential risks of disconnect at the civil-military interface at all levels, from the grand strategic to the tactical and has identified seven civil-military interface lessons / enduring principles. These principles are illustrated and have formed the basis of the interim set of norms or rules for force allocation in the C2 area, required by NC3A. Application of these principles would help to avoid the damaging effects of a poorly-resourced or maintained interface.

The formal status of the project is still work-in-progress since the consideration of one case study is not sufficient in itself. Further analysis of other recent operations would ensure the methodology employed withstands scrutiny and serve to validate and to consolidate the conclusions about the nature of the civil-military interface and the mechanisms and procedures that must exist if it is to be successfully established and maintained.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The authors would like to acknowledge the research contributions and guidance of the NC3A sponsors of the original project. Acknowledgements are due to the other team members of the project who provided help and advice at the time and subsequently in reviewing and improving this paper, namely Dr Rachel Utley of Leeds University, Mr Graeme McDonald, Mr Richard Cousens and Mr Robert Bailey of SCS Ltd. The authors emphasise that the opinions throughout the paper are those of the authors and not of NC3A, SCS or ISG Ltd.

The paper deals with historical issues and solutions at the time to those issues. Current emerging doctrine, such as 'Effect Based Approach to Operations (EBAO)' is much more based on Inter-agency cooperation from the outset, which would certainly solve some of the issues raised in the paper. In EBAO, the military is only one of the actors (alongside Diplomatic, Information, Economic specialists), with the intent that all of the actors contribute to and harmonise the activities across an intervention.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY AND GLOSSARY OF TERMS

For convenience, a bibliography and a glossary of terms used throughout the paper is provided below.

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## ONLINE RESOURCES

EU Website	<a href="http://europa.eu/">http://europa.eu/</a>
Eurocorps Website	<a href="http://www.eurocorps.org/">http://www.eurocorps.org/</a>
FCO Website	<a href="http://www.fco.gov.uk/">http://www.fco.gov.uk/</a>
ICRC Website	<a href="http://www.icrc.org/">http://www.icrc.org/</a>
UK MoD Website	<a href="http://www.mod.uk/">http://www.mod.uk/</a>
NATO Website	<a href="http://www.nato.int/">http://www.nato.int/</a>
OHR Website	<a href="http://www.ohr.int/">http://www.ohr.int/</a>
OSCE Website	<a href="http://www.osce.org/">http://www.osce.org/</a>
UN Website	<a href="http://www.un.org/">http://www.un.org/</a>

## GLOSSARY OF TERMS

ARRC	Allied Rapid Reaction Corps
C2	Command and Control
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIMIC	Civil-Military Co-operation
CJCMIC	Combined Joint Civil-Military Co-operation
CMCS	Civil-Military Co-ordination Section
COMIFOR	Commander, IFOR
DPKO	Department for Peacekeeping Operations

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DRR	Defence Requirements Review
EC	European Council
ERC	Emergency Response Co-ordinator
EUMC	European Union Military Committee
EUSR	European Union Special Representative
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
GA	(UN) General Assembly
GFAP	General Framework Agreement for Peace
HQs	Headquarters
HR	High Representative
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IFOR	Implementation Force
IMS	International Military Staff
IPTF	International Police Task Force
IOs	International Organisations
JCCs	Joint Civil Commissions
JFC	Joint Force Commander
JFHQ	Joint Force Headquarters
JMCs	Joint Military Commissions
LOs	Liaison Officers
MND	Multinational Division
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NC3A	NATO Consultation, Command and Control Agency
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OCHA	Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OHR	Office of the High Representative
OPLAN	Operation Plan
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PIC	Peace Implementation Council
PSC	EU Standing Political and Security Committee
PVOs	Private Voluntary Organisations
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
SC	(UN) Security Council
UNHCR	UN High Commissioner for Refugees
UNMIBH	UN Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina
UNSC	UN Security Council