
Prologue to Cornwallis XIII

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Ian Mitchell has worked in Operational Research (OR) since 1988, following a flirtation with accountancy. He was commissioned into the Territorial Army in 1984 and encountered OR as part of a Business Studies degree during 1986. For the Centre for Operational Research and Defence Analysis (CORDA) he initially produced historical data compilations. Studies of the land battle followed until 1992. After two years as an independent OR consultant to the UK Department of Social Security and the European Space Agency he joined the Defence Research Agency at Fort Halstead in 1994. He managed the Battle Group War Game, and led infantry studies. He moved to Porton Down in 1998 managing OR studies until 2000 when he was seconded as the OR specialist for the Directorate of Equipment Capability, Nuclear Biological and Chemical (DEC (NBC)). As of 2004 he has supported studies of capability management across domains including Chemical Biological Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) defence. Since 2005 he has worked on Naval Systems OR studies. Ian served on the Council of the UK OR Society from 1994 to 2000 and 2002 onwards, being Vice-President from 2003 to 2005 and Treasurer as of 2007. He became Secretary to the Cornwallis Group in 2006.

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ABSTRACT

A Prologue is an executive summary for a play. The prologue, literally a “foreword,” introduces the characters, gives the circumstances for the play, sets the scene and outlines the key points from the story to follow.

INTRODUCTION

The characters of the meetings of the Cornwallis Group are its participants. The Group has a unique mix of analysts, military and diplomatic participants with occasional representatives from other specialities. A committee directs the activities with support from the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre. The interactions of this diverse group lead to the generation of new ideas and broader perspectives. *Tim Carney*, late of the US Foreign Service, and *Roy Williams* provided keynote addresses to the thirteenth meeting, Cornwallis XIII.

Cornwallis XIII met at the home of the Cornwallis Group, Cornwallis Park on the shore of the Annapolis Basin in Nova Scotia. The Park is an isolated location some 100 miles west

of the International Airport at Halifax and is reached by road from there. Until 1994 Cornwallis was the Canadian Forces Base for basic training. The closure of this had a great impact on the local economy with the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre established in 1994 as a critical driver for local business until the new millennium. The Pearson Peacekeeping Centre is now a part of the Annapolis Basin Conference Centre.

The Cornwallis Group always meets during the week before Easter. In 2008 Easter fell at its earliest possible time so the group began to assemble on 15 March, the Ides of March in the Roman calendar. As this was the date of the assassination of Julius Caesar, it seemed particularly apt for a conference considering issues of policy, at the boundary of military and civilian spheres. Shakespeare has the assassins take great pride in their act. Brutus says:

*Stoop Romans stoop
And let us bathe our hands in Caesar's blood
Up to the elbows, and besmear our swords;
Then walk we forth, even to the market-place,
And waving our red weapons o'er our heads,
Let's all cry 'Peace, freedom and liberty!'*

Act III Sc I: The Tragedy of Julius Caesar

Brutus and his group believed that they were a “force for good” with their use of violence a just means to reach a better society. They were mistaken. What came next was Civil War rather than peace, freedom and liberty. From an analyst’s point of view their model was flawed. Even such surgically precise violence as the assassination of Caesar does not generate peace, freedom or liberty. The discussions at Cornwallis XIII helped to explain why Brutus was so mistaken.

The headlines of Easter week in 2008 included reactions to the declaration of the independence of Kosovo, growing concerns with the conduct of elections in Zimbabwe, the increasing crisis in Darfur and the outbreak of civil unrest in Tibet.

The formal part of the conference ran from Monday to Thursday. As much travel is required to attend many of the Group gather at The Inn on The Lake near Halifax airport on the Saturday. Although originally driven by desire for the lower air fares available for staying over a Saturday night this has become a tradition. The extra time together effectively acts as an additional informal session for the conference. In 2008 in an innovation some two thirds of the Group met again on the Thursday evening for a meal together before dispersing back to their homes. To call this innovation a “last supper” feels somewhat excessive, despite the timing, so “final dinner” may be a better term. Evangelism of good works and promoting the potential to do more are shared by both the biblical and contemporary occasions. Should it occur again next time then the tradition of the final dinner will be secured by the rule that the first time something happens it is innovation and the second onwards is established tradition.

