

# Assessing Iraq's Future ... and Afghanistan's as well!

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# Agenda

- The Role of Political Landscapes, Political Power Concentration Curves, and Key Societal Variables
- Assessing the Combined Impact of All 79 Iraq Study Group (ISG) Report Recommendations
- The 30% Solution for the Future of Iraq
- Saddam was ‘On the Cusp!’
- “a profoundly new strategy with four fundamental pillars”: A Possible Way Forward in Afghanistan ...

# Some Initial Thoughts ...

- The Iraq Study Group (ISG) made 79 recommendations for the future of Iraq; all recommendations were to be implemented as a complete group, no exploitation of low-hanging fruit ...
- **No simple way existed to assess the combined impact of the 79 recommendations because they were all different and could not just be added together, a new approach was needed ...**
- The briefing describes development and use of a modeling framework to assess the combined impact of the 79 ISG recommendations
- Effect of each recommendation was assessed in terms of its impact on four influences or dimensions
  - In-Power and Out-of-Power Segment Strength, Balance of Coercive Force, and External Influence
- Assessments were used as inputs to Political Landscape and Political Power Concentration Models

# Some Results of the Analysis ...

- **Increases in Iraq Government Stability Could be Achieved Based on Implementing all 79 ISG Recommendations at at least the 30% level**
- A Surge of U.S. Troops in Parallel with Political Changes would provide increased likelihood of success
- **Dual Sovereignty should be avoided in Iraq**
- **Conditions in Iraq in 2007 appeared to resemble conditions in Russia in the summer of 1917 after the February 1917 Revolution**
  - “Three Outcomes were Theoretically Possible ...” Compromise, Counter-Revolution. and Revolution ...
- **Saddam Hussein was “On the Cusp” after Operation Desert Storm ...**
- **The four key factors of the Iraq Model resemble the ‘four fundamental pillars’ in the new policy for Afghanistan ...**

*“There is no magic formula to solve the problems of Iraq. However, there are actions that can be taken to improve the situation and protect American interests ... No one can guarantee that any course of Action in Iraq at this point will stop sectarian warfare, growing violence, or a slide towards chaos.”*

James Baker III, Lee Hamilton, *et al.*  
*The Iraq Study Group Report*, 2006, p. ix.

# An Integrated Framework was needed ...


**Some form of overall framework where the impact of each recommendation could be assessed in terms of its impact on key properties of the overall political and societal environment in Iraq was needed to undertake analysis of the ISG recommendations**

*Recommendation 1 (ISG Report p. 45): The United States, working with the Iraqi government should launch the comprehensive New Diplomatic Offensive to deal with the problems of Iraq and of the region. This new diplomatic offensive should be launched before December 31, 2005.*

*Recommendation 50 (ISG Report p. 78): The entire Iraqi National Police should be transferred to the Ministry of Defense where the police commando units will become part of the new Iraqi Army.*


*Recommendation 79 (ISG Report p. 96): The CIA should provide additional personnel in Iraq to develop and train an effective intelligence service and to build a counterterrorism intelligence center that will facilitate intelligence-led counterterrorism efforts.*

# The Spectrum of Model Types



The spectrum of combat model types represent different levels of operational realism, degrees of abstraction, and convenience and accessibility (modified and redrawn from Taylor, 1983)

# Process of Applying the Impact Assessment Framework (IAF) to Results of Iraq Study Group Report Recommendations



IAF supports combined analysis of all 79 Iraq Study Group recommendations

Overall effect on Four Key Variables calculated

Impact of full and partial implementation of ALL 79 recommendations assessed

Selective implementation avoided: no 'low hanging fruit' permitted by ISG


# The Impact Assessment Framework: Key Variables

- *Impact Assessment involves defining values of Four Key Variables:*
  - *The Strength of the In-Power Segment (IPS)* represents the power of the government.
  - *The Strength of the Out-of-Power Segment (OPS)* represents the combined power of the opposition.
  - *The Balance of Coercive Force (BCF)* reflects strength of military forces under the control of the government compared with those controlled by the opposition.
  - *The External Influences (EXT)* represent the level of external factors.