By well established tradition, Cornwallis uses a single stream of presentations and discussion, with syndicate workshops reporting back to the overall group. The margins of the meeting are broad allowing detailed discussion by individuals. Each meeting’s proceedings are published by the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre about nine months later as a book.

The aim of Cornwallis is excellence in Analysis. The twelve books that it has produced to date form a unique intellectual resource. The theme of the thirteenth meeting was Analysis in Support of Policy. This broad theme attracted a variety of perspectives, which had a theme of the importance of Justice.

THE STORY

Professor Ted Woodcock welcomed the participants to the thirteenth meeting. He noted that the Cornwallis Group exists for only one week each year when it meets. Its Website gives it a continuing presence to complement this. Cornwallis grew from Dave Davis's idea at an Operational Research (OR) conference in the United Kingdom for a more in-depth approach to Peace Support analysis. The Pearson Peacekeeping Centre hosted this event at Cornwallis Park hence the name of the Group. 13 years on the Group punches well above its weight. The Pearson Peacekeeping Centre's visibility is rising within Canada as courses are reintroduced on disarmament and re-integration.

The theme of Analysis in Support of Policy has immediate relevance to current issues. The collapse of major banks and investment markets crashes are symptoms of misguided policies. The troublesome young men who advised Churchill's circle in the 1930s overcame the obstinacy of the Prime Minister against opinions divergent from his own. All leaderships risk becoming divorced from reality by refusing to acknowledge the truth. Analysts have to find ways to communicate realities to them, however unpleasant these may be.

This is a long game, with planning horizons spanning years to decades. Informing the future leaders is possible by briefing mid level officers in order to provide the informed policy makers in later years.

Developing a common understanding of the peace support operation process enables interests to coalesce. Stability is not enough for success. The world has changed, with greater emphasis on state to state assistance programmes, illicit power structures and measuring or mapping of political will. The environment in Western capitals is too constrained, as these are in a continual state of distracted bureaucratic frenzy to which Cornwallis offers a haven for reflection.

Participants of Cornwallis XIII included retired American Foreign Service officers, analysts from Canada, American, Britain, Germany, and Sweden, academics from America, current American Marine and Army personnel, the Institute for Peace, USAID and industry. Most attended in their official capacities but some attended on their own initiative and at their own expense. Besides being a testimony to the quality of Cornwallis this suggests that we stand at some sort of threshold with regard to analysis in support of policy. There is great, but latent, potential.

Ambassador Tim Carney gave the *first keynote* paper. Diplomacy only becomes noticed during crises. These last three decades have seen a spectrum of results from a range of approaches to a variety of weak, fragile and broken states. Some states have progressed towards international acceptance, although often in ways unforeseeable at the time. Some concerns reoccur across time and location. The governance issues addressed by the Civil

Office Of Revolutionary Developments (COORDS), during the 1960s, concern Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan today.

Fundamental weaknesses exist in the Western approach to interventions based on the structural limits of these societies. These include impatience, arrogance, and ignorance which work hand in glove with the former two. The advance of our interests depends on the application of knowledge. In most organisations there is a layer cosseted from reality by courtiers, which frustrates this.

Two keys offer the way to resolution of states in crisis. These are stability and the existence of a social contract. In 2003 the aim was to bring democracy to Iraq when creating stability was the real need. Politicians tend to follow hopes rather than analysis so the Coalition Provisional Authority did not focus on stability but tried to redevelop society. Troops deployed then were sufficient neither in numbers nor in skills to stabilize the society.

Stability may be thought of as the capacity of the state to retain the ability to do what it wants without recourse to violence. In this sense North Korea and Cuba are stable. A social contract exists in North Korea, albeit with some unusual terms. In contrast Zimbabwe is falling apart.

Whilst Cornwallis XIII met in March 2008 it was apparent that Zimbabwe's economy was unravelling, reducing stability. It was apparent that the dictator's trough is going to become a dangerous place to be seen. This illustrates the need for a legitimate basis for sovereignty that derives from a social contract. All states have some form of a social contract. The social contract is a mechanism to tie the State to the social economic system within boundaries. Where the contract between rulers and ruled becomes too bad it is repudiated.

Cultural Stability draws off the existing state of values of the dominant groups. For example Afghanistan is an oligarchy of clans. Stability can exist based on such small powerful groups, organized by religion, clan or party lines.

Creation of a social contract requires reconciliation. Stability is based on security. Stressed states will recover their stability if key services, such as hospitals, electric power and water are maintained. Total success is not always feasible but neither is it necessary for improvement. Large scale violence is still a great evil which it is well worth being rid of.

Moving from the ambassador's view of states to the detailed realities of support to operations, *Tom Ramjeet* described five pieces of *support to operations work in Afghanistan*. These were fast turnaround, using data direct from troops on the ground. They included analysis of trends in contacts, significant acts such as ambushes, attacks and intimidation, incidents of Indirect Fire on bases and Improvised Explosive Devices.

For support to operations timeliness is all. A good enough 70% solution in time is far better than a 100% solution delivered too late. The response of an officer confirms the worth of analyst cells "*If I ever do this again the first thing I will ask for is one of those.*"

Michael Miklaucic considered *Justice as The Absent Factor In The Equation*. His first question was whose value system decides what "justice" is. There is a much of both policy

and analysis but not much connection between these. Rhetoric based policy often ignores analysis, save as an expedient justification.

Paradoxes of justice exist in the Bush administration. The enthusiastic and resourced support for democratization in Foreign Policy is let down in implementation. Practice diverges from rhetoric: our friends can do anything whilst our enemies are criticized for any misdemeanour.

State-building was dismissed by Bush but serious problems are inevitable if the United States continues without it. 9-11 made democratization the central aim with billions of dollars and person hours invested, yet no suitable tool is available for Iraq.

Where some institutional foundations and some social capital were present things can be done. Afghanistan lacks both these. Customary and traditional justice was incompatible with Western beliefs. Afghanistan was a large challenge as a 3 year deal emerging from the Bonn agreement. The promise of democracy has not been realised there. Progress along Social and Political dimensions as well as Military has been disappointing.

Iraq and Afghanistan differ in many respects but there are similarities. Iraq was a “republic of fear” with extensive psychological damage caused to the society. Children informed on parents and institutionalized violence existed. Disputes in Afghanistan are resolved by local elders rather than the formal State justice structure. There is a universe of dark matter that drives the operation of these countries.

Justice has immense scope. Western values drive the forms of Western laws. Other values would and do drive other laws. Descriptive Law like Sharia allows greater interpretation. The Washington consensus is too light on Justice versus Liberty and Freedom for its own good. Trade needs trust to work. Promoting Equity in trade will support the development of stability.

Dave Davis's theme was *Through A Glass Darkly - Measuring Policy In Conflict Environments* (MPICE, pronounced “EM-PEACE”). The terms used in such analyses do matter: The words for Near Term Objectives and Long Term Goals blur in Russian. The meanings of Justice both as a normative value and a means of conflict resolution lead to confusion. MPICE addresses an essential but previously ignored area. No means of formal assessment existed 5 years ago. MPICE seeks to aid the sharing of assessments although absence of trust is the main reason for hiding these. MPICE uses a Hierarchy of Goal, Indicator then Measure for each of five sectors. The value of MPICE's metrics lies not the numbers shown, but in the insight generated.

On Monday night *Gene Visco* introduced a discussion on the *Morality of War*. There has been a move away from the era of holy wars. Codification occurred through World War I with a collapse and rebuilding during World War II in a conflict between Just War theory, realism and pacifism. Current United Nations laws of armed conflicts cover more of the conduct of war than the justification for use of weapons.