# The Impact Assessment Framework: Political Power Concentration Curves, and Political Landscapes

- *Political Power Concentration Curves* represent the political conditions within a country of interest
  - The government entity (IPS) is challenged for control of State Power by the opposition (OPS)
  - *A Dual Sovereignty* involves creation of two competing foci of political power
- *The Political Landscape* represents overall political conditions in a country of interest
  - Gradual (evolutionary) or sudden (revolutionary or counter-revolutionary) political transitions can take place.
- Catastrophe Theory-based Methods for Political Landscape and Power Concentration Curve construction

# Four Key Societal Influences



Societal conditions in a country of interest such as Iraq are expressed in terms of the values of four key societal variables referred to as the strength of the In- and Out-of-Power segments (IPS and OPS, respectively), the Balance of Coercive Force (BCF), and External Influences (EXT) acting on Iraq



Assessment of assumed initial conditions in Iraq before application of the 79 ISG recommendations in terms of the IPS, OPS, BCF, and EXT variables for Iraq

Assessment of the potential impact of each of the 79 ISG recommendations on the societal conditions in Iraq involved estimating the possible level of the impact and assigning numerical values deemed appropriate to those levels.

Impact	Severe	Major	Moderate	Minor
IPS	1.0	<b>0.1</b>	0.01	0.001
OPS	1.0	0.1	<b>0.01</b>	0.001
BCF	1.0	0.1	0.01	<b>0.001</b>
EXT	1.0	<b>-0.1</b>	0.01	0.001

# Assessing Severe, Major, Moderate, and Minor Impacts

- Severe Impacts are assumed to cause a change in the value of societal variables values of the order of 1.0 unit, that is the assumed change would be equal to 100% of the assumed values of the existing IPS and OPS variables (1.0 and 1.0 units, respectively), and 50% of the value of the existing EXT variable (-2.0 units), for initial conditions in Iraq before implementation of the Iraq Study Group recommendations, for example.
- Major Impacts have been assessed as causing a change in societal variables in the order of 0.1 units in the existing values of the IPS, OPS, BCF, and EXT variables. A 0.1 unit change would represent a 10% change in the assumed initial 1.0 unit values of the IPS and OPS entities, for example.
- Moderate Impacts have been assessed as causing a change of the order of 0.01 units in the existing values of the IPS, OPS, BCF, and EXT variables. A 0.01 unit change would represent a 1% change in the assumed 1.0 unit value of the IPS and OPS variables, for example.
- Minor Impacts have been assessed as causing a 0.001 unit change in the values of the IPS, OPS, BCF, and EXT variables, or a 0.1%, change in the assumed 1.0 unit values of the IPS and OPS variables, for example.

# The Iraq Study Group Report

	IPS ISG	IPS Init	IPS Tot	OPS ISG	OPS Init	OPS Tot
<b>TOTAL (100%)</b>	<b>2.062</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>3.062</b>	<b>-1.706</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>-0.7</b>
<b>50% Implementation</b>	<b>1.031</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2.031</b>	<b>-0.853</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0.15</b>
<b>40% Implementation</b>	<b>0.825</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1.825</b>	<b>-0.682</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0.32</b>
<b>30% Implementation</b>	<b>0.619</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1.619</b>	<b>-0.512</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0.49</b>
<b>25% Implementation</b>	<b>0.516</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1.516</b>	<b>-0.427</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0.57</b>
<b>20% Implementation</b>	<b>0.412</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1.412</b>	<b>-0.341</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0.66</b>
<b>10% Implementation</b>	<b>0.206</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1.206</b>	<b>-0.171</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0.83</b>
<b>5% Implementation</b>	<b>0.103</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1.103</b>	<b>-0.085</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0.91</b>