A Just War implies that we should be fighting rather than how we are fighting. Even if fought well a war is unjust if fought without due cause. Behaviour towards non-combatants is of interest to both Western and Islamic authors. The cultural context of belief systems drives the range of accepted behaviours as conventions. The State's behaviour is not the same

as that of individuals and nor is the morality of acts of organisations. The state is a fiction - Individuals with power make things happen.

The second day began with a view of the *Future Of Sudan* from *Dr. Mike Baranick* of the National Defense University obtained from the model “Senturion” which generates possible futures. In Senturion stakeholders interact and influence each other. In Sudan, which has never been stable, the Bashir regime and the Chinese influence, the presence of over twenty rebel groups and some five million displaced people present a complex situation. Assuming that no more oil is handled in the North Senturion suggests that the North’s GDP stagnates and is overtaken by the South in 2012.

Senturion findings suggest that a third civil war with global economic effects via oil supply on China and US should be considered. Senturion minimizes Subject Matter Experience bias and integrates views of interagency experts thereby providing insights into complex decision-making. Visual representation is a useful way to see the relationships. Ultimately the people in these drive the future.

Fatima Hadji considered the view *Through A Different Lens* in her description of the umbrella of Islamic culture and its lens to the aspects of peace processes of transformation and conflict resolution. Perceptions of symptoms and triggers of conflict rely on underlying causes, where everything impacts on everything else. Historical Societal and Economic background produce drivers for violence.

The Islamic revival in Iraq can be interpreted as giving power to the powerless. Islamic thought has some overall links but many splintered views. Competing economic and political interests support development of groups with robust structures and deep suspicion of other groups especially in other countries.

Michael Volpe discussed the relationship of *Private Security Companies* (PSCs) and USAID. The accountability of PSCs was a concern whilst they fulfil their roles such as security of individuals and bases. Security is necessary but insufficient alone to guarantee success. Humanitarian Assistance tasks such as those in Darfur and Rwanda put developers at risk. In Afghanistan Provincial Reconstruction Teams were doing in-conflict not post-conflict nation building. No neutrality is possible in a conflict. The use of a security force causes a conflict of norms with the various organizations on ends justifying means.

Anders Christenson and *Dr. Ted Woodcock*, also representing *Dr. John T Dockery*, described a *systemic approach for fully integrated civilian-military policy and decision making*. Dedicating this to *Peter Segerhammar* they reviewed Technical state of art solutions, particularly STRATMAS. They noted that the Military does not understand civilian or economic concerns and that we all use models both implicit and explicit.

It is believed that the policy cycle has not been modelled with Systems Dynamics before this activity. Such models are needed to assess the Efficiency of Governance, political affection and disaffection with indicators and warnings and approximate reasoning indicating situations requiring alert and response.

Gene Visco presented *Analysis of Effectiveness of Counter Insurgency (COIN) Tactics and Strategies* by *Christopher A Lawrence* from *The Dupuy Institute*. Analysis of Iraq suggested that an Insurgent force would be of 20-60,000 strong, causing 5,000 to 10, 000

American casualties over a 10-year duration. The Depuy database contains some 83 post-World War II conflicts.

Factors considered include the terrain, rules of engagement, level of brutality, nature of insurgencies, force ratios, burden, sanctuaries, border control, resettlement, Government Type and elections, and Force ratio. The burden includes the cost of COIN and insurgency. Force ratio stands out as a key to success with the insurgency cause and what actions are undertaken to remove the driver of the insurgency's support. Prediction can not be done safely although analysis can suggest the ranges for uncertainty. Non-linearity and varying conditions frustrate anything more precise than this.

Skip Cole of the *US Institute of Peace (USIP)* described new means to access the *world of models*, proposing that if you wish to correct a false view you are changing the underpinning model which generated it. This implies that education is about developing the models in people's minds. The USIP Framework for success has 5 different aspects: Security, Law, Stable society, Economy and social well being. All end states all achieved at the same time provide success in the quest for viable peace.

H Roy Williams discussed *Humanitarian Outcomes*. The clarity of humanitarian outcomes is limited. Humanitarian organisations tend to view or define reality to match what they can manage. This can make them unwitting instruments for local factions. The aim of the International Federation of the Red Cross to save lives is good for individuals but not necessarily for organisations. The UNHCR in 1995 was manipulated into support of ethnic cleansing by the threat of the greater evil of loss of life if people were not moved out of the area.

The selection of local people to be beneficiaries and translators by Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) has huge impact on those individuals' roles within their own societies. The NGO can leave whilst the participants can not. The real framework of operations is often not understood allowing stovepipe building initiatives. In some situations there were no good guys. What individuals do differs from what organisations do. Their motivation is their own and is not aggregatable.

Humanitarian Assistance is a noble concept but USAID supplies have the logo displayed: this invites partisan perspectives. There is a fiction of impartiality: Special Interest Groups mix advocacy and impartiality. It should be remembered that the civilian area represents one trillion dollars of business to be competed over. Changes in power relationships lead to resistance by vested interests.

Commercial involvement in society is a major driver. Wal-Mart has huge logistics and intelligence capabilities as evidenced by their moving stocks of Strawberry Pop Tarts to enable stock moves to get back into New Orleans after hurricane Katrina. This followed experience in Mostar where Poptarts were moved into a war zone, as the best comfort food. These proved useful as a lever with parents because their kids loved them.

The comprehensive approach of military implies that more co-operation is needed between military and civilian organisations. The three parallel *Workshop Sessions* considered *Frameworks for Strategic and Operational Analysis*.

Capability based planning has great potential to improve homeland security. Basic principles proposed were uncertainty on nature of events and details, harmonization between cylinders of excellence, risk reduction, and holistic (ie whole system) approaches linking inputs to outputs.

Managerial analysis covers future capability and capacity requirements while concurrently addressing current operational and planning needs of stakeholder communities. Organizational analysis develops a framework and networks that recognize the challenges from a joint perspective. For this a common language is essential.

The military have their own culture with great national harmonizing and enabling capabilities if their links to the politicians are enhanced. Dealing with other departments is still a classic stovepipe situation, requiring lead to lead contact then communication up and down their hierarchies. Interactions need to be at all levels.

Taking a principled approach may overcome the “turf” of opinion. The collaboration jigsaw relies on Senior Management Support and Training to get the processes going and to develop capability then Transformation of Resistance to change.

- *Group 1* developed a strategic outlook of successful stability operation interventions. It represented stabilization and reconstruction based on a strategic “Keg” model whose staves were Governance participation, Economics infrastructure, Justice and rule of law, Security and Humanitarian status. The shortest staff of the keg sets the maximum level that the keg will hold.
- *Group 2* considered strategic framework uniting strategic operational and tactical levels. Senior Leaders and front line operators are very busy. Middle level resistance exists and falls back on bureaucratic accountability, responsibility, etc.

The enablers to analysis are common understanding of threats, problems, scenarios, a Target Capability List and Capability Activity Process Flow.

Social capital is a mitigator of otherwise insurmountable challenges. The success of the All Hazards Risk Assessment depends on the 21 departments’ lower tier people seeing a need to sort this out.

Ownership of problems becomes fragmented with accountability remaining vertical.

Measuring outcomes and linking these to inputs, especially budgets, is a major challenge, because any Society is a complex input-output system, with some factors outside of control of Policy implementation. Models offer a means to link inputs to outputs to outcomes, for the education of public, government officials, senior bureaucrats, as well as operations analysts. The models offer evidence of proof of concepts. Exercises and other fora share information, build trust and understanding. The analysts still need high profile champions.

- *Group 3* addressed the Challenges in Stability Operations. It considered Stakeholder misunderstandings, Overinstitutionalization, lack of personnel continuity as well as unpredictable and complex environments.

Building ad hoc capability as an individual is like building a habit. It means practicing how to think quickly drawing widely on experience. The Cornwallis Group is “An ad hoc method in itself” which should seek to expand its application.

Dr. Kip Thomas addressed *Boston Biomedical Crisis Management*. He described the scope of wicked problems as reduced by allocating the risks which make them wicked. Analysis is a deliberative process to understand the risk and engage the population. Decisions in US are often ill-informed, through lack of communication chains from managers of individual problems yet there is progress. Situational Awareness for commander in Iraq is recognised as including social behavioural issues.