→ 30%: IPS much stronger than OPS

→ 5%: Almost equal IPS and OPS Strength

	BCF ISG	BCF Init	BCF Tot	EXT ISG	EXT Init	EXT Tot
<b>TOTAL (100%)</b>	<b>-1.679</b>	<b>-0.1</b>	<b>-1.78</b>	<b>-1.019</b>	<b>-2</b>	<b>-3.019</b>
<b>50% Implementation</b>	<b>-0.84</b>	<b>-0.1</b>	<b>-0.94</b>	<b>-0.51</b>	<b>-2</b>	<b>-2.51</b>
<b>40% Implementation</b>	<b>-0.672</b>	<b>-0.1</b>	<b>-0.77</b>	<b>-0.408</b>	<b>-2</b>	<b>-2.408</b>
<b>30% Implementation</b>	<b>-0.504</b>	<b>-0.1</b>	<b>-0.6</b>	<b>-0.306</b>	<b>-2</b>	<b>-2.306</b>
<b>25% Implementation</b>	<b>-0.42</b>	<b>-0.1</b>	<b>-0.52</b>	<b>-0.255</b>	<b>-2</b>	<b>-2.255</b>
<b>20% Implementation</b>	<b>-0.336</b>	<b>-0.1</b>	<b>-0.44</b>	<b>-0.204</b>	<b>-2</b>	<b>-2.204</b>
<b>10% Implementation</b>	<b>-0.168</b>	<b>-0.1</b>	<b>-0.27</b>	<b>-0.102</b>	<b>-2</b>	<b>-2.102</b>
<b>5% Implementation</b>	<b>-0.084</b>	<b>-0.1</b>	<b>-0.18</b>	<b>-0.051</b>	<b>-2</b>	<b>-2.051</b>

→ 30%: Strong pro IPS BCF; Larger EXT


→ 5%: Weak pro IPS BCF; Smaller EXT

The assessed impact of ISG recommendations on the IPS, OPS, BCF, and EXT societal variables for Iraq. The overall situation is obtained by adding those impacts to the initial societal variable values assessed for Iraq.

**Construction of Political Power Concentration Curves shows that Implementation of ALL 79 ISG Recommendations at the 30% level could stabilize the Iraqi Government**

The Butterfly Catastrophe is used to model the impact of all 79 ISG recommendations on the overall political situation in Iraq

Catastrophe Name	Number of Dimensions		
	Control	Behavior	Overall
Fold	1	1	2
Cusp	2	1	3
Swallowtail	3	1	4
Butterfly	4	1	5
Hyperbolic Umbilic	3	2	5
Elliptic Umbilic	3	2	5
Parabolic Umbilic	4	2	6



The Political Landscape construct represents interactions between the government or In-Power (IPS) segment and the opposition or Out-of-Power (OPS) segment of a society


Use of all available dimensions can support overall control and domination. As an analogy consider land warfare with and without air combat involvement

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TIFF (LZW) decompressor  
are needed to see this picture.

The Political Power  
Concentration Curve  
can have two peaks  
(representing some  
form of Dual  
Sovereignty) or a  
single peak under  
different conditions


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Large inwardly-  
directed External  
Influences (EXT) can  
create conditions that  
create a Power  
Concentration Curve  
with three peaks  
representing some  
form of Triple  
Sovereignty



Assessed conditions  
in Iraq before  
implementation of  
ALL 79 Iraq Study  
Group  
Recommendations  
suggest the  
existence of three  
foci of political  
power and the  
possibility of  
multiple ways  
forward for the  
country


Implementation of all 79 of the ISG recommendations at the 30% level would produce a relatively stable Iraqi government with marginal challenges




# Notional Impact of a Surge in U.S. Force Levels for Iraq

In an address to the Nation on January 10 2007, President Bush announced the deployment of an additional 20,000 American troops to Iraq. He stated that “the vast majority of them—five brigades—will be deployed to Baghdad. These troops will work alongside Iraqi units and be embedded in their formations.”

“Our troops will have a well-defined mission: to help the Iraqis clear and secure neighborhoods, to help them protect the local population, and to help them ensure that the Iraqi forces left behind are capable of providing the security that Baghdad needs.”



Impact of a medium-level surge of U.S. troops on the concentration of political power within Iraq. The initial curve (lower panel) changes to reflect an increase in Political Power Concentration for the IPS entity (upper panel)




A medium surge of U.S. troops coupled and increase in government strength and decrease in opposition strength is more effective than an increase in force strength alone. The Political Power Concentration curve now has a distinct single peak (upper panel) reflecting a measure of security for the government (IPS) entity.

## “Three Outcomes were Theoretically Possible ...”


In his *History of the Russian Revolution*, Trotsky (1980, for example) identifies three different paths or outcomes that might be followed by Russia in the period between the February Revolution of 1917 that overthrew the Tsar, and the October Revolution of 1917 that overthrew the Kerensky Regime and ushered in the era of the Soviet Union. These three outcomes include the following possibilities.

1. Compromise: A compromise between the warring political factions within Russia.
2. Counter-Revolution: Some form of counter-revolution against the results of the February Revolution, in which elements of the old political structures or an elite sub-group possibly formed from within the government itself were able to seize political power.
3. Revolution: Some form of Revolution where the Bolsheviki, and perhaps others, would triumph over their opponents and form a new type of government.