Wicked Problems are based on human nature. The Cornwallis Group began from the “Analytic approaches to the future of conflict” as the prospective battles on North German Plain and in Korea faded from any likely future. Computer support now enables the analysts to address the “mushy” problems which confront us, including cultural conflict and the counter insurgency of ideas. OR and social scientists are well positioned to address these problems especially in structuring them.

Dave Mason presented a study on *Strategic Air Lift Risks*. Two C-17s providing assured airlift for Canadian Forces were acquired as a result of the 2005 election when the Conservatives came into government. A study on this followed using a risk based method, considering numbers of personnel deployed and the types of operation. The Future Security Environment was represented by countries with a high estimated probability of conflict over next 20 years. Risk categories considered included Timeliness, Threat, Accessibility, Flexibility, Legal, Political, Foreign Policy, Availability and Impact to headlines. These acted as filters and exposed subtle differences and effects between the options.

Analysis acted as a go-between for airforce cultures with divergent views on the available solutions.

Dr. Paul Chouinard spoke on *Meta Organizational Collaboration And Decision Making In The Context Of Domestic Operations*. He considered Social and Cognitive behaviours to explain how different organisations collaborate without losing their own identities. This supports *Governing by Network: The New Shape of The public sector* by William D Eggers.

Neglected areas include social process, governance structures, and interface dynamics. “Boundary spanners” are those whose activities span different areas. Real Collaboration happens on margins of established institutions.

Considering Collaboration we need Collaborative Information Environments. The analytical community needs a language with a regular vocabulary.

The test for any communication system is how well its consumers understand regardless of the sophistication of its communication media. The design of Geographic Information Systems demonstrated this by relying on naïve rather than sophisticated representations.

Social capital includes a shared way of approaching problems as well as physical means such as uniforms.

Dr. Kevin “Kip” Thomas and Dr. Peter R Bergethon addressed the need for *cross discipline Awareness and Interoperability in the first responder and emergency management communities*. For the current state of the disaster preparedness, interoperability allows exchange and use of information. Cross situational awareness involves social, political, organizational and cultural systems. Case based protocols become too constrained to be resilient. In the Military environment the approach linking fielded force with information dominance is well established. Civilian organisations lack such broadly accepted approaches and models.

The brain constructs internal models moving from neophyte to expert through repetition, also generating bias through pattern recognition. Pedagogy may be considered as developing expert mental models from naive ones. Mental models are revised through education.

It is essential to cross train because the language of the individual communities will not change but they will at least be capable of translating each other’s views into their own terms.

Points arising from *addresses after the Company of Good Cheer Dinner* by *Ambassadors Bill Farrand and Tim Carney, Gene Visco, George Rose and Dave Davis* included the importance of addressing Fear to allow Reconciliation between the groups. A key channel was through calming the mothers in these societies. Listening to putative friends and dedicated enemies was not only necessary but often a success in itself. Analysts should feel humility as they realise the scope and complexity of the problems of social policy which they seek to address.

The emergent theme was of the importance of justice and the need to link up the stakeholders for a society. Thinking broader requires accepted ways to communicate. Analysis in support of Policy exists to assist others yet they may not be aware of the potential available to them.

Cornwallis Groups close with a *Roundtable* discussion where each participant gives a view on what they have learned and suggests changes and improvements for future Cornwallis activities. The following are un-attributable comments from the participants, grouped into themes:

Language has again come to the fore as an issue. There needs to be a common language to express the ideas of an overall theory. The ideas are often understood by the various communities but each has their own words to describe these. Linking front line crises to a framework connecting theory to practical is essential to all practitioners in all areas.

Syndicate sessions catalyze ideas in a small group so are great to get people talking, and to build a team. Although it did seem to some that nobody understood the questions as put they still produced complementary approaches. The groups seemed to need something tangible to focus them eg a future Cornwallis plan, or a specific subject. Clarity is essential on discussion area to allow group to get to grips with the subject.