The middle sheet of the Political Landscape can serve as a starting point for counter-revolution, compromise, and revolutionary activities related to trajectories that can be identified with Trotsky's "Three Outcomes" (After: Woodcock)

# Three Ways Forward for Iraq: Compromise




One Iraq Future could involve the formation of a compromise between the government and its opposition

# Three Ways Forward for Iraq: Counter- Revolution



A Second Iraq Future could involve a counter-revolution where an elite sub-group might seize State Power and overthrow the existing democratically-elected structure

# Three Ways Forward for Iraq: Revolution




A Third Iraq future could involve a revolution in which the current democratic conditions were overthrown by the opposition

*Saddam Hussein exercised a very special kind of power. He had become an institution unto himself, one virtually without checks. His leadership was related to the sentiments of the broad mass of Iraqis in a complicated yet resilient way as proven by the latter course of the [Iraq-Iran] war when the initial confidence had ebbed away. ...*


Samir al-Khalil, *Republic of Fear*, 1990, p. 271.

Analysis of the impact of Operation *Desert Storm* on the position of Saddam Hussein shows that he was “On The Cusp” and could have been overthrown with relatively minor effort ...



The impact of a dominant Saddam Hussein Regime before Operation *Desert Storm* (upper panel) compared with the assumed conditions in Iraq in 2007 before implementation of any ISG recommendations (lower panel). The assumed condition in Iraq is represented by the location of the State Point disc on the control plane relatively far from the pointed or cusp line where sudden political transitions could occur

# Saddam Hussein was “On the Cusp ...”






Operation *Desert Storm* severely reduced the political domination of Iraq by Saddam Hussein. Political power that had been concentrated in the regime (lower panel) appears to have been dispersed after the conflict (upper panel). The State Point has moved close to the region of the political landscape where sudden political transitions, such as regime overthrow, can take place

*Many individuals use the metaphor of 'being on the cusp' to represent the potential for changes to take place. The Political Landscape shown in the previous Figure is an actual realization of that metaphor.*

*In this case, the regime of Saddam Hussein is literally located very close to the Cusp Line. Very small changes in the relative strength of the government and opposition and/or in the balance of coercive force could lead to revolutionary overthrow of the regime.*

NOTIONAL CONDITIONS IN IRAQ IN LATE 2006/EARLY 2007 BEFORE ISG IMPLEMENTATION



External Influence (1) = -2.00; (2) = -0.20  
Balance of Coercive Force (1) = -0.10; (2) = -2.00

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
Assessed values of the conditions in Iraq in late 2006-early 2007 (upper panel) compared with the assessed conditions in Iraq before Operation Desert Storm (lower panel).

“... ISAF must also adopt a profoundly new strategy with four fundamental pillars:

- develop a significantly more effective and larger ANSF with radically expanded coalition force partnering of every echelon. [BCF]
- prioritize responsive and accountable governance—that the Afghan people find acceptable—to be on par with, and integral to, delivering security. [IPS]
- gain the initiative and reverse the insurgency’s momentum as the first imperative in a series of temporal stages. [OPS]
- Prioritize available resources to those critical areas where the population is most threatened.” [EXT]

General Stanley A. McChrystal, 2009  
COMISAF’S INITIAL ASSESSMENT

Report to the US Secretary of Defense and the President of the United States



Afghanistan: Initial Conditions with no external influences, weak government, strong opposition, and military force balance in favor of the opposition create a Low concentration of political power

Increased External Influences can Create Political Compromise conditions

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Focus of government power




Political Compromise

Introduction of large resources or external influences (EXT) can Create conditions for political compromise to emerge in Afghanistan

A small focus of political power associated with the Afghanistan government also occurs and can form a basis for the emergence of a stronger government entity due to changes in the values of the IPS, OPS, and BCF influences

AFGHANISTAN: FURTHER REDUCTION IN EXTERNAL INFLUENCES AND INCREASED BCF



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Afghanistan: Increased external influences, stronger government, weaker opposition, and military force balance in favor of the government create a high concentration of political power

Political Power Concentration Curves and Political Landscapes provide a new representation of the impact of political, military, and external influences on political stability and change.

“ ... a profoundly new strategy with four fundamental pillars ...”

**Political leaders who do not use all four dimensions of the Political Landscape will be defeated by opponents who do ...**