Cornwallis is a *community*, with some regular participants but also welcomes new arrivals. Even after 13 appearances at Cornwallis participants always learn, from the new topic, new people and new information. For the repeat participants it is easy to take and ask questions. The small groups encourage the new faces to participate. The papers may benefit from making the benefits achievable clear in terms of what and who will enjoy these. Using analyses to prepare for crises is one such benefit. The roles of the non-military and military participants were complementary. Speakers from the development agencies gave great insights into these communities, which are very different from those of the analysts. Getting more inputs from these other groups would be advantageous.

The Cornwallis Group is always about the people. It is a group of friends as well as a professional development opportunity. Return visits break the barriers down between the attendees. Of the 22 participants remaining at the close of Cornwallis XIII 10 were new to 2008. Most attendees were from the US then the UK. People from military organisations numbered 16 compared with 12 non-military. Papers presented numbered 7 from new authors versus 3 by veterans. Participation could be a bit broader without compromising the Cornwallis style. Jurisdictions are not respected by the enemy or nature so this is a great benefit. Syndicate discussions advance the research agenda.

The *topics* were diverse and yet relevant across the communities represented. The focus on Institutions was striking. Theoretical and experiential are both covered. The Cornwallis proceedings need better and broader dissemination. Cornwallis needs better visibility especially via its website where new technologies make it possible to interact. Reading the papers in advance would allow a sense of the whole before arrival. The invited papers have great value by giving different perspectives. The scope of operations is complex and we do not have the great model of everything.

On *format* speakers should leave time for critique and discussion in presentations. The *next Cornwallis* needs to make representations lively and approachable despite the niches represented. Slides need to be readable so brevity and clarity are prized as are the anecdotes which tie the audience's mind to the intellectual constructs presented. The time for discussion following most presentations is essential and well worth spending.

Suggestions for *improvements to the website* included:

- Advertisement of the next Cornwallis Group meeting well in advance.
- Cornwallis alumni.
- Membership of the Group.
- E-journal.
- A snapshot of what's new as an update, perhaps 6-monthly.
- Bylaws.
- Behind the firewall for the membership:
 - The slides and proceedings of past Cornwallis Group meetings.
 - The outlines of the papers about to be presented.

The more general the **topic** the greater the potential pool of participants, provided that they recognise the relevance to them and their sponsors. New topics suggested included:

- The capacity of the other to do OA on you.

- Crisis Management.
- “Better than ad hoc” analysis.

Cornwallis is unique. Time-wise Cornwallis is expensive despite good accommodation especially the three and a half days white space which is hard to find in many calendars.

Creating a *Cornwallis Society* would make the group sustainable beyond the Cornwallis meetings. Cornwallis would benefit from a constitution.

Attending the Cornwallis Group is an investment in Social Capital. It reinforces existing contacts and establishes new ones. Technically it gives understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of approaches in use giving confidence in their application through the feeling that the participants are either on the right track or lost in good company.

As suggested by *Ronnie Shephard*, the founder of ISMOR, papers on what their authors have done or are doing tend to offer more value than what they may be about to do. All participants were Subject Matter Experts. Cornwallis needs to have a positive image to other people who can benefit from the skills of those experts.

The friendly welcome always makes the meeting a magical week. *Terri Tidd* and *Heidi Davis*, the administrators of the conference were congratulated for the excellent hospitality enjoyed by all participants.

The *best paper of Cornwallis XIII* was voted as *Michael Miklaucic's* piece on *Justice – the missing factor in the equation*. On receiving his award Michael noted that the relationships always drive policy and that the analysts supporting policy take on Machiavelli's role – they act as the advisers to their Princes.

CONCLUSION

The Cornwallis Group and the analyses which it proposes are at a boundary. The Group needs to consolidate its position, especially in the virtual world, and disseminate the progress which it has made to those who could benefit from it and sponsor further endeavour.

Many points raised at Cornwallis XIII are not new, yet they remain important to the direction of efforts to improve the state of the world. This would support the claim of Cornwallis to be a small part of “a force for good.